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CHAP'l"'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. John Grote's life 
i. Sketch of his life 
John Grote will remain best known by reason of the thought 
formulated in the Exploratio Philosophica, or Rough Notes on Modern 
Intellectual Scl.ence. To the philosophical world of his c'.rffi time he 
vlas well known as the teacher vTho ably held the chair of Moral Philos-
ophy in the University of Cambridge from 1855 until the year of his 
death, le66, in succassion to the Knightbridge Professor , William 
Whewell whose Philosophy of Science is the subject of at least one 
chapter of the Exploratio Philosophica. 
Grote's birthplace was Beckenham in Kent , and the date, May 5, 
1813. The influence of his devout mother may have been responsible 
for his leaning toward the clerical profession; he eventually became 
an ordained minister in the Church of England . 
He studied at Cambridge for the f irst time when he entered 
Trinity College in 1831. Previous to this, his education was carried 
on privately vdth a vie1., to employment in the civil service in India. 
After spending four years i n Cambridge, he graduated in classics in 
1835, and became a Fellow of Trinity College in 1837. For eight years 
longer he continued study in Trinity. Next followed his rather brief 
career in the ministry before becoming professor i n Cambridge. He 
2 
was ordained as a deacon in 1842, and minister (or 'priest,' in the 
Church of England) two years later * Between 1844 and 1847, Grote 
preached for several of his clerical friends and continued his resi-
dence i n college until 1845. Foreign travel formed certain interludes 
from stu~. After 1847 he became curate of Wareside, near Ware. Here 
he was rector until called to Cambridge in 1855. From the middle of 
the year 1847, Grote lived near Cambridge and he continued there to 
the end of his life. 
Professor W. R. Sorley1 classifies John Grote as a rational and 
religious philosopher, and states that though he was a contemporary of 
Mill, he was not affected by him. Rather, he criticized Mill's episte-
mology and ethics, and gave what he consldered a necessary supplement 
to each. Anyone who reads Grote ls work entitled, An Examination of 
the Utilitarian Philosophy must conclude that he was an independent 
thinker, and yet he appears to have been greatly influenced by 
Immanuel Kant as the ~loratio Philosophica reveals. 2 
ii. His brothers 
It is interesting to notice that a brother, Arthur Grote (1814-
1886), was in the employ of the Bengal civil service after he passed 
from Haileybury . A like task appeared to be the ambition of John 
Grote before the death of his father, which circumstance altered pre-
vious plans. Another brother was the famed historian, George (the 
1 . Sorley, HEP, 264, 265. 
2. Cf . Chapter II, of this dissertation. 
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eldest of the f amily of ten sons and one daughter). George Grote, too, 
was not uninterested in philosophy; his works on Plato and Aristotle 
are well knmm. 
Moreover, the Grote family , especially C~orge Grote, was well ac-
quainted with John Stuart 1lill to whom George Grote was introduced by 
Ricardo , and whose writings became the object of John Grote's construe-
tive criticism. Mill introduced George Grote to Jeremy Bentham, and 
though George was not a member of 11 The Utilitarian Society" founded by 
J. -S. 1\.tfill, he, nevertheless , was i n sympathy with it. 1_,Jhen the society 
became altered, in name at least, to form a society in systematic read-
ing and study, George Grote donated the meeting-place . 
George Grote was one of the supporters of the new university pro-
jected by Henry Brougham, Thomas Campbell, and James 1\.tfill. London 
University, therefore, had its beginning. Bitter controversy was waged 
before this inst itution was founded, and a chief impetus for its inaugu-
ration may be seen in the follo\'>ring : 
wfill, with the approval of Bentham • • • resolved, in 1813, to 
start a 1\I<Jest London Lancasterian Institution' to educate ~11 
the children west of Temple Bar on unsectarian principles. 
iii. Relationship with Ellis 
It should be noted that much of the interest that Grote took in 
philosophy sprang from the stimulus supplied by Robert Leslie Ellis , 
a friend of his at the University for many years. Grote wrote an 
appreciation of Ellis4 in which he claims that Ellis gr eatly influenced 
3. DNB , 37(1894), 385. 
4 . CR, m (l872) , 56- 71. 
his life. Further information on just how Ellis made a strong im-
pression on Grote is novrhere to be found. Grote, however, does imply 
that he had very many conversations v-dth Ellis in ;.rhich Ellis seemed 
to insist on accuracy in thinking and expression. Moreover, other 
influences seem to be those which one makes on a close friend. The 
editors of The Contemporary Review5 make the following statement in 
connection with the article6 which Grote wrote: 
The friend who wrote this memoir, was laid by his (Ellis's) 
side in August , lS66, the last of a group of remarkable men, 
too early lost, and long to be remembered in Cambridge. 
Ellis held a fellowship at Cambridge for seven years, and was, 
up to the time of his death on May 12, lS59, in connection vdth the 
4 
university. The last four years of tenure of this fellowship coincided 
with the first four years of Grote's position as professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Cambridge. These were only a few of the years of a 
life-long friendship at Cambridge, where Ellis took up the study of 
law and carried out detailed research in Roman jurisprudence, while 
Grote continued his interest in philosophy. 
5. CR, II (1S72). 
6. CR, lac. cit . 
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2. Writings 
i. Writings enumerated 
Besides several volumes, Grote wrote numerous articles. Some of 
these articles are on specialized topics and will be discussedm the 
addenda at the close of this dissertation. The most important of 
Grote's writings is the one which presents the main tenets of his 
epistemology and metaphysics, the Exploratio Philosophica, Part I. 
Next in importance is Part II, posthumously edited by J. B. Mayor, 
his literary executor who was married to his adopted niece. Following 
in importance is An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy where 
Grote reveals his idealism. A Treatise on the Moral Ideals is next 
in significance. Here Grote's. roiscellaneous and loose notes are as-
sembled by Mayor . These reveal his affinity with Aristotle's summum 
bonum, and Plato 's idealism. The complete list , since it i s not ex-
tensive , of his known writings, may be given here: 
l. "Commemoration Sermon, " preached in Trinity College Chapel, 
December 15, 1g49. 
2. "Remarks on a Pamphlet by Mr. Shilleto entitled 1 Thucydides 
or Grote,' 11 1851. 
3. 110n the Dating of Roman Histor.r, 11 in the Journal of Classical 
and Sacred Philology, vol. 1, pp. 52-82. 
4. "On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names," in the Journal of 
Cl assical and Sacred Philology, vol. 11, pp. 257-270, 1855. 
5. "Old Es says and New" in Cambridge Essays , 1856. 
6. 11 A Few Words on Criticism a propos of the Saturday Review." 
An exposure of an attack made by the Saturday Revie1v on vJhewell' s 
Platonic Dialogues, 1861. 
7 . 11E..xamination of some portions of Dr. Lushington r s judgment 
in t he cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v. Wil iams, and Fendall 
v. Wilson, 11 in Essays and Revie~vs, 1862. 
B. 11A Few lflords en the New Educational Code." 1B62. 
9. ExploratioJhilosophica, Par t I , 1865 . 
10 . '~'That is Materialism, " in Macmillan ' s M2.gazine, 1e67 . 
Printed as chapters one, two, and three, in Part II , of 
Exploratio Philosophica . 
11. An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, 1870 . 
6 
12. 110n a Future State, 11 in The Contemporary Review (1871 ), vol. 18. 
13 . "Thought vs . Learning," in Good Words , December , 1B71 . 
4.. A small selection of sermons vras published by Messrs . Deighton 
in 1B72 . 
15 . "Memoir of (Robert) Leslie Ellis," published in The Contem-
Eorary RevievT, voL XIX, ,June, 1872 . 
16. "Papers on Glossology," published in Journ2.l of Philology, 
1872 and H~74 . 
17.. A Treatise on the Moral Ideals, lB76 . 
lB. 11Montaigne and Pascal, 11 published in The Contemporary RevievJ", 
July , 1877 . 
19 . "Imaginary Conversation between Mr . Grote and Socrates, " 
published in The Classical Review, March, 1889 . 
20 . "Discussion on the Utilitarian Basis of Plato's Republic," 
in The Classical Revi ew, 1889 . 
21 . Exploratio Philosophica , Part II; 1900.7 
7. Any other v1ri tings that may exist, apparently have not yet come 
to light ; there do not seem t o be any possibilities. Hi s chief viTitings 
as ~ell as some miscellaneous ones are discussed in this dissertation. 
ii. Remarks on writings 
The article concerning Richard s. Shilleto was an attempt to 
counteract an attack upon his brother, George Grote, the Greek his-
torian; Shilleto claimed that some of George Grote's statements con-
tradicted views presented by Thucydides. Besides this article and 
the 11 Conunemoration Sermon118 he published only one or two classical 
articles . After he was elected to succeed William Whewell as Knight-
bridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, in 1855, he wrote copiously, 
in the form of notes, the most of which \vere later incorporated by 
Mayor in E.."'{:ploratio Philosophica and A Treatise on the Moral Ideals. 
These notes were written more "'1-Tith a view toward clearing his own 
mind on various subjects than for any other purpose. He did not def-
initely decide to publish any of his writings till later. 
,.., 
I 
Articles 3 to 8, above, were Grote's only writings until he pro-
duced Ex.ploratio Philosophica, in 1865, a year before his death. This 
volume was hurriedly sent to press and became Part I, to ""~orhtch Grote 
wished to add Part II. Hm'lever, Part II was not edited till long 
after his death, in 1900 (and then only in a most unfinished form),' 
by Rev. Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, Grote 's literary executor and hus-
band of his adopted niece. Much of Part II of the Exploratio 
Philosophica was written by the year 1865. In 18?0; Mayor edited 
An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy written by Grote to 
8. After extensive search through the libraries of Boston and 
Harvard Universities, as well as the Boston Public Library, no trace 
whatsoever of this sermon could be found. · 
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clear up his ovm views on Utilitarianism, which is largely a detailed criti-
cism of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism. In 1876 there appeared A Treatise 
on the Moral Ideals to which Grote had not gi ven .a title . This volume is 
the product of his thought on ethical subjects vihich he decided to publish 
after An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, and was partially 
printed in 1863 . 
Grote seerns to have been respons ible for coining several new words which 
have begun to find their way into common use, for example, ' personalism' as 
a philosophic term 9 'relativism tlO ' nervicit~r tll ' hedonics tl2 and man~r 
' ' " ' ' ,, 
others . For example , though the Oxford dictionary states that ' relativism' 
wcs first used in 1885, Grote used it previous to 1876 in some unpublished 
paper ·~ entitled, "Relativism and Regulativism.nl3 He wrote papers "On Glosso:J:. 
ogyj " sorr.e of which appeared a few years later in 1872 and 1874 . Grote's ac-
curacy in questions of philology is the same as that shovm throughout all 
his writings and he probably i·Iill be remembered best for the distinction be-
t ween psychology and philosophy. His able criticism of contemporary char-
acters, such as William Vfuewell, Sir William Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, and 
others, was made to a great extent in the light of this clear distinction . 
iii . Additional information relating to circumstances 
under which writings were presented 
Moral fervor and sensitiveness were outstanding characteristics in 
Grote, and largely by reason of qualities such as these he attracted 
9. Grote, EP, I, 11+6. 
10. Grote, 91:• cit., p. 183. 
11. Grote, EP, II , 251~ . 
12. Grote, EUP, Chap . XI.. 
13 . Grote; TMI, vii. 
to himself the esteem of many people with whom he came into contact, 
especially in his private life . 
9 
In early years , Grote made a special study of history and was 
urged by his brother , George, in 1849, to make application for the 
chair of Modern Historf in Cambridge. However, Grote was unsuccessful 
in his application, and the office went to Sir James Stephen. Jor~ 
Grote vras not marri ed. 
3. Statement, and division, of the problem 
In this dissertation, the problem is to arrive at a critical 
estimate of t he writings or philosophic thought of John .Grote. This 
problem, in the first place, entails a presentation of the distinc-
tion which Grote made between ' phenomenalism ' and ' philosophy, ' and 
the var~ous shades of meaning of both. The problem becomes mainly an 
epistemological one and is closely connected with metaphysical con-
siderations. Grote, in treating of this subject, deals with some 
well-known figures in modern philosophy, who ~~11 be treated in the 
dissertat ion. 
It is designed that a distinction will be made between phenomenal 
reality and things in themselves . Also, it will be shown that there 
is a fundamental monism throughout Grote's epistemology where the two 
factors in any theory of knowledge, namely, 'philosophy ' and phenomena, 
are really only different ways of viewing the same reality . This is 
a major problem in the dissertation and is basic throughout all the 
ten chapters. But the first eight chapters are specially epistemolog-
10 
ical. The last two, dealing with personalism and idealism sho\'J a 
basic episterr~logical emphasis but are characterized by ideaiism. 
The problem in these last chapters is to show Grote's professed po-
sition in the history of philosophy and to show how it is related t o 
his 'philosophy ' and phenomenalism. What he means by these last t wo 
t erms will form the subject matter of the following tvm chapters, and 
l ess intensively , the other chapters of the dissertation. 
In order to make this present >'lork comprehensive of all the kno .. m 
writings of Grote, arti cles 1-lhich appeared in various periodicals are 
discussed; this part of the work appears at the end of the disserta-
tion, as addenda. 
4. Survey of sources and of previous work on the problem 
i. Sources 
a. Plato 
Examples of the early use of 'noumenon' appear .in the Republic 
and in the Parmenides, as a synonym for rational intuition. In early 
.>I Greek philosophy , ' phenomena ' meant the opposite of 'essences' or ov~ . 
Hence the early meaning of phenomena was that of a derived type of 
reality. 
b. Kant and other modern philosophers 
In Kant, a definite di stinction is made between ' phenomenon' and 
'noumenon.' It was he who instituted a veritable gold-mine of re-
search in t he distinctions and comments he makes upon the use of these 
ideas and horl they are related to reality. Kant greatly influenced 
11 
Grote, and was himself indirectly affected in his epistemology by such 
bifurcation as that presented in the Two Worlds theory of Plato . 
ii. Previous \'rork on the problem 
In carrying out his discussion of phenomena, as he contrasts it 
with what he calls ' philosophy," 'mind,' ' spirit, ' or 'consciousness,' 
Grote is carried into a systematic criticism of the positions of many 
philosophers who do not adhere to the distinctions made by Kant and 
who confuse what Grote regards as the two sides of the epistemological 
problem, which may be briefly stated by such terms as form and matter, 
or subject and object. The epistemological problem is not a simple 
one and Grote deals 1dth it from many angles. Among those who are 
guilty of confusion in epistemology and are dealt with at considerable 
length, are, Ferrier, Hamilton, J. s. Mill, Whe>vell, Locke, Berkeley, 
Hume, Spencer, and Dugald Stewart. 
Grote makes an original contribution in the clarity with which he 
attacks the vulnerable position of some of his predecessors and con-
temporaries . vJhat these positions are, and how Grote deals with them, 
necessitates an examination of the previous work, on the problem, v1hich 
is surveyed i n the foregoing. 
5. Transition to next chapter 
What Grote 's original position was, will be presented in the main 
body of this work, beginning with his view of phenomenalism in the 
following chapter. In the present chapter four main points were pre-
sented and briefly discussed, Grote's life, his writings, statement 
and division of the problem, and sources and survey of previous work 
12 
done on the problem. 
A brief discussion of Grote 's >vritings seemed to be fitting as 
part of an introduction to a vmrk designed to deal with these major 
writings . It is of supreme importance that notice should be taken of 
the distinction that Grote makes between 'philosophy' and conscious-
ness and the importance of this distinction for his epistemology. Let 
us, therefore, begin with a presentation of Grote ' s view of phenomena-
lism involving a consideration of a distinction amongst terms, such as 
'noumenon, ' ' phenomenon, ' and 'thing in its elf. ' 
CHAPTER II 
GROTE ' S VIEH OF PHENO:W:LENALISM 
1. Distinction of terms: •noumenon, ' 'phenomenon,' 
and •thing in itself ' 
i. Derivation and meaning of 1noumenon, 1 and ' phenomenon ' 
a. •Noumenon' 
As a basis for his constructive criticism of James Frederick Ferrier, 
Sir William Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, and others, Grote seeks in the 
beginning of the Exploratio Philosophica to show what he means by the 
term ' phenomenalism.' The use of the v.rord •noumenon ' is, at least~ as 
old as Plato. It is therefore expedient to refer to the use of these 
words, 'noumenon ' and 'phenomenon,' in their earliest connotation. EJc-
amples of the early use of 1noumenon' are in the Republic, 1 and in the 
Parmenides . 2 The word 1noumenon I is derived from the Greek, voou,th·Yo v ' 
anything knov.m, from voE1v , •to know.' It is the German 'Ding- an-sich.' It 
is free from all s ense, and is the .object of rational intuition, or pure 
thought. 
1. -rorr, ;v - -ro/vvv.> ;3\ v S'f:y4>,. cf!:rvo(t ..a~ A 1-ytdv -r~v -rou 
> 11 """ -' ' > A' > -, / \ t: "' (X yq oO U c K" Vo VC ~ a v T<:{ fci. oOV € r~ VVH cr~ y bf VO( A oyo V (: c(t/1~> 
c/ ,l ~ _, A ,....., , · I / """ , 
Oil/ref ctvro t-V Ivy vohllf ro.,-w 7r';Oos -rt:. vouv lfl:<'i rcy 
/ ,.... A -, I""\ ' e / A / ..)1"' 
VdOUf{6-V9' '"Tt:J v1o rou-rov ~v -rt:J o/' .,.,.~ 7T;<>t:'.S -r-t!:- optv 
lfq) TO( ~ f' .j ,/.! 6- Vo(. 
( 11 And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat 
in his mm likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and 
the t hings of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in re-
lation to mind and the things of inind • 11 Jmvett trans . ) . Republic, 508. /7'- _., '3' )-" ..JI ""'- '\ _, - ' 2. £ ''~ otJI\ ~too.s &rT"To(t -rour~ -ro va o vy~vov ~ v 
"" /'' ' >' .>' "" f.tVq/_, Qlf:l -'c::>v -r-o OfCJTtl €.-71"1 7f0(<7'"/V, 
( 11 And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in 
all, be an idea? 11 Jov1ett trans.). Parmenides, 132. 
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b. 'Phenomenon' 
The word 'phenomenon' comes from rl fc< ' vcfptlftJV, .ITleaning something 
that appears, or is seen; the German l.vord is 'Phenomen ' which appears 
to have the same meaning as the word •Erscheinung. ' 
>/ In early Greek, 'phenomena ' was the opposite of ovrq , or ' essen-
ces. ' Hence it w·as early considered to possess a derived type of 
reality . There existed no real chasm between the two though they 
might readily be contrasted; the reason for the contr?st is because 
the phenomena involve the senses and are changeable, while the essen-
ces do not change, are related to reason, and are one and eternal. 
Such was the distinction in Greek thought, but successive ages brought 
their modification, so that in modern philosophy the word 'phenomenon' 
is contrasted with •thing in itself' or 1noumenon.' (But note the 
distinction between 1thing in itself' and 1noumenon,' and also affinity 
of •thing in itself' to ' phenomenon, ' below.) 'Phenomenon' is that 
which has the appearance (Schein) of reality. Kant regards the thing 
in itself as that which is basic to all reality . 
The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not 
known, and cannot be known, throug~ these representations; and 
in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it.la 
Our further contention must also be duly borne in .mind, namely, 
that though we cannot know these objects as things in thenllielves, 
Ne must yet be in position at least to think them as things in 
themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd con-
clusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.2a 
la. Kant, CPR, 74. 
2a. Kant, ££• cit., p. 27. 
, • 
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That is, ' phenomenon' depends upon the manner in which 1thing in itself ' 
affects the senses. 
The aboye is, in outline., an indication of the change which the word 
'phenomenon' has undergone. But another use of the word should be men-
tioned, 1vhich i s really a part or by- product of t he gradual unfolding 
of meaning that time has brought t o the word ' phenomenon.' It is used 
in a positivistic sense, and this is them nner · in which John Grote 
employs t he word . 
I am about to explain a manner of thought v•hich in various ap-
plications, or perhaps misapplications, of it, I have been in 
the habi t of mentally characterizing, and perhaps of speaking 
of , as ' positivi sm.' I shall now hov-rever not use this term, but 
the term 'phenomenalism. 1 I underst and the tvm terms to express 
in substance the same thing . 3 
The distinction, then, amongst the terms, 1 noumenon, ' 'phenomenon, r 
and •thin · in itself, ' may be stated as follows: 1Noumenon 1 is the object 
for thought, or, 11 the object as it is for troothought . 11 4 'Phenomenon' is 
"the object as it appears to the senses. 11 5 The •thing in itself ' is "the 
true correlate of sensibility . 11 I t is that which 11 i s not lma;;n, and cannot 
be kno-vm. 11 6 
ii. 'Noumenon, ' ' phenomenon, ' and •thing in itself,' 
as used by Ke.nt 
Grote appears to fall into the tradition of Kant, and certain it 
is that Kant had a profound influence on Grote ' s philosophy . Grote 
3 . Grote, ~P, I, l. 
4. Brightman, ITP, 389 . 
5. Loc . cit . 
6. Kant, CPR, 74. 
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believes, however, that the distinction between phenomena (as related 
to us), and, things in themselves as objects in themselves, cannot de-
cisively be made . To meet this difficulty, Kant employed matter and 
form; but since matter in the sma.llest detail is subjected to quanti-
tative laws, this emplo!ment to distinguish between phenomena and 
things in themselves is not finally effective. 
It is important to observe that Kant employs 1t hing in itself' 
as something which can be thought and yet is not an object of sense. 
Thought, thus, ascribes limits to the realm of sense and indicates a 
world cf things in thew.selves. The 'idea ' is the word Kant used for 
the ideal of totality Nhich is characteristic of the world of ' things 
in themselves .' The ~<rorld of things in themselves, or the world of 
'noumena,' could be reached by practical reason, for it is the object 
of pure thought. However, through a consciousness of 11duty done for 
duty's sake, 11 theoretically at least, the vmrld of the noumenon (which 
may be thought but cannot be knovm) , may become a practi cal reality . 
Moreover, teleology in science, Kant holds, attempts to bridge the 
chasm between tnoumenon' and ' phenomenon ' in that it asserts that the 
latter depends for its foundation upon the former. 
This purposive order is quite alien to the things of the world, 
and only belongs to them contingently; that is to say, the diverse 
things could not of themselves have co-operated, by so great a 
combination of diverse means, to the fulfilment of determinate 
final pur poses, had they not been chosen and desi gned for these 
purposes by an ordering rational principle in conformity with 
underlying ideas.? 
7. Kant, CPR, 521. 
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Yet it does not c.ffirm (because it cannot) that 1nou.menon 1 exists ·, 
though it treats 'phenomenon' as though the former did exist. 
The difficulty then appeared to be as to whether or not there is 
a road from 1noumenon' to ' phenomenon.' Kant attempted to assert a 
distinction between the tvm that would remain firm. ~ere ivas a dif-
ficulty here, and to cope with it did not appear easy. 
Kant had taken the two words, things-in-themselves and noumena 
as wholly synonymous, and accordingly had called on the one hand, 
duties things-in-themselves, and, on the other, the unknown cause 
of our sensations noumenon. Here •• Reinhold distinguishes very 
exactly. Noumenon is never anything else to him than Idea of the 
reason, a demand. Hence it never signifies anything other than 
what always remains beyond experience: it is an eternal ought.8 
iii. Reinhold on 1noumenon, 1 and 1thing in itself' 
Let us look at some critical remarks on Kant's use of the terms, 
' noumenon ' and 1thing in itself, ' in order to bring out the meaning of 
these terms more clearly. Reinhold9 was conscious of the confusion 
between the thing in itself and the noumenon, because if the 'noumenon' 
was regarded as the ground of 'phenomenon' there was need of an ex-
planation here. Fichte attempted to solve this difficulty as well as 
did the successors of Kant. Reinhold regarded the thing in itself as 
the source of the tmatter 1 for our perceptions as distinguished from 
the noumenon which stood for the problems and ideals which remain un-
realized for the mind and which thought sets for experience. The 
8. Erdmann, HOP, II, 479. 
9. Reinhold, at one time professor of philosophy at Jena, undertook 
extensive reshaping and transforroing of the Kantian philosophy. 
Cf. Windelband, HOP, 570. 
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noumenon is therefore not.identical 1v.Lth thing in itself, but rather, 
the thing in itself has a closer relationship with phenomenon. 
2. lihat phenomenalism means 
i. Three ways in which phenomenalism has been regarded 
Phenomena may be regarded: 
a . As mere appearance--as opposed there~ore to objective reality. 
Into this objective reality human knortrledge cannot penetrate . Hence 
epistemological considerations have only to do with the realm of phe-
nomena. This appears, by far, the most commonly held view of the 
three, though disciples of Henri Bergson, Shadworth Hodgson, and others 
might be firm in their claims for either one of the other two views of 
phenomenalism here presented . 
b. From the time of Heraclitus this view has existed. The only reality 
is flux, or phenomena. Among modern philosophers, Bergson as well as 
others held to this conception. 
c. External existence has no place. All reality may be reduced to 
appearance; events or things in space and time are rejected . Shad-
i·wrth Hodgson ardently supports this view. 
ii . Grote's meaning 
The point of immediate concern is, what is Grote ' s view? As al-
ready mentioned, Grote uses the term ' phenomenalism' for positivism. 
Phenomenalism would seek to subordinate the study of philosophy to the 
special sciences. Or in Grote's own words: 
Phenomenalism (isJ that notion of the various objects of knoN-
ledge which go to make up the universe which belongs to the point 
of viet.v of physical science.10 
The reason v1hy Grote uses the word 'phenomenalism' instead of 
'positivism' is because in the former there is a 'purely intellectual 
application ' which the term 'positivism' does not possess. The term 
' phenomena ' is an abstraction because it is a looking , for the tima 
being (that is, from the aspect of 1things ' ), at the ' objects' of 
physical science. But 'ph_enomena' are never 1vholly unrelated ~' 
otherwise they would not be phenomena at all. 
Phenomenalism implies a way of looking at objects. If examina-
tion is made as to how man arrives at the knowledge which the facts of 
phenomenalism give, or if consideration is given to man ' s conduct vrith 
regard to such facts after he has a consciousness of them, then the 
field is one with \'lhich phenomenalism is not directly concerned. Con-
sideration as to how man arrives at knowledge is the task of philosophy 
and not of phenomenalism, strictly spealdng. Phenomenalism, like phy-
sical science, deals vri.th the view of the object of knowledge in con-
trast to philosophy which deals with the logical view of the process 
of knowledge. 1f,_fhat Grote means by ' philosophy' should be described 
here: 
Philosophy, by which I mean the study of thought and feeling not 
· as we see them variously associated 1vith corporeal organization, 
and producing various results in the universe, but as we understand, 
10. Grote, EP, I, 2. 
think, feel them of ourselves and from within, is something 
to me of an entirely different nature, and leads to entirely 
different fields of speculation from the physic- psychology 
which I have been spe~ldng of. I think that those who have 
the truest view of the one will also have the truest of the 
other.ll 
I t is very important that these tv..ro, phenomenalism and ' philosophy' 
should be kept separate, otherwise there is likelihood of error like 
that of J. S. Mill and V.Tilliam Whewell who did not keep physical 
science distinctly separated from 'logic ' or consciousness.12 
iii . Berkeley ' s meaning 
a. General 
Grote states that the verb of phenomenalism is, is, rather than 
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feels--the verb of consciousness. This cl_istinction turns on a possible 
confusion in two different points of departure, when looking at reality. 
Grote maintains that the confusion arising from Berkeley ' s thought is 
due to lack of realizing that there is this double point of departure. 
The fact of phenomena, Grote feels, is overlooked. Grote may be seen 
to deal with Berkeley in more detail in a later part of this disserta-
tion . He notes also that the double point of departure exists when no 
distinction is made between phenomenal reality, and consciousness (or 
' philosophy'), and when it is not expressedly observed that t hese t wo 
aspects of reality may be confused with each other. Grote ' s criticism 
of Berkeley is not too well taken , but there are some elements of his 
criticism that are significant . These will be dealt with in a later 
11. Grote, EP, I, xi . 
12. The position of J. S. WJill and William 1.fumvell v.rill be dealt 
with in detail in later chapters. 
chapter. 
b. Physiologi st denies any distinction between 
'philosophy ' and phenomena 
Of course, the physiologist may deny this distinction Nhen he 
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attempts to demonstrate that such and such Hill happen when a partie-
ular stimulus is supplied. But there is no final assurance t hat it 
actually viill happen. That it will happen must forever remain in the 
realm of the unkno~~. For example, the physiologist cannot _experience 
t he sensation of the individual . The feeling of the individual may be 
quit e differ ent than what the physiol ogist believes that it is. 
In connection vrith Berkeley ' s position in this chapter the follow-
ing comment of Grote should be noted: 
Tne phenomenal assumption is t hat the vwrld of reality exists 
quite independently of being knmm by any lr.nmdng beings in 
it • • • The Berkeleian idealism is little more than the easy 
demonstration that this view, from a philosophical standpoint, 
is untenable: that the notion of existence, as distinguished 
from perceivedness , is, nakedly and rudely stated, as abhorrent 
to the philosopher as that of perc ivingness and will in any 
part of the marter the l aws of which he is seeking is t o the 
phenomenalist. 3 
Here Gr ote's anal ysis of the communicati on behreen mind and 
1 external 1 reality comes sharply to the point. Grote seems to be im-
plying that the notion of existence, in distinction from perceivedness, 
is abhorrent to any phil osopher, and that this is self-evident. He 
tries to show that the philosopher hasn't got this view of reality at 
all, but one very cl ose to Berkeley 's own. It is interesting to note, 
13. Grote, EP, I, 4. 
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that Grote claims, virtually, to be very close to Berkeley since he 
argues that phenomenalism is not the only view of reality that i s 
possible, and seems to hold also, with Berkeley , that there is no 
reality 11without the mind." 
Grote is scarcely fair to Berkeley if he has in mind that Berkeley 
is asserting only a commonplace remark when he contends that Berkeley 
virtually depricates physical science. Most i dealists, as well as 
others, would agree with Berkeley, as against physical scientists. 
Grote deals with the sentence, "we perceive things," in a manner 
which reminds one of much of the present-day discussions on theories 
of value. He speaks of 'sensation' being a misleading term because it 
suggests an action from without rather than from vd.thin (that is, >-rith-
i n the mind of a human being) when in actuality it should not give such 
a one-sided emphasis. The term, 'impression,' he states, is not so 
misleading because it suggests action from .vli thout outwards-- more so 
than from without inwards. Hence the importance, he concludes, of 
stressing the 'communication' between the senses and objects. By this 
emphasis Grote has anticipated much discussion upon the subject of 
value, in maintaining the importance of both subjective and objective 
approaches. Phenomenal reality rests in the corrummication, between 
'objects' and consciousness. Yet, even though this is so, 
phenomenal reality so far as it exists, is what it is quite in-
dependently of the ma~ner in which anyone knows it, and even 
independently of its being known at all by anybody, or of there 
being any such thing as consciousness, or of mind, ·to knmv it, 
except so far, af I have said, as this 'mind' may produce phe-
nomenal effects. 1~ 
The existence of consciousness has nothi ng to do with it except 
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insofar as consciousness may produce the effects of phenomenal reality, 
for example, as illustrated in discussion of the sentence, 11we perceive 
things. 11 
Knowledge of phenomenal reality is an accident of it, and an in-
escapable one. Since the reality itself is independent of mind and 
since the only time we come to affirm the existence of objects is 
afte~ they are observed as existing, then phenomenal reality cannot be 
observed in any 1r1ay by the senses even though it may communicate with 
consciousness. 
1J.!hat, then, is the difference betvreen this phenomenon and t hing 
in itself? Grote attempts to make the position clear. Apparently 
Kant had confused the issue some1rrhat, and certainly he has, according 
to Reinhold, a Kantian critic, commentator, and contemporary. Kant's 
blurring of the issue is cleared by Reinhold who regards the thing in 
itself as the source of matter for our perceptions and therefore dis-
tinct. from the noumenon, which, for example, has to do with the idea 
of God or that which never can be kno1rm by the senses or that for which 
the senses can never furnish a backgrot'-!ld. That is, the noumenon de-
notes the unrealizable problems and ideals which thought sets for ex-
perience. Hence the thing in itself has a closer connection here to 
14. Grote, EP, I, B. 
phenomenon than to noumenon. But this is not so, according to Kant, 
for 
At the same time if we entitle certain objects, as appearances, 
sensible entitiesl5 (phenomena), t hen since we thus distinguish 
the mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to 
them in themselves, it is implied i n this distinction that we 
pl ace the latter, considered in their own nature, although we do 
not so intuit them, or that we place other possible things, which 
are not objects of our senses but are thought as objects merely 
through the understanding, in opposition to the former, and that 
in so doing we entitle them intelligible entitieslo (noumena ) . l7 
iv. Grote is specially concerned with ' phenomenon ' 
and 1thing in itself' 
Grote does not deal with the 'noumenon' of Kant to any extent, 
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but he was apparently influenced by this concept. For he discusses ideals 
vfhich, like the 'noumenon 1 can be thought but cannot be known. But the 
concepts ' phenomena' and 1thing in itself' are of prime importance. 
'Phenomena' are basic in all his discussions of reality. 
3. Phenomenal reality 
i. How it is 'seen ' 
The difficulty with forming conceptions of phenomena is that t hese 
conceptions do not do justice to phenomenal reality . Phenomenal reality 
is j udged to be such after conceptions have been formed of it, not before. 
In the sentence, 111-re perceive things, 11 there is communication but con-
sciousness has to intervene before the 1things' are perceived. Or the 
matter may be put thus: Things as they are (as it were), attempt to 
15. Sinnenwesen . 
16. Verst andeswesen. 
17. Kant, CPR, 266, 267. 
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communicate themselves (their phenomenal reality), but by reason of the 
mind of men they are looked at through a glass darkly, and the glass is 
al\vays there (but a different kind for each individual). That which 
makes phenomenal reality appear as it is, is the f act that t he gl ass 
is there. 11 To find phenomenal reality, we must find that vfhich can 
be known, so far as it is knovm, in common by all . 1118 Generally speak-
ing, therefore, the standpoint of phenomenalism is the same f or each 
one. 
VIe have nothi ng ••• phenomenally, to do with the way in which 
the universe is known to us (because its being knovvn is an 
accident of it), but we have of course to do with the way in 
vrhich the different parts of it communicate ••• with the 
bodily frame . l9 
And if phenomenalism had nothing to do with the bodily frame it would 
not be phenomenalism but the r eal m o.f things in themselves--which, of 
course, could not be a sensible realm at all, since it would be out of 
all relation to life, and could neither be asserted nor even thought. 
iL How i t is related to life 
It may be stated here that "space and tj_me are phenomenal reali-
ties in virtue of this their relation to matter and movement , not other-
wise .n20 'Natural agents' are what are furnished to the realms of space 
and time. The unity that is in nature, and which 'natural agents' to a 
certain extent furnish, results in perplexity to phenomenal reality as 
to what life is . Life suggests unity . Each person may lmo1r1 Nhat life 
18. Grote, EP, I, 9. 
19. Grote, ££• cit., p. 10. 
20 • Grote, ££. cit • , p. 11. 
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means to himself , but only so. He cannot feel vrhat it is for any 
· other. Phenomenal reality cannot comprehend Nhat life is. This may 
readily be observed by recalling that phenomenal reality is what it is 
quite independent of the feeling of any individual. 
4. ~~o tests of phenomenalism 
Moreover, phenomenal reality presents a phenomenal truth test. 
vle are convinced that Nhen we act in a certain manner that certain re-
sults will always readily follow. This is a phenomenal test of truth . 
Phenomenal reality responds to our actions. There is also another test 
that phenomenalism presents, namely: We believe that a certain thing 
exists because we see it; and we believe that it will be found to exist 
if others, as Nell as ourselves, see it. This is a belief that vlhat 
we see could be handled, heard, etc . Bacon believed in the utility of 
practical lmo"tvledge and what was of l ittle or no utility was of little 
or no consequence as practical lmovlledge; in f act, it could not be 
practical l~owledge. In so believingJ Bacon was simply applying the 
I . 
first test of truth . With reference ko the secondJ it is sufficient 
to state that the fact that we believe, for example, in the existence · 
of a certain object which 1-ve see even before we handle or touch it, is 
because our sight is ordinarily a safe criterion and Y.rhat it finds out 
to be true is verified by other senses in the same individual and also 
by the same or other senses in different individuals. 
In actuality_ these t wo phenomenal tests for truth are one. They 
both include response of phenomenal reality to bodily action, or to a 
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particular sense, or senses. That is, reality, or phenomena, responds 
to the senses. It communicates ~dth them, but nevertheles s does not re-
quire the senses for its reality . The phenomenal test of truth cannot 
be made without communication with the senses or a responding in some 
manner to bodily f orm. Otherwise it could not be a test of t ruth . 
This phenomenal t r uth test, of Grete 's , does not seem justifiable 
even on the grounds he has accepted himself, to the effect that there 
are two different aspects of reality, ' thought ' and phenomena . These 
tests run into the same df fficulty as a correspondence theory of truth, 
that assumes 'ob jects' as already in relation to thought when a corres-
pondence is sought. It would seem that these tests presented by Grote 
are consciousl y presented as unjuctifiable, or, G:!:'ote is in error in 
presenting phenomenal truth tests which really are not tests at all. 
I t is, apparently, fairer to assume that the former alternative is t he 
correct one. 
5. The phenomenalist spirit or mind 
Concerning the phenomenalist spirit or mind, Grote hol ds that the 
phenomenalist spirit i s not something which man has originally; it is 
more like a gradual growth 1'fhich is increasingly observant in that it 
watches out for new ¥-.no1'Vledge, and leaves a place for such, and is 
directly dependent upon phenomenal reality. Moral approval or dis-
approval in t he growth of this spirit should not be countenanced . 
Grote probably holds that such approval or di sapproval is not admis-
sible since the growth of this spirit would seem to be l ar gely biologi-
cal and epistemological. 
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Order which the phenomenali t spirit recognizes shou d not ap-
proach in the slightest extent that order >'lhich individuals are prone 
to observe in the universe and give to various events and things in it . 
Not only should the phenomenalist spirit be on the alert for new lmov:-
ledge and adju~t itself accordingly but also should hold certain events 
and things exclusively, that is, allovdng no other conviction to enter 
into our belief and yet at other tirres not formule.te any conception about 
certain things and events which because of their nature should remain in 
doubt . 
However, in all this it is of supreme import ance to observe that 
phenomenal reality is what it is irrespective of being knovm . Nothin 
should be postulated of the universe beyond what is discovered there, 
otherwise the mind is prone to conceive of unity and order where there 
actually is none . 
6. Summary and foreword to next chapter 
In the foregoing chapter the attempt was made to show what Grote 
means by the terms 'philosophy ' and ' phenomena, ' and to hm~ the re-
lc.tionship amonfst the terms ' phenomena, ' 1 noumena~ 1 and •thing in it-
self.' Various trc.ditional usages of these terms were dealt 1vith . Very 
general remarks Nere made on the place these terms have chiefly in re-
/ 
lation to Plato, Berkeley and Kant . These remarks were intended to be 
illustrative and indicative rather than exhaustive . I t was pointed 
out that the meanings that Grote gives to ' philosophy ' and phenomena 
are especially important . Neither of these can be wholly abstracted 
from all connection vdth the other . Each requires the other. Each is 
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connected in some important way with us . 
However, neither term can properly be considered even in consid-
erable isolation from the other for the meaning of each is partially 
to be .found in its essential counteroart . Just what the relationship 
-. 
between these terms is requires much comment and exposition. To this 
task we now turn as we consider 1Grote 1 s interpretation of the relation 
of phenomenalism to philosophy;, ' in chapter three. 
CHAPTER III 
GROTE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE B.ELATION OF 
PHENOMENflLISM TO PHI LOSOPriT 
l. Each is necessary to the other 
There are two main parts to Grote 1 s thesis in "&.J?loratio Philosophica. 
The preceding chapter dealt \·lith one and stressed it particularly, though 
mention vias also made of the other . It Hould be impossible to deal vrith 
one to the utter exclusion of the other . TI1ese two are entitled phenom-
enalism and ' philosophy. 1 Let us recall the distinction ;,rhich Grote makes 
bet1:1een these t1.vo terms: 
I shall call by the name ' phenomenalism ' that notion of the 
various objects of knowledge which go to make up the universe 
'vhich belong to the point of vie\·l of physical science . l 
When Grote turns to what he calls ' philosophy and consciousness ' 2 he con-
siders the "process of knm'lfing ••• \dthout any reference to any thing 
being known. n3 
I f we consider simply the process of knowing, or ask ourselves 
what knowledge is, vlithout an· reference to any thing being 
knm-m, v.fe have again 1:1hat , in respect of the vrhole fact, is an 
abstraction, in the same 'lrlay in which, on its side, phenomenalism 
is so . 4 
It may be stated that Grote here presents his view of physical things. 
True to his epistemological w~nism he regards the reality of phy sical 
thing s as capable of being approached from two sides, that of ' philosophy ' 
and.~of phenomena. In this view he is a Kantian inasmuch as he recognizes 
the utmost significance of what Kant refers to as the 1pure concepts of 
L Grote, EP, I, 2 . 
2 . Grote, ££· cit., pp. 17-33 . 
3. Grote, ££• cit ., p . 17 . 
4. Loc . cit , 
31 
the understanding .t4a This recognition is manifested in his ' philosophical ' 
approach, an abstraction from reali ty. Kant, Grote 1-.rould maintain, should 
hold that these pure concepts are abstractions from reality which must be 
re3arded also as having a phenomenal ide . He differs from Kant in hold-
ing that lve cannot even refer to a thing in itself apart from a phenomenon . 
For such vmuld be an unwarranted abstraction . In his view Grot e is also 
a Berkeleyan inasmuch as he would maintain that we can never regard any 
r eality as having significance for us without being related to mind in a 
meaningful \'fay . That is j it would make no ~ for Grote to contend 
that there are real physical things •out there.• 
2. Consciousness as active and passive 
i . The phenomenalist view presupposes consciousness p ssive 
Grote states that the phenomenalist view is fo1mded on a supposition, 
namel y that we are passive in the knowing process.5 This view supposes 
that we are present at the communication between certain natural agents 
and the parts of our body affected by those agents . There is a comm:unica-
tion bet>"leen matter on one side (the object for us), and matter on the 
ot her side (the matter of our body) . 1bis communication is accomp nied by 
a feeling, or by knowledge (which is a sort of feeling). The communication 
and the knowledge are coeY~stent but they are not identical . The communi-
cation is betvreen phenomenal reality and the bodily organs . Knovrledge is 
a sort of •inward ' end of the communication and its role is essentiall~ to 
give meaning to the process . 
The ~of the communication ma;y- be referred to, according to Grote, 
4a . Kant J CPR, 104 . 
5. "The phenomenalist view rests on a supposition, one way of putting 
which is that we are thus passive in knowledge •• • 11 Grote , EP, I, 35 . 
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correctly, ~s 'sensation .' But in respect to the whole of the comrnunica-
tion vle have 'experience. ' The extension of this communic tion makes 
possible the extension of k novlledge . There is a process going on, then, 
according to Grote, which i .:; r· ferred to as 1 nature . ' This process is 
phenomenal because it goes on whether we are conscious of it or not . 
Phenomenal reality does not necessarily ' appear' but it can affect us 
through comnrunication and adjustments of our bodily organs to meet the 
stimuli. In the knmring process Grote holds that Vl'e are passiye (but also 
active) . 6 Bowne maintains that we are active . 
A certain sense of effort manifests itself, and we seem so to 
permeate the body that our own spi~itual force comes in contact 
with the reality. But the sense of tension and effort in the 
muscles, in such cases, is but the reaction of the organism against 
the volition, and has merely the function of teaching us how to 
measure our activity. ? 
Kant in 'The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding' says that 
the pure concepts are like seeds that lie prepared , so that on the occa-
sion of experience they are developed . The mind is active, thereforP-, 
for Kant in the kno1ring process . He states that he has undertaken 
the hitherto rare y attempted dissection of the faculty of the 
un erstanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of 
concepts !!_Eriori by looking for them in the understanding alone, 
as their birthplace, and by analysing the pure use of this facultv . 
This is the proper' task of a transcendental philosophy; anything 
beyond this belongs to the logical treatment of concepts in phi],.os-
ophy in 6eneral . We shall therefore follow up the pure concepts 
to their first seeds and dispositions in the huraan understanding, 
in Nhich they lie prepared, t i l l at last, on the occasion of ex-
perience, they are developect.8 
6 . c·f . ' ii. Consciousness is also active, ' below. 
?. Bowne , MET, 74. 
8 . Kant, CPR, 103 . 
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a . Consciousness of a process taking place betv.reen 
the matter of nature and the matter of otrr bodies 
But the consciousness of the process bet~reen the matter of nature and 
the matter of our bod· cannot go on without our witnessing, or bein present 
~t, or having awareness of, this process . This witnessing is conscious-
ness . This is the particular part of the whole noetic process which Grote 
freruently refers to as ' consciousness,' ' i ntelligence,' or ' philosophy.' 
To pay attention to it alone is to abstract ' philosophy ' from that without 
whi ch there could be no ' phil osophy ' or ' awareness ' at all . 
I said, in speaking of the awakening of our consciousnes s , that the 
first recognition of our own being is accompanied with the reco nit ion 
of something besides it, or of an universe into which we are born . I t 
is the same as if I had said, that the first recognition of anything 
not ourselves, or of the universe, was accompani d by the recoenition 
of our own being . In each case the one is the counter- notion of the 
other: the notion of the one is formed by distinguishing it from the 
other . 1tThichever is the first distinct .and affirmative notion is in 
a manner not the first, for the other is the ground and basis of it . 9 
Hov1ever, Grote does not hold t hat both are equall;y immediate . There is 
1i rrunediateness, ' he maintains, essentially in what he calls the ' self-self ' 
but immediateness di sappears in the 1thought- self when reflection enters . 
b . Kant recogni zes phenomenal reality as a necessary 
supplement to reason 
Awakening of our consci ousness, or· rousing of our awareness, means the 
awakening of our consciousness of something , or the rousi ng of our awareness 
of something , a witnessing of an essential communi cation between the matter 
of nature and the matter of our bodies. One might paraphrase Kant here , by 
sa~~ng phenomenal process without consciousness is blind; consciousness withe~ 
t he phenomenal · co~muni~ation is ~· 
vJithout s ensibility no object would be given to us, without 
understanding no object -vmuld be thought. Thoughts without 
content are empt y, intuitions ~dthout concepts are blind.lO 
ii. Consciousness is also active 
TI1ere is an important sense , Grote woul d hold, in which the 
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phenomenalist view--which we are regarding as dealing ~nth the inter-
communication referred to, in abstraction from that part of the know-
ing process which is aware of the intercommunication taking place-- is 
wrongly phenomenal . For the phenomenalist, consciousness is regarded 
as passive . Grote, on the other hand, calls attention to the f act that 
the passive side of consciousness is only one part of the field. For 
consciousness means activit;z_, also. It means not only consciousness 
as i n "pleasurable or painful feeling, but also consciousness of 
willing or acting. ull The reason why the phenomenal approach is "'rrong 
in this respect is because our consciottsness of acting or willing is 
much more difficult for us to conceive than our consciousness as pas-
sive. But though it may be regarded conceptually as more difficult, 
this charact eristic of consciousness as active is as real as the 
10. Kant , CPR, 93. 
11. Grote , EP, I, 36. 
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passive nature of consciousness. 
The roots however of the phenomenalist (that is, the wrongl y phe-
nomenalist) view lie deep, going even to the original supposition, 
that it is feeling (or susceptibility) that makes our being, and 
not feeling and acting (or willing) as well ••• We are sometimes 
inadvertently led to this view by our language, Nhen we say that 
it is consciousness v-rhich shows to us our personality: by this 
we should mean not only consciousness as pleasurable or painful 
feeling, but consciousness of willing or acting.l2 
This difficulty is due to the great number and variety of things 
whi ch seem to act~ upon us, whereas we are very limited in t he amount 
of action which we can carry out on things in contact with us. 
a. Emphasis on ' philosophy ' may lead to 
epistemological idealism 
The ' philosophical, ' or consciousness, vie\"i, though an abstraction 
from what Grote regards as phenomenalism, is, nevertheless, an approach 
that i s frequently found in epistemology . Emphasis upon it is, he 
would seem to agree, epistemological idealism. This emphasis is not 
mistaken, but it results from an abstraction vlhich is weak ohly >-<hen 
it overlooks t he phenomenalist view. The strength of the abstraction 
of thought from phenomena is evident in that we are always on the side 
of thought and , conversely, could never be on the side of 'objects' in 
abstraction from thought or consciousness. Laterl3 it will be shown 
how necessarily idealistic and personalistic this emphasis on con-
sciousness, or the self, becomes in Grote. 
-·~--:---= 12. Grote, EP, I, 36 . 
13 . In chapters IX and X. 
b . Sensation, intelligence, and 1dll 
(1) These three terms have a close rel ati onship 
to each other 
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The idealistic emphasis can be detected even in connection with 
the term ' sensation ' which would not mean anything without conscious-
ness. We can speak, Grote would contend, about having sensations only 
insofar as they have meaning somehow fo:r_us . Grote groups together 
sensation, intelligence, and will, 14 as repr esenting this 'philosophi-
cal ' approach. In dealing with these three , he reveals ftiTther, the 
essential relation between phenomenalism and ' philosophy.' This, he 
does not do briefly and in a few words, but with patience one may dis-
cover his argument--an argument that cannot easily be pointed out by 
referring to any particular passage but which is, nevertheless, present, 
and once discovered is peculiarly stimulating. Let us, then, turn to 
his specific disc.ussion of intelligence and will, both of >vhich are in-
separable from sensation . The three terms may well be considered to-
gether. 
(2) Sensation and experience 
What sensation is can be indicated in the intercommtmication which 
takes place between particular natural agents and specific parts of our 
bodies . 11 The communication, which in respect of the particular porti ons 
of it is called ' sensation, ' is often in respect to the 1-vhole of it 
14. Grote, EP, I, 34-52. 
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called ' experience. 11115 Grote here reveals the synoptic view. 
(3) Contemplation is essentially non-phenomenal; 
communication is phenomenal 
In experience--and sensation_, as the parts of it--there is a con-
tinual process taking place which is called 1nature . 1 Hand in hand 
with it goes contemplation. Contemplation is essent ially non-phenomenal; 
the process, or communication between ( touter') phenomenal reality and 
our bodily orge~s (as 1inner 1 phenomenal reality) , is phenomenal . One 
must hold on to this, to lose sight of which is to forfeit the peculiar 
meaning which Grote assigns to the phenomenal. 
There is a process going on which we call 'nature, ' and there 
is a wonderful, extra-phenomenal £9l!Ier of contemplating this 
process: the whole is knowledge. 0 
(4) Contemplation is both active and passive 
Grote takes special care to point out, however, that this contem-
plation is not simply passive. I t is active. Intelligence and will 
are active. Moreover, they are essentially non-phenomenal . Yet they 
deal with the phenomenal, the 11 process going on i>Vhich we call •nature. tul7 
That is, the phenomenal and the ' extra-phenomenal' are inseparable . The 
'extra-phenomenal' is the realm of ' philosophy. ' To separate it de-
cisively from the phenomenal is an unwarranted abstraction . 
15 • . Grote, EP, I, 35 . 
16. Grote, op. cit., p. 36. 
17. Loc. cit. 
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(5) Commencement of 1villing requires particulars 
1ihen we wake, we wake into a universe of things. Our waking is 
not to ourselves, and, specifically, not to our consciousness alone. 
If it were, then a decisive bifurcation would be justified betNeen 
thought and the process which thought contemplates, There are commence-
ments of acting and willing which make the universe, that we contem-
plate, a universe of particulars (as well as a universe). All of this 
commencement of. willing, or intelligent acting, as well as the contin-
uation of ~t, is involved in the term, 'sensation, ' which without some 
such qualifications, is only loosely used. 
(6) Recapitulation on the knowing process 
Let us now return briefly to consider the knovdng process, gen-
erally, in its entirety, and to see the place of sensation, intelligence, 
and v-rill, in it. Grote contends that there are two extremes in the 
knowing process, the thought or consciousness end and the •thing ' or 
phenomenal end. Each considered by itself is an abstraction. There 
are no things except for consciousness, and there is no thought that 
does not imrolve that which is thought of. Intelligence refers to the 
extreme of consciousness. Sensation involves both extremes and is cer-
tainly neither purely thought nor purely phenomenal reality. The will 
is active and reveals the active nature of consciousness, and that there 
is that upon which it acts, namely, phenomenal reality . This general 
and brief summation vdll be sup~lemented in v.rhat follows. 
3. Analysis of sensation 
i. Sensing in general 
Before considering the relation of these considerations to time 
and space, let us look at the term 'sensation' and the analysis which 
Grote makes of it. Grote holds that 
An instance of what appears to me the confusion between philosophy 
and logic on the one side~ and physiology or phenomenalism on the 
other, appears in the manner in 1.vhich the whole question of sen-
sation has constantly been treated.l8 
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Sensation, for Grote, means sensing in general. But sensing in general 
must be further qualified. 
a. 'Sensation proper' and •the sensation of our acti~lty. ' 
. 19 
Grote refers to 'sensation proper' by which he means passive 
sensing as in our 'sensations' of pleasure and pain. He distinguishes 
this part of •sensation ' from •the sensation of our a~tivity,t20 meaning, 
by this latter term, sensations .of v-Iilling, or acting. In either case, 
namely, passive or active sensing, intelligence or awareness is involved 
and not merely sensing . I t is from this sensing in general t hat intel l i-
gence gazes upon phenomenal reality . tiithout the intellectual elements 
which are coJ11.bined in this sensing (i.e. the intellectual part of i t --
for there are intellectual elements involved in the term •sensing ' as 
it is ordinarily used, Grote states), phenomenal reality would not mean 
an;yt hing at all . 
18. Grote, EP, I, 19. 
19 . Grote, ££• cit., p. 38. 
20. Loc. cit. 
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b. Philosophy and logic 
V<That Grote means by ' philosophy and logic •21 is the intellectual 
end of a process of communication through our various orgal'!s of sense , 
which--1.·rere it not for the intellect- -would be purely physical. 
'Sensation,' a s this term is ordinarilJr us ed, carries this implication 
of 'phi losophy and logic' with it, Grote believes . Some sensations mor e 
than others ~mply consciousness; others . seem to be almost purely phy-
sical. But, according to Grote 1 s vie1.v of sensation there is never a 
complete absence of knovdng however minute, since phenomenal reality is 
never wholly unconcerned with ' philosophy' (or 1logic 1 ). The physiolo-
gist and phenomenalist treat sensation as physical. Theyassume in-
t elligence involved in ' sensation' 1vithout accounting for it. 
ii. Two meanings of sensation 
There are two meanings that may be taken from the term 'sensation.' 
First: 
'Sensation, ' meaning by the term an affection or modification 
(hmiever :>fe may style it) of our senses (to use that misleading 
expression), nerves, and brain, is a phenomenon belonging to the 
domain of physiology. It is what I have ••• called ' communica-
tion. t 22 
Second: 
' Sensation, ' meaning by the term a feeling on our part, or a 
portion or instance of consciousness, which, in 1.-1hatever manner, 
grows into knowledge, is a fact, so far as we call it one, be-
longing to a different order of thought, and it is philosophy or 
log:l.c vrhich must deal with it so far as it can be dealt 1vith.23 
21 . Grote, EP, I, 19. 
22 . Loc . cit. 
23. Grote, EP, I, 19, 20. 
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\lle will novi consider these bm meanings in relation to time and space, 
in Grote's view. 
4. Time and space 
i . Time, but not space , is necessary for acting and willing 
These t wo meanings implicit in ' sensation ' are evident in Grote's 
comments on time and space. Grote asserts that vie have commencements 
of acting and willing (or active sensing, or. sensation--the physical 
side of which is sensation with the first meaning above ) , 24 in t i me. 
Space is not needed for acting and willing . Motivation is possible 
even within our minds; we can motivate our feelings alone. By this, 
Grote seems to mean that we can have reflection without any spatial 
requirements (excepting, of course, that our bodies must have space 
which Grote assumes). For in reflection--though he does not actually 
make this statement--there is the active part of the process of reflect-
ing and that reflected upon. Both are involved in reflection and both 
are within the 'philosophical ' view (implied in the second meaning of 
'sensation, ' above25). 
ii. Space adequately reveals to us our active nature 
Space revea,ls to us our active nature more adequately, for postu-
lating space 1rfe are aware of act ing upon what is not ourselves. Force 
and matter go together. \fuen we feel that we exercise not only 1rill 
but force, we become aware of what resists our force, namely, matter . 
24. p. 40 . 
25 . Lac. cit. 
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The sensation of matter is, therefore, as intLmate and early to us as 
space. 
Space reveals our active nature in this way. vfuen we act on ob-
jects in space this action is evident or manifest to others. But, space, 
according to Grote, does not need to be present in order that we may 
act in some way or will something. For Grote mc..intains that only time, 
not space, is necessary for acting and willing. Now, Grote seems to 
have in mind merely that an act, as reflective, requires time but can-
not be measured. He does not, of course, hold that our·bodies do not 
require space. And our minds, qua physical, require space. If he means 
that thought can take place without any spatial considerations at all--
not even for that in 1rrhich thought talces place--then his view would seem 
to be untenable. This untenable position, however, does not seem t o be 
implied in Grote's writing. 
iii. Sensation as a feeling, and sensation of our activity 
Sensation as a feeling should be distinguished from the sensation 
of our activity, according to Grote. Sensation of our activity is only 
part of the domain of sensation. Sensation as a feeling he regards as 
sensation proper, or feeling as passive_. This distinction is not clear-
cut, as Grote would likely admit; but it is a sensible distinction. 
Sensation as feeling is pleasurable or painful. Sensation of time is 
neutral if it is considered as that which contains our feeling of 
pleasure and pain . Sensation of space is of the area in \fhich motion 
operates and may be considered also, as in the case of time, as 
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neutral, 
Sensation proper, as a feeling, ••• is all, in a manner, as I 
have said, pleasurable or painftli. In a manner: for the sensation 
of time is rather as containing our feeling of pleasure and pain, 
and so f ar as we have a sensation of time, ~ve must perhaps r ather 
call it neutral. Our sensation of space is as of the continent of 
our motion, of matter as of the absorbent, or counter-agent of 
our force: how far these sensations are to be considered neutral, 
i.e., not of pl~asure and pain, seems hard to determine, and not 
~ important. 26 
iv. Sensations of pleasure and of pain 
Whether there. are sensations of pleasure and pain which belong to 
space and time is doubtful. At least one can say that some sensations, 
other than those of space and time, are sensations of pleasure and pain. 
In considering sensation as pleasurable and painful, Grote points out 
that the sensation of taste has attached to it a. special pleasure or 
pain. Here one may see the phenomenal character of sensation, as well 
as its ' philosophical ' nature. For the sensation of taste involves the 
chemical properti es of matter which communicate with our organism. This 
is the phenomenal aspect of the sensation of taste, namely, the communi-
cation. TI1e feeling or subjective part of the sensation is not of 
activity but of pleasure or pain, Here one is much more passj_ve and 
susceptible to impressions from rrhat communj_cates with the matter of 
our bodies . 
v. Time is common to consciousness and phenomena 
Time is the one element .-.rhich is peculiar to both consciousness 
and phenomenal rea~ity, TI1e reason why Grote seems justified in this 
26 . Grote, EP, I, 38, 
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view is because consciousness requires time. Also, phenomenal reality 
being essentially the comnn.mication of the matter of nature vdth our 
bodies (wi.th such parts as sense organs, nerves, brain, etc.) requires 
time in order that communication can be carried out. Sensation proper, 
or passive sensing, according to Grote, requires time for its sensing, 
passively, to take place , e.g ., as in the passive sensing of pleasure 
and pain. Active sensing, such as willing, etc., also postulates time 
in which its acting may be carried out;, Grote vJas , no doubt, influenced 
by Kant in his vievr of time as pertaining to both consciousness and phe-
nomenal reality. 
Time , as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and 
therefore of the connection of all representations, contains an 
a priori manifold in pure intuition~ No-vr a transcendental determi-
nation of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which con-
stitutes its unity , in that it is universal and rests upon an 
a priori rule. But, on the other hand, it is so far homogeneous 
-vnth appearance, in that time is contained in every empirical repre-
sentation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to 
appearances bec~mes possible by means of the transcendental determi-
nation of time. ·r 
Duration is experienced and hence time is in the realm of con-
sciousness or feeling . If time were not felt by us, then it would re-
main unla10wn to consciousness. And, if it existed anywhere ;-re would 
knm:J nothing about i t . For utter absence of feeling time (i.e. the 
passing of time) would mean even the lack of any affection of time on 
our bodies (through any of the senses). · That is, one would neither be 
conscious of time nor would there be any communication (which required 
time) for us, of any kind, on our hodies , and hence there would be no 
27. Kant, CPR, 181. 
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phenomenal reality for us. Time, therefore, must be peculiar to both 
consciousness and phenomenal reality. 
vi. Space is only partially common to both 
consciousness and phenomena 
Space, Grote states, is only partially common to both feeling 
and phenomena. Our bodies, to which our feelings are confined, exist 
in space . Space is not characteristic of feeling as such. But space 
is characteristic of bodies. Feeling is located in our bodies r1hich 
are spatial. This last statement must be qualified. For there is the 
meaning end of feeling and the phenomenal reality end. It is the 
phenomenal reality side of feeling that is physical, and the physical 
is spatial. In this sense, therefore, feeling can be said to be lo-
cated in our bodies which are spatial. Space, then, is not character-
istic of feeling qua feeling as time is •. This justifies Grote's view 
that time is peculiar to both consciousness and phenomenal reality, 
whereas space is peculiar only to phenomenal reality, and to feeling 
inasmuch as it may be considered as that which characterizes our body, 
or feeling as phenomenal reality. 
And ' feeling ' itself vJhich necessitates a body in order to exist 
at all, is a term having implicit two meanings as ' sensation ' has, 
namel y, as 1philosophical 1 and 1phenomenal . 1 Space, then, is not peculiar 
to arrareness only very indirectly, inasmuch as awareness requires a body 
in order to exist at all, and body is spatial . 
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vii. Conception of space by analogy 
Moreover, we are conscious of the matter of our bodies as spatial 
and can formulate a conception of the matter of the rest of the universe 
by analogy . That is, it is by analogy that we have awareness of space; 
spe.ce is, therefore, in this way-connected with consciousness. Also, . 
phenomenal reality requires space in order to communicate with the matter 
of ou:r body . This communication, requiring space, is physical, and phe.:.. 
nomenal. ~'le are aware of our bodies as phenomenal. Grote does not 
specially center attention on how we !mo>-r our bodies. But if he did so, 
it would have to be somewhat as follovJs: There is a sort of network of 
communication in our bodies (as physical and as 1mentalt1 ). Hmr we 
know our bodi es must always be through our capacity to understand, reason, 
judge , im3.gine , etc . I:Je seem to have ~ knowledge at least, even in 
o~r feeling of anything, otherWise there would be no registering of any 
meaning for feeling at all. Feeling is popularly related closely vdth 
the physical, but to so restrict it entirely (to the physical) is erron-
eous. However, it should not be overlooked that the knowing of our 
bodies has also a phenomenal side where there is the •object• (or •ob-
jects •) of our physical selves communicating with that which gives 
meaning to it. 
viii. Resume 
This exposition of Grote's remarks on the relation of space and 
time to consciousness seems a faithful account of his position and seems 
in accord with the distinction he makes between philosophy and conscious-
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ness on the one hand, and phenomenal reality on the other. His general 
position, then, regarding space and time is that space is necessary to 
phenomenal reality, whereas time is necessary both to consciousness and 
phenomena. Space is not essential to awareness though one may be aware 
of what is spatial, or may frequently think spatially (i.e., of what 
eY2sts s patially). One might cowment further on Grote 1 s remarks re-
garding space by stating that many concepts are of entities that are not 
spatial, e.g ._, triangularity, roundness, var i ous transcendentals such as 
truth, goodness, oneness, etc. Grote , does not attempt to refute such 
comments in advance and thus by not contradicting further possible re-
flections on time and. space, he leaves a strong impressi on of the sig-
nificance of his views . regarding space and time, so far as they go . 
But Grote fails to deal with other i ssues regarding space and time, 
such as their apparently inseparable relation to each other, and so re-
veals v[eakness in not having more adequately circumscribed the subject of 
space and time . However, he is primarily concerned with the relation of 
space and time to consciousness. Let us nmv consider the ascribinr; of 
rationality to spatial objects. 
b:. Rationality ascribed to spatial objects 
Grote observes, regarding spatial objects, that there is a tendency 
to ascribe rationality to them. Consciousness may be consciousness of 
selfhood, or i t may be an 'extra-phenomenal' power of contemplating 
',-rhat is not self. The whole of this consciousness falls within the 
range of knowledge. This 'extra-phenomenal' I?Ower whether of contem-
48 
plating the self or 11hat is not self, is intellect. The awakening 
intelligence (or will) is avJ-are of what resists our efforts. There is 
a tendency , therefore, to regard 1'\l"hat resists our effort, as living 
like we do . Thus we ascribe animation to objects in the universe~ and 
a scr ibe rationality to them. The result is that we 'philosophize' about 
the phenomenal world, and ascribe unity to it where no unity may be 'ac-
t ually present. 28 
5. The relationship of phenomenalism to philosophy 
further. illustrated 
i. By taste 
Again, Grote illustrates the r elation of phenomenalism to 'philos-
ophy 1 by anal yzing the sensation of sight. For a clearer analysis let 
us first l ook at the sense of taste. Tasting is a sort of handl ing of 
the chemical agent!3 by the matter of our body, especiall;y- by the t ongue. 
By such 1handling 1 we get the ideas of t he shape of some objects. Sen-
sation proper, then, or sensation ns feel ing (the passive nature of sen-
sation, according to Grote) is concerned with the sensation of space 
1'1Thich appear ed, as Grot e obser ves, t o be neutral--neither pleasurabl e 
nor painful. 
i i . By si ght 
a. The eye is vir tually a machine 
Sensation involving 'handling' becomes much more evident in the 
case of sight. The eye is ·virt ually a mach..ine for touching or handling , 
28. This view of Grote regarding unity as an essential characteristic 
of the ' extr a- phenomenal' will be referred to again, below. Cf. PP· 54-56. 
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at a distance, the chemical properties of objects in space. Light is 
the specific physical agent or substance tmich makes the actual communi-
cation possible . 
We may now • • • speak of that which, in the advance of knowledge, 
is of all the most important organ of sensation, the eye : which 
is in fact a machine for both handling or touching, and also tast-
ing, that is, appreciating certain chemical qualities of matter 
removed from us, perhaps widely, in space . The instrument of this 
communication is the particular physical substance or agent, •• 
light . 29 
Though he does not mention other factors concerned in this communica-
tion, e.g., the receptivity of the retina for images, etc., yet Grote 
is fully aware of the necessity of these factors. 
b . Color is subjectively felt 
Grote does not claim any special training in optics, and states 
that for the purpose of showing the relation between phenomena and 
consciousness, an intimate knowledge or analysis is not necessary. 
Suffice it to hold that there are voluntary movements and adjustments 
of the eye lenses so that space is measured to us. So, in the language 
already used regarding tasting of certain natural objects, we •taste• 
color. That is, the color is, in a certain way, felt . 
The phenomenal communication being this, the corresponding sub-
jective feeling is, that we, in the language which I have used 
before, as it were taste the colour by means of the nervous sur-
face, in a way in some measure analogous to that in which we 
taste the taste of anything by the palate.30 
The color is subjectively felt. The various volitional and physical 
29. Grote, EP, I, 39, 40. 
30. Grote, ££• cit., p. 40. 
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movements of the lenses of the eye have a sensation of feeling (sensa-
tion proper, according to Grote) and a sensation of activity either as 
acting upon proximate portions of the eye, region in the matter of our 
bodies or upon remote matter as in the objects of nature. 
iii. Sensation of space is the same 
no matter what senses are used 
So the sensation of space, as a whole, is t he same whether it has 
to do with the movement of the eye or of the hand. In the case of 
light, i t is the actual communication of rays upon a ner'vous surface 
that is phenomenal, whereas the subjective feeling ~lhich corresponds 
to thi s is t he intellectual, volitional, conscious part of the exper-
ience. In handling objects there is also the phenomenal communication 
vvhich is only part of the process. But there is also the conscious 
avvareness of stimulus from objects or of activity upon objects. Either 
abstracted from the other would be meaningful but its meaning would be 
necessarily limited. 
iv. Concerning the defining of 'phenomenon'; 
Professor Brightman's definition and 
Grote 's analysis 
It is correct to state that 11 the object as it appears to the 
senses" is phenomenon.31 Grote does not seem to take any position that 
would deny any part of this definition. He seems concerned with point-· 
ing out what the implications of such a definition may well be considered 
31. Brightman, I'l'P, 389. 
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to be. The phenomenon, for him, is not 'the object' but the object 
as connnunicating with our senses or, more particularly , with certain 
specific parts of our bodies. JSenses,' unanalyzed, include awareness 
of some sort. It is just here that Grote becomes specific and distin-
guishes, in sensation, between a physical communication which strictly , 
for him, means the phenomenal part of the lmovving process, and conscious-
~or awareness through activity (as volition, purpose, etc.) or pas-
sivity (as awareness of pleasure or pain)~ To separc:.te the one from the 
other is part of a necessary analysis in attempting to understand con-
sciousness and phenomena better. But SJ~thesis is also necessary for 
a synoptic vie1•r of the noetic .process. 
v. Significance of sight among the senses 
The ' sense' (as we use the term in ordinary parlance) of sight is 
especially complicated because 1sight 1 is used to mean not only the 
' 
seeing of objects but also as inward sight or intuition. Imagination 
is a term derived from seeing, yet applies to touching, handling , 
smelling, and hearing as well. That is, sight has a subjective impor-
• 
tance of a Nide kind when used to represent other 'senses.' It is a 
sort of t ypical sense which enables us to r efer to and describe the 
senses in general, according to Grote . 
The sense of sight being thus, with development of the intellect , 
the. most important, takes also a sub j ective importance of a dif-
ferent kind. We use it as the typical sense by means of which we 
describe, and to v-rhich vre refer, the operations of sense in general. 32 
32. Grote, EP, I, 42. 
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Taken as the typical sense, the corporeal communication between 
the matter of object s of natur e (which includes, strictly , the matter of 
our mvn body) and the matter of our bodies (not noN considered as an 
ob ject of natur e) is phenomena. This communication simpl y pr esents the 
object t o the mind. Qua corporeal commlunication there is no ' philosophy, ' 
or consciousness, or awareness. 'I'her e is a 'my.sterious point .33 at which 
the corporeal communication is converted into sensibility •. ftnother way 
of stating this is t hat 11it is the mind that sees the object, and the 
real sight is thi s .u34 
vi. Mind 1 sees ' 
Sight, considered in a sense wider than merely physical seein~ , 
where mind i s involved, is comprehensive in enabl ing us to know . Sight, 
in this sense necessarily involves intelligence , consciousness, aware-
ness, or volition. Here the phi losophical approach i s str essed. Em-
phasis on intell i gence in ' seeing ' enables ~to 1see around ' objects as 
wel l as to see them. I t seems that Grote woul d mean by this that we 
can see, or i magine, because of our mentalit y , the side of a building 
which is not and cannot be corporeally communicat ed to us . Here, phe-
nomen~ ar e missing but 'philosophy ' is present. 
vii. Quantity of phenomenal communication 
That is, t he sensation -vrhich we may have is 
of a. colored object having magnitude and fi gure, and • • • solid 
shape and definite dist ance. TI1is is what we c~ll seeing : this 
33 ~ Gr ote, EP, I , 44 . 
34 . Loc. cit . 
is 1·rhat we see • • • the corporeal communication vfhich is the 
means of it is not more elaborate than the logical result of 
the sensation .35 
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The phenomenal communication may be elaborate (and also the ' sensibility•) 
as indicated in the quotation,36 or it may be almost entirely missing as 
in the case of •seeing ' the side of a building opposite to us . The phe-
nomena are inseparably connected with mv-areness ; both are necessary to 
each other and any separation that may be made results in phenomena ab-
stracted or philosophy abstracted . 
6. Relationship through contrast 
i. Phenomenalist view reached through 
an llllphenomenal process 
It is particularly important to see, Grote states, that the phenom-
enalist vie1v is an abstraction . One may approach epistemology from the 
phenomenalist vie1v. But one cannot reach the phenomenalist view except 
through an unphenomenal process . I t >vould seem that Grote 1,\Tould hold 
to a non-behe.vioristic position in psychology. He would seem to say 
that the behaviorist must reach his position through a non-behavioristic 
process . 
~rfe may hold simply • • • the phenomenalist view in our developed 
intelligence, but we never can arrive at i t, we never can learn 
it, except by an unphenomenal process . This amotlllts to the same 
as I have fo§l}lerly said 1vhen I called the phenomenalist vie-v; an 
abstraction. 
35. Grote, EP, I , 44, 45. 
36. Immediately above . 
37. Grote, EP, I, 45, 46 . 
54 
ii. Phenomena as a deposit from our thinking 
In contrast to the phenomen&l universe, thought is fluid and un-
£'ormed. Phenomena are a sort of deposit from our thinking . That is, 
all phenomena require thinking in order to be phenomena for us. They 
cannot affect us so that the affecting can be for us (and yet not be 
for us , as would be the case if phenomena were unrelated to conscious-
ness 1). In other words, if we were phenomenalists first, we would never 
have been phenomenalists at all l Phenomenalism is possible only through 
the extra-phenomenal. 
If we had been phenomenalists and physiologists from 
the first we should .never have been so at all, for we 
never should have lmovm anything .38 
iii. Extra- phenomenal elements in sensation make 
phenomena perceptual 
Phenomenalism depends upon our subjective sensation, or upon vrhat 
i s sometimes referred to e..s ' perception.• It is only because of the 
mixture in sensation of extra-phenomenal elements, or elements quite 
independent of phenomena that we can have phenomena at all . 
7. Mind provides ~ity 
i. The extra-phenomenal gives unity 
\Vhat Grote refers to as the 1 extra--phenomenal' also makes possible 
the unity that mind observes in the uni verse. Phenomena are essentially 
gr eatl y lacking in unity .39 Grote af f irms that much of the order and 
38. Grote, EP, I, 46 . 
39. 111 said that the notion of unity • • • is not phenomenal. 11 
Grote, EP, I, 49. 
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· arrangement that people see in the universe is not the order of phenom-
enal reality alone but the order characteristic of mind also. Uuch of 
the demand for unity and coherence ,.rhich is postulated b;y the mind is 
due to a conception essential to the nature of human beings. The in-
fluence of Kant could Nell have affected Grote so that he strongly em-
phasizes the essential nature of the mind to see unity, or to unify: 
This transcendental 11nity of apperception ferro~ out of all possible 
appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, 
a connection of all these representations according to laws. For 
this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in know-
ledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of 
function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. The 
original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is 
thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessaFJ unity 
of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, 
according to ru~es, which not only make them necessarily reproduc-
ible but also in so doing determine a.n object for their intuition, 
that is, the concept of something wherein they are neces sarily inter-
connected . For the mind could never think its identity in the mani-
foldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity 
a priori, if it did not have befo r e its eyes the identity of its 
act, "'hereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which 
is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible 
their interconnection according to a priori rules . 40 
Man, by investing the universe ,.rith unity, concedes to it a mind 
~dth conceptions of time, space, etc., derived, not from .sight or any 
other sense, 41 but in some manner so that the lack of unity, coherence, 
and order 1'lhich is characteristic of phenomenal reality, is obscured. 
40. Kant , CPR, 136, 137. 
41. !'Though particulars of the universe ••• have not life they have 
that unity, or individuality, or reason why they should be distinguished 
and separately thought of, which in fact is only suggested to us by our 
consciousnes s of our own life and consequent felt self-belonging or in-
dependence • • • is a sort of relic or reminiscence of the life which 
the inf;mt intellect supposed in things. 11 Grote, EP, I, 48, 49. 
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Hovrever, it must not be supr osed that the phenomenal completely lacks 
unity, for some parts of it are distinctly tmified. It seems fair to 
Grote to say that examples f this unity are the motions inside the 
atom, the harmonious motion of the planets , the 1law 1 of gravitation, 
.snd t he action of chlorophyll in a growing plant.42 
ii. Phenomenal reality essenti ally obscured 
In other words, as soon as consciousness enters the field, true 
phenomenal reality is obscured. The reason for this may be seen in 
the case of space. Space (in daylight) for persons possessed of sight 
is always lighted space . Phenomenal space that operates on our bodies 
without any consciousness present is not lighted at all. Consciousness, 
or mind, me.kes a specific contribution to our conception of space. 
Phenomenal reality, ~ phe omenal, is always obscured. It is obscured 
because our awareness is ve liiDited, and depends upon the particular 
viewpoints of various selve • The self is also restricted to avrareness 
through the selective natur of each ' :3ense' taking in certain aspects 
to which it is adapted , e . g ., the eye assiiDilates as~:-ects of an object 
very different from the aspects to v-rhich the ear is adapted. 
iii. Awareness is not the process of operation of phenomena 
And yet one cannot say that these various a sfects exhaust the na-
ture of the action taking p ace beb<Jeen the matter of nature and the 
42. 11 I said that in strictness, unity v.ras phenomenally exceptional 
rather than unphenomenal •• 11 Grote, EP, I, 49. 
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matter of our bodies. Indeed, the ru~areness is ~ot the process of 
operation. This operation belonc;s to the phenomenal 'l'rorld . At the 
risk of being understood only literally, one may affirm that Grote 
seems to be sa;ying that consciousness is the most imrard part of 
phenomenal reality; consciousness ce..nnot be e:::~plained in terms of be-
he..vior alone. This is . not quite fair to Grote, but it is an attempt to 
indicate exactly 1-rhat he means . It is better to say that consciousness 
is not phenomenal reality at all, and is mental . 
This does not mean that the phenomenal is entirely non-mental. But 
phenomena are non-mental viewed from the aspect of phenomena. Viewed 
from the consciousness or 1we 1 side they are significant and have a 
'mental' aspect. There is a sort of 'imvard 1 part of the communication 
of phenomenal reality ''rith our bodies that is mental, namely, awareness. 
And without this awareness the communication of phenomenal reality would 
not mean anything, not even communication. For even the term 'mental' 
seems too broad (because there are phenomene..l implications in it) to 
distinguish consciousness (or awareness) from phenomena. The term 
'sensation ' doesn't make the i ssue sun- clear either . I n saying that 
"consciousness is not phenomenal reality at all 11 43 one must hasten to 
say that consciousness and phenomena cannot be considered adequately 
if wholly separated from each other. But one can abstract either from 
the other to emphasi ze what is meant by these necessarily inseparable 
terms. 
43. At top of this page. 
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B. Grote avoids a basic blunder in behaviorism . 
V.Te have said that using the term 'sensation' is not clarif;ying 
the issue. Even though vre analyze sensation into 'sensing ' and •thing 
sensed,' this does not sufficiently render Grote 's meaning . For even 
'sensing' can be looked at behavioristically only. This seems to be 
one of the great blunders of behaviorism. It should grant that there 
is an al'rareness without which behaviorism wouldn't ~ anything at all. 
It is this meaning that Grote refers to as 'philosophy,' and alludes to 
by such terms as 'intelli ence, ' 'l1ill, ' and even such a term a.s 1 sen-
sing' (and the much vaguer term, •sensation') when these latter terms 
are stripped of behavioristic elements . The elements in the whole 
noetic process that comprise 'philosophy' are •extra-phenomenal,' the 
balance are phenomenal. Grote \v-ould seem to have as little use for 
Ding-an-sich as Kant did. 
9. Kant's abstraction of phenomenal reality 
from reason 
i. Kant stresses reason 
It is quite 'impossible wholly to separate consciousness or the 
sensing of one's existence from phenomenal reality.44 Phenomena can 
be sensed but they cannot be completely knovm. Knowing, as awareness 
or intelligence, is a sort of response that we make .to the communica-
tion of the matter of nature upon our bodies (through the senses). 
44. By "consciousness or the sensing of one's existence" is meant 
simply awareness. This awareness is of phenomenal reality (including 
one 's ovm physical being). 
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Grote believes that Kant has erred in laying such great stress on a 
critique of reason to the neglect of that from which reason is insepar-
able, namely, phenomenal reality. No such abstraction can be carried 
on with utmost fruitful result, according to Grote. Consideration of 
consciousness, or ho\v we came to knm•r, cannot be separated entirely 
from 1·rhat we do knmv. 45 Yet this is what Kant has, at least, sometimes, 
apparently done, for he sought "to disengage the action of intelligence 
from al l application and actual use of it, and to see what it is in 
itself. 1146 
ii. Concerning the disengaging of "the action of 
intelligence from all application and actual use of it " 
To say that Kant disengaged 11 the action of intelligence from all 
application and actual use of it 11 and 11to see what it is in itself" is 
not objectionable in one sense. For one can take intelligence by itself 
even though one may not grant that there could be intell igence of any 
significance without an empirical world i n which it might develop. It 
must be taken for granted, then, that the intelligence which Kant ' takes' 
is an intelligence that already is so intervwven ,,fi th empirical elements 
and dependent on these that we cannot tal{e it 11by itself . 11 .And if, by 
'intell i gence' we mean intelligence already partially born of the em-
pirical world, then, in this sense it is objectionable 11 to disengage the 
45 . Consciousness for Grote is wholly knowing. "Consciousness, excluded 
from phenomenalism, I now assume as the one thing which we do know or are 
certain of." Grote, EP, I, 18. "The 1we' ·or 1I 1 of conscioosness is 
something quite different from the 1we' or 'I , ' 'man ' of phenomenalism, 
which, as I said, is a portion of matter organized and variously endowed, 
vdth phenomenal sensation ••• for one of its properties ." Grote, EP, I, 19. 
46 . Grote, EP, I, 18. 
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action of intelligence from all application and actual use of it 11 and 
seek 11 t o see what it is in itself . 11 
iii. Basic agreement betvTeen Kant and Grote 
If this latter interpretation of intelligence is considered, then 
Grote is correct in pointing out that intelligence is never separated 
'.-vholl_y from 1vhat he calls 1 phenomenal reality . 1 It is not so mucp a 
case , then, that Grote is correct and Kant wrong , or the reverse. The 
case is, rather, that there is essential agreement between them. Grote 
is especially concerned with pointing out that actually one can never 
separate intelligence from the matter of nature because there is a con-
stant cowmunication of thi s matter with the matter of our bodies, and 
this communication is phenomenal reality . And Kant is especially 
concerned with showing what one can find out by separating intelligence 
as ent irely as possible from 11 application and actual use of it. 11 There 
seems sufficient evidence from Kant's own treatment that intelligence 
cannot function in a vacumn, for example, he states that 11 thoughts with-
out content are empty .u47 
10 . Abstracting of consciousness from phenomena 
is unwarranted 
Let us novr consider the position that Grote would take if he were 
to crit "cize some epistemological theories in history. 
47. Kant, CPR, 93 . 
i. Descartes 
So far from believing in Descartes ' s maxim, Je pense, done je suis 
(cogito, erc;o sum),48 Grote -v:ould .affirm that the proof of or ovm. 
e~detence is no more justified by saying that we are conscious than a 
statement to the effect th~t t here is proof of the external world, is 
iustifi ed . There i s awareness in both cases- - of our bodies in the case 
of our ovm existence, and of other bodies in the case of the existence 
of the external world . Grote does affirm tha t the ' self - self, ' i s the 
only ent ty that is \./holly immediate . 49 
By the ' self- self ' I mean that which cannot r eal l y be thought of, 
i . e . , which cannot be made an object of thought, but which is 
with- thought (mitgedacht), thought along >·lith, or included in, our 
immediate thought and feeling, or which, in other words, is one of 
the essential elements of such thought or feelin~ . There is a sort 
of contradiction here , for by attempting to make the reader under-
st~d what i t is , I am making i t an obj ect of thought . 50 
There is a sense in which even our bodies are as much a part of 
phenomen 1 reality as any part of the extern 1 world is (a part of 
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phenomenal realit y ). The only portion of ourselves which is not phenom-
enal is our intelligence, cons ciou.~ ness, or awareness. And this non-
phenomenal, or- -as Grote sometimes refers to it-- extra- phenomenal aspect , 
is also necessarily present when we are conscious of t he external world . 
For Descartes to start with his mm existence as a thinking being 
first, as Grote implies, r ather than with phenomenal reality (first ) i 
to be guilty of abstra cting consciou ness (or, ' philosophy ') fr m that 
48 . Descartes, DOM, 26 , 27 . 
49 . Grote, EP, II, 145- 228 . 
50 . Grote, ££• cit. , p . 145 . 
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with which it is necessarily inseparable, namel y , phenomenal reality . 
The phenomenal has no meaning w~olly separated from consciousness • 
. Consciousness is empty without phenomena . Simpl e awareness that is 
a>·Tareness of avvareness, considered in the narrowest solipsistic sense , 
is scarcely worthy of being termed ' awareness. ' P~d if this critical 
r eflection be allowed, there is, therefore, still remaining the question, 
How do we know even that vie ~ (in any respect, mental or physical ?--
which is a critical comment on Descartes's first postulate (Cogito, ergo 
sum). This at least is Grote ' s criticism of Descartes . However, it is 
not justified, for the 'cogito• of Descartes includes all sense data. 
Descartes can scarcely be criticized on the ground that he abstracted 
consciousness from phenomenal reality. For he included phenomena in the 
apparent abstraction through the use of the phrase, 1 Cogi to, ergo sum.' 
Descartes believed that there was one absolutel y independent fun-
damental substance, in the sense that extended things and thinking things 
are not comprehensible in themselves but only are so in relation to cre-
ation by God . Extended things and thinking things are not comprehensible 
alone; the former are manifestations of extension and the latter of 
thought . Thought and extension are relative, and created, substances . 
For Spinoza ~ind and matter are reduced to attributes of one abso-
lute substance, the totality of reality , God. The attributes are the 
eternal essence of the one substance, and all finite things are modes 
of these attributes . For Descartes there are actually two relative sub-
stances , namely, thought and extension. These two run parallel and do 
not interact (except in the pineal gland). Generally , interaction 
between mind and matter was not intelligible to Descartes.51 
Descartes affirmed that an act of the will causes expression of 
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the body and an object of the external world causes an impression with-
in--a thought or sensation. The definite bifurcation which Descartes 
makes, giving two substances, thought and extension, is um;arranted. 
For extension, or the external world is not so utterly external as 
Descartes regarded it. For the so-called (by Descartes) external 
world is always, in some manner, communicating with our bodies whether 
it be in the adjacent form of motions of the atmosphere as one sits in 
a room or something as remote as the bursting of a toy balloon by a 
native on the island of Java . 
The point is that the external world is not completely external at 
all. It is a vrorld whose significance is exhausted in the communication 
th~t it makes with our senses, nerves, brain, etc., through the matter of 
our bodies. Our knmving of the external world is possible because of 
awar eness of this communication. 
In fact, there is no external world worthy of being called by any 
term except the communicating world. Any other existence is the world 
of' things in themselves of which •tie can neither speak nor think (nor 
writ e) ! This communication, involving things communicating, and that to 
which they communicate, includes all that Descartes referred to as ex-
t ended things. 
51 . "The world is made up of two ultimately different kinds of reality. 
Descartes • • • had an uneasy feeling about tr~s situation, for it ren-
dered interaction bet ween mind and matter unintelligible to him. " 
Brightman, ITP, 222. 
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In short, it is phenomenal reality, which together vnth the extra-
phenomenal character of intelligence, comprises all that is on earth, 
or sea. The difficulty vli th Descartes 1 s bifurcation betv1een thought 
and extension is that it is altogether too deci sive . Grote would re-
flect, it seems safe to state, that the inseparable elements of con-
sciousness and phenomena ,are a suf ficient explan~tion . In this comment 
on Des cartes ' s philosophy the assumption i s that some such criticism 
as thi s would be made by Grote. 
ii. Spinoza 
Let us now look ~t some possible comments that Grote wollid make on 
s:rinoza Is philosophy . Spinoza tried to bridge the gap betvleen thought 
and extension through the introduction of attributes and modes. There 
are bvo known attributes of substance , thought and extensi on . For 
Descartes there vias a problem of two substances inter c:.cting in an auto-
matic manner. Spinoza--introducing modes of thought and modes of exten-
sion--states that substance could be a mode of thought from the aspect 
of mind, and a mode of extension from the aspect of matter. This explan-
ation virtually set up a parallelism where no interaction is possible. 
Grote would seem to hold that Spinoza •s solution of the mind-body 
problem was not much more successful than Descartes's. For we are still 
l eft wi th the internal and the eA~ernal worlds . He would appear to hold 
t hat Spinoza •s system was better in that it regarded substance as one. 
To say that there are two knmm attribut es helps greatly in giving the 
particularity that we would expect of a cosmic system dealing with the 
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variety of life which expresses itself in thinking , extension, particu-
lar objects, etc. But Spinoza's philosophy doesn't show how t he modes 
of extension and modes of thou,sht actually interrelate. It seems that 
at this particular point Grote presents a solution. All so-called ex-
t ended objects, according t o him, are phenomena, and all phenomena 
conuillmicate v'ri t h us; also, we are aware of at least some of the communi-
cat ion. Both the communication of which we are aware, and the communica-
tion of 1t1hich v<e are not avv-are, is phenomena. 
11. Historical recapitulation 
Gr ote believed that Descartes went further ·than Locke, Cousin-and 
Hu..rne. Because cogi to j ergo sum formed the basis for Descartes 1 s episte-
mology, then, Descartes argued, there must be a non-ego, or 'circum-ego ' 
to vJhich such thought conforms~ Descartes believed that this non-ego 
was God along vrlth created substance, according to Grote. 
It should be noted, ho1-Jever, that Descartes's argument may be more 
properly, in pa:!:'t, stated thus: C-od must exist because I have a clear 
and distinct consciousness of Him, and the idea of perfection that I 
possess of the deity involves the deity's existence. .And the inference 
can be made from the existence of God to the existence of corporeal 
bodies and finite selves. Grote, in fastening on one part of Descartes's 
ar gument, namely , upon the •cogito• of •cogito, ergo sum 1--and saying 
that Descartes tends to abstract consciousness from 'pl:enomenal reality' - -
seems to be considerably less than wholly fair to Descartes's whole po-
sition. 
God, for Descartes, accotints for the conformity of thought to ex-
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tended things. Desce.rtes asserted this in the form, namely, God would 
not deceive us by having the case otherwise. Cousin blamed Locke, Grote 
states, for attempting to make i deas, or thought, conform to fact. But 
this method, of representation, which Locke employed, was closer to 
De s cartes's than Cousin ' s was. Even though Locke denied the existence 
of innate ideas, his approach was the same as Descartes's, namely, in 
att 3mpting to find a congruence between thought and things . Cousin de-
clared that thought in conformity with human nature is knowledge . There-
fore, Cousin fell into almost the same error as Hume who declared know-
ledge to be congruent with human custom. 
Both Cousin and Hume stated , in effect, according to Grote, that 
custom furnished the basis for knowledge. But Locke's and Descartes's 
vie1" was ver;y- much different and more fundamental because based for all 
practical purpos~s on Descartes ' s dicttun, cogito, ergo sum--a pillar 
which remained unshattered until the time of Kant who criticized thought 
in the light of pure reason. 
Grote asserts that Berkeley regarded the world as we see it to be 
an inspiration from deity . 
Hume is content to leave lmowledge as customary thought, without 
any care to examine t he nature of this custom. In the same way 
Berkeley sees no difficul ty, and nothing requiring further probing, 
in the consideration that two notions, both of which may fairly Qe 
called natural, in so far as actual human thought indicates human 
nature--the vul ·ar notion, namely, of the independent existence 
of an unlmown substance underlying what we properl y perceive--that 
these t uvo apparently natural notions are prejudices only and not 
correct; while what is correct is something which the natural, 
habitual, actual thought of men certainly does not realize at all, 
viz. that our thought as to vrhat vie cnll the external 1"orld is a 
quasi-inspiration of the Deity .52 I am not disputing Berkeley's 
being to a great extent right, which I believe him to be: my 
point only is, that he leaves the question where no philosopher 
has a right to leave it.53 
Grote also held that Berkeley's reference to things as divine 
language does not help us: 
Things are themselves, or they are nothing : if they are God's 
words to us, ns there is no harm in considering them, they are 
this in virtue of their being things,54 and we come most to enter 
into the meaning of them as God's words by the most thoroughly 
considering them as things, in the sense in which our mind or 
nature leads us to view things.55 
vfuat the vulgar have conceived as things, the wise conceives as 
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a language, i.e. as signs of things . Berkeley ' s favorite metaphor 
of language is here singularly unhappy. Though there is no harm 
in calling the external vwrld a language of God to us, there is 
no good in doing so, if we stop 1,..,.here Berkeley stops, for it is a 
language entirely unknmm to us. He have the letters and words, 
and are told they are signs: but hmv are >·re to find out of ,,rhat? 
We perversely think the letters and 1vords the things, and then 
we are told they are not so, but we are not told what it is of 
1<1hich they are signs, so that vve are left 1.;ithout things at all, 
only ,,rith a language telling us nothing.56 
In saying that there is no harm in considering things as divine 
language , or, as Grote states, 1 God 1s words,' Grote shows his preference 
for considering things as •things .' In other words, Berkeley says things 
are divine language; Grote says •things ' are such considered from the 
phenomenal aspect. But they are always, also, things for us, and they 
can never be 'things' out of all r elation to us. In speaking this ~:my 
52 . 
53. 
54. 
being 
55. 
56. 
I te.lics mine. 
Grote, EP, II, 37. 
Or, as Berkeley v!ould likely say, rather : 
ideas .' 
Grote, .EP, II, 39. 
Grote, ~· cit., pp . 39, 40 . 
1In virtue of their 
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Grote is humanistic in his epistemology . Berkeley is theistic in a 
v.ray that Grote sees 1no harm in, 1 yet "He come most to enter into the 
me~ning of them as God's \mrds by the most thoroughly considerin6 them 
as things." 
Grote sees a similQ.rity between Descarte m1d Berl~eley in their 
c.pproach t o the problem of ~mmdedge from vrhat he calls the philosophical 
(in contrast to the phenomenal) . .And from his assumption, ' cogito, ' 
Descartes came to yet another which was much-less worthy, namely, 11 I 
judge this conclusion to be true only because I clearly see it to be 
so: therefore clear mental sight is the test of truth. n57 The similar-
ity appears in t he phrase ttclear mental sight" of Descartes; Ber keley 
as serted the oneness of.c:.ppearance and reality . To take clear mental 
sight as the test of truth is vrhat is responsible for 1mis'- psychology. ' 
Hallucination can res'.llt; clear mental si ht is a good criterion when 
it is clear mental sight, but if it is thought to be so when it is 
really not, error creeps in . Hence the very evident possibility of 
'mis- psychiogy . ' Grote states that this lack of ability to see all the 
implications in his theory of knm'lledge vras in Berkeley 2. f ault only 
similar to that of a long line of successors in the Cartesian philosophy, 
and one in 'trhich Descart es himself had become i nvolved . 
57. Grote, EP, I I , 41. 
12. Main contribution of the chapter, 
wi th coro.ment 
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Nmv, leaving the ve.rious illustrati ons of the relati on of phenome-
nalism to philosophy, which Grote derives from his references chiefly 
to Kant, Descartes, and Berkeley, l et us note the main contribution of 
this chapter . Both phenomena and ' phil osophy ' are opposite sides of 
t he same reality . This reality is not properly regarded wholly as 
phenomenal reality, nor is it suffi cient to refer to this reality as 
adequately accounted for by the term ' philosophy, ' ' logic, ' or 
'consciousness. ' 
Not ' phil osophy ' ~ phenomena, but ' philosophy ' and phenomena, can 
adequately account for r eality. 'Philosophy ' or consciousness is that 
which gives significance or meaning to the reali ty that is ' seen, ' ' felt, ' 
or 'sensed. ' Consciousness must ahrays be consciousness of something, 
whether an ' external ' object or of the self. Consciousness as complete 
immediateness does not exist . I t entails phenomena of some sort, whether 
these phenomena be external ' ob j ects ' or selves. So much for reality 
considered from the consciousness , or thought, si de . Let us novl view 
reality more specifical y from the phenomenal side . 
It should be noted that the phenomenal of Grote is very different 
from t e viev.r of the phenomenal as 11the object as it appears t o the 
senses .n 58 The phenomenal, or phenomenal reality, for Grote is simply 
58. Brightman, ITP, 389 . 
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reality vievJ"ed from the side of 1 things. 1 Strictly, however, reali t;y-
can not be viewed entirely from the side of things since such viewing 
involves consciousness. Phenomena, therefore, are intimately related 
to consciousness, 'philosophy,' or •us.' Phenomena, fer Grote, can 
not •appear' to the senses at all. •Appearance' is a thought word. 
That is , phenomena are always related somehow ~' othe:n'lise they 
would not be phenomena for us at all. And they couldn't, in that case, 
•be , ' or exist out of all relation to the consciousness, or thought 
side of us, which alone justifies the use of the word 'existence,' or 
'being,' as applied to reality. 
13. Transition to next chapter 
Having already considered Grote's view of phenomenalism in chapter 
two, and his interpretation of the relation of phenomenalism to 
' philosophy' in chapter three, let us now consider specifically 
'philosophy' itself , as consciousness and the ego. 
CHAPTER IV 
PHILOSOPHY AS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EGO 
1. Introduction 
In considering ' philosophr 1 itself , as consciousnes and the ego, 
let us turn first of all to a philosopher in history who is a good e~c-
ample of those who confuse ' philosophy ' and phenomena to a remarkably 
small degree, namely, James Frederick Ferrier. We will also deal briefly 
with consciousness as revealed throu h the ego of Fichte and Lotze , show-
ing points of strength and possible weakness (according to Grote) in 
e&ch. First of all, t hen, vre vrill consider the philosophical and the 
phenomenalist views as clearly distinguished by Ferri er. 
2. Ferrier ' s treatment of philosophy and phenomenalism 
i. The philosophical and the phenomenalist views clearly dis -
tinguished by Ferrier 
The valuable point in htr. Ferrier, in ffi"J view, is, as I have said, 
his consistency in distinguishing what I have called the phi oso-
phical and the phenomenalist view. l 
Grote is careful to aclmowledge Ferri er' s invulnerable position on 
the i ssue of distinguishing 'philosophy,' from ' phenomena. ' He, never-
theless, comments upon Ferrier ' s manner of presentation in Institutes 
of Metaphysics, and points out both what seems tenable and what is not . 
To this task Grote now proceeds . 
Grote states that to say an~~hing is an object before it i s an 
object to somebody is to deal in meaningless terms . The subject, says 
1. Grote, EP, I , 71. 
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Ferrier , sho1ld be thought with the object.2 
~1/hen Mr. Ferrier says that we think the sub ject with the object, I 
rather question the term 1ob ject 1 in this application: if, till the 
s bject is added to it, there is no knowledge, it is not as yet, or 
itself, the object. ~nd Mr. Ferrier hardly sufficiently explains 
whether he means to pass from the notion of ourselves as kno,Ning, 
or from knm>~ledge being 11 knowledge that we know, 11 which of itself, 
I thin ~ , is not very i mportant, to the notion o.f ourselves, or part 
of ourselves, known i n the object, 1·rhich is the important one. I t 
is t his which really leads on, in the chain of thought, to the no-
tion of knowledge being the meeting , through the intervention of 
phenomenal matter and the conversion of it into intellectual objects, 
with the thoughts, proceeding in the opposite direction, of mind or 
a mind like our ov..m, however, viider and vaster.3 
The view adumbrated in the last sentence of the preceding quotation 
i s the view which , though here attributed with doubtful accuracy 
to Ferrier, is avowedly ac cept ed by Grote himself. 4 
ii. S bject-object relation 
'Ti t h Ferrier 1 s position as stated above, namely, 11 that we think 
t he 3ubject with the object, 11 Grote agrees. But Grote adds that in 
the application here, of 'object,• he rather questions the term. 
By the object of knovdedge, we are, of course, to understand the 
whole object of knowledge, whatever that may be at any particular 
time. I t is quite possible for the rPind to attend more to one part 
of any given presentation than to another. The mind does indeed 
usu lly attend most t t hat part of every presentation which is 
col1JI1lonly called the thing . But the part so attended to is not the 
whole object; it is not properly the object of our knowledge. It is 
only par t of the object,- the object being that part together with 
t he other part of the preserrt&tion (self, namely, or the subject) 
Vlhi ch is usually less attended to, but which is necessary to com-
plete every datum of cognition. I n other 1-lords, the object, usually 
so called, is only part of the object of the IDinct, although it may 
be that part which is most attended to. Tne object, properly so 
2. Cunningh m, IAB, 69. 
3. CtULningham, op . cit., pp . 69, 70; quoting Grote, EP, I, 67, 68. 
4 . Cunningham, I AB, 69, 70. 
c lled, is always the object vrith the addition of the subject, 
because this alone is the 1trhole object of our aprrehension .5 
The mind, Ferrier states, is "itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-
/ 
apprehends ._" 0 
The me must in all cases form part of that which we know; and the 
only-object which any intelligence ever has, or ever ce.n have any 
cognisance of is, itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-apprehends.? 
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Here , 1vlhatever-it - apprehends 1 is the 1object' which Grote questions. 
There is for Ferrier a subject-object relationship. Grote observes, 
uite correctly, that there is a danger in writing in this way. The 
perilous shoals appear around the bend when one becomes aHare that until 
there is a subject attached to the ' object, • there can be no knowledge, 
nor can there actually be an 1object. 1 That is to say, an object cannot 
be known until it is knmm to someone. 'l'here is significance, then, in 
the reflection, that 
Ferrier hardly sufficiently explains whether he means to pass from 
the not· on of o rselves as knowing , or from knmvledge being 'knolrr-
ledge that we know, ' which of itself, I think, is not very important, 
to the notion of o rselves or part of ourselves, knovm in the object, 
which is the important one.8 
\tJhat Grote is concerned ·about here is, again, his distinction be-
tween 'philosophy' and phenomenalism. •'lbe notion of ourselves as know-
ing 1 is ' philosophy' which Grote identifies as consciousness·. It c:lso 
seems to be a correct reflection to me..ke, namely, that the passing from 
5. Ferrier, IOM, 98, 99 . 
6. Loc. cit. 
7. Ferrier,~· cit., p. 98. 
B. Grote, EP, I, 67. 
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knowledge as 11mowledge that we knov1 1 is not very important. Because 
1knov'lledge that we kno'I>I 1 embraces confusion of the 'object' and the sub-
ject . 'rJhereas 1 the notion of ourselves as knowing' is 'philosophy. ' 
Grote related further that taking this consciousness as the stG:.rt-
ing- point i-Ie pass to something which i s the more significant part, 
namely, to the "part of ourselves , knovm in the object, 1-vhich is the 
important one." 
It is this which leads on, in the chain. of thought, to the notion 
of knowledge being the meeting, thrm.).gh the intervention of phenom-
enal matter and the conversion of it into intellectual objects, with 
the thoughts, proceeding in the opposite direction.9 
Thoughts 'proceeding in the opposite direction' to 'phenomenal matter' 
are the f~ctors which make possible the 1part of our selves kno•vn in the 
object.' 'Phenomenal mntter 1 is not present in consciousness. Its 
phenomenal nature, 9.ua phenomenal, is at the furthest extreme from con-
sciousness. One might say that 'phenomenal matter' is aLmost dissociated 
from us, but it cannot be wholly dissociated, otherwise it would not be 
' phenomenal matter' for us at all. It is reality seen as much as pos-
sible from the aspect of phenomenal reality (in contrast with the aspect 
of 'philosophy' at the other extreme) . To use the terms 'subject• and 
'object• without qualification is to leave much room for ambiguity . 
Hence Grote is careful to qualify each term throughout his discussion 
of the subject-object relationship. 
Grote asserts that Ferrier is sometimes confused in respect to 
9. Grote, EP, I , 67, 68. 
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subject-object, especially in his presentation of it, and yet Ferrier 
recognizes that 'philosophy ' and phenomena should not be wholly ab-
stracted from each other. 1his recognition is evident where Ferrier 
points out two common misapprehensions. 1hese 
are chiefly of two kinds; the one th t this process of logic or 
thought is an actual, historical (imagined) production on our part 
of things from nothing, a creation: the other that in such pro-
cesses, alongside of our thought, we are to suppose things already 
existing as we kn011 them. But these misapprehensions are in reality 
confusions between what I have called the philosophical and the 
phenomenalist point of view, of the kind which I have endeavored 
to prevent.lO 
Grote is aware of the misapprehensions or confusions of the philosophi-
cal and phenomenal points of vie1.v. Ferrier is also aware of these. 
Both see that one cannot speak of an object before it can be an object 
to anyone, that is, before the ob j ect has a subject which 1knows 1 or is 
conscious of it 1 
I t should be noted that the status of phenomena, whether in or out 
of consciousness, needs clarification. Phenomena and consciousness are 
both necessary in order to have reality . 1his reality can be viewed 
either from the consciousness (or thought) side, or phenomena (or 'object ') 
side. The point is that reality is one; this is a very important feature 
to observe. All reality must be for consciousness, or for us, in some 
way, otherwise it could not be reality. This reality (or phenomena) re-
quires consciousness to be regarded as reality or phenomena at all. In 
this sense phenomena, qua consciousness, is in consciousness. 
10. Grote, EP, I, 55, 56. 
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But one must be careful here. For phenomena, qua phenomena, are out 
of consciousness. And the whole view is that reality has these two as-
pects to it . Phenomena cannot be phenomena (or 'ohjects ' ) at all without 
consci ousness. Nor does it seem possible that consci ousness c n be ut-
terly and wholly separated from phenomena; on this point Grote expounds 
at consi derable length .11 In this dissertation a complete ch_pterl2 is 
devoted to this issue, under the topic, "Immediateness and Reflection . " 
iii. The ego and the non- ego 
Let us now consider the subject and object, and their relation, under 
the terms ' ego ' and 'non- ego, ' in order to see if Ferrier provides a good 
illustration of the relationship between what Grote calls ' philosophy ' 
and 'phenomena . ' For Ferrier, Grote thinks, succeeds very well'in keeping 
t .. ese two fundamental aspects of ' philosophy ' and phenomenal reality sep-
ara.te; the terms Ferrier uses chiefly are , ' subject 1 and •ob ject. 1 Grote 
believed >vith Ferrier, that t he distincti on between these hro, the ego and 
the non- ego is of great :Lrn.portance . The road of objective ·knowledge is the 
course of the growth of t he non- ego in conjunction with the ego . The non-
ego for Grote is that which contrasts with consciousness . I t is the other 
side of reality from the abstracted mental side. It does not exist by it-
self . I t is the universe of what is sometimes referred to as 'physical 
things .; .' As i t is grov.rs, consciousness, as ego, grOliS. 'Each is necessary 
to the other . 
The course of objective knm-1ledge i s the growth of the non- ego, vlhich 
from the first, i n conjunction with the ego , we are conscious of, 
into distinctness . The spring or start in this course is given by 
(what I suppose 1\Te must consider a primary fact of all intelligence) 
the attribution, in the first instance, to each one of these 
11. Grote , EP, II, 145- 228. 
12 . Chapter VIII. 
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members of the form of thought under v.rhich we view the other: i.e . the 
attribution of ob·ective knowableness to our felt self, and the attri-
bution of subjective knowingness or mind to the non-ego. The latter 
of these two f acts is the spring of objective knowledge .l3 
1be sprin of objective knowledge has its origin in the projection of our-
selves into the non- ego of conf~sion which Ferrier calls 'nonsense' or 
' the contradictory.' Let us see hovr this takes pl ace by considering 
'sensation. 1 Sensation regarded as "grown intellectual sensation 1114 may 
be regarded as the subjective state corresponding to which, there is the 
object or quasi- object. This object is the 'non- ego of confusiontl5 
which Ferrier calls 'the contradictory ' or 1nonsense . 1 
The unity which i s given to the 1 contranictory, ' and which we ob-
serve in the non-ego, is a. projection or an extension of our subjective 
selves. Thus there is that "which gives law to the disorderly mass . 1116 
This knowin~ness attributed to the non- ego is the starting-point f or ob-
jectivity in the non- ego conceived in conjunction Nith this kno-vJingness. 
Grote does not appear to make hi position much clearer by referring 
to the ego and the non-ero of • errier . But tl-:e., e :i c a manner f e::~rres-
Qion in Ferrier that attract Grote . I t seems that Grote agrees with 
Ferrier thc:.t there is a 'non-360 of confusion' and that this is the 'ob-
j ect' before t he sel f is projected into it. 
There are t-vro features here that seem important for Grote. The 
first is that it is not quite a case of a 'non- ego of confusion' before 
13. Grote, EP, I , 56, 57. 
14. Grote, £E• cit., p. 57 . 
15. Loc. cit. 
16. Loc . cit . 
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the self i s projected into w_atever this 'confusion' could be for 
Ferrier . Ratter; for Grote, the 'non- ego of confusion' i s nothing at 
all out of relation with the self. The second feature is that Grote 
believes that the mind furnishes unity. ·· And \vhat Ferrier says about the 
original 'non-ego of confusion , ' before the self is ' projected' into it, 
s ems t o shaH the essenti&l unifying nat ure of consciousness. 
There is a sense, then, in vrhich this non-ego is unh'Tiown to humanity. 
I t is not objectivity, for the objective requires a subject or ego vlith-
out which \'le cannot properl:r speak of the objective at all. 'I'his is the 
'nonsensical ' or 1 contradi~tory 1 to which Ferrier refers.l7 For Grote, 
the non-eg as 'nonsensical• or 'contradi ctor y ' (to use Ferrier's terms ), 
is simply non- existent. In other words, it is \vi thin what Grote vrould 
call--if it were to exist for him- -ph9nomenal f act. But i t doesn 't exist 
for Grote, and to call i t the 'nonsensical' int o which t he self is pro-
jected (as Ferrier states ), is to give t o t hi s 'nonsensical' the existence 
Nhich Grote does not admit that i t should have. 
This act of projecting self into the unknown, or into tl:.is r ealm of 
phenomenal fact (which strictly is not necessaril y not unknmm) is simi-
l ar to our first tminstructed acts of consciousness. We perceive mind 
or r eason, Gr ote believes, follo·ring Ferrier, in the universe somewhat a s 
the child may imagine animation in inanimate objects around itself. Grote 
hol ds that this ~rejection of self into phenomena and consequent obser-
vance of unity and coordination in respect to i t , is similar to the very 
17. Ferrier, IOM, 503. 
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first acts performed by the child in gaining a conception of the world 
about i t. 
Grote's positi on here is simply, that phenomenal reality is always 
rel ted to consciousness, or with us in some w y, and necessariLy so, 
since it becomes knowledge (for us). That is, the world of phenomenal 
fact may be exceedingly c.isconnected but it is not thus th t it is seen . 
This is the point which Ferrier, too, wishes to make. Grote states his 
essential agreement with Ferrier on this issue.l8 
3. Critici m of Grote and Ferrier on the basis of 
Lotze's position 
i. The Non-Ego is not essential to the Ego 
Let us turn now to crit "cal reflections on Grote nnd Ferrier by con-
sidering part of Lotze 's view of the Ego and the Non-~go. Lotze discusses 
the chief objections \vhich have been put forward concerning belief in the 
ey-istence of an Ego, apart from the existence of a Non- Ego. His argument 
is followed here to show the possibility of the existence of the Ego with-
out the existence of a Non-Ego to make it poss ible. Thus we may consider 
briefly the Ego and the Non-Ego in relation to the Personality of God. 
An Ego (or Self, I ch) is not thinkable without the contrast of a Non-
Ego or Not- Self ; hence personal existence cannot be asserted of God 
without bringing even Him down to that state of limitation, of being 
conditioned by something not Himself , which is r epugnant to Him.--
The ob jections that speculative knowledge makes to the personality 
of C~d f all back upon this thought; in order to estimate their im-
portance , we shall have to test the apparently clear content of the 
18. In all of this epistemological treatw~nt Grote is concerned, of 
course, with vrhat R. B. Perry refers to as •the ego-centric predicament.• 
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proposition which they take as their point of departure . For un-
ambiguous i t is not; it may be intended to assert that what the term 
Ego denotes can be comprehended in reflective anal ysis only by ref-
erence to the Non-Ego; it may also mean that it is not conceivable 
that thi s content of the Ego should be experienced without that con-
trasted Non- Ego being experienced at the same time ; finally, it may 
point to the existence and active influence of a Non-Ego as the con-
dition withm1t 11hich the being upon which this influence works could 
not be an Eao.l9 0 
Now, G:;.~ote does not admit the possibility of the existence of the Ego 
without the existence of Non-Ego to make it ~oss ible. In f act , Grote 
would e other terms fo r ·rhat seems to hi m to be essential in episte-
mology, namel y, phenomena and ' philosophy. 1 l}!'ote would hold, if he were 
to discuss the pr oblem with Lotze, that there is too much involved in the 
'Ego ' to be useful in epistemology . There are, Grote would say, imrnedi-
<lte and r eflective (or mediate ) elements i n it. If the Ebo is reflective 
then there is ' philosophy ' and phenomena present , a s the t~ro aspects in 
Hhich the one reality of the E o may be vieNed. 
Again , if the Ego ~rere taken as r epres enting the self '.ihich involves 
consciousnes, 'thought, ' or ' philosophy,' t hen the complete reality must 
i nclude the Non-Ego as phenomena . Beth ' phil osophy ' and phenomena are 
e sential to each other, so it would be incorrect on Grote ' s view to say 
that t he Non-Ego is not neces s<1r y in order to m ke the Ego possible. 
The }<~go cannot stand alone , for -rote, if he ·Tere to us,e the terms Ego 
and Non-Ego . However, h 'vould not use these terms since he wou d feel 
that t hey were inadequate to deal with what is involved in epistemology . 
19 . Lotze, ~rr c , II , 678. 
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TI1e third objection must be considered more fully. Lotze does not 
believe that Fichte 1 s insistence on a Non-Ego is vmrth ccnsidering. 
Fichte 1 s theory 1·1as the 11 Anstoss 11 or shocl< of collision (with the Non-
Ego) in >-rhich self- consciousness arises. 
Selfhood, the essence of all personality, does not depend upon any 
opposition that either tas happened or i s happening of the Ego to " 
Non-Ego, but it consists in an immediat e self- existence which con-
stitutes the basis of the possibility of that contrast 1vherever it 
appears. Self-consciousness is the elucidation of this self- exis-
tence \vhich is brought about by meo.ns of knowledge, and even this is 
by no means necessarily bound up with the distinction of the Ego 
from a Non-Bgo which :i_ s substantially opposed to it .22 
In the nature of the finite mind as such is to be f ound the reason 
why the development of its personal consciousness can t. ke place 
only through the influences of that cosmic whole which the fin "te 
being itself is not, that is through stimulation coming from the 
Non-Ego, not because it needs the contrast with something alien in 
order to have self- exi.stence, but because in this respect, as in 
every other, it does not contain in itself the conditions of its 
existence. We do not find this limitation in the being of the 
Infinite; hence for it alone is there possible a self- existence, 
which needs neither to be initiated nor to be continuously developed 
by something not itself, but which maintains itself within itself 
with spontaneous action that is eternal and had no beginning.23 
Nov.J, it appears that both Fichte and Lotze were concerned v-rith the 
Ego and the Ncn-Ego from a more cosmological vie-..Tpoint than Grote. Grote 
is chiefly concerned with epistemological considerations . He discusses 
the personality of God ver-;1 little, and Nhere he does spec..k of God it is 
more in a traditionally puritanical sense designed for audiences unfamiliar 
>·lith a more rational theology, as in an article entitled 110n a Future 
state .1124 
22 . 
23. 
24. 
Lotze, 1ITC, II, 687 . 
Lotze, ~· cit., pp. 687, 
CR(l87l), XVIII, 134 . 
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But the 90int is, as far as Grote's philosophy is concerned, whether 
the self as consciousness is possible witho1...t considering what consciousness 
is of. To this question Grote answers with an emphatic 'No.' Lotze would 
seem to disagree by bringing up the case of •the personality of God.' Grote 
would say to Lotze that this illustration does not sufficiently bear upon 
the epistemological problem. Likewisej he would sc.y the same t o Fichte 
who held that the Non-Ego is necessary to the existence of the Ego , even 
though Fichte 1 s viev/ and Lotze 1 s were very contrary to each other. 
The vi el'r that the Ego requires the existence of a Non-Ego is also 
supported by the fact that the greater the variety and multitude of forces 
working, the more developed will the self or Ego be. Analogous with this 
self-existence is the Personality of God. 
Perfect Personality is in God only, to all finite minds there is 
allotted but a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is 
not a producing condition of this Personality but a limit and a 
hindrance of its development.25 
But care must be t aken not to make thought (or idea ) equivalent to 
the Personality of God. 'What is true of the human Ego is not necessarily 
true of the divine Ego. The human Ego may possess the necessary poten-
t ialities for sensations and feelings, yet require stimulus from without 
for their activity. With the theistic Ego t his is not the case , for this 
Ego contains 1dthin its own nature the causes of every stage of its de-
velopment. I t does not require what is not itself in order to be what 
25 . Lotze, MIC, II, 688. 
it is. 
This Infinite Being does not need--as vre sometimes, with a strange 
perversion of the right point of view, think--that its life should 
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be ca led forth by external deficiency whiGh seems to us to m~ ke such 
stimuli necessary for the finite being, and its active efficacy t hink-
able. The Infinite Being , not bound by any obligation to agree in 
any ~-1ay uith something not itself, will, with perfect self- sufficing-
ness, possess in its m·m nature the causes of every step forward in 
t he development of its life . 26 
The purpose of including Lotze 1 s view of the personality of God, v.as 
to consider the relationship of the Ego to the Non-Ego, and to see what 
difference, if any , such a consideration would make in regard to philosophy 
as consciousness . For consciousness is basic in the Ego and also fundamen-
t al in Grote ' s epistemology . To overlook all consideration of the Ego and 
the Non-Ego vlOuld scarcely seem appropriate in regard to v1hat Grote is deal-
ing Nith throughout the ~loratio Philosophica, namely, the problem of 
consciousnees as inseparably related to phenomena . 
iii. Human mind pro j ected into nature 
a . Not necessary for mind to project itself into nature 
Grote is not concerned with the affirmation or denial of roind or reason 
in nature . The mind, he says, is projected into nature . By this he means 
that, for example , the order tve see in nature is an order made possible be~ 
cause of the mind's action. Everything, he implies, is dependent upon 
being related to mind. If we want to call mind, the ' ego, ' Grote would 
seem to have no objection, unless he would hold that b calling it by the 
t erm ' ego ' we are much less decisive and descriptive than by using the term 
consciousness, ' philosophy , ' ' logic, ' •thought ,• or mind . 
~ Lotze, MIC, II, 683 . 
Through the projection of mind into nature, there is a constant cor-
recting going on, either t hrough contact with other minds, or through the 
making of advances in one ' s o•~ thought by oneself . This correcting leads 
to the eradicating of the projecting of ourselves irito nature. That is, 
phenomenal reality as communication exists even though we may not be aware 
of it. Phenomenal reality i s stil l reality even though conscious mind is 
not projected into it . 
In short, Grote is trying to show that nature considered as physical 
communication has no relation to the human mind . As purely physical there 
is nothing mental involved. Pure physical reality is devoid of any relation 
,,lith mind . Yet there is communication among purely physir.al things . But 
the communication as wholly material is utterly meaningless, for Grote . 
It is only ':lhen mind is projected into nature that meaning enters . \'ie can-
not speak or think of the ' purely physical .' Hence Grote's frequent refer-
ences to the crucial necessity of regarding consciousness and the phenomenal 
as abstractions from a reality that requires t hem both in order to be rea ity. 
b . No projection of mind in the complete vi er.r 
The complete view (which, of course, is impossible) for the hlunan know-
ing mind, would occur when a complete eradication of this projection takes 
place . One may see, then, "~J~rhat Ferrier means by the 'nonsensical ' or the 
'contradictory . ' It is that vrhich by itself, and apart from consciousness 
makes no sense . It is meanincless, •nonsense, • the •contradictory.' It is 
that condition that would exist if there were no projection at all of the 
Ego into the Non-Ego. Actually this condition, Grote maintains, is never 
reached. But if it vlere reached it would be in the region of phenomena--
utterly lacking in consciousness, but still fulfilling its role of 
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communication through the sens es with the body, and up to (but not far 
enough to include) consciousness . 
The 'nonsensical ' or ' contradictory ' could never be the complete view 
to us .. , But i t is the c omplete 1view 1 for phenomenalism- -to which one should 
add--granting that the phenomenal could be entirely divorced (which is not 
the case) from ' philosophy.' 
4. Meaning of ' knovt , ' and ' know about,' in reference to phenomenal realibr 
i . The knol'rin of phenomenal reality viewed in hro ways 
What is 'nonsensical' is meaningless ; if meaning were added it would 
no longer be the realm of ' nonsense.' Meaning, attributed to phenomenal 
reality, i. e . the knowing of phenomenal reality, may be looked at in tvw 
ways . First, we may ' lmow' objects, and, second , 1._re may 'know about ' them. 
1\ 
The former is yvtAJY«.t , nos cere, kennen, connaitre, the latter, ) !: I /O(;'("tft , 
scire, wissen, savoir . This knmdedge has been referred to as knowledge of 
acquaintance and knowledge of description, by Grote . The former implies 
that there is something already knovm and to kno\>1 is merely familiarity 1vith 
this knmm . It is the bodily communication with an ob j ect, e . g . , by means 
of the eye . The latter is more expressedly intellectual and does not ap-
pear so directly dependent upon the senses for its existence. It is judg~ 
mental, according to Grote . Phenomena refer to v1hat is in contact Ni th 
bodil r existence and yet is 1....-hat it is apart from any mind . Yet is i s 
possible f or mind to communicate 1d th it. But with things in themselves 
there is no possibility of conta t at all by mind and the;{ are not knovm 
to any -'"'r':lon in any form . ! f they could be manifeste to human intelli-
gence their nature would at once be c anged . 
Confusion betv1een what ue knol'i and what we knm-1 about, should be 
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avoided. Grote believes that Ferrier is not lucid here, as may be ob-
served from the follo~dng: 
I am not sure whether Mr . Ferrier, i n general so clear, is not in 
this particular othenv-ise, when he speal;:s of our knowled;?;e as the 
knowing ourselves as lmowing or apprehending, or the knowing that 
vie lmo'" and apprehend, the object of our knmvledge • • • he seems 
to lose sight of the necessity of giving an account of the last-
mentioned knowledge, or apprehension. Is the word 'know' in the 
two parts of the sentence used in the same or in different meanings? 
It appears to me that the notion of a difference between things in 
themselves, and things as 1ve know them arises in the main from the 
confusion together of these two views of lmowledge. 27 
_ii . 'Kno1", ' and 'lmovl about, ' in relation to 
phenomena and things i n -themselves 
I t seems safe to state, on Grote's vi ew, that if it were possible 
to have a notion of things in themselvGs, then knowledge would be complete 
so far as it went, however localized it might happen to be. And to have 
a notion of complete kno-vrledge would be to lmow things . If such a notion 
were actualized, then to say that we know about things cov.ld not be ad-
rnitted. One must speak of either one or the other but not both if one is 
allo-vwd to discuss knm"'"ing i n relG.tion to things in themselves at all. 
For if to kno,tT an object would be to !mow the thing in itself, then this 
knowing of the object \vould actually be the subject. Were the thing in 
itself completely known it could be an object to _no subject, but would 
be a subject to itself. In that case, to speak of 'knowing about' the 
object would be superfluous. 
27 . Grote, EP, I , 60, 61 . 
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5. Relativity of knowled ·e 
i. Knmvledge is essentially relative 
To deal with the relativity of knowledge ~ppears just as much be-
side the mark as to discuss lmowledge of things in themselves. Y,no,.r-
ledge, according to Grote, is itself relative. Communication betvreen 
the object and consciousness is essential. 'l'o say that knowledge is 
relative suggests that there is alread•r a sort of thing in itself that 
is related to mind. Relativit-r of knowledge also suggests a relation 
to a £_articular person. A word here might be given concerning the _er-
ror into which Sir Hilliam Hamilton falls. Hamilton's reference to the 
relativity of knowledge overlooks the necessary distinction that Grote 
mckes between the phenomenal and the philosophical views. To say that 
knowledge is relative in the sense in which Sir ~filliam Hamilton does 
is to affirm twice, and hence once unnecessarily. I\nowledge itself im-
plies relativeness. 
And since knmvledge is itself relative because there are the t1vo 
elements of 'philosophy' and phenomena involved, it is superfluous to 
say· again that this knowledge that· is relative is relative ! This is 
Grote' s criticism of Hamilton's remark that he (Hamilton) is going to 
consider 1in what sense human knowledge is relative.' 
In what sense human knowledge is relative,--F'rom v•hat has been said, 
you will be able , I hope, to understand what is meant by the proposi-
tion, that all our knowledge is only relative. I t is relative, (1) 
Because existence is not cogniz.able, absolutely and in itself, but 
only in special modes; (2) Because these modes can be lmown only if 
they stand in a certain relation to our faculties; and (3) Because 
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the modes thus relative to our faculties are presented to, and known 
by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties 
themselves.28 
ii. Misleading to speak of 'modes of existence' 
Sir William Hamilton refers to ever.ything known, as 'modes of 
existence.•29 This language tends to obscure the relation between mind 
and the object known. By 'modes of existence' he really means the var-
ious ways in which the thing in itself is presented to the mind through 
the senses. An equivalent to Hamilton's •existence' is •thing in itself.• 
Grote believes that the •thing in itself' is a logical figment and nothing 
more. 
The •thing in itself' if we use that language , or •existence' if we 
use Sir ~villi am Hamilton's, may be considered either as a simply 
logical entity, a manner of expression necessary for us because we 
wish to consider knowledge as the knowing about something , the 
forming of judgments, scientia-~in which case it is not the object 
of knowledge at all, but simply the logical subject of the judgments, 
and the notion of reality attaches not to it, but to the sum of what 
is and can be known about it: or it may beconsidered as the in-
tended object of the~ledge, what the mind, acting in the way of 
intuition, apprehension, kenntniss (not , i.e. judgment about ) is 
always aiming at, to whatever degree it succeeds. •Existence,' says 
Sir William Hamilton, in the passage already cited, •is not cognisable 
absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes. 130 
This is an attempt to describe what underlies that which we know, 11a man-
ner of expression necessary for us because we wish to consider knowledge 
_as the knowing about something, the forming of judgment, scientia. 1131 
What Hamilton in all likelihood did mean was that the thing in it-
self (•existence,' according to him) could really never be known, and 
28. Bowen, MWH, 95. 
29. Bowen, ~· ~., pp. 95-97. 
30. Grote, EP, I, 65. 
31. 12.£• cit. 
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that it could not exist except as a logical entity. In so considering 
•things in themsel;res ' Hamilton seems to me.:m i·rhat Kant does by 'noumena, t 
namely , ' intelligible entiti es. ,32 Reality does not attach to the 
thing in itself, but only to v.rhat can be knovm . Unfortunately , howe;rer, 
,e speaks of 'modes of existence, ' all of \·rhich may be kno-vm, and ;ret 
'existence ' (as he uses the term) itself could remain unkno1>m . \rlhere 
Hamilton uses the term 1 exist~nce, 1 Ferrier uses the term 'matter per se .' 
Ferrier prefers this term to ' thing in itself ' or to 'unknowable sub-
stratum. ' To Grote , ' matter per se ' seems to refer to something ~:;hich 
can be lmmm, even though Ferrier does not mean that it can be lmmm . But 
matter for Grote is never actually ' matter oer se. ' I t always is matter 
for us . •Matter per se ' is matter entirely separate from any human con-
sciousness . Such a term v-muld have no meaning for Grote . 'Per se ' is 
simply indicative of the view of reality from the side of phenomena. 
Ferrier ' s thought is acceptable in the eyes of Grote but not the 
language. Grote believes that not only the language is unfortunate but 
also \·lhen Ferrier speaks of "Agnoiology, ' or 11 theory of i gnorance" the 
terms are equally ill- chosen . Ferrier admits that we cannot knovr the 
thing in itself so v1hy speak of it as "matter per se" ? Also, we cannot 
be ignorant of it, so why refer to it as ' Agnoiology ' or ' theorJ of 
ignorance ' ? In other words to se.y that \'le know the thing in itself, or 
that \'le do not know it, is useless. All that can be said about our 
relati on to i t does not pertain to knowing, but rather to existence, or 
32. Kant, CPR, 267 . 
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11 our state in regard to it, 1133 if there is such a state which is neither 
i gnorance of the thing in iteelf nor knowledge of it. 
In reference to • • • his Agnoiology or theory of i gnorance 
His manner of thought here~ as I understand it, is one which might 
strike many roinds forcibly. '!Te do not knm;1 this 1thing in itself, 1 
to be sure , but then, on the other hand, v<e are not i ;;norant of it; 
our state in regard of it is not that of i gnorance, which is wh t 
all you who talk about it imply, and even say: it is no more ignor-
ance than it is lmowledge: if you can find a third alternative, 
that is our state in regard to it: if not, you have no more right 
to say, expressly or impliedly, that l're are ignorant of it, than 
I have to say we know it. This, as I understand, is in other lan-
guage what I meant h;r saying, that the notion of knmvledge is not 
appl icable to it: that there is nothing to knov1: that talkin;; of 
knowing it is like talking_ of eating light, or smelling sound: 
disparate, incongruous.34 
iii. Jvfisleading view presented by Ferrier in writing about 
the 'Primary Law of Condition of all Knouledge' 
Grote agrees with Ferrier when the latter states that the problems 
of philosophy are seen very differently to different people and Hamilton's 
reference to 1modes of existence' as virtual things in themselves, finds 
a cot nterpart in Ferrier's view cf a strictly personal philosophy. 
\•Then Ferrier refers to the difficulty of seeing 11 the true flesh-
and-blood countenance of a single philosophical problem," Grote agrees 
that 11no man, for the last t'No thousand years, has seen the true flesh-
ancl.-blood cotmtenance of a single philosophical problem. 1135 But Grote 
sees error in Ferrier v.rhen the latter refers to the possibility of rely-
ing, with ' perfect confidencet36 upon a 'strictly reasoned philosophy.' 
JJ. Grote, EP, I , 75. 
34. Grote, ~· cit., pp. 74, 75. 35 . Grote, ££.• cit., p. 69. Cf. Ferrier, I OM, 10. 
36. Loc. cit . 
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This posit4 on of Ferrier's is similar to Hamilton's and evident in the 
phrnse, ·~odes of existence,' used by the latter. 
But Nith his remedy I cannot agree: that is, with the applicability 
of it. We want, he says, strictly reasoned philosophy: and uhen we 
have it, we shall be so certain that we have it, it >vill be so 
evidently irrefragable , that we shall take our ground '.vith the most 
perfect confidence as a ainst all possible controversy.37 
Ferrier stated that, 
Besides the ego, or oneself, there is no other identical quali t ;;; in 
our cognitions- -as anyone may convince himself upon reflection. He 
will find that he cannot 1 y his f'ina-er upon anything except himself, 
and say- -This article of cognition I must know along with whe>.tever 
I know.38 
Grote objects that 'himself' is just ~-rhat 'he' cannot 1 lay his 
finger' upon--upon his body surely, but not on 'himself~' Grote holds 
that body (qua physical ) in this ccnnection is a part of phenomenal 
reality, and at the farthest extreme from consciousness. 
iv. •Ordinary' and •natural• thinking 
Though Grote is so greatly in ar.reement with Ferrier's main argu-
ment, namely that, the self must be apprehended along with the object, 
the ego requiring the non-ego, yet he cannot agree that this main argu-
ment, constituting as it does the basis for the philosophy of the 
Institutes of Metaphysic , is in essential agreement with what Ferrier 
professes is the role of philosophy. Ferrier speaks about 11 the plausi-
bilities of ordinary thinking, n39 and "that man does not naturally think 
37. Grote , EP, I, 69. 
38 . Ferrier, IOM, 80. 
39. Ferrier, ££· cit., p . 28. 
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2.r-Lght.u40 Against this position Grote directs a potent attack . Grote 
states in defence of ' ordinary thinking 141 that there are not so man -
plausi~ilities about it as there are in much philosophy . The reason for 
this statement i s that ' ordinary thinking ' in the estimation of Grote 
is only partially phenomenali stic and will therefore represent the round 
upon which thought vfill most likel;y- stand, and. the thought of many philos-
ophers is t horoughly phenomenali stic. 
Grote points out that Ferrier is right in his assertion that philos-
ophy exists for correction insofar as it prevents an overemphasis on 
either 'philosophy ' or 'phenomenalism. ' 
So f ar as phil osophy does exist for . cor ection ••• i ts use 
as to 1ordin ry ' thinking seems to be to prevent any tendency to 
>!hat I call •nat ionalism,' that is, to prevent people's thinking 
that the ' qualities,' •attributes ' &c . , which they talk about, a e 
the real things of the .universe. Similarly, its use as to 1natur al 1 
thinki ng would be to prevent phenomenalism trespassing , as I should 
call it, on morals and reli gion, and becoming positivism.42 
Grote further points out , in commentin on Ferrier 's position, 11 that 
the l anguage of ordinary intelligent communication among men is better 
than t he language of philosophers.u43 
There is a sense in which Ferrier is correct in stating that philos-
ophy s erves as a correction to •ordinary ' or 'natural • thinking . For by 
'natural ' t hinking Ferrier probably did not mean anything more than 
•ordinar; ' thi nking . That is, he asserts that naturally , or ordinarily , 
40 . Ferrier , IOM, 28. 
41. Loc . cit. 
42 . Grote, EP, I, 73. 
1:3 . Loc. cit. 
94 
man does not think correctly. If, by natural or ordinary thinking, he 
means any non-professional positivistic or naturalistic position , or 
pre-scientific thought , then philosophy should be a correction for this 
view. For such positivism (or naturalism) seems very limited in that 
it does not account for much beyond it, and does not escape the criti-
cism of being phenomenalistic . 
Hence, it is evident that Ferrier in holding this view regarding 
natural or ordinary thinking sees quite clearly the dcmger of over-
emphasis on phenomenal reality--a main weakness in phenomenalism as 
Ferrier and Grote use the term. Yet, on the other hand, Grote properly 
points out that philosophy is not a corrective for ordinary (or natural) 
t hinking when this latter thinking neither over-emphasizes 'philosophy ' 
nor 'phenomena.• Rather, Grote points out, philosophy can spoil this 
healthy thinking characterized as •ordinary' or •natural. • 
In either case--where Ferrier is correct (as pointed out above) 
and ~rhere Grote 's criticism of Ferrier is acceptable--one sees that both 
Ferrier and Grote do not lose sight of the distinction between 'philos-
ophy' and 'phenomenalism. ' Both seem to see quite clearly Nhat fre-
quently is overlooked in the histo~J of philosophy through specific em-
phasis resulting in pan- objectivism, correspondence, sense eA~erience, 
and many other theories. 
6. Stunmary of main issues 
Let us now recapitulate on the main issues presented in this chaper. 
Grote states that Ferrier is in essential agreement "Qth the distinction 
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which he himself makes betvJeen phenomenalism an.d 1 philosophy . ' The am-
bigui t ies evident in Ferrier's argument arise from his r ef erence t c 
knowledge in such a way that one cannot be sure whether he is stressing 
the 1 phil osophical' or the phenomenal c>.spect s. I t also seems not only 
in Ferrier ' s statements, but also in much of Grote's writing, there 
would be considerable more clarity if some use '.vas made of the ter ms 
'knm·ring 1 and 1 JrJlown. ' 
I t is interesting to note that Samuel Alexander attempts to be 
specific regarding the ' subject' nd •ob j ect' in knowledge . He st tes: 
11 There is no mental object as distinct from a physical object . 1144 
As an example '.vhich presents the least difficulty take the percep-
tion of a tree or a table . This situation consists of the act of 
mind Nhich is the perceiving ; the ob j ect which i s so much of t he 
thing call ed treo as is perceived, the aspect of it which i s pecu-
liar to that perception, let us say the appear~nce of the tree under 
these circumstances of t~e perception; an' t •. e tozet~P.rness or ccm-
~resence ;-vhich connects these bm di sti nct existences (the act of 
mind and the object) into the t otal situation called the experience. 
But the two terms are di fferently experienced. The one i s experienced, 
that is, is present in the experience, as the act of experiencing , the 
other a s that which is experienced. Tc use Mr . Lloyd Morgan' s 1-:appy 
notati on, the one is an -ing , the other an - ed. The act of mind i s 
the experiencin~ , the appearance, tree, is that upon which it i s 
directed, that of "rhich i t i s aware.45 
Both Ferr ier and Grote , as well as Alexander, Morgan, and many others, 
see clearly the danger in spealdng of ' subject• and ' ob ject' as though 
these terms could be used j.n abstraction from each other . 1;Jhere Ferri er 
fails Gr ote observes that f ailure is due chiefl y to Ferrier 's manner of 
presentation rather t han to a fundamental confusion of the philosophical 
/+4 • Alexander, S'lD, II , lll. 
45 . Alexander, ~· cit., pp. 11, 12 •. 
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and phenomenal aspects in epistemology. 
A further consideration of 'philosophy' as consciousness leads 
Grote to an analysis of the relation of the ego to the non-ego. His 
&nalysis is confined to an investigation of human lmowledge. For Grote 
the ego requires the existence of the non- ego, as consciousness requires 
phenomenal reality for a basis of co1rununication between consciousness 
and the 'outside 1 world, or vdth the non-ego. 
It \'Till be helpful to look a little closer at this relation of the 
ego to the non-ego . In discussing (above) Lotze's comments on the 
personality of God, it 1vas observed that the Ego did not require the 
eY..istence of a Non-Ego to make it possible. Ego here is taken as deity . 
The deity requires nothing other than himself in order to exist. It v>as 
pointed out, that according to Grote and Fichte the ego on the hQman 
plane does require the existence of the non-ego. But, whereas, for 
Fichte this . is true (as it is for Grote) yet the explanation which 
Fichte gives is very different from Grote's. In Fichte 1 s theory, the 
non-ego provides the 1Anstoss 1 or shoct of collision with the ego, and 
t hus consciousness arises. 
Strictly , Grote does not actually speak in terms of the ego and the 
non- ego. But there is a sense in vrhich he could speak of them, if they 
mean what he regards as consciousness and phenomena respectively. And 
the :!:'elation which consciousness and phenomena have with each other has 
been discussed extensively in the present work up to this point, and 
also specifically in chapter three. An example of the difficulty that 
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Grote would have in trying t o express himself in terms of the ego and 
non-ego may be seen in the fact that to talk about the non- ego as 
phenomena 'lmuld mean that there would be a sort of inner side to the 
non-ego which is classed by Grote (when this inner side refers to phe-
nomena) as consciousness. N'm-1" it would s carcely make sense to speak 
of the inner side of the non- ego as the ego. 
In the case of the ego and the non-ego, there is a dichotomy which 
seems to separate decisively each from the other. But in the case of 
what Grote means by 'philosophy' and phenomena ·there is no decisive bi-
furcation between the tvm. And the whole of Grote 1 s phenomenology is 
built up on the view that reality is one, but can be seen from two very 
different aspects. 
According to Grote the non-ego is not properly regarded as th1ngs 
in themselves, for about these latter we are not qualified to speak or 
think. Were it possible to do so, then the conscious subject would be 
the object, and the known about would, for us, become the known, because 
t hings in themselves vmuld be the same as things in themselves being 
known l 
Some consider·tion of the Ego on the theistic plane would have en-
riched Grote's writing on 'philosophy' as consciousness, especially in 
the case of the deity. One cannot fail to be impressed by the more 
restricted vision vrhich remains on the human plane. But Grote cannot 
be condemned for not being more comprehensive in scope. V.Jhat applies 
on the human level v-rould seem to be applicable on the theistic, for 
Grote. It would seem then, that Grote \<Iould not have admitted, if he 
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tad gone beyond the htunan plane in his discussion of the Ego, that the 
Ego as Personal ity of God were possible without the contrasting Non-Ego. 
Ho;'fever, Grote ' s pr esentation is restricted to human lmowing, and one 
is left t o surmise only, about the possible development of his episte-
mology if he had Lotze as a fellow collea ue. 
Grote 's reflections, following Ferrier, on the projection of human 
mind (consciousness, or the ego )_, into nature (phenomenal reality , or 
the non-ego) , seems very so1.md. I f mind were not projected into nature 
there would be no consciousness of nature . All that is meant here is 
that nature to be for us .requires c:. mind for it to be to. And if mind 
were not proJected into nature, nature would still affect our senses~ 
i.e. the phenomenal would operate on us just as its parts interco~muni­
cate vd. th each other. The intercommunication does not cease though the 
parts involved l ad: the characteristic of consciousness. 
Sir Hilliam Hamilton is the object of considerable corrunent because 
of his ambiguous use of terms like knowledge, clearly r evealing the fact 
of the ambiguity of equating of 1 exist8nce 1 with things in t hemselves. 
vJhere Ferrier is clear on this poi nt, Hamilton is opaque . Moreover, 
Hamilton's writing is deeply vitiated throughout because of his failure 
to make his epistemology (or metaphysics) clear. Had he distinguished 
between the possible approaches to epistemology, recognizing the 
' philosophical ' or t he 'phenomenal,' and the possibility of emphasizing 
either, he would not have confused the sub ject knowing, and the object 
knmm , under such terms as 'knovrledge,' and the object known 1-rith things 
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in themselves under terms such as modes of exist ence (vThere existence 
is used f or things in t hemselves ). 
Hamilton 1 s confusion is seen in the fact that he stat es that vre 
are equally consc · ous of our own r eality and of matter. Grote points 
01 t that we are iJTIJJ1_ediately conscious of our selves, but that we a re 
not iroJnediatel;y consciou s of rnatter at all. To sr:.y that 1ve are conscious 
of matte r is t o assume matter as already being in relation to conscious-
ness and then to relate this consciousness cf matter to our conscious-
ness 
Failclre to see important issues in epistemology clea rly is character-
istic of much 1·1riting in th':) field. Ferrier is ba sically correct. Ham-
il ton is a good example o.f considerable failure. There a r e others 1:lho 
have roissed the fundamental distinction between 'philosophy' and :;;he-
nomena . Grote turns his attention to some of these in subsequent chap-
ters . His immedir:.te concern, howevor, i s ~~t~ the scale of sensation 
in relati on to knowled.s;e 
chapter. 
'l'hi s subject is tal(en up in the follo\\ring 
CHAPTER V 
1PHILOSOPHY 1 AND THE SCALE OF SENSATION 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter the discussion centered on philosophy as con-
sciousness and the ego. The method followed was to deal with Grote's 
exposition of the positions taken by several philosophers regarding 
consciousness and the ego, and to show more clearly, by an examination 
of these positions the various features of his own position. This 
method provided for consideration of what is sometimes regarded as the 
subject-object reJ.ation, and the relation of the ego and the non-ego, 
in epistemology. 
It was also pointed out that there are two types of knowledge, 
knowledge of acquaintance, and knowledge of description or knowledge 
about. The former is immediate and has to do with the consciousness 
side of knowledge; the latter is concerned with knowledge viewed from 
the side of 1things. 1 
The present chapter is concerned with a further exposition of the 
relation of consciousness with phenomena, showing that there is a scale 
having two extremes, the one which is as wholly consciousness or 'philos-
ophy' as possible (for example, in self-consciousness) and the other 
which is as wholly phenomenal reality as possible. We will be particu-
larly concerned in the present chapter with showing the place of 'phi-
losophy' in, relation to this scale. Hamilton provides a good illustra-
tion of a mixing of the two aspects (the 'philosophical' and the 
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phenomenal) together, for example, in stating that consciousness of our 
selves and 'consciousness of matter' are equally immediate. But the 
particular concern in this chapter is with the 'scale of sensation' and 
its relation to 'philosophy.' So it will be necessary to consider both 
the extremes of the scale and the gradation between them. 
2. Importance of the scale of sensation 
i. Meaning of sensation very significant 
Grote considers, what he calls, 11the scale of sensation or know-
ledge" very important. It is important because it illustrates his en-
tire epistemology and because, without its being either explicitly or 
implicitly in his system, his main contribution to epistemology would 
be negligible. 
This chapter is related to the foregoing chapter on "philosophy as 
consciousness and the ego" as illustrative of the place of 'philosophy' 
in relation to phenomena. The illustration it provides is logical 
rather than pictorial. There are two main points served in the relat-
ing of this chapter to the previous one: (a) It attempts to solve the 
problem of how much 'philosophy' is present in various sensations, the 
amount varying from an infinitesimally small degree to an infinitely 
large degree. (b) The other purpose served is in the development of 
the problem of the relationship of 'philosophy' (or consciousness) to 
phenomena, since this relation is essential and crucial for all episte-
mology, according to Grote. To discuss this scale of sensation he seta 
aside a complete chapter.l The relation of 'philosophy' to this scale 
1. Grote, EP, I, Chap. VI. 
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is illustrated by referring to the metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton. 
The word, 'sensation,' itself, was used by Grote in a general sense 
to express feeling, thought, or consciousness. 
After all, sensation is the general term to express the conscious-
ness, feeling, tho~ght which we have correspondent with ••• more 
correctly, suppOsed by us correspondent with, the presence of any 
portion of existence independent of us.2 
Kant also used sensation in the sense of feeling, thought, or conscious-
ness. For Kant sensation means the content of sensuous intuition, that 
is, the way that a conscious subject is modified by an object. He seems 
to use the term to point out the content that is sensed instead of the 
sensing process. The process he calls 'intuition,'3 and the faculty, 
'sensibility. t4 
ii. 1 The scale of sensation' 
In general one might say that feeling--whether of pleasure-pain, of 
color, or whatever--is at the bottom, space at the middle and thought at 
the top of the scale of sensation. Further, at the bottom feeling and 
matter are not the factors, but rather, feeling and the mediation be-
tween body and the external world. Present at this end is consciousness 
though it may be infinitesimally small. But there must be some conscious-
ness present, however small, in order that there may be feeling. How 
infinitesimal consciousness is, may be judged from the action and reaction, 
extremely minute, for example, when anything is tasted. That is, con-
2. Grote, EP, I, 106. 
3. Kant, CPR, 65. 
4. ~· cit. 
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sci ousness is barely present and so small that it can almost be neglected 
but for the infinitesimal amount that is necessary to complete the scale 
with feeling at one end. Consciousness can be postulated as present at 
the feeling end of the scale, otherwise feeling could not be spoken of 
at all. At the middle of the scale feeling is present but not nearly so 
gr eat in magnitude as at the lower end. Here feeling is in relation to 
matter itself because there is a communication between our bodies and 
the outside world. 
What Grote means by feeling should be noted here. Feeling as physi-
cal is, of course, phenomenal; feeling as mental (or viewed from the _ 
aspect of 'philosophy') is consciousness. 
This feeling or consciousness, excluded _from phenomenalism, I now 
assume as the one thing which we do know or are certain of • . It 
is evident that this is a higher and a more intimate certainty to 
us than any phenomenal certainty. Whether anything beyond our-
selves exists or not, we are at least certain that we feel, i.e. 
that feeling, pleasure and pain, are realities, and individual to 
what, in virtue of this feeling or consciousness, we call ourselves: 
and that so far as consciousness is a proof or a fit suggestive of 
existence, 1cogito• of 1 sum, 1 we ourselves exist.5 
We are conscious of the commUnication between our bodies and the outside 
world, and can speak about it. That this is so appears more clearly 
when the upper part of the scale, which is the reverse of the lower, is 
observed. Here there is a communication between thought (as judging, 
reasoning, imagining, etc.) and phenomenal reality into which we project 
ourselves. 
At the upper end of the scale, that of thought, the case is exactly 
the opposite of what it was in the lower. As there there was communi-
cation between two different forms or modes of mind, and matter, 
5. Grote, EP, I, 18, 19. 
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phenomenalism, appears distinct from them, as simply what has 
brought about the communication. The perception, in its complete-
ness, of an existing object of knowledge, is really a sympathy with 
its constitution, arising from the fact that we know ourselves more 
or less as constituted beings, and that we can make or constitute 
things ourselves for purposes for which we need them. We recognize 
therefore in the objects, mind kindred to our own.6 
Where 1unity 1 is attained through perception knowledge is complete. 
However, since perception is so imperfect at its best knowledge is but 
fragmentary. Thus consciousness or knowledge is at its greatest magni-
t ude at the top of the scale and gradually diminishes practically to 
nothing at the lower end. 
At the lower or feeling end of the scale of sensation which I gave 
a short time since the two things which stand opposite to each other 
are not properly feeling and matter (sensation and body), but are 
sensation or feeling on the one side, and on the other side a 
communication between two kinds of matter, that of our body and that 
which is external to it. It is possible, as I have said, that ~ 
there may be a mechanical measurement and corresponding to it a 
latent, because infinitesimally minute, consciousness: e.g. that 
the real character of taste might be an action and reaction (the 
force on the one side being our will) between the separate portions 
of our organ of taste and the particles and minute forces of the 
thing tasted. But this, though we might possibly follow it out on 
the side of physiology, we could never possibly follow out on the 
side of feeling, having no microscope for consciousness.? 
Here, Grote envisages a scale for sensation which has feeling, with 
at tribut es of pleasure and pain, of willing, acting, etc., at one ex-
tremity. Sensation at this extreme is pure feeling--meaning by 'pure 
feeling,' feeling as devoid of thought as i s possible. At this extremity 
there is thought with attributes such as magnitude and durability. These 
attributes qua phenomenal are physical, and it is this aspect of the 
6. Grote, EP, I, 116. 
7. Grote, !E• cit., pp. 114, 115. 
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phenomenal that we are concerned with at this end of the scale. But 
these attributes qua phenomenal must have some 1thought• ·related to 
them; hence one cannot avoid speaking of thought in this way, that is, 
as having attributes such as magnitude and durability--but it is not 
thought gua thought but rather thought gua phenomena. 
We may conveniently imagine two kinds of this sensation, in no 
degree rigidly separable the one from the other, viz. feeling and 
thought: feeling, that kind of it in which selfconsciousness, re-
flexive attention, pleasure or pain, is strongly present: thought, 
that in which the attention is directed rather to the non-ego and 
to the exertion of the will. The former is clearly that in which 
there is the least approximation to each other, in the qualities 
of the feeling and those of the matter.8 
The attribute of time also appears at the thought end of the scale. 
Further, at the lower end of the scale, where feeling dominates, 
space has a place even though its major importance is at the top of 
the scale where thought predominates. It seems that it would be better 
to regard space more as at the phenomenal end of the scale than at the 
thought end. But Grote may be very much influenced by Kant here, as, 
for example, by such an expression as this: "Space is a necessary 
a priori representation, which underlies all ~uter intuitions. 11 9 
On the philosophical assumption the confused mass of chemical or 
secondary sensation gives the confused and chaotic matter of (in 
this sense), or preparation for, what is afterwards knowledge. 
To this time and ~ (which viewed from within, are in fact a 
higher degree of self-consciousness and so much volitional exertion) 
give form and order of the first or lower description, in the sense 
of shape, magnitude, relative position, &c.lO 
8. Grote, EP, I, 106. 
9. Kant, CPR, 68. 
10. Grote, EP, I, 110. 
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Form, whether in Plato or Aristotle would be at the top of Grote's 
scale of sensation. Form is the ,\ 6yo.s of Aristotle ·which corresponds 
I 
4-\ to the ft o os of Plato, or what Grote refers to as the reason, mean-
ing, purpose, etc., which acts as a soul or criterion for arrangement 
and which constitutes thing, a thing. This reason or meaning which 
acts as a criterion for arrangement is at the ~hought 1 or top of the 
scale. It is not the primary qualities (of Locke) which have this po-
tentiality of creating the form for feeling but rather 11form of the 
higher description, Gl~s , quality, or ~ualitiedness, kind, true re-
ality, is given by a higher self-consciousness, and there begin to be 
things.nll The point of the matter is that shape, size, etc., in which 
the form may be presented are only accessory factors to that which ere-
ates the •things.' 
~£7os applies to •number' also. The exactitude of mathematical 
calculations does not apply here for this preciseness is only an acci-
dent of •number. 1 What is important here to notice is the unit which 
all calculations presume. This unit is the 'individual' which in cal-
culations give arrangement or order to the •number' and suggests or 
reveals a •mind' present in the universe. The 1thought 1 which lies at 
the upper end of the scale of sensation is not of space, which appears 
to be that which reveals the form, but form or {;}' l"as itself. 
11. Grote, EP, I, 110. 
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iii. The center of the scale 
In the center of the scale space--and its relations--is evident. 
No space appears at the end of the scale where feelings dominate solely, 
for Grote. At the feeling (~ua phenomenal) end the mind is passive--
the state which Hamilton improperly regards as the unconscious--and re-
ceives impressions, such as those which produce pleasure and pain, from 
the outside world. At the opposite extremity, where thought is supreme-
ly dominant, objects of the outside world are acted upon by thought. 
~fuat can one say, then, about the center of the scale where the 
dominant characteristic, for Grote, is space? It seems that, here, 
feeling--which, gua phenomenal, is dominant in the feeling end of the 
scale--is no longer passive but actively mingles with the activity of 
what is •outside' itself. Also, thought, which is dominant in the 
thought end of the scale, is no longer entirely active but becomes some-
what passive as we approach the center of the scale. 
It would seem, then, that feelings such as pleasure and pain on the 
one hand, and thought as involved in willing and acting on the other, do 
not belong to two different realms but commingle; this is true of the 
center of the scale. Bifurcation, where thought predominates at one 
end, and feeling, gua phenomenal--or the •external world' affecting 
feeling--predominates at the other end, depends upon the emphasis laid 
upon the extreme ends of the scale. The bifurcation throughout becomes 
clearer as one compares the extremities emphasized and disregards the 
portion (including the center of the scale) between (the extremities). 
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iv. Importance of the scale of sensation 
for Hamilton's position 
Let us now turn to consider Hamilton's views regarding the extremes 
of •thought• and •object• in order to see the importance of recognizing 
what Grote presents as a 1scale 1 of sensation. 
It is not the retina which ~eels,' or sees, but the 1 ego ' or the 
•I,' and the specific relationship of matter to this 1I 1 still remains 
the problem involved in bifurcation. Hamilton does not solve the issue 
by referring to 'consciousness' of mind and 'consciousness of matter.• 
Hamilton's argument, then, simply reintroduces in a new form the problem 
of how mind and matter are related; it does not solve the problem. The 
problem that Hamilton does not seem adequately to cope with, and where 
a bifurcation remains, may be observed in the following: "Knowledge, 
in general, is a relation between a subject knowing and an object known."l2 
For an •object known' is treated as though it were not in relation to 
a •subject knowing' but in such case it could not be an •object known' 1 
Grote makes a summary statement covering Hamilton's attempt: "The 
idea of a communication between mind and matter, feeling and space, 
further than as a relation of contemporaneousness isl3 such, is not 
reasonable.nl4 But Grote makes a concession in Hamilton's favor: 
Though the statement above reveals the conclusion, concerning the in-
compatibility of space and feeling (or matter and mind), at which Grote 
12 • . Bowen, MWH, 139. 
13. Evidently an error. Grote must have meant 'as. • 
14. Grote, EP, I, 104. 
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arrives, yet the problem cannot be easily dismissed. And Grote does 
not attempt to banish it lightly. Where there is an apparent semblance 
between space and feeling this semblance is due to the manner in which 
our bodies seem to communicate with the •outside' world. 
v. Locke's error resembles Hamilton's 
The semblance is not really a semblance at all. Hamilton's solu-
tion through •consciousness of matter' and 'consciousness of mind' is 
unacceptable, for reasons which we will have occasion to consider later. 
John Locke was equally unsuccessful in expressing the possibility of 
•t hinking spatially.• The primary qualities of an object, according to 
Locke, are in the object as in our perception of the object. 
To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse 
of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, 
as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, _ ~d as they are 
modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions 
in us.I5 
But for Grote here lies a problem to be solved which Locke had over-
looked, namely, the compatibility or lack of compatibility of space and 
the idea of space. 
In the scale of sensation at the extreme of feeling, the phenomenal 
is predominant. Here the emphasis is on communication of the body, 
through feeling, with phenomenal reality. At the extreme of thought, 
'philosophy,• consciousness, idea, etc., are predominant. To say with 
Locke that the primary qualities of an object are in the object as in 
our perception of it is a plastering over of the crack by a language 
15. Locke, ECH, in Burtt, EPB, 264, 265. 
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composed of 'square ideas,' etc., Grote asserts. Grote is trying to show 
that it is quite all right to talk (as he does himself) of the relation 
between sensation (on the highest possible level) as thought and objects, 
where a dualism is unavoidable, and, sensation (on the lowest possible 
level) as feeling (lacking consciousness) and objects, which is the 
realm of phenomenal reality. The two are at opposite ends of 'the scale 
of sensation.• The main and necessary qualification in speaking about 
thought and objects and feeling and objects is to be extremely careful 
to recognize which end of the scale we are emphasizing. 
3. Two kinds of knowledge--' higher' and 'lower • 
i. Meaning of the terms 
a. •Higher ·philosophy' 
'Higher philosophy' is t he theory of 1being, 1 which may be cont rasted 
wit h the theory of knowing. What this higher philosophy is, Grote tries 
t o show (in the rather imperfect language) in the following: 
~ notion of the higher philosophy answers to what might be called, 
and by many philosophers has been and is called 'Ontology,' or the 
theory of 'being,' as against the theory of knowingi or the phae-
nomenology of knowledge, or various other language. 6 
b. 1Lower philospphy 1 
'Lower philosophy' is the theory of knowing, feeling, or thought, 
and is existence only insofar as this knowing may suggest it. 
It is not existence of any kind, that in the first instance is 
supposed to be the object of our knowledge, but what is supposed 
is feeling, thought, knowledge, and 1 as the subject of them, and 
only existence in so far as this feeling may, in whatever way, 
16. Grote, EP, I, 84, 85. 
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inevitably suggest it. This, evidently, is a deepe~ view than 
phenomenalism, or, in other words , it mounts to an earlier original 
fact . But, in the first instance, all that we may consider it 
concerned about is feelings, thoughts, knowledge, of a supposed I.l7 
'While so restrained , however widely it may trace the manner in whi ch 
we think and the resul ts at which our thought arrives, it is an ab-
straction, like phenomenalism, in comparison \vi.th what we may imagine 
an entire view of things. This is 1.'ihat I have called the logical 
(epistemological) or lovfer philosophical view .18 
ii. Reid's answer to skeptics is impotent 
For both the higher and the lower philosophies the primary fact is 
not that the universe exists but that we feel or know that it exists. 
This is probably the reason why Grote refers to the theory of knowing, 
or thought, as 'lm·rer,' that is, apparently, as the more fundamental, 
and without which there could be no being for us. This is another way 
of saying that ' philosophy' is all- important i n epistemology . The lan-
guage of philo ophy f requently has been to the effect that \'l"e are quite 
convinced about the existence of the world even when the brounds for 
being convinced are not clear . Reid states the grounds to be 1 comm n 
sense. 1 
The method of the Common Sense School was employed to refute skep-
tical doctrines concerning the existence of the world. But refutat ions 
on the basis of common sense were accidents of the question as to the 
~rounds of certainty . They -vrere not logical arguments. The Common 
Sense philosophers, according to Grote, simply affirmed the reality of 
thought and things without caring too much about specific details of 
17. Probably Grote means the 'soul. ' 
18 . Grote , EP, I, 84 . 
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~they are related to each other, and without giving reasons beyond 
intuition. There is no intimation of possible specific emphases some-
times on the 'philosophical' approach, and sometimes on the phenomenal, 
such as that for which •the scale of sensation' makes provision. Grote 
is tr,ying to show in referring to the Common Sense School that one can-
not overlook the two different aspects of looking at one reality. And 
he is tr,ying to show that a lack of distinguishing these aspects from 
each other is ver,y characteristic of such thinking as Common Sense. 
iii. Hamilton regards the 'philosophy' of knowledge 
as the analysis of consciousness 
Hamilton emphasizes the 'philosophical' approach. With his view 
of the 'philosophy' of knowledge as the analysis of consciousness, 
Grote agrees. 11All our knowledge, as knowledge, is consciousness: Sir 
William Hamilton has well exhibited the philosophy of knowledge as the 
analysis of consciousness. 1119 
a. Grote points out the defect in Hamilton's use 
of the tenn •consciousness' 
•Consciousness,' understood in the wide sense in which Hamilton 
uses it, may be analyzed in two ways. It may be regarded as self-
consciousness or reflection, or as consciousness of what we sometimes 
speak of as the external world. We know our own selves by self-con-
sciousness or reflection, and we know the not-self from consciousness 
that we do not comprise the whole universe. One may say that we have 
19. Grote, EP, I, 96. 
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consciousness in both cases but the kind of knowledge that we have of 
ourselves differs from the kind of knowledge that we have of other 
things. 
Here, then, is the point at which Hamilton errs, according to 
Grote. One should not call the consciousness that we have of the not-
self knowledge at all, if, following Hamilton, knowledge be what is 
built up on consciousness. Grote admits in favor of Hamilton that 
consciousness as reflection is knowledge. But he does not allow 
Hamilton to regard consciousness of the not-self as the same kind of 
knowledge as that arising out of reflection. In fact, he will not 
allow consciousness of the not-self to be called by the term 'knowledge' 
at all. Yet it seems all right to call it 'belief.' For the certainty 
that we have of the not-self is not the same as the certainty that we 
have of our own selves. The certainty that we have of the self is im-
mediate, while the certainty that we have of other things is mediate. 
Grote would seem almost to go so far as to say that it is only the 
self that we~ know. And he would hold that to say we know •things' 
is to say that we know what already are things for us as though we did 
not know them in this relation at all {by saying that we know them). 
Let us look at what Grote is concerned about here, for surely he 
is concerned about something that is important to him, and he seems 
correct in taking pains to show what he means, and it seems of much 
value for his ver,y important epistemological position. 
One may therefore paraphrase his meaning in the following. 
Hamilton and the Scottish School of Common Sense are equally in error 
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in the grounds that they accept for belief or conviction . These grounds 
are unsound for the same reason in each case . The Common Sense philos-
ophers assert that common sense is the basis for conviction, for example, 
they could say to us, let us look at objects as we see them . HaJ11ilton 
would say, we have a consciousness of objects. Both views are funda-
mentally one. They virtually assert a single conclusion. Let us look 
at objects as they appear to common sense or as we are conscious of 
them- -both assert . 
But} Grote asserts that this is exactly what 1ve cannot do in re Jard 
to the objects. Hamilton and the School of Common Sense are in error, 
fo r we do not kn01r1 ' objects ' in such a simpl3 way . By saying. that we 
know ' objects, ' we are assuming that these objects that we knov..r are 
somehow ' objects ' that we don ' t know when \•/e say 1ve ' 1-.now bj ects. 1 
All that we kno>t is our immediate selves. The point is >ve cannot s ay 
that an 1 object t is, without knowing it somehou. And, then to say 
that we knoN it is simply superfluous, or the virtual saying of the 
seme thing tvrice. 
This, then, is the basis for Grote's Yiew that conviction or belief 
about something has other grounds than actual kno1.'ring . For example, 
the basis of conviction can well be founded on the convictions of others . 
It has, therefore, no exclusive foundation such as kno>ving , nor is it 
exclusively founded upon consciousness of self . 
Conviction or belief for Grote may be, strictly speaking , sound 
or precarious (and therefore possibly sound or unsound). Conviction 
is sound if based on consciousness of self . I t is precarious i f it is 
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founded on the doubtful ground which does not lmow whether it has the 
character of consciousness of self (or personal knowledge) or the 
character of convictions of others. If both characters are present 
the conviction is not precarious but sound. If only the convictions 
of others are present then there is no justification for saying that 
one knows, or that one is certain, but only (at best) that one has a 
conviction, or belief. 
Hamilton would express himself somewhat as follows. The majority 
of men do think thus, and that is all that is necessary to convince us 
that what is thus thought is a fact of consciousness. But the fact that 
men do think in a certain way is very often convincing as a fact of con-
sciousness, but it may be wholly unjustified, _because the majority may 
be wrong. There is no certainty attached to such a 'proof• of a fact 
of consciousness, even though it may be a good practical criterion to 
follow. 
We know the form or qualities of this not-self (i.e. the sensible 
world) as something entirely dissimilar to the form and qualities 
which in ourselves we are conscious of. This ought not indeed (as 
I have said) to be called knowledge, if lmow1edge is what is built 
on consciousness: we may call it belief: by which we need mean 
no more than that, without the slightest doubt as to matter (the 
form and qualities of the not-self) existing, the certainty which 
we have of it is not the same (in kind, i.e. for in degree, for all 
that I know it may be) as the certainty which we have of our own 
exist ence.20 ~ 
Grote holds that in all Hamiltonis discussion of •consciousness' 
he can detect no distinction between the two references to consciousness, 
20. Grote, EP, I, 96. 
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namely, self-consciousness and consciousness of other things. 
I can see nothing in Sir William Hamilton's doctrine except assertion 
that it is the same, without any attempt at reason for the assertion 
except what I have already spoken of, the notion (if I may so describe 
it) of a local coincidence of thinking existence and material exist-
ence on the occasion of what we call a sensation in a particular part 
of the body. We feel that part of our body and what is in contact 
wit h it, I understand him to say,--that is, we feel or are conscious 
of matter--in the same way as we feel or are conscious of mind, our 
thinking selves. We know thus from the first, in the same way and 
with a like original knowledge, mind and matter. In different words, 
we have an immediate knowledge of matter (or the external world), and 
the establishment of this immediate knowledge Sir William Hamilton 
looks upon as an important discovery .21 
Anything like a scale of sensation revealing the relation between 
'philosophy' and phenomena is foreign to the whole of Hamilton's writing 
on consciousness. The consci ousness which is 1philosophy 1 and the con-
sciousness of phenomena are not distinguished from each other, by Ham-
ilton. And yet they should be distinguished from each other. We are 
immedia:tely conscious of tne self but to say that we are immediately 
conscious of the not-self is to overlook the fact that the not-self to 
be regarded as the not-self must already be in relation to consciousness 
before we say that we are conscious of it. 
b. Grote states a reason for Hamilton's 'consciousness' 
of the external world 
Grote ventures a reason for Hamilton's philosophy concerning con-
sciousness of the external world. The example concerns a pin coming in 
contact with the finger. Hamilton would say that the knowledge of the 
21. Grote, EP, I, 96. 
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pain and of the pin was immediate in both bases. Grote would not agree. 
The only relation which one bears to the other is that both are contem-
poraneous, according to Grote. Knowledge of the pin is not knowledge 
really at all, but simply belief. Knowledge of the pin prick is immed-
iate and is within the realm of consciousness. This illustration is of 
crucial importance in revealing Grote's view that consciousness of self 
and consciousness of matter are not properly put together as Hamilton 
is inclined to do. Hamilton's statement regarding the immediacy of 
knowledge in both cases is another example of the clash between the be-
ing of space, solidity, etc., predominant in the feeling end of the 
scale, and the being of pleasure, pain, colour, etc., predominant in 
the thought end. 
These factors cannot be brought together on the same plane, and 
Grote's whole .discussion on this subject is to show the fallacy in any 
attempt to so correlate, what cannot be correlated, on the one and the 
same level. This particular poirlt is noted by McCosh. Hamilton "at-
tempts far too much by logical differentiation and formalization. No 
man purposes now to proceed in physical investigation by logical dis-
seetion.n22 
c. Hamilton's writing on consciousness vitiated 
In view of Grote's criticism of Hamilton's metaphysics in dealing 
with consciousness, and his mixing indiscriminately the two fundamental 
aspects in which reality may be viewed, is sufficient to indicate that 
22. McCosh, SP, 417. 
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Hamilton's influence was somewhat exaggerated. 
I doubt much whether Hamilton's System of Logic will ever as a 
whole be adopted by our colleges. We have, however, two admirable 
text-books founded on it:--Thomson's •Outline of the Laws of Thought,• 
and Bowen's 'Logic.' It will be acknowledged by all, tha~ the dis-
cussions he has raised .have done more to clear up unsettled points 
in formal logic than any work published since the days of Kant. These 
discussions will be looked at by writers on logic in all coming ages.23 
Sir William Hamilton's own labors in this department, (i.e. Logic) 
by which he certainly accomplished more for the science than has 
been done by any man since Aristotle • • contains the germs of all 
his subsequent discoveries.24 
d. •Natural Dualism' and •Hypothetical Dualists• 
The name Hamilton gives to his doctrine concerning the immediate 
knowledge of the external world is Natural Dualism. 
Sir William Hamilton calls his doctrine of the immediateness of our 
knowledge of the external world by the name of Natural Realism or 
Natural Dualism: the mass of philosophers, who have looked upon 
this knowledge as, in comparison with our knowledge of our own 
existence, something which required, so to speak, to give an account 
of itself, a belief, a mediate knowledge {or however they might ex-
press it)--being called by him Cosmothetic Idealists or HYPothetic 
Dualists.25 
Grote would call it a monism rather, because Hamilton attempts to place 
feelings and material qualities together. 
The classification here made of philosophers seems of very little 
value, making, as it does, no account of the purpose and method of 
the various philosophies, nor any distinction between what a phi-
losopher assumed at the beginning and the results which he con-
sidered himself to arrive at. As to the ~thetic Dualists, it is 
to be observed that almost all philosophers have been dualists, (nay, 
have not all?) in admitting a 'besides-self' as well as a self or 
mind, Berkeley as much so as Sir William Hamilton: our sensations 
23. McCosh, SP, 417. 
24. Bowen, TOL, iii, iv. 
25. Grote, EP, I, 97. 
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were not in his view causeless or merely self-modifications, only 
he di d not consider the cause of them to be what we are here calling 
1the external world.' The name 1Hypothetic 1 therefore is little ap-
plicable to these philosophers, nor, it seems to me, is that of 
Natural Dualism to Sir William Hamilton 1 s view, which I should ra-
ther describe as a sort of Monism (in language of his own), or an 
attempt to fuse together, as objects of one kind of knowledge, two 
kinds of things (if they may be called things) so different as 
feelings and material qualities.26 
Nor is Hamilton justified in calling philosophers, who see a dualism 
here, by the name of HYPothetic Dualists because these are far from be-
ing 'hypothetic.' They do not affirm the existence of the external 
world by reason of consciousness of the self. Hamilton, then, accord-
ing to Grote is actually an epistemological quantitative monist. But 
those who do not hold to dualism on the basis of a consciousness of 
matter and a consciousness of mind are actually dualists; they admit 
an irreconcilable bifurcation. 
Hamilton's mistake in confusing the two points of view which Grote 
insists must be kept separate is much in evidence here. Grote would say 
in criticism of Hamilton that perception is not so immediate (or intui-
tive) as it appears to Hamilton to be. The only place that it can be 
considered as intuitive in the smallest extent is in the lower part 
of the scale. When Hamilton makes the distinction which he does be-
tween immediate and mediate knowledge he simply shows that perception 
i n such distinction i s mediate--despi te the fact that he contends that 
it :is. immediate. 
26. Grote, EP, I, 97. 
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e. Matter is only one entity of v-rhich >ve are conscious 
In short , according to Grote what takes up a grec:..t many pa es in 
Hamilton's philosophy is what has to do ~~th the statement, that what 
we know is matter (et least it is one of the thin s we know ) and what 
we know we are. conscious of. But matter is only one of the things of 
which we are conscious and this consciousness is much less intimate 
than the immediate consciousness of ourselves. And because matter is 
only orte thing of which we are conscious, then consciousness of our-
selves is that upon which consciousness of matter is dependent. A 
study of matter as it affects us is phenomenalism. Grote is especially 
careful to interpret Hamilton 1 s philosophy correctly~-devoting a who.le 
chapter to Hamilton's 'consciousness of matter 1--and in so doing ful-
fills his desire to define his own position. 
The net outcome of Hamilton on matter is an untenable position . 
Hamilton asserts that he knows matter, through an immediate consciousness 
of it. He affirms that vve are equally conscious of our thoughts and of 
matter . This position is unwarranted in Grote ' s vie\v. For it is only 
in consciousness that immediateness can exist . -.re are not conscious of 
matter immediately. To say so, a fter Hamilton, is virtually to affirm 
that mat t er first ey~sts or is taken to be, and only after that are we 
conscious of it 1 This is the main issue that Grote belabors in dealing 
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with Hamilton's view of matter as that of which we are immediately 
aware. 
f. Hamilton states that he knows matter, 
even before he examines consciousness of it 
In Hamilton's examination of consciousness of matter , matter is 
regarded as defined and lm.ovm already, and this altogether independently 
of·consciousnes s , according to Grote. Hamilton undertakes to examine 
the ' contents ' of consciousness and herein reveals the glaring error in 
his philosophy . For Hamilton, 'contents' at one t i me designates will, 
feeling, etc . , and at another light , oxygen with its attributes such as 
·colottr, taste, sound, and shape . He concludes that the qualities of 
matter eYist in the same way as thought does; we are immediately con-
scious of both matter and self (or thought ), he holds. Hamilton is not 
a dualist on the basis of his vie>·r that Ne are equally (immediately ) 
conscious of both matter and mind . That is, Hamilton is professing to 
look at mind and 'matter , ' Grote seems to say , f rom the side of 
' philosophy ' and in this sense he is a monist . 
Ha.roilton has postulated matter spatially to begin vlith . Then he 
brings consciousness of this matter into the field . Grote objects to 
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this, and with good reason . Grote states that the only reason why we 
lm01·1 that matter exists spatiall~t i s because it is related to our .con-
sciousness. vle cannot bring .consciousness in aft e!"'t.rards. Hamilton is 
not finding matter through consciousness, but lmmvs it already and 
states v1hat it is . Grote argues that Hamil ton is incorrect in doing 
this . For the more reality is vie\ved from the phenomenal side the more 
it is a case of belief, and the more it is vi.e1.,red from the 
'philosophical' side the more it i s lmm'lledge . Hamilton vi_e"fS it f rom 
thP side of phenomena and calls it krlO'·rledge (rather than belief, 
g . V.le are immediately cognizant of the non-ego 
The above shm'ls ho'l'; Haroilton came to his philosophic inconsistency. 
The follo\dng is a specific example of his confusion when he attempts 
to criticize the opposite point of view held by other philosophers. He 
sa s that ph.i.losophers declare that \'le are not immedi.:.tely co.:;nizant of 
the non-ego . This roistake of Hamilton ' s is based upon his failure to 
see the inadequacy of his main thesis . 1iJhat the philosophers, to Nhom 
Hamilton refers , mean, is that we are not cognizant of matter immediately, 
but only phenomenally . We cannot assume the existence of matter and then 
say that we are conscious of it to begin l'lith . But Haroilton says that 
we are conscious of it after we assume it . By this argument it is 
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evident that we are not immediately conscious of the non-ego as he would 
have us believe. And that we are not immediately conscious of the non-
ego is the very argument of the philosophers which he has set about to 
refute. 
4. Hamilton, Mill, and Reid compared 
i. Hamilton and Mill-starting point of each in regard 
to philosophy and phenomena 
The basis of Hamilton's refutations resembles the position of 
J. S. Mill. Both Hamilton and Mill were equally confused in distin-
guishing between 'philosophy' and phenomena and were equally monistic. 
Sir William Hamilton, starting from consciousness, thinks it a great 
thing to be .able to put the phenomena of matter, by the side of the 
phenomena of mind, which of course are the first thing he supposes: 
Mr. Mill, starting from the supposition of the spatial universe, 
thinks it a great thing to be able to put the facts of mind by the 
side of the facts of matter, which of course are the first thing ~ 
supposes. Sir William Hamilton's supposition of our being conscious 
of matter seems to me to be wrong in exactly the same manner as Mr. 
Mill's supposition, which I should describe as that we phenomenally 
know mind-i.e. that we may put its facts, and that exhaustively, or 
as our only consideration of them, by the side of physical ones. In 
respect of Sir William Hamilton--we are conscious of seeing, and just 
the problem of philosophy is to make out what is our mental relation 
to the thing we see: what is it but plastering up a crack to say 
that the word 'consciousness' will cover that also, and that being 
conscious of seeing is being .conscious of the thing we see?27 
ii. Hamil ton and Reid 
Reid states that we know equally well primary qualities and our 
perception of them. However, he does not show how we lmow primary (and 
secondary) qualities of objects. His error is, therefore, as great as 
27. Grote, EP, I, S?n. 
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that of Hamilton, for the latter believed that the consciousness of 
mind and the consciousness of matter are equally knowable. 
Reid's doctrine of perception, taken in conjunction with his state-
ment of the difference between primary and secondary qualities--
that in the case of the former we know equally well both the quality 
and our perception of it, whereas we know the latter qualities only 
as powers in bodies occasioning the perceptions, already points in 
the direction of Hamilton's view.28 
Reid's view, then, is a sort of occasionalism, without the inter-
vention of deity. Just h£! the powers occasioned the perceptions is 
left blank. This view is markedly different from the occasionalism of 
the Occasionalists generally, of whom Malebranche is a typical repre-
sentative. 
The Occasionalists, rejecting Descartes' attempt to explain inter-
action, held that any direct and natural communication between mind 
and body was impossible and invoked supernatural aid to effect it. 
God, they said, acted as an intermediary. On the occasion of the 
body being stimulated, God aroused in the mind the appropriate 
sensation and response. And on the occasion of that response, God 
set the body moving in an appropriate reaction.29 
Malebranche stated: 
that God is the cause of our conscious experience as well as of 
the bodily processes. Matter, being passive, can neither initiate 
nor transmit physical motion of itself. All movement, whether or 
not corresponding to mental states, needs the constant intervention 
of God to set it and to keep it going.30 
Grote's view regarding the emphasis that is placed now on 'philosophy' 
and again on phenomena--concerning which the scale of sensation gives 
an intelligent account~ay be substituted for the summary exposition 
28. 
29. 
30. 
Forsyth, EP, ll4, ll5. 
Fuller, HOP, II, 68. 
Loc. cit . 
--
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offered by Reid on the basis of common sense alone. 
The essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We know 
certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the 
last, and by these only we can define or describe them. We define 
body to be that which is extended, solid, moveable, divisible. In 
like manner, we define mind to be that which thinks.3l 
But the kind of relation which exists between mind and matter is ~t 
unexplained. 
According to Pringle-Pattison,32 Hamilton's relativist doctrine 
is foreshadowed in Reid. "There are not more than one or two passages 
in Reid which could be cited to show him to be a Relativist; but one of 
them is so explicit as to be sufficient.u33 This relativistic claim 
made for Reid is sufficient to show his oversight of phenomenal reality 
which affects us even when we may not even have capacity for being con-
scious of it. 
iii. Source of Hamilton's error 
Grote states that Hamilton makes a somewhat similar error when he 
does not distinguish clearly between consciousness of self (which is 
the only place in which the word •consciousness' can be applied properly) 
and consciousness of things. In the latter use of the word •conscious-
ness' Grote cannot concur. To say that we are conscious of things is 
to say that we are conscious of what already is in a definite relation 
to mind--without which relation these •things' would not be •things' 
for us. Hamilton's procedure might be stated in another way. He regards 
the phenomena of matter as on the same plane as the phenomena of mind--
31. Hamilton, WTR, 220. 
32. Pringle-Pattison, SP, 184. 
33. Forsyth, EP, ll5n. 
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both alike phenomepa. But clearly there is a difference here. One must 
be careful to no~that the phenomena of matter are really phenomena and 
not something in a definite relation to mind already. 
To speak of phenomena is, for Grote, to take a physical approach 
to reality. Qua phenomenal this reality is not consciousness, and as 
such (namely, as phenomenal reality) it is not in a relation to mind 
already. Phenomena are not wholly unrelated to us, however. But 
phenomena qua phenomena are out of the mind, and phenomena gua conscious-
ness is the 'inner' side of phenomenal reality which gives meaning to 
it (phenomenal reality) and is, therefore, in the mind. This is another 
way of saying that consciousness of •things' is not consciousness pro-
perly, but rather a looking at reality from the phenomenal side so that 
we can use the term •things' with more justification than if we looked 
at reality from the consciousness side. 
To speak of phenomena of matter in the manner in which Sir William 
Hamilton does is to give matter a prominence in this way of reasoning 
that it never should have. For the only way that matter is known as 
matter is because it is seen, touched, etc. Then calling it matter we 
cannot say that we are conscious of it as we are conscious of self for 
·the very fact that it is matter means that it is so, in relation to 
mind. Hamilton appears to have been very much attracted by the philos-
ophy of Common Sense--of which Reid is a good example--though it '~s not 
an appeal from philosophy to blind feeling 11 that he advocates, but 
rather 11it is only an appeal from the theoretical conclusions of particu-
127 
lar philosophers to the catholic principles of all philosophy. 1134 
John Veitch states that Common Sense philosophy closely resembles 
analyses of consciousness. "The Philosophy of Common Sense, as held 
and explained ~ Hamilton, is none other than the attempt to analyze 
knowledge or consciousness-our experience, in fact, into its elements.u35 
But analyses of consciousness is not necessary in order to give us some 
of the entities of Common Sense Philosophy where non-conscious. entities 
are assumed. 
The chief point of attack, then, made by Grote on Hamilton's 
philosophy is in reference to the confusion made between 'phenomenalism' 
and 'philosophy. 1 Hamilton appears to be guilty of the error of look-
ing upon the 1! 1 as a part of the phenomenal universe as though it were 
capable of dissection. But it is not •existence' that comes first, ac-
cording to Grote, but consciousness. What we suppose first is thought, 
and secondly, existence. We could not have 'existence' at all except 
for consciousness through which all things exist. Here existence must 
be interpreted as phenomenal reality, and not as things in themselves 
in Hamilton's sense.36 
i v. Source of Mill 1 s error 
The foregoing is an attempt to show wherein the confusion of 
Hamilton's thought arises. Mill is guilty of similar confusion. Mill 
accepts the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of matter on the same 
34. Hamilton, WTR, 751. 
35. Veitch, HAM, 103. 
36. Cf. pp. 110, lll, above. 
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basis. Here t he basic difficulty is that we cannot refer to phenomena 
of matter without a consciousness of mind. 
For Mill 'phenomena of matter' seems legitimate since he approaches 
reality from the aspect of phenomena rather than the aspect of conscious-
ness. To speak of 'phenomena of mind' when dealing with the phenomenal 
approach to reality seems as erroneous as to speak of 'consciousness of 
matter' when dealing with the 'philosophical' approach to reality. The 
trouble lies in the fact that in each case there is a professed design 
to approach reality from either one of two aspects {but not both), and 
in actual practice reality is approached from the two aspects at the 
same time. Thus there is a mixing of 'philosophy' with phenomena through 
the use of phrases such as 'phenomena of mind' (in Mill's case) and 
•con~ciousness of matter' {in Hamilton's). In the distinction whi ch 
Grote makes between consciousness and phenomena, it is illegitimate 
either to speak of a 'consciousness of matter,' with Hamilton, or 
'phenomena of mind, ' with Mill, as shown above. 
What appears confused in Mill's method is his manner of dealing with 
'consciousness' and phenomena. He appears to take for granted {and this 
is Grote's difficulty in seeing clarity in Mill's argument) that the 
phenomena of mind are like phenomena of matter--both alike phenomena and 
with equal right, namely, because we are conscious of both. 
5. Descartes and Hamilton 
i. Descartes's epistemological approach, and Hamilton's 
It is int eresting to reflect t~at Descartes would not have regarded 
- consciousness of matter and consciousness of mind as worthy of equal 
acceptance. In cogito, ergo sum he recognizes the necessar.y priority 
that consciousness (of mind) must receive. 
But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to 
think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who 
thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, 
I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no 
ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Scep-
tics capabl e of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, 
accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in 
search.37 
Grote concludes that this is 11 the logical (epistemological) or lower 
philosophical view.u38 It may be said that Descartes would regard the 
phenomena of Grote as in consciousness in the sense that such phenomena 
have meaning only insofar as they are in consciousness. But for Grote, 
phenomena are in consciousness only gua consciousness and not gua phe-
nomena . On this basic i ssue Descartes would seem to agree with Grote. 
However, Grote seems to think that in Descartes's 'cogito' there is a 
great tendency to emphasize the 'philosophical' approach. 
\\lhile so restrained, however widely it may trace the manner in which 
we think and the results at which our thought arrives, it is an ab-
stracti on, like phenomenalism, in comparison with what we may imagine 
an entire view of things.39 
But if Descartes meant that •cogito• embraced all processes of con-
sciousness, including sensing, then phenomena are in consciousness, for 
·Descartes. It appears that Descartes ~mean this by the use of the 
term •cogit o. 1 The point, however, that Grote wishes to make here is 
that consciousness, strictly speaking, should not include any more of 
37. Descartes, DOM, 26. 
38. Grote, EP, I, 84. 
39. Loc. cit. 
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•sensing' than is required for meaning, and that the remainder of 
•sensing' belongs to phenomena--to the phenomenal aspect of reality. 
Grote appears to be narrowing down the meaning of Descartes's ~ogito ' 
so that it covers, for him (Grote), the thought side of reality when 
Descartes actually meant that 1cogito 1 should also include sensing. 
Grote might remark to Descartes, your •cogito 1 is too mental to cover 
the field that you allow it to cover. · Descartes could retort--evidently 
you misunderstand the wide area that 1cogito 1 covers in~ epistemology. 
Hence, Descartes might continue, I am justified in using it the way I 
do. 
Descartes's cogito, ergo sum was an abstraction as was Hamilton's 
view of the ego in contrast with the non-ego. Hamilton is much less 
restrained than Descartes. For he talks of •the phaenomena of mind' 
side by side with •the phaenomena of matter.•40 In order to justify 
this procedure he states 11that we have a consciousness of matter similar 
to the consciousness which we have of mind or self. 1141 Grote would say 
that this is not even true of matter, as phenomena, not to menti on of 
matter as Ding an sich. Grote declares in refutation of such a view that 
mind is above matter, because even if there could be established a 
parallel consciousness of phaenomena of mind with the phaenomena of 
matter, it is mind which has that consciousness. There would still 
be a phaenomena of mind at the head of all, namely, this double con-
sciousness itsel£.42 
40. Grote, EP, I, 85. 
41. Loc. cit. 
~.~.cu. 
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ii. Hamilton 's imperfect application of consciousness 
Again, it is not possible to consider both the ego and the non-ego 
as possessing the same relation to consciousness, because consciousness 
of the ego has to do with feeling, desire, etc., whereas consciousness 
(to use the word as Hamilton does) of the non-ego has to do with solidity, 
magnitude, space, etc. 
I f we have one sort of knowledge in which the forms of the knowledge 
or the qualities of the things known are space, solidity, etc. (what-
ever language v1e use) and another kind of knowledge in which such 
forms or qualities are pleasure, pain, etc.--knowledge then is not a 
common ground upon which the things which are knovm can meet--not a 
way in which they can be brought together: there are two worlds: and 
though we may think of space and solidity, and though we may see the 
space or the solid body in which we understand the pleasure and the 
pain to be, we cannot bring the characters of the one world into 
relation with those of the other, or (in different words) establish 
any relation except a very imperfect one of contemporaneousness, 
between them.43 
Moreover, this confusion may be noted further when Hamilton refers 
to consciousness of seeing which brings up the question, 11'vvhat is our 
mental relation to the thing we see?u44 Being conscious of seeing is 
very different from being conscious of the thing we see. The former 
refers to consciousness of a state within the mind primarily; the latter 
to consciousness (iri Hamilton's use of this word) of matter . 
6. Proper use of certain terms in relation to 
the scale of sensation 
i. 'Presence' and ' presentation' 
Let us nov-r look at certain terms. the specific meaning of \'rhich helps 
to reveal their misuse by Hamilton, and their proper use by Grote, such 
43. Grote, EP, I, 91. 
44. Grote, ~· cit. , p. 87n. 
132 
as 'presence' and 'presentation,• and 1inward 1 and 'internal.• With 
regard to the first two of these--phenomenally they mean nothing more 
than being contemporary with feeling. At the top of the scale mind is 
dominant and contemporaneousness is infinitesimally small. Again, 
'presence' or 'presentation• may be local, referring to our bodies where 
feeling, as mind, is in some way related to the corporeal. In the state-
ment •a tree affects the mind' or •a tree is presented to the mind,' 
there is the philosophical application which differs from the tree •be-
ing present at the eye 1 or •affecting the eye'; this latter application 
is phenomenal. That is, the philosophical application has to do with 
the top of the scale where thought reigns supreme, and the phenomenal 
with the bottom where, not thought, but feeling, is dominant. 
ii. •Presentation• and •representation• 
•Presentation• and •representation• are frequently used without an 
adequate knowledge of their meaning, e.g., as in 'presentative conscious-
ness.• By 'presentative consciousness' is meant a feeling of ourselves 
as phenomenally existential and a feeling of an object, in the outside 
world, in communication with our bodies. By •representative conscious-
ness' is meant something quite different. In this we feel ourselves to 
be a part of phenomenal existence as in 'presentative consciousness' 
and then a consciousness of the existence of something in our thought 
that appears as if it could be in communication with our bodies as 
phenomenal existence. Moreover, representative consciousness has to 
do with two objects, one outside of the mind and the other within. It 
is only by virtue of the image within the mind that the external object 
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can be known. One of these objects, the one in the mind, is what is 
thought, the one outside, is thought of. 
iii. •Mediate• and 'immediatet45 
It should be observed that the words •mediate• and 'immediate• are 
much wider in scope than the words 'presentative' and •representative.' 
'Immediate' indicates that there is no break betv1een our knowledge of 
the outside world and our own consciousness, or rather it refers only 
to our own consciousness and not to the outside world. 'Representative' 
indicates a break. In 'representative consciousness' the mind is re-
garded as presenting an object from the external world to the mind; this 
object is different from the object within the mind. Knowledge may re-
fer to the object within the mind while 1belief' (or some other word) 
refers to the object of the outside world. When we speak about know-
ledge being immedi ate we deal with that which treats of ourselves; the 
term •immediate• cannot be used in reference to the outside world. More-
over, the mediateness of hi-objective knowledge such as in representa-
tiveness is only one form of mediateness, this mediateness is possibly, 
generally, one that comes through the organ of the body, namely, the eye. 
Grote differs with Hamilton over the word 1mediateness. 1 "Sir 
William Hamilton seems to me to make all knowledge, even as knowledge, 
mediate.n46. Insofar as knowledge cannot be other than of phenomena, and 
an object of the phenomenal world may be represented by its bi-objectival 
45. A more detailed discussion of immediateness is found in Chapter VIII 
of this dissertation, under the title 11Inunediateness and Reflection." 
46. Grote, EP, I, 121. 
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counterpart, Grote would agree with Hamilton. At the lower end of the 
scale {where feeling predominates) this mediate knowledge becomes im-
mediate for the body comes into contact with external objects and the 
external objects, then, where thought or will is at a minimum, are the 
knowledge. In this sense the knowledge is immediate and this pertains 
to outward objects, and not to inner objects {that which is thought of 
the object) as would apply when dealing with the upper part of the scale 
where thought predominates. 
7. Critical reflection on the foregoing chapter 
Grote uses the scale of sensation as a mental device to show the 
relation of 'philosophy' and phenomenal reality to each other. When 
'philosophy' as consciousness, mind, thought, is emphasized we are at 
the top of the scale where knowledge is mediate. Here phenomenal re-
ality enters progressively less and less, as one approaches this thought 
end of the scale. Self-consciousness has a large place here. Time and 
space considered as forms of the understanding enter into this end of 
the scale. 
The first main issue in this chapter concerns space and time. There 
is a similarity between Grote and Kant regarding the character of both. 
"There are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles 
of a priori knowledge, namely, space and time. 11 47 
For Grote time seems to be •viewed from within.•48 Time then has 
47. Kant, CPR, 67. 
48. Grote, _EP, I, 110. 
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a large place at the top, or thought, end of the scale. It seems that 
Grote should have allowed time to have a prominent place at the bottom 
of the scale also. For if phenomenal reality is more prominent at the 
lower end, and carries out communication with the body, time is necessary 
for this communication to take place, even though we might not be aware 
of the communication. Grote admits that time is essential at the thought 
end of the scale, because thought requires time. But with as much jus-
tification it seems that one could say that time is essential at the 
phenomenal end of the scale, because, for example, communication of 
phenomenal reality with the body requires time. Space cannot mean any-
thing at the bottom of the scale but is necessary there for the communi-
cation of phenomenal reality with, for example, our bodies. Space has 
meaning at the top of the scale. It is a form for thought. But there 
is a strong objection49 to holding that space is more predominant at the 
top than it is at the middle of the scale. Grote seems to infer that it 
is more prominent at the center of the scale. 
To say that space is more significantly attributed to the thought-
end of the scale is to face the following difficulty. If space were 
located at the top of the scale it would seem natural to speak of •think-
ing spat ially' which would make no more sense than to say that •thinking 
redly• is possible, or that square ideas may be assumed. 
To say •we think spatially' I which is the kind of language we ought 
to use on the supposition of space being a form of thought, seems 
to me language in some respects of (exactly) the same kind as the 
4 9. Cf. p. 13 5. 
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supposition of a square idea. The way we think spatially, so far 
as we do so, is to will a certain amount of exertion, which exertion 
we understand as carrying our hand (say) through a certain amount of 
what then we call 'space.•50 
Space, then, Grote concludes is more prominent at the center of the 
scale. Yet he admits that space is a form of the understanding and hence 
is present at the top of the scale. 
It seems that he should, also, have given space a much larger place 
at the bottom of the scale. For in order to have •things' act on each 
other space is required. It is, of course, also required in order that 
•things may have EQSition in place (that is, in order that •things' may 
be in place). In the realistic philosophy of Aristotle, •things' have 
position, and position is an Aristotelian category. It would seem, there-
fore, that space (also a categoryfor Bowne51) is a phenomenal word (in 
Grote's meaning of phenomenal) and should also appear at the bottom of 
•the scale of sensation.• The only foundation for Grote's view that 
space is more pronounced at the center is that here (at the center) both 
thought and phenomenal reality are emphasized equally, and space is 
characteristic of both. Whereas he is trying to point out that it is 
not exclusively characteristic of either thought or phenomenal reality, 
and hence its place is not so prominent at either end of the scale. 
Why Grote does not hold that time could be considered as having 
its place in the center also, is not clear. It seems that it is here 
(at the center) that it should be placed. Yet Grote seems to regard it 
50. Grote, EP, I, 108. 
51. Bowne, TTK, 66~116. 
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as more fittingly placed at the top of the scale. 
Grote makes many thoughtful reflections on both space and time, for 
example, such as, to point out that we could not be without time, but it 
is possible that we could exist without having space. ''We could not have 
been otherwise than in time, we might have been otherwise than in space.n52 
There are certain broad perspectives that one looks for in Grote, 
regarding time and space, and does not find. He does not dwell on Plato's 
view of time as the moving image of eternity. Aristotle also could have 
been discussed through his definition of time as the number of motion, 
with respect to before and after. Plotinus said that time was the pro-
ductive life of the soul. This comes close to Grote's view where the 
latter places time on the thought, or conscious end of the scale. With-
out time, Grote held, ~ cannot be. It is necessary for the life of the 
soul therefore. 
In Plato, the 'receptacle,' though wholly indeterminate, "must be 
rather construed as the potency of matter, and of space, and of physical 
motion. 11 53 And it is of motion (whether physical or psychical) that time 
is the number. Both time and space, then, are the actualizing of the 
potency of the receptacle. 
Again space and time may be regarded as space-time54 or reality. 
Grote is attempting to see reality as separate entirely from space (when 
he asserts that it is possible that ~ might be even though space might 
52 . Grote, EP, II, 200. 
53. Demos, POP, 31. 
54. Alexander, STD. 
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not be). He does not consider certain ancient views of space and time, 
such as Plato's or Aristotle's. He seems concerned, in Part II of 
Exploratio Philosophica, in making general comments on both time and 
space. In Part I he tries to show the relation of each to the scale of 
sensation. In attempting to show this relation there are various 
questions left unanswered, such as: Why does space belong more to the 
center of the scale rather than to the top? How much place does time 
have at the center of the scale? What is the relation of space to time? 
Are space and time inseparable? 
Let us look at these questions to see what Grote could have said 
in reply to them, if he had given one. What he could say regarding the 
problem of whether space belongs more at the center of the scale than 
at the top is that in a sense space is found equally prominent with time 
at the center of the scale. And both space and time are at both ends of 
the scale. At the top of the scale, space and time are (somewhat as Kant 
regarded them) pure concepts of the understanding. At the bottom of the 
scale space and time are empirical. Grote has, all along, been speaking 
of the consciousness and the phenomenal sides of reality. It seems that 
he could have included space and time in dealing with these two aspects. 
This view of what Grote could have said about space and time would 
seem also to settle the several other questions noted above. Let us look 
briefly at the several other answers. Time would appear to have as much 
place at the center of the scale as space has, since there are two ways 
of looking at time as there are two ways of regarding space, namely, 
-from the side of consciousness and from the side of phenomena. 
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· The relation of space to time is a very intimate one, both being 
required in order that a •thing' may be known {or, to speak more gen-
erally, in order that we may have knowledge). In the light of this 
intimate relation between space and time, it seems incorrect for Grote 
to remark that, 1~e could not have been otherwise than in time, we might 
have been otherwise than in space: space might not have been at all, and 
yet ~ might have been.n55 
Part of his meaning, however, in this passage is evident. He means 
that thought requires time but, as thought, thought does not require 
space. Yet, he admits, thought requires a body of some sort in order 
to be what it is, and a body requires space. Grote would seem to be 
ready to admit that in this way thought requires space indirectly, though 
he does not say so. He is emphasizing the fact that the ·~· or thought 
side of us can ~without space being assigned to it. However, it must 
be admitted that this is a rather odd way of expressing oneself. 
However, there is one basic and underlying fact that Grote does 
answer in regard to space and time. The communication of •things' with 
our bodies requires both space and time; hence, phenomena require both 
(even though Grote's conception of phenomena does not require that we 
-are conscious of them). Also, consciousness requires time and is re-
lated to our bodies which are spatial. 
Grote attempts to picture this basic fact regarding space and time 
in the scale of sensation which must remain unclear to the extent to 
55. Grote, EP, II, 200. 
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which it leaves many questions unresolved. So we must conjecture, or 
figure out just what the answers to these questions are. One important 
point must be continually kept in mind, however, namely, the meaning 
Grote gives to 'philosophy' and phenomena.56 Almost everything he writes 
hinges on this basic distinction. 
In human knowing we must use either the philosophical or the phe-
nomenal assumption. In the former subjectivity is the test of truth, in 
the latter objectivity is the test. In the one, the philosophical as-
sumption, knowledge is having reason, or having meaning, concerning that 
which, but for the knowledge, would be characterless and confused. In 
the phenomenal assumption "we begin with supposed existence independent 
of us,n57 with which we coexist, and take for granted just what knowledge 
is--even though, actually, knowledge can never be investigated on this 
view, due to the phenomenal nature of the view. 
Grote believes that space is a 'simple' notion that does not bear 
much analysis. 
All discussions about space are in one point of view unprofitable, 
namely, because space, so far as it is an idea or notion at all, is 
preeminently what Locke would call a 1simple 1 one, and these simple 
ideas of Locke will not bear much talking about. They cannot be 
defined, and for their reality in any way Locke has to appeal to the 
individual consciousness of each one.5S 
Concerning space, Grote states that T. K. Abbott argues against Alexander 
Bain that we get our notion of space from sight. Bain contended that we 
get it from movement of the arms , etc. Grote believes that the matter 
56. 
57. 
- 5S. 
Grote, EP, I, Chapters I and II. 
Grote, EP, I, 109. 
Grote, EP, II, 195. 
is not thus to be settled. For, to arbitrate between Abbott and Bain 
one should have a notion of space by which to judge Abbott's and Bain's 
views. This notion of space would reveal to us what space is, rather 
than the other views would, between which views it would pose as arbi-
trator. 
However space may be explained, Grote states, we cannot well avoid 
two main strands in its constitution, namely, the notion we have of 
space so that we 'think spatially.• And to say that we •think spatially' 
is to emphasize the thought side of space. We also have locomotion in 
space, and this locomotion is phenomenal. This indicates, then, what 
Grote means when he states that space dominates neither end of the scale 
of sensation but 1ts proper place is, better, at the center of the scale. 
In support of his view that we conceive of space through consciousness 
Grote makes the following remark: 
We cannot at all find out and be sure that when different people use 
the term 'space,' even thinkingly, they mean the same thing by it; 
that is, in other words, we cannot tell whether there is any one 
meaning of 'space' for us to find out.59 
Yet space is an important part of our notion of the phenomenal universe. 
We must conceive space as we conceive the phenomenal universe. 
The notion of space is an important ingredient or part of our notion 
of the phenomenal universe or external world, and we mean by space 
a supposed something which (speaking from the objective point of 
view) enables us to unite in one conception our heterogeneous ex-
periences, or (speaking from the objective point of view) which gives 
a basis or bond of connexion to our heterogeneous sensations (or 
occasions of sentience); which experience or sensations are what make 
us aware of the so-called qualities of matter. According as we con-
ceive the phenomenal universe, so we must conceive space.60 
- ~. 
60. 
Grote, EP, II, 195. 
Grote, 2£• cit., pp. 196, 197. 
Now, just how do we conceive the phenomenal universe is a basic 
question. For, evidently, the way we conceive it; is the way we must 
conceive space. The briefest reply is that, actually, we do not con-
ceive the phenomenal universe at all, that is, at least, as phenomenal. 
'Conception' is a thought (or consciousness, or 'philosophical') word. 
To say that we conceive what is phenomenal is a mixing of the two ways 
of looking at reality. What we actually do is to conceive of the phe-
nomenal insofar as it is consciousness or 'philosophy.' We must con-
ceive the phenomenal universe, therefore, as 'philosophical' and not as 
phenomenal. 
In the passage quoted innnediately above Grote is evidently looking 
at reality from the phenomenal point of view. What he means by saying, 
naccording as we conceive the phenomenal universe, so we must conceive 
space , n is what we have said, immediately above, about phenomena. For 
space, considered from the side of the phenomenal is itself phenomenal, 
while considered from the side of 'philosophy' space is 'philosophical' 
or conceptual. We may look at space either subjectively or objectively 
depending upon which end of the scale of sensation we are emphasizing. 
We must assign to it a subjective or objective existence according 
to our general view of the phenomenal uQiverse. We may regard it 
as that by which we create to ourselves the phenomenal universe: or 
we may regard it as that which contains, holds, gives a frame or 
canvas for, the various sensal objects which we come to know--
their •continent' as I have elsewhere called it: were it not for 
this these objects would not be a universe to us.61 
61. Grote, EP, II, 197. 
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One cannot say that space is 1internal 1 or •external• as Grote intimates. 
The reason why I do not here make us e of what might be thought the 
easier expressions, •external world,' is because the word •external,' 
in the proper use of it, supposes space, and is therefore better 
avoided in trying to come at this true notion of space.62 
Externality to our bodies will not represent space, because our 
bodies themselves have magnitude or occupy space: and externality 
to our minds can only mean independence of them, which does not 
represent anything like what we want to mean by space.63 
Space seems more objectively real than time. 
Space has the appearance to us of being the more objectively real 
and necessary, time of being the more intimate to us. If we could 
conceivably get out of ourselves for a moment , and look at immedi-
ateness as immediateness, it would involve space, but not neces-
sarily time~64 
1'We could not have been otherwise than in time, we might have been other-
wise than in space: space might not have been at all, and yet ~might 
have been. n65 Just what Grote meant by this statement we have already 
considered.66 
Another main issue dealt with in this chapter is consciousness as 
'philosophy' in relation to the scale of sensation. To clarify his own 
views Grote examines Hamilton's vi~~ that we are equally conscious both 
of our own selves and of matter. Grote is very .clear on this issue, 
pointing out that we are immediately conscious of our own selves but 
that we are only mediately aware of matter--we are not conscious of it . 
This criticism of Grote conforms with his view of phenomenal reality in 
62. Grote, EP, II, 197. 
63. Grote, ~· cit . , P• 198. 64 . Grote, £E.• cit., p. 200,. 
65 . Loc. cit. 
66. Cf. p:-138. 
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communication with our bodies through our senses, and yet--this communica-
tion may take place even though we are not conscious of it. 
Hamilton begins, by affirming matter as though it were already known 
to us and then speaks of our consciousness of it. But the object is not 
a sort of given irrespective of a mind to which it is given, which then 
has an immediate consciousness of it. It is all right, to say with 
Hamilton, that we are conscious of matter if we are careful to note that 
this is a different kind of knowing than when we say we are conscious of 
our own selves, i.e., of ourselves as thinking (not of ourselves as ex-
tended in a certain portion of space). 
Professor C. I. Lewis presents a somewhat similar view of the given 
which cannot be regarded as something external which we are conscious of. 
But rather it is a given that is given to consciousness. 
This given element is never, presumably, to be discovered in isola-
tion. If the content of perception is first given and then, in a 
later moment, interpreted, we have no consgiousness of such a first 
state of intuition unqualified by thought.67 
"The given is admittedly an excised element or abstraction; all that is 
here claimed is that it is not an 'unreal' abstraction, but an identi-
fiable constituent in experience."68 
Hamilton's error in speaking of consciousness of matter and con-
sciousness of mind as the same kind of consciousness is an attempt to 
bridge the gap between thought and what we ordinarily speak of as 
'objects' or as the 'external world.' His attempt was no more successful 
67. Lewis, MWO, 66. 
68. ~· cit. 
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than Locke's where the primary qualities of an object are regarded as in 
the object as in our perception of the object. 
Grote holds that Mill is involved in error similar to that of 
Hamilton. When Mill refers to 'phenomena of mind' as well as 'phenomena 
of matter' he is asserting, in a sense opposite to Hamilton, that both 
are alike phenomena. But without a consideration of the consciousness 
of mind the 'phenomena of mind' would make no sense. Whereas Hamilton 
overemphasized consciousness, Mill overemphasized phenomena. But Mill 
is justified in writing on the 'phenomenalist logic' whereas Hamilton's 
position, emphasizing the top of the scale of sensation, scarcely allows 
him to write on phenomenalist logic at all. To a consideration of 
phenomenalist logic, and its relation to knowledge (and to the growth 
of knowl edge), we now turn our attention. 
CHAPTER VI 
PHENOMENALIST LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE . 
1. Introductory 
In the last chapter the chief point presented was the relationship 
of 'philosophy' to what Grote calls the 1 scale of sensation. '' Let us 
briefly survey what was presented in that chapter, and then show its 
relation to 'phenomenalist logic and knowledge,• before dealing specifi-
cally with the latter--the subject of the present chapter. 
i. Brief resume 
•Sensation,• as this term is used in the phrase •scale of sensation,' 
refers to all of our consciousness. It covers the most lively and agi-
tated feelings of pleasure and pain where the body is in contact, or in 
touch, with things--as at the bottom of the scale. It is also used in a 
sense wide enough to include thought, as much abstracted from what we 
call •things' as possible. The logical, or thought, end of the scale is 
at the top. The 'philosophical' (or logical aspect of reality is mostly 
concerned with the very top of the scale, and in proceeding downwards, 
regards what it confronts as of progressively less intellectual impor-
tance. Finally the lowest part i! virtually altogether neglected by the 
logical view. It is treated as •unreason' or 1nonsense'--which it is 
the business of thought in the higher part of the scale to convert in~o 
knowledge. Each higher part is a sort of form to what is below it. 
The lower part of the scale, as one descends, becomes wholly phe-
nomenal. Here thought is as much as possible abstracted and absent from 
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phenomenal reality. This reality is not interpreted in the usual sense 
of the objective as it appears to the senses. Grote is very careful to 
exclude from phenomenal reality any meaning. For meaning belongs to the 
thought end of the scale. It pertains to the 'philosophical' view. The 
ess ential characteristic of phenomena is that they be devoid of all mean-
i ng whatsoever--when there is ~ admixture of intellect with them. We 
can never be ~ of such utter abstract phenomena, for should we be 
aware of them, they would not be pure 'phenomena.• 
Yet t hese phenomena must not be confused with things in themselves. 
The latter carmot be thought. It might be better to call things in them-
selves figments of t he imagination. The only trouble with calling them 
this is that once they become such, they are no longer things in them-
selves but things related to imagination. Hovfever phenomenal reality 
affects us, it communicates with our bodies through our senses and so 
acts even when we are not aware of its acting. That is , utter phenomenal 
reality devoid of any consciousness whatsoever is an abstraction, because 
it cannot mean anything without some degree of awareness being present. 
- -
In relation to us phenomenal reality is essentially communication--
communication with the bodily organs. Any meaning that is given to it is 
not due t o i ts character of phenomena qua phenomena, but phenomena qua 
'philosophy.• Just how much awareness is present in the communication 
between ourselves and •things' is what Grote tries to illustrate in the 
'scale of sensation.• 
... 
ii. Relation of the 'scale of sensation' to 
phenomenalist logic 
148 
Let us now link the last chapter, through the foregoing resume, with 
the main content of the present one dealing with phenomenalist logic and 
knowledge. 
When the lower end of the scale is emphasized the view is phenomenal. 
Here •things' are stressed with as little of intellect involved as pos-
sible. The thought side of •things' cannot be neglected if •things' are 
going to mean anything at all. But here it is the phenomenal emphasis 
that is of chief concern. It is not a case of complete phenomenal re-
_al ity that is under consideration. In the phenomenal sense things can 
affect us even when we are unaware of them. The essential concern we 
have with phenomena is that they fulfill the role of communication , not 
that they are •things.• For •things' carry meaning along with them. 
Hence we cannot regard •things' as though they had a sort of rout-there-
ness' about them, in contrast to an •in-hereness' of thought. 
The 1out-thereness 1 of things is dependent upon thought to which 
they are in the contrast of •out-thereness.' To speak of •things,' there-
fore, in contrast to thought is to regard them as •things-as-thought• and 
hence not as bare •things' at all. 
The above is a free rendering of Grote regarding thought and phe-
nomena. Now, the point at which Grote differs from Mill is in regard to 
what he thinks is over-emphasized in Mill, namely, phenomenal reality as 
almost altogether separated from consciousness. Mill approaches episte-
-mology, Grote holds, through emphasis on the lower part of the scale of 
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sensation. 
2. Grote's own position revealed through criticism 
of Hamilton and Mill 
i. Mill and Hamilton--their consistency compared 
In this chapter it will be shown that Mill is peculiarly qualified 
to write on phenomenalist logic because of the strong emphasis which he 
placed on the phenomenal view. It will also be shown that Hamilton is 
not justified in writing on phenomenalist logic because he places 'phe-
nomena of matter' side by side with 'phenomena of mind' and regards both 
as established on the same basis, namely, the logical or the 'philosoph-
ical.' We are, Hamilton holds,1 immediately aware of matter as well as 
mind. SUfficient has already been said, on this error of Hamilton's, to 
show that matter is exactly what we are not immediately aware of.2 
Hamilton's position, then, should prevent him from writing on phenomena-
list logic. He could have written on a logic which dealt with concepts, 
and he could have called such logic, formal logic, but not phenomenal 
logic. His metaphysics was such that it did not warrant his writing on 
phenomenalist logic at all. 
The two sets of Lectures of Sir William Hamilton which have been 
published are one on Metaphysics, and the other on Logic, the two 
courses having some introductory Lectures in common. The Lectures 
on Metaphysics I have to a certain degree examined, because, ••• 
the subject is called Metaphysics, and the point of view, the pur-
pose assigned being the analysis of consciousness.3 
1. cr., above , pp. 120, 121. 
2. Loc. cit. 
- 3. Grote, EP, I, 154. 
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ii. Basis of Hamilton's error 
Hamilton 1vrote on both logic and metaphysics. Grote calls atten-
tion to the fact that students of Hamilton wondered why it was necessary 
to write two large volumes on logic when an equal amount (or less) of 
writing on metaphysics would have been sufficient, and could have avoided 
confusion between the 'philosophical' and the phenomenal points of view. 
The type of error which is so evident in Hamilton may be seen in his 
first dealing with 'perceiving' things and then with the 'forming con-
cepts' of these things. He should not have dealt with the perception 
of •things,' as though things somehow existed as •things' apart from 
their relation to us. For thos e 1things 1 are things for us, only be-
cause the.1 are known through concepts. 
Sir William Hamilton speaks, as we have seen, of matter being the 
object of consciousness . It seems odd that he should do this, when, 
in a different set of Lectures, those on Logic, we have the real 
objects of consciousness, which he calls 1concepts,r4 treated truly 
and properly as such: we seem to have here, all along, that diffi-
culty which I spoke of, and the student of Sir William Hamilton's 
Lectures on Metaphysics is astonished to find that, when he has got 
through them, there are two volumes, as big as the others, treating 
knowledge and the processes of the human understanding in an entirely 
different manner and 'With different languages- -after all, he asks, 
have I only got half the subject, and now I know what 'perceiving' 
things is have I got to learn all about the 'forming concepts ' of 
them, and is it a different thing or the same?5 
4. It is possible that Hamilton was influenced by Hegel. It seems 
that this influence can be seen in such statements as the following: 
"The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. 11 Loewenberg, HEU. 218. 
11The real objects of consciousness" of which Hamilton speak~ coul d be 
analogous to 11the objective mind" of Hegel which includes morality and 
all social institutions (according to Professor E. s. Brightman, in a 
class lecture, February, 1947). The concepts of Hamilton are also 
analogous to 11the absolute Idea" of Hegel. 
5. Grote , EP, I, 155, 156. 
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That irreconcilable bifurcation clouds the clarity which otherwise 
could be brought out by showing that the emphasis was meant to be parti-
cularly on the side of •things.' Hamilton precluded any possibility of 
doing this by dealing with 'perception' of things as well as with •things' 
out of relation to (perceiving) mind. Grote states that the obscurity 
becomes more pronounced when Hamilton deals in the second place, in his 
logic, with concepts of things. The result is a confusion together of 
the phenomenal and logical approaches. 
iii. Mill is justified in writing on phenomenalist logic 
Hamilton cannot justifiably write on Phenomenalist Logic, Grote con-
tends , because his approach is at one time 'philosophical• . or •logical,• 
and at another, phenomenal. Mill, on the other hand, takes his starting-
point from Aristotelian or Formal Logic. 11Mr. Mill's book is what I call 
a Phenomenalist Logic with a starting point from the Aristotelian or 
Formal Logic.n6 
Mr. Mill's phenomenalist logic is in effect a description of the 
facts of nature , the heads of this description being suggested by 
the relations and processes of logic, as these have been previously 
understood. Our knowledge is then, in his view, a following or 
tracing in one direction or another, a keeping close to, these facts. 
Thus in respect of propositions, what Mr. Mill considers is, that 
where the proposit ion is important for the advance of knowledge, what 
we are doing in it is not the assertion of anything as to the appli-
cability of the terms or names (which is the same thing as the ref-
erence of things .ta : classes), nor the making a judgment, in the sense 
that the result of the proposition is something in or having reference 
to our own mind {a view, a chenge of view, a notion &c.) but the 
assisting, as it were, the standing by or looking on at, an (imagined 
or actual) natural fact , which the terms of the proposition, indicate. 
- 6. Grote, EP, I, 157. 
The proposition in this phenomenalist logic, is not the reference 
by us of a thing to a class, nor is a judgment, or opinion, on our 
part, about a thing , but is an expression of a natural fact or re-
lation of things. What is important about the proposition is not 
the goodness and good employment of a classification of things 
which it may imply, nor the correctness of thought on our part 
which i t may imply , but its trueness to the phenomenal fact ••• 
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The object of the previous logic has been correctness of thought: 
that of Mr. Mill's logic is true following and rendering phenomena.? 
It seems that Grote is impressed in Mill's logic by what he refers 
to as the notion of 1adstance, 1 or the view that might be regarded as 
one where there is a 'presence at• the •things' being considered.s He 
expl ains this notion of 1adstance' by pointing out that there are three 
possible positions that may be taken regarding reality, and that one of 
these is characteristic of Mill's logic. Let us note these positions: 
(1 ) Here we view things by saying that "they exist." (2) Or, referring 
t o •things' we assert "we believe them." (3) And, the third possibility 
is a sort of mixing of both (1) and (2), such as appears in the state-
ment, 11we have learnt them." 
It seems to Grote that the first position is characteristic of 
Mill's logic. By saying that Mill ' s Phenomenalist Logic has its "start-
ing point from the Aristotelian or Formal Logic , " he seems to mean that 
there is something realistic in the sense of being 'out there , ' about 
Ari stotelian logic and that Mill has continued this •Real Logic' of 
Aristotle. 
However, there appears to be less justification for taking this ap-
proach either to the logic of Aristotle or of Mill than Grote appears to 
? . Grote , EP, I, l57n, l58n. 
8. Grote, 2£• cit ., P• 157. 
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allow. It is possible that Grote was impressed with the assumption 
that, because Aristotelian philosophy is ordinarily classed as •realistic• 
that Aristotelian logic is •Real' or •Phenomenalist Logic.• Taking this 
attitude toward the logic of Aristotle it seemed fair enough to regard 
Mill's logic as also Phenomenal. But the fact that the logic of both is 
conceptual, rational, and judgmental, there appears less reason for 
calling this logic Real than for calling it •Philosophical.• However, 
we will continue to follow the analysis of Grote in dealing with Mill's 
logic, in what follows. 
iv. Formal and Real Logic contrasted 
Grote contrasts Formal Logic with what he calls Real Logic. Real . 
Logic deals with the growth of knowledge because it has to do with actual 
experience. 
I shall call a. supposed method of Logic, of any kind, which so far 
incorporates into itself the notion of actual experience as to be 
able to take into account the growth of knowledge , whether in the 
individual or the race, a Real Logic, in contrast with such as the 
Aristotelian, which we may call if we like, when pure and by itself, 
Formal, and which may have various valuable applications, besides 
this, if we consider it one: as to verification, to grammar, or to 
digestion of argument.9 
The reason why Mill may deal with Phenomenalist Logic and Hamilton should 
not is because fundamentally the opposite approach is taken by each to 
metaphysics. The basis for Hamilton might be regarded as consciousness, 
or Formal Logic, and from this he deals with perception of the external 
world. The starting point for Mill is the •external world,• or phenomena, 
Hence Mill's Logic is consistent with his metaphysics, whereas Hamilton's 
is not. 
9. Grote, EP, I, 153. 
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v. Mill's phenomenalism and Hamilton's 'philosophy' 
There appears to be good reason for the treatment of Mill's phe-
nomenal approach by the side of Hamilton's 'philosophical' view. Since 
the contrast between both is rather sharp, Mill's phenomenalist logic 
shows up even more clearly than it would if considered without the strong-
ly contrasted position of Hamilton. It is interesting to observe that 
Herbert Spencer compares Mill and Hamilton also. Spencer takes the side 
of the empirical in defence of Mill, but sees that one must go beyond 
empiricism. Spencer criticizes the position with which Hamilton iden-
tifies himself. 
Metaphysical reasoning is usually vitiated by some covert 'petitio 
principii·.' Either the thing to be proved or the thing to .be dis-
proved, is .tacitly assumed to be true in the course of the proof or 
disproof. It is thus with the argument of Idealism. Though the con-
clusion reached is that Mind and Ideas are the only existences; yet 
the steps by which this conclusion is reached, take for granted that 
external objects have just the kind of independent existence which 
is eventually denied.lO 
Though Empiricism, as at present understood, is not thus suicidal, it 
is open to • • • criticism on its method, similarly telling against 
the validity of its inference. It proposes to account for our so-
called necessary beliefs; as well as all our other beliefs; and to do 
this without postulating any one belief as necessary. Bringing for-
ward abundant eVidence that the connections among our states of con-
sciousness are determined by our experiences--that two experiences 
frequently recurring together in consciousness, become so coherent 
that one strongly suggests the other, and that when their joint re-
currence is perpetual and invariable, the connection between them 
becomes indissoluble; it argues that the indissolubility, so produced, 
is all that we mean by necessity. And then it seeks to explain each 
of our so-called necessary beliefs as thus originated. Now could 
pure Empiricism reach this analysis and its subsequent synthesis with-
out taking any thing for granted, its arguments would be unobjection-
able ••• Empiricism, starting from an uncertainty and progressing 
through a series of uncertainties, cannot claim much certainty for 
its conclusion.ll 
10. Spencer, EMP, 396. 
11. Spencer, ~· cit., PP• 397, 399. 
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vi. Spencer's reflections support Grote 
Spencer seems to be saying that the conclusions of Idealism claim 
to be much more unobjectionable, and with considerable justification. 
Whereas, empiricism cannot claim certainty for itself, for certainty is 
not essentially empirical. He could have said, in terms used by Grote, 
that empirical certainty is founded upon the 'philosophical' view. More-
over, he could have added that 'certainty' is a 'logical' term rather 
than a phenomenal one. In the passage before us, it is not clear that 
Spencer wishes to commend Hamilton through a comparison of his position 
with that of Mill. MOreover, whether he wishes to do that or not, does 
not part icularly concern us here. But it is significant to note that 
Spencer contrasted Mill with Hamilton because he saw that the one tended 
toward empiricism and the other toward idealism. Grote seems to go even 
furt her than Spencer in contrasting these two philosophers. ·Grote's 
additional contribution is to note that Hamilton is not unwaveringly 
faithful to a sort of idealistic position even though he states that we 
are immediately aware both of our own selves and also have •consciousness 
of matter.' Grote notes further, too, that Hamilton even writes on phe-
nomenal istic logic. Hamilton--if he tends toward idealism, as Spencer 
-impl ies, and as Grote realizes in identifying Hamilton with a 'philosoph-
ical• view--is in error, in writing on phenomenalist logic, whereas Mill--
not professing (or pract icing) other than the phenomenal approach--is 
correct (or much closer t o being so) in writing on phenomenalist logic 
which Grote refers to as Real Logic. 
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vii. Mill is faithful to phenomenalist logic 
a. General comment 
Grote deals with the metaphysics of Hamilton, and his view of 
'consciousness of matter' as immediate, in order to show his inconsis-
tency and to contrast him with Mill. He does this not to show inconsis-
tency in the Phenomenalist Logic of Mill, but rather to illustrate, still 
further from the outstanding philosophical thought of the period, a fun-
damental confusion between the phenomenal and the philosophical points 
of view. This is not to say that Mill is guilty of the -error of mistak-
ing the difference between the two but rather he is contrasted with 
Hamilton whose position is not so strictly philosophical as Mill's is 
phenomenal. Mill remains generally true to phenomenalism; Hamilton 
( v1hether infiuenced in this by two incompatible currents--one from Reid 
and the other from Kant is at least very possibly influenced) in his at-
tempt to be consistent with both phenomenalism and philosophy ultimately 
ends by being true to neither. 
I suppose that Sir William Hamilton, in his attempt to unite logic, 
Reidian psychology, and Kantian criticism, really did confuse to-
gether the logical view of knowledge as a forming proper notions 
of what (no matter to logic what) in virtue of the notions thus 
formed, we call things, and the view of knowledge as a communica-
tion or presence with something supposed existent.l2 
Mill attempts to be faithful to what Grote called 'Phenomenalist 
Logic,' by usi~g the methods of traditional logic in dealing with •things. t 
He takes "care to preserve the old logical methods and language, while 
altering their application and utilizing them.n13 That is, Mill deals 
12. Grote, EP, I, 189. 
13. Grote , 2£• cit., p. 160. 
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only with names which are expressions for things instead of dealing 
with concepts or ideas. Taking exception to Hobbes, Mill states, 
Are names more properly said to be the names of things, or of our 
ideas of things? The first is the expression in common use; the 
last is that of some metaphysicians, who conceived that in adopting 
it they were introducing a highly important distinction . The 
eminent thinker seems to countenance the latter opinion.l4 
In dealing with concepts or ideas one remains within the 'logical' point 
of view, according to Grote. Mill, if he is to remain within the field 
of phenomenal logic , cannot make ideas and concepts his chief concern. 
Mill classified things under four heads, namely, minds, bodies , attri-
butes of mind or feelings, and attributes of bodies with their sub-
categories. For the basis of this classification Mill goes back to the 
categories of Aristotle, Grote states. These categories, though in-
eluded in a realistic philosophy (that of Aristotle) may be regarded 
eit her as •logical• or phenomenal, depending upon the specific emphasis 
involved. In regarding them as applicable to phenomenal reality they 
form the chief constituents of almost all conceivable universes. 
I mentioned previously about the Aristotelian categories, that though 
they proceed from a logical point of view, yet they might be turned 
round to a sort of quasi-phenomenalist one, in which view they will 
represent the main constituents, so to speak, of almost any possible 
universe. Mr. Mill finds , reasonably enough, that they are a very 
poor catalogue of the constituents of this universe, and proceeds 
to utilize the notion by substituting others for them.l5 
The imperfections of this classification are too obvious to require, 
and its merits are not sufficient to reward, a minute examination. 
It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the 
language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, 
by philosophic analysis, to the rationale even of those common dis-
tinctions. Such an analysis, however superficially conducted, would 
14. Mill, SOL, I, 23 . 
15 . Grote, EP, I, 160. 
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have shown the enumeration to be both redundant and defective . Some 
objects are omitted, and others repeated several times under different 
heads. It is like a division of animals into men, quadrupeds, horses, 
asses, and ponies. That, for instance, could not be a very compre-
hensive view of the nature of Relation which could exclude action, 
passivity, and local situation from that category. The same obser-
vation applies to the categories Quando {or position in time), and 
Ubi {for position in space); while the distinction between the latter 
and Situs is merely verbal. The incongruity of erecting into a 
summum genus the class which forms the tenth category is manifest. 
On the other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of anything be-
sides substances and attributes. In what category are we to place 
sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind; as hope, joy, 
fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment, concep-
tion, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by the 
Aristotelian school in the categories of actio and passio; and the 
relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of such 
of them as are passive, to their causes, would rightly be so placed; 
but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. 
Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be accounted 
among realities 1 but they cannot be reckoned either among substances 
or attributes.lb 
It should be noted that Grote frequently employs the terms 'logical,' 
•rational,' 'mental,' 'consciousness,' and several others as synonymous 
for 'philosophy,' or 'philosophical.' Just which word he uses is some-
times arbitrary and sometimes dependent upon the view he is discussing. 
In dealing with Mill's philosophy he is likely to use the term 'logical.' 
And by his use of it he means to imply the conceptual or thought side of 
reality. 
Mill found the Aristotelian categories as not entirely practicable 
for this universe and hence suggests ways in which a list of categories 
might be drawn up to include, for example, feelings, and states of con-
sciousness. For Mill the substratum for the attributes of mind was mind, 
and of bodies was bodies or things. Grote believes that Mill was in error 
16. Mill, SOL, 29, 30. 
159 
in placing these categories side by side because categories should be 
selected from either one or the other but not from both, if faithfulness 
to phenomenalist logic is to be maintained. To be clear as to which 
should be made the starting point for a system of philosophy is the 
chief point. 
Apparently, then, two steps were open to Mill: 1. He could have 
started from the phenomenalist point of view where the logic of our 
knowing about things, as body and its attributes (in Mill's classifica-
tion), could be traced. 2. He, then, could have considered it as 
probably possible in the future history of physiology to bring into 
relation with things such unassimilated, unappropriated or incommensur-
able matter which are not yet things and which are known to exist. Mill 
seems to have gone only so far as the end of the first step. At least, 
he professed to going only this far. But he did not altogether avoid 
mixing the 'philosophical' and the phenomenalist views together in a sort 
of combination of Formal and Real (or Phenomenalist) Logic. He could not 
speak of •notions' with ease because of the implied non-phenomenalistic 
connotation. He placed 'mind and its attributes ·• by the side of •matter 
and its attributes,' and looked at both phenomenally, which was the op-
posite to the method of Hamilton who placed 'matter and its attributes' 
by the side of •mind and its attributes,' and looked at both 'philosoph-
ically.' 
b. •Names' and 'notions' 
Mill has taken great care to avoid •notions' because of their 
•philosophical' or 'logical• implications and has dealt with 1names• 
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instead. What he really means by names is difficult to see. Grote 
asserts that •names• could be more easily replaced by •notions' or 
•concepts• but if Mill used either •notions' or 'concepts• in his sys-
tem of logic he might readily be accused of departing from his main 
thesis which is Real Logic, and is essentially phenomenal. Mill appears 
to recognize that there is difficulty here but has not been-able to see 
exactly what it is. Grote believes that Mill has been misled by the 
logical view, more so because he has partially rather than wholly made 
use of it. 
c. Syllogistic logic 
Grote holds that the three main parts of syllogistic logic will 
probably always continue unmodified; he designates these parts as, 
perception (or conception), judgment, and reasoning. 
The old logicians had then these processes, •simple apprehension' 
(perception, conception), 'judgment,• and •reasoning,' and one way 
or another this triplicity must always exist. Thought or language 
naturally divides itself into notions or words, . judgments or prop-
ositions, and syllogisms or arguments.l7 
In the first, •names• rather than •notions' are the expressions of 
•things' in nature. In the second, 'propositions• are the expressions 
of 'phenomena• or •facts.• Just as Mill made great efforts to classify 
•things in the first process he now takes great pains to classify 'facts• 
(in the second process) which he regards as five in number, namely, co-
existences, sequences, existence, causation, and resemblance. 
17. Grote, EP, I, 159. 
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~w. Mill gives five great heads of natural fact, just as he gives , 
with whatever success, four great hea~s or categories of things. 
The facts are facts about the things, or what the things enter into, 
in the same manner as propositions are about the terms, or what they 
enter into. These categories or kinds of fact are Coexistences, 
Sequences, Existence, Causation, Resemblance.l8 
3. Phenomenalism inadequate for a 
perfect scheme of knowledge 
i . Reasoning not an element in phenomenal reality 
Just as the term •names• is used by Mill for •things' so may 
•assertables • or •asseribles• (though the terms are not employed by 
Mill, but both are used by Grote) be used for propositions. Both names 
and propositions must have behind them •things' and •facts.• But Mill 
passes over to the logical (or philosophical) point of view illegiti-
mately inasmuch as a perfect scheme of knowledge (which must include 
propositions) requires something more than what can be supplied by 
phenomenalism alone. And in the third and most important process of 
logic, viz, reasoning, Mill appears to be even more dependent upon the 
'logical• point of view. He is concerned not only with the existence 
of things but also with reasoning~ things. 
ii. Time and space , and phenomenal reality 
Further , what Mill considers in nature has to do more with time than 
with space for what he considers is not so much what exists as what goes 
on. •Order• occupies many pages in his logic but is not as important as 
•function• which appears to be characteristic of practically all the 
•things' with which he deals. •sequences• or •simultaneities• are of 
18. Grote, EP, I, 165n. 
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more importance than spatial considerations, and within sequences 
•uniformities' are of great moment. Grote shows the importance of 
action in comparison with the lack of importance of existence in re-
gard to what Mill is dealing with in nature. 
It may be noted that Mill had what might be called a theory of 
time. For he held that geometry and arithmetic were concerned with 
physical things, and that these occupy both space and time.19 Alexander 
felt that Mill fell victim to a mistaken conception of empirical method 
when he maintained that mathematical propositions are simply generali-
zations from experie,nce. Alexander also held that Mill tried to place 
geometry and arithmetic on the plane of inductive sciences by holding 
that they are concerned with physical tnings and not with space and time 
in which physical things exist. There seems to be affinity between 
Alexander and Grote regarding Mill at this point. For both regard Mill 
as empirical in his approach to reality, at least on this issue of space 
and time. Grote would say that Mill is :E_henomenal in his approach, and 
this would give some credence to Grote's view of Mill's logic as Real 
or Phenomenal. 
iii. Belief and phenomena 
In dealing with fact (within the second process of logic) Mill 
speaks of •belief.' This word suggests that there appears to be for 
Mill something existing in the phenomenal realm which is there indepen-
dently of whether or not anyone is present to know. That is, phenomena 
19. Alexander, STD, I, 232. 
163 
are what they are, for Mill, quite independent of their being known. 
When he speaks of •belief' he is inconsistent with Phenomenalist Logic. 
iv. Mis-psychology 
Grote states that if there is anyone who should be regarded as not 
guilty of •mis-psychology' it is Mill because Mill distinguishes very 
clearly between •sensation' considered as 'bodily affection' and 'sensa-
tion• considered as 'consciousness.• The lack of making this distinction 
is, what Grote calls, 1mis-psychology. 1 Yet Mill identifies himself 
definitely with phenomenalism and hence his 'philosophical• (or 1logical 1 ) 
point of view remains part of his unprofessed position. Mill says, in 
effect, that the truth about objects must be considered as knowledge if 
the truth is to become truth for us. This is practically to state that 
the phenomenalist point of view is an abstraction from the 'logical• and 
never can be considered apart from the point of view of consciousness. 
Moreover, according to this phenomenal view, facts of mind should never 
be regarded as objects themselves and reduced to the logic of phenomenal-
ism, for they can in that case never be regarded as facts of conscious-
ness. To strengthen his theory Grote makes the statement that it appears 
impossible to regard our consciousness of activity or will as reduced to 
-the phenomenal realm unless we consider it as mere delusion. And there is 
no more reason WQy we should consider consciousness of activity or will as 
delusion than there isto consider our supposition of the existence of the 
•external• world to be delusion. 
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4. Critical observations and analyses 
i . vfuy Grote deals with Hamilton and Mill at all 
Now, there is no reason why Grote should deal with either Mill or 
Hamilton except that in so doing he tries to show that a phenomenalist 
logic is impossible, gua phenomenal. Grote believes that Null provides 
an excellent example of Real or Phenomenalist Logic. Mill is much more 
correct than some others who do not remain faithful to what Grote calls 
Real Logic, the 'real' nature of which is dependent upon phenomena ab-
stracted from consciousness. 
. 
That there can be such Real Logic should be admitted as impossible. 
Mill does not admit this in any sort of testimonial. But there is evi-
dence of his definitely phenomenalist position far stronger than any 
verbal admission can present. This evidence is found in his use of 
'names' instead of 'notions , ' 'concepts,' and the like. Somehow, 1till 
felt that by the use of 1names 1 he could refer to 'facts,' or 1 things 
denoted by names,r20 and avoid language foreign to Real or Phenomenalist 
Logic. 
Instead, if Mill had used such terms as 'notions,' 'concepts ,' etc.,. 
he would have gone beyond a Ehenomenalist logic. The point is, that Grote 
wants to show the impossibility of avoiding a mixing of the 'philosophical' 
and the phenomenal approaches in epistemology. And that any system pro-
fessedly (or otherwise) based on phenomena alone is foredoomed to disaster. 
In order to show this he must deal, he feels, 1-1i th those viho have been 
20. ~ull, SOL, bk. I, chap. III . 
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guilty of this. Mill and Hamilton are good examples. He deals with 
each, showing their merits and demerits. Mill, he believes, has not 
been a great offender since he has much more success in keeping the 
'philosophical• and phenomenalist views separate. He does not waver 
back and forth, one time writing in conceptual language and again in 
phenomenal language. Nevertheless, neither Mill nor anyone else can 
avoid dealing in conceptual language, because a language which will pre-
sent phenomenal reality gua phenomenal does not nor cannot exist. 
Mill is the least guilty of mixing the two possible epistemological 
emphases, the 'philosophical' and the phenomenal. One of the greatest 
contemporary offenders, living in Grote's time, was Sir William Hamilton. 
Hamilton's grievous fault seemed evident to Grote at almost every turn. 
Grote deals with him again and again since he seems to be the most 
glaring offender of all. He sees no justification for Hamilton's writing 
on metaphysics and later on logic in order to make a contribution to 
philosophy with almost similar content, in each work. One, metaphysics, 
dealt mainly with perception of 1things'--with an emphasis on both the 
'philosophical' and the phenomenal views in a way that left the episte-
mological situation hopelessly confused. 
This confusion arises from the basic error that Hamilton makes when 
he does not distinguish between consciousness of things and consciousness 
of self. In the former case, regarding consciousness of things, Hamilton 
is asserting that we are conscious of •things,' or of what is already in 
a definite relation to mind, and without which relation the •things' 
(which Hamilton is concerned with in his metaphysics) would not be •things' 
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for us. In the latter case, Grote asserts, and apparently correctly 
so, that consciousness in such a phrase as, 'consciousness of self,' is 
the only place in which the term 'consciousness' is correctly applied. 
The other work of Hamilton, on logic, dealt with the nature of 'per-
ceiving,' 'notions,' etc.--with emphasis on the 'philosophical• view. 
Thus, when both his metaphysics and logic are considered, Hamilton leaves 
the reader in extraordinary perplexity, as to how we know and what we 
know. Grote is concerned in showing that much clarity is possible through 
regard for two basic views in epistemology--to which he continually called 
attention in dealing with Hamilton and Mill--that should always be kept 
in mind, namely, the two based upon whether one's approach is 'philosoph-
ical' or phenomenal. 
ii. Things in themselves and phenomena 
We have seen that Grote dealt with Hamilton and Mill in order to make 
his own fundamental epistemological position clear. Both Hamilton and 
Mill provide good illustrations of Grote 1 s distinction between 'philos-
ophy' and phenomena. Grote claimed that Mill is basically 'realistic' 
in his approach to reality. This realism is referred to under the terms 
•Phenomenalist Logic' or 'Real Logic.' Grote frequently employs the term 
'logic,' instead of the term 1philosophy,i as referring to the •thought' 
or 'consciousness' aspect of reality. But by the terms 'Phenomenalist 
Logic' and 1Real Logic' he is referring to Mil]s A System of Logic, which, 
Grote believes , presents the phenomenalist (in contrast to the 'philos-
ophical') approach to reality. 
Hamilton, Grote affirms, mixed the two aspects of reality together, 
167 
the •philosophical' and the phenomenal; he did not distinguish between 
these. He uses phrases such as 'consciousness of self' and 'conscious-
ness of matter,' and, terms such as 'perception,' 'conception,' 'matter,' 
'sensation,' •thing,' and 'object,• in such a way that one cannot discern 
whether he is referring to thinking, or that which is thought about, or 
that which is thought about in relation to consciousness--the given for 
consciousness. Grote's point is that we must distinguish between the 
two views of reality, the 'philosophical' and the phenomenal, if we are 
going to have any semblance of clarity in what we say in epistemology. 
There is another question which may be regarded as arising out of 
Grote's concern with Hamilton. Or it may be considered even apart from 
Hamilton and Mill altogether. This question is in regard to the relation 
between things in themselves and phenomena. It may be examined wholly 
apart from any philosopher with whom Grote deals. But first let us note 
the dissatisfaction which Grote finds in Hamilton's use of the term 
'things in themselves.' 
Of things absolutely and in themselves, be they external, be they 
internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognizable; and 
become aware of their incomprehensible existence, only as this is 
indirectly and accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities 
related to our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we 
cannot think as unconditional, irrelative, existent in and of them-
selves. All that we know is therefore phaenomenal--phaenomenal of 
the unknown.21 
'Phaenomenal' for Hamilton is not clearly separated into conscious-
ness on the one hand and 1things 1 on the other. From Hamilton's use of 
the term, one does not know just how much consciousness he is going to 
21. Hamilton, IOM, 65. 
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admit into his 'phaenomena.• Nor does one know some of the time whether 
he is going to speak of phaenomena as •things.• Also, he admits that the 
unknown may be spoken about, as though there were something non-phaenomenal 
which is the unknown. This unknown is the thing in itself, for Hamilton. 
But one may ask, what is this unknown which is unknown? If it is known 
in anl respect it is not the unknown. And if it is unknown then it is 
clearly unknown, especially since Hamilton is treating the •unknown' as 
•things absolutely and in themselves• r To speak, as Hamilton does, there-
fore, in language like 'phaenomenal of the unknown,' doesn't make sense, 
in Grote's meaning of phenomena. For, as soon as anything is known to us 
in any way it is phenomena. And to speak of what is known to us in some 
way as also unknown is meaningless. This meaninglessness is significant, 
therefore, considering what phenomena mean for Grote. But for Kant to 
refer to phenomena of the unknown does make sense, for phenomena considered 
as the objects as they appear to the senses can very well be objects that 
are somehow related to the unknown. Or, again, phenomena of the unknown 
could refer to unknown objects which might, under suitable circumstances, 
appear to the senses. 
Grote feels that he has to illustrate his epistemology by reference 
to some of those who did considerable research in the field. Hence he is 
considerably occupied by several of his contemporaries. Before consider-
ing Grote's distinction between 'philosophy• and phenomenal reality fur-
ther, it should be pointed out that he is not using the term 'phenomenal• 
as a synonym for Hamilton's 'phaenomenal.' Hamilton's 'phaenomenal' is 
•all that we know'; it is 'phaenomenal of the unknown.' Now, Grote has 
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no place for the •unknown' as a sort of thing in itself. As Grote uses 
the term 'phenomena' it may seem that he has in mind things in them-
selves, and that 'phenomena' ~ things in themselves. This resemblance 
is only on the surface. Things in themselves cannot exist--probably this 
remark gives more infor.mation than one should entertain about what things 
in themselves are. But we can speak of what Grote calls 'phenomena.• 
These are influential; they are not in themselves. They produce effects. 
But the phenomenal effects they produce, ~phenomenal, are not conscious 
effects. The phenomenal may also be looked at gua 'philosophical' where 
there~ conscious, or at least, 'philosophical,' effects. Consciousness 
is the mental, logical, or 'philosophical' element which contributes to 
the knowing process. 
Phenomena are 'things' inasmuch as they have some relation to us. 
Phenomena are of utmost importance in the knowing process, but their 
specific role stops short with the making of impressions on the physical 
constitution of the body. They are not psychical in the sense of 'mind,' 
•awareness,' or 'consciousness.' This consideration takes ' phenomena,• 
as Grote uses this term, out of any basic similarity with things in them-
selves. Phenomena are not in themselves at all, but they ~ in relation 
t o us. But the relation in which they are to us is not a conscious re-
lation until consciousness is present. The essential role of phenomena 
is to communicate rather than to make aware. If phenomena produce effects 
upon us, even though we are not conscious of these effects, we are justi-
fied, in Grotian language, in referring to them as 'phenomena.• 
Justification for our speaking of phenomena at all must rest upon 
170 
qualities of •objects• and faculties of comprehension, according to 
Grote. He refers to the qualities of an object as fitted to our facul-
ties of knowledge. '~e know the object through certain qualities fitted 
to our faculties of knowledge--these, in language I have used, fit each 
other. 1122 This is a peculiar manner of expressing what he means, but 
peculiarity of expression is not uncommon in Grote.23 But the meaning 
is fairly clear. He states that 'qualities and faculties of knowledge 
go together.' Grote should admit that the term 'qualities' had a 
double (or triple) meaning in the senses present in Locke's use of the 
word, as primary and secondary (and tertiary). He seems guilty here of 
the error which he points out in others, namely, of using a term in two 
senses, one 'philosophical' and the other phenomenal. Along with the 
two (or three) implicit senses in which the word is used he speaks of 
•faculties' which is a term clearly 1philosophical•--not phenomenal. 
But Grote puts 'qualities and faculties of knowledge' together in order 
to show that no object can be known that has no qualities. 
Suppose one single universal faculty of knowledge, in place of 
various special and particular ones, what the mind having this 
must know is--one universal quality of the object and no more. 
Who then knows the object itself, if even omniscience does not 
and cannot go beyond quality? Here we have doubtless got at an 
unknowablenesa of the •thing in itself,• but it is an unknow-
ableness I think of ~ sort, viz. because there is nothing to 
know.24 
Grote affirms, that minds such as ours know objects through qualities, 
and it seems unlikely, he holds, that there are minds that know objects 
22 • . Grote, .EP, I, 187. 
23. Peculiarity of expression may be traced to Grote's awareness that 
Exploratio Philosophica should be revised. For he gives this work the 
sub-title, Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science. 
24. Grote, EP> I, 187. 
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independent of all qualities, namely, as things in themselves. 
It seems of the nature of knowledge to have qualities 1fitted to' 
faculties. The impossibility of severing 'reality' from faculties 
operating by 'concepts,' 'notions,' etc., is exemplified in the case 
of J. s. Mill. Mill works out a Phenomenalist or Real Logic fairly 
successfully, Grote believes. But Mill is not altogether succes$ful. 
It is not that Mill lacked the ingenuity to be highly successful in 
working out a Real Logic. The lack of success that Mill experienced 
is due to the nature of knowledge. One seems safe in concluding the 
following from what Grote has inferred about Mill. It is not essential 
(though ver,y helpful) to have illustration from Mill's philosophy or 
from any other, to reach the conclusion that if there were minds that 
could know objects otherwise than through their qualities, then 
Phenomenalist or Real Logic is wholly possible. One might go further 
and say that if this type of logic is possible, then things can be 
known other than through their qualities (which seem inseparably con-
nected with our faculties}. The consequent of what, in the foregoing 
statement, thus masquerades as an implication, is equivalent to main-
taining that we can know things in themselves 1 
iii. Further reflections on 'phenomenon' 
The term 'phenomenon' is used to designate a reality that may exist 
independent of being known by any knowing mind. If it makes any effect 
on us at all, conscious or unconscious, it is phenomenon. Of course, for 
Plato and Kant the phenomenal is that which somehow appears to our senses. 
_For Plato, the phenomenal world is the world of appearances. "The 
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phenomenal assumption is that the world of reality exists quite indepen-
dently of being known by any knowing beings in it.u25 That means that a 
Phenomenalist Logic is a logic which exists independent of any kno\iing 
mind. Such a logic, of course, is impossible. 
Mr. Mill gives us what I have called a thoroughly phenomenalist logic 
or method, i.e., treats of things in the first instance, for science 
and life,--with careful putting aside all mention of our conceptions 
of them,--as if they were reality to us. The consideration of their 
'seeming' or being conceived by us he will not allow to disturb the 
science of them.26 
The strictly non-conscious nature of phenomenal reality is an ab-
straction from consciousness: 
The great rule of phenomenalism is to be sure that we do not do that 
which, as we shall see, we always naturally do do, humanize the uni-
verse, recognize intelligence in it, have any preliminary faith, per-
suasion, suppositions about it, find ourselves, if I may so speak, 
at all at home in it, think it has any concern with us.27 
To me there is something in the simply phenomenalist spirit, so far 
as one has a tendency to sink (as I should say) into it, inexpressibly 
depressing and desolate .28 
The depressing and desolate nature of phenomenal reality is the absence 
of 'spirit' or 'mind' in it. The term 'phenomenalist spirit' seems a 
somewhat unfortunate choice of words in Grote, since he means by the term, 
simply phenomenal reality (not abstracted from 'philosophy'). 'Phenomenal 
reality' regarded as abstracted from 1spirit 1 or 1mind 1 is phenomenal 
reality of a depressing and desolate nature. It is like Aristotle's 
matter in the sense that it is never wholly devoid of all 'philosophy' 
25. 
26. 
27. 
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as Aristot le's matt er is never completely lacking in some form. 
This reali ty i s markedly different from 'phaenomenat as used by 
Lotze: 
In our varied and complex civilisation there are many thoughts 
which seem to have a stamp of intellectuality and a certain striking 
elegance and simplicity , because they detach from the soil of common 
experience and transplant as it were into empty space, apart from all 
explanatory surroundings, ideas familiar to us in everyday life, 
where we observe, patiently and minutely, all the conditions on which 
thei r validity depends. This fate has overtaken the i dea of phaenom-
~ or ~earance among others. It is plain that in order to be 
intelligible this idea must presuppose not only a being or thing which 
appears, but also, and quite as indispensably, a second being by whom 
this appearance is perceived.29 
Lotze's meaning is present in current usage, whereas Grote's is not. If 
Grot e were discussing Lotze's use of the term he would say that 'phaenom-
enon' as 'appearance' (as Lotze uses the term 'phaenomenont) must be re-
garded as possessing two elements the •thing which appears, and the one 
to whom this 1thing 1 appears. But this analysis does not go far enough, 
Grote would maintain. Grote is concerned about showing that the •thing 
which appearst30 is not a •thing' until it is related to consciousness, 
or if not to consciousness, then related to us in some other way, as, for 
example, productive of certain effects on us. However, for Grote the 
•thing which appears' is 'phenomenon' (if in •appears' consciousness is 
-absent--supposing thi s were possible) even without the presence of con-
sci ousness. That phenomena fulfill the role of communi cation with the 
bodi l y organs i s enough , but such communication does not necessarily 
involve consciousness. This phenomenon does not have the difficulty 
29. Lotze , MIC , II, 159, 160. 
_JO. Lotze, 2E• cit., p. 160. 
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involved in the Ding-an-sich, for we cannot say anything about the 
latter or it ~dll turn into phenomenon. But we can speak and act in 
regard to the phenomenon. In fact the phenomenon is alreacty related to 
us. 
Moreover, phenomena, of course, could not be known without con-
sciousness. Probably it is better to say, 'phenomena' qua 'phenomena' 
do not necessitate consciousness. And these 'phenomena' gua 'phenomena' 
are what 'phenomena• are essentially. Yet if we are conscious of 
'phenomena' this consciousness does n~ affect phenomena so that they 
become other than phenomena. 
In no case are we justified, according to Grote, in calling 'phe-
nomenon' 'appearance,' for appearance means appearance to some mind when 
Grote's meaning of 'phenomenon' is such that we do not need to be aware 
of it, nor does it need to appear to us, and yet it may affect us. 
Phenomenalist Logic in Grote's sense of Real Logic would not have any 
place in Lotze's thinking, and he does not seem to mention or allude to 
such logic anywhere. The meaning that Lotze gives to 'phaenomena• pre-
eludes having any place for Real Logic at all. 
For Lotze the real is what is affirmed, is actualized, or occurs: 
We call a thing Real which is, in contradistinction to another which 
is not; an event Real which occurs or has occurred, in contradistinc-
tion to that which does not occur; a relation Real which obtains, as 
opposed to one which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition 
Really true which holds or is valid as opposed to one of which the 
validity is still doubtful. This use of language is intelligible; 
it shows that when we call anything Real, we mean always to affirm 
it, though in different senses according to the different forms which 
it assumes, but one or other of which it must necessarily assume, and 
of which no one is reducible to or contained in the other. For 
we never can get an Event out of simple Being, the reality which 
belongs to Things, namely Being or Existence, never belongs to 
Events--they do not exist but occur.31 
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·The meaning that he gives to reality does not lead him to consider the 
possibility of Real logic . Yet Lotze does refer to the real which can-
not have its being in the form of concepts, judgments, and syllogism. 
It is out of the question that • • • Reality should move and have 
its being in the forms of the Concept, of the judgment or of the 
Syllogism, which our thought assumes in its own subjective efforts 
towards the knowledge of that reality.32 
Lotze does not seem to develop this view of the real into a Real, or 
what Grote would call a Phenomenalist , Logic . If he did so develop it, 
his grounds for so doing would be open to the same criticism as we have 
already fourid in Grote's view, of Mill. It is interesting to note that 
Dewey also does not consider the possibility of phenomena as real, for 
he states that there is 11true reality in contrast With the merely phe-
nomenal. tt33 
That there are existential phenomena is asserted by Hartmann. Yet 
Hartmann does not dwell unduly on the existential nature of phenomena, 
but states that there are mental phenomena. 
Thus also in the problem of Being, certain existential and cog-
nitive phenomena are indices which point to real self-existence • • 
• Certain phenomena of the moral consciousness indicate the exis-
tence of moral freedom.34 
Hartmann also states that the basis of phenomenon may be illusory. "The 
phenomena may always rest ultimately upon an illusion. 1135 This sharply 
31. Lotze, LSP, 439. 
32 . Lot~e, op. cit. , pp. 493, 494. 
33 . Dewey, EAN, 66. 
34 . Hartmann, ETH, III, 139. 
35. Hartmann, 2E• cit., p. 144. 
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contrasts with the ~ nature of phenomena in Grote. 
Hartmann appears to regard phenomena as indicative of something 
else which substantiates or supports the phenomena. This is supported, 
for example, by his contention that moral phenomena indicate moral free-
dom. Now these phenomena are different than the phenomena of Grote. 
Hartmann asserts that there are entities beyond phenomena. But Grote 
does not allol'/ that there is anything at all beyond his phenomena. 
Phenomena, for Grote, do not seem to be illusory at all. They !:!:!:! 
reality. They cannot rest upon illusion. The only illusion that is 
possible in Grote's theory is another sort of phenomena that seems to 
be the same as something that we are thinking about. Hartmann seems to 
hold that beyond phenomena there may be nothing to substantiate them. 
It may be briefly noted here that in the phenomenology of Husserl 
the nature of the real, or of being, is always the real as known, or 
being as known. 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the phenomenological 
method deals with phenomena, and that all the questions it raises 
are significant only in respect to a knower. When 1being' is 
spoken of, known being _ is meant.36 
iv. Personalism 
Let us look now at the phenomena of Grote which are essentially 
'philosophical' on their 'inner' or thought side. For Grote 'being' 
means 'known being.' 
Grote acknowledged that in all knowing there must be a knower. And 
when being is spoken of, it is known being that is meant. In this 
3 6. Farber, 11 Phenomenology, 11 in Runes, TCP, 3 63 • 
respect Grote resembles Husserl. Husserl states that 
I am the ego which invests the being of the world which I so con-
stantly speak about with existential validity, as an existence 
which wins for me from my own life's pure essence meaning and sub-
stantial validity.36a 
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Grote's analysis leads him to the position of maintaining that being may 
be considered independent of any knower, only as an abstraction--what he 
calls 'phenomena• which may affect us even when we are not av1are of 
them, and when we do not philosophize about them. 
But that phenomena require a knower to be phenomena to us, Grote does 
not deny. For £!!enomena are always phenomena to us. He even emphasizes 
this point very strongly to the extent of caJ_ling it "idealism, personalism, 
or whatever it may be called. 1137 'Ihis, he states, "which lies at the root 
of all that I have said, is not simply a doctrine or opinion, but seems to 
me to have been my earliest philosophical feeling, and to have continued, 
if not so vivid, yet not less strong, ever since.rr38 
Philosophy is, essentially, individual, Grote maintains. Our tendency 
is to sink our individuality into the phenomenalism so that the world is 
too much with us in the sense that we overlook the personal element in it. 
Grote means that we can never regard phenomenal reality correctly as a 
sort of reality for a social group, or reality that is characterized by 
•out-thereness.• Reality is always phenomenal reality for him. This re-
ality is for each individual, fundamentally. Reality for a particular 
person is not reality for a second person on the basis of it being a re-
ality for the first. Just what reality for another person may be, will 
always remain fundamentally unknown to us. 
36a. Runes, TCP, 365. 
37. Grote, EP, I, 146. 
38. Loc. cit. 
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Sinking our individuality into phenomenalism means, for Grote, the 
obliteration of individual meanings of 1 things 1 where there is a tendency 
to regard the world as essentially 'out-there' for all, rather than phe-
nomenal reality for each individual--a phenomenal reality always with 
its 'philosophical' side. Hence, Grote says that we are inclined to 
have •the world' too much with us. 
In earlier years, there is a disposition in us to be struck with 
what I may call our personal or conscious difference from it, or 
independence of it, or however else we may style the individual 
feeling: this is what is with me the root of philosophy.39 
I suppose there is more of what may be called personal or individual 
philosophy in the world than one readily hears of, but it is not 
a thing which seems much in people's mind that any real philosophy 
••• is something that they must see for themselves, and that they 
must value any chance or early glimpses they may get about it, be-
cause the course of life and study will in many respects make it 
more difficult for them to get such. 40 
This personalist view, which Grote professes, is not at all surpris-
ing since he holds that 'philosophy' is an indispensable element in all 
knowledge. By 'philosophy' he means a sort of idealism which he feels 
is very appropriately called 'personalism' since all experience is ba-
sically individual. There appears to be a close relationship between 
Grote 1 s personalism here, and Professor Brightman's. Personalism is the 
"theory that only persons are real; that all true being is personal . "41 
For Grote, all being is phenomenal reality. And outside of persons 
there is no being of any sort . We are justified in speaking about being 
at all only on the basis of being related to us. 
39. Grote, EP, I, 146. 
40. Grote, 2£• cit., P• 147. 
41. Brightman, ITP, 389. 
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But there appears in conjunction with his discussion of personalism 
a most arresting remark which seems out of harmony with Grote's episte-
mology: "A belief in a real substance, or thing in itself, is what I 
have always had, and have most strongly. n42 This remark seems to belie 
much of what Grote has already affirmed. It seems that he should not 
have admitted any place whatsoever for the thing in itself for he has 
been saying all along that phenomenon gua phenomenon is an abstraction 
and is nothing for us consciously (though it may affect us even when we 
are unaware of it, and when we do not 'philosophize•). Now, he brings 
in the thing in itself which by its nature has no relation to us whatso-
ever, and does not allow us strictly to refer to •its nature• or t o •it,• 
as an !1 at all. If he means by •substance• the self, then this state-
ment would seem in harmony with the rest of his epistemology. But this 
statement appears, rather, to be plainly an inconsistent one which would 
be excusable only on the recognition that Exploratio Philoaophica claims 
to be only •rough notes.• That 1real substance' is a thing in itself is 
a view that is evident nowhere else in Grote's writings. 
Moreover , Grote does not appear to qualify his professed belief in 
a thing in itself in the passage immediately following his affirmation 
of a belief in its existence: 
It is this very belief which makes me revolt against the philosophy 
which would disjoin from the substance or reality of the thing every 
thing, it appears to me, which we do or can come to know about it: 
it is the assigning a character of unY~owableness to the substance 
which is repugnant to me.43 
42. 
43. 
Grote, EP, I, 147. 
Loc. cit. 
-- -
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Here he speaks of revolting against any philosophy whi.ch seeks to abstract 
from the substance all that we know about it, and thus "assigning a char-
acter of unknowableness to the substance." And yet this is what Grote 
has done in stating belief in a thing in itself, namely, assigning a 
character of unknowableness to this thing in itself, and yet stating a 
belief in it 1 This position of Grote's is hopelessly confused. If he 
had stated that he believed strongly in the possibility of the unknown 
in substanc~his position would be allowable. He seems to admit easy 
entrance to the critic here bythe following statement, also: 
Of the unknown there is no reason for us to suppose either that 
it is unknowable, or that it is (necessarily) more important to 
the thinghood of the thing about which the knowledge is than the 
qualities which we ~ know about it.44 
Already Grote has given us to understand that the thing in itself is both 
unknown and unknowable, because it is the thing in itself. 
It may be said that Grote believes in a real substance, but real 
substance is always phenomenal reality or phenomenal (substance). It is 
correct to say that this phenomenal reality can be known, for it has an 
'inner' or consciousness side that gives meaning to it. Phenomenal 
reality, however, does not need to be known to be knowable, for it may 
act upon us and hence be real for us even when we are actually unaware 
of it (yet could be aware of it). 
Moreover, to affirm belief in the unknowable thing in itself is to 
deny personalism in the sense of all experience being fundamentally 
individual. It is difficult to see how this fundamentally individualis-
44 • . Grote, EP, I, 147. 
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tic character of reality which Grote calls 1idealism, 1 as 'personalism,' 
relates to what is in itself. To hold with Grote that personali sm is 
idealism is to overlook dualists who were also personalists: 
It would be a terminological blunder to identify personalism with 
••• idealism (since most scholastics and many religious realists 
are dualists, yet are also personalists in the .sense of holding that 
personality is either the only ultimately creative reality, or else 
is the controlling reality, in the universe).45 
It should also be noted that, not only is it true, as Grote states, that 
personalism is idealism, but idealism also may be personalism. 
It is interesting to observe that a personalistic philosophy is not 
a distinctly American development since Grote presented a philosophy of 
personalism. There are elements of personalism in Greek philosophy as 
early as Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras: 
The trend toward naming the qualities of personality as the ultimate 
reality began at least as early as Heraclitus ••• who affirmed 
mind as the fundamentally real because it alone had the power to 
differentiate itself from the objective world and from its own 
experiences.46 
Personalistic elements may also be observed in the philosophy of Anaxagoras 
for whom there was a special kind of matter, self-named, animate or psy-
chical. The fac t that Grote presented a personalistic philosophy supports 
the statement: 
It has been quite the custom among American Personalists to assume 
that Personalism is a distinctly and original American development 
in philosophy. Except in a superficial way, nothing could be farther · 
from the truth.47 
45. Brightman, POR, 314n. 
46 . Flewelling, 11Personalism, 11 i n Runes, TCP, 327. 
47. Flewell ing, ££• cit., p. 323. 
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Inasmuch as t here will be a full er account of personalism i n a 
l ater chapter (Chapter IX), further discussion on the subject may be 
left in abeyance. Suffice it to have shown that per sonalism cannot 
entertain the possibility of a Real or Phenomenalist Logic, in the sense 
in which Grote uses these terms as well as the term 'phenomenon.' 
v. Transition 
Regarding the nature of Grote's professed idealism, or personalism, 
we will consider in the following chapter the introspective method as 
exemplified in Locke and others. An attempt will be made to understand 
t he basi s which led Locke to declare that certain qualities were present 
in the mind and others present in objects. The analysis and criticism 
which this discussion involves will be followed in Chapter VIII by a 
consi der ation of the issues to which this introspective method in know-
ledge leads, namely, immediateness and reflection. Following this topi c 
it seems appropriate to devote Chapter IX to the significance of per-
sonalism in Grot e's writings. The next step, however, i s to analyze 
the introspecti ve method in knowledge, and to this subject we will now 
proceed. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE INTROSPECTIVE :METHOD IN KNOWLEDGE 
1. Introduction 
i. Introspection concerned both with 
1 knowing 1 and •the known 1 
Let us turn from a consider ation of Phenomenalist Logic where the 
basis for knowledge is erroneously, according to Grote, regarded as real 
independent of us, to a consideration of the introspectionist method in 
knowledge. For without that which is introspected there can be no know-
ledge. That is, the field of the introspective is necessary to all 
knowledge, and without this field, or, more specifically, without 'phi-
losophy' or consciousness there could be no phenomena. Since the thought 
side of reality is so significant it seems appropriate to devote a spe-
cial chapter to it. 
It may be stated, at the outset, that the examination of what goes 
on in the human mind during any process of knowing is an application of 
the introspective method in knowledge. Knowledge, with which the intro-
spective method deals, concerns both knowing and the known. Specifically, 
·introspection should confine itself to 1knowing,'l but since all knowing 
is inseparably connected with what 'knowing' knows , or at least the ref-
erence to the known--it is fundamental, in the introspective method as 
1. For introspection is "observation directed upon the self or its 
mental states and operations. The term is the modern equivalent of 
•reflection' and 'inner sense' as employed by Locke and Kant." Runes, 
DOP, 149. 
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employed by anyone, to consider 'the known,' the object, or the datum, 
only as this is necessarily and inseparably related to knowing. We are 
not here concerned with a description of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. 
Introspection, then , is specifically an epistemological issue and is not 
clearly bound to idealistic monism where the self is all-important, nor 
to dualism where there is what we may call 'introspecting' and 1the 
introspected.' 
It is important to notice this vast area over which introspection 
may spread--now into a field whose universe of discourse is thinking, 
and again pointing to a field of 1objective 1 reality, or of things thought 
of. However hard we may work to keep introspection in the field of think-
ing, the attempt will meet with inevitable disaster, for it will overflow 
the boundaries of this enclosure and flood the adjoining area. 
ii. Ideas not innate but of empirical origin 
Locke attempted to curtail introspection and found himself at one 
time denying innate ideas when he advocated a 1tabula rasa' theory, and 
professed knowledge to be of empirical origin. At another time he accepts 
the view that there are ideas of various sorts though he is never clear 
as to whether these ideas are wholly self originated or an inevitable re-
sult of our experience with objects in everyday life. 
He does say, however, that our senses convey into the mind distinct 
perceptions of things according to the way that objects affect the senses. 
This is the professed empirical character of Locke's philosophy. The 
introspection side is also evident in Locke's thinking. Both the mental 
and the empirical emphases appear in the following: 
The object of sensation one source of ideas.--First. Our senses, 
conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the 
mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those 
various ways wherein those objects do affect them.2 
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The operations of our minds the other source of them.--Secondly. 
The other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the under-
standing with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our 
own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got.3 
The mind can neither make nor destroy them.--These simple ideas, 
the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to 
the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz., sensatj_on 
and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these 
simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, 
even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure 
new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted 
wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of 
thoughts, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not 
taken in by the ways before mentioned; nor can any force of the 
understanding destroy those that are there.4 
Locke states that the mind 11 can make at pleasure new complex ideas" and 
that 11the mind can neither make nor destroy" simple ideas. This shows 
the active and the passive characteristics of the mind which account 
for the ideas that we have. 
iii. Reflection has both active and passive elements 
Before dealing specifically with Grote's examination of Locke, let 
us still further, consider some basic reflections on Locke's introspec-
-tive method. The introspective method, professedly dealing, in Locke's 
Essa~, with reflection, does not confine itself to reflecting, merely. 
Reflecting is always a reflecting upon something. It is as though 
2. Locke, EHU , in Frost, MOP, 378. 
3. Locke, ~· cit., P• 379. 
4. Locke, 2£• ~., PP• 380, 381. 
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introspection has both active and passive elements in it, the part that 
introspects and the part that is introspected. This question has to do 
with the reflective capacity of the human mind, which is dealt with in 
considerable detail in Chapter VIII of this dissertation under the 
heading, 11 Immediateness and Reflection." 
The reflective character of the introspective method is justifiably 
restricting in its emphasis as it confines attention to the self. In-
trospection tends toward being more and more solipsistic as it leaves 
reflection behind and approaches immediateness; it becomes less and less 
solipsistic as it leaves immediateness behind and approaches reflection. 
Complete immediateness where there is no reflection at all, is never 
reached, Grote means to point out. Introspection in this sense of an 
utmost solipsistic extreme is impossible. It can be regarded as a limit 
no more capable of comprehension than an infinite magnitude. Intro-
spection, then, may be regarded as more and more solipsistic when it 
approaches this limit, and less and less solipsistic as it progressively 
moves away from it. Solipsism characterized, thus, by degrees, shares 
t his character with introspection. 
Introspection is necessarily solipsistic, but it cannot be so ex-
tremely solipsistic that its confines would be infinitely small--so 
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much so that the momentary states of the very psychic self would be 
so infinitesimally minute that they would scarcely allow of being 
considered at all. This introspecting is of an 'introspected,' but 
the introspected are better described as our own past and future ex-
periences rather than 'objects.' 
But we must distinguish further. The introspecting mind is sur-
rounded by objects either of a psychic or physical nature. The active 
phase of introspection requires that other phase upon which it acts. 
Aristotle affirmed an inescapable fact when he presented 'action' and 
'passion' as categories.5 
iv. Two questions faced in this chapter 
With these general remarks on the introspective method we are 
ready to introduce Grote into the scene of the introspective method and 
knowledge. In this chapter we must face two questions, namely, first, 
5. "Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or 
affection." Aristotle, BWA, 8. 
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the nat ure of our problem, and second, the method employed in dealing 
with it. The first question has already been presented. It is to con-
sider the chief issues involved in the introspective method , which issues 
are especially concerned ;vith •thinking' and its 'objects.' The second 
question, regarding methodology, has not yet been dealt with; we will 
consider in t urn the issues as they arise from the specific epistemologi-
cal positions of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spencer, and (to some small ex-
tent) Morell. Let us now turn to the second question, regarding method, 
which also commits us to dealing with the issues involved in introspec-
tion as t hese arise in connection with t!Je various philosophers on whom 
we now center attention. 
2. Locke's psychology 
i. Error in the introspective method 
The introspective method as Locke uses it involves what Grote refers 
to as 1mis-psychology 1 or •bad psychology' where things perceived are 
considered apart from (or even before) our perceiving of them. What is 
involved here is 11 the mis-psychological supposition of the independence, 
first , of the things perceived, and of our then, as such, perceiving 
them. 11 6 
ii. Mis- psychology 
To see the source of the fundamental confusion in the introspective 
method, for example, of Locke, let us consider 'mis-psychology' more 
_ 6. Grote, EP, I, 242. 
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fully. Since this psychological approach to epistemology is evident in 
the introspective methods of the British Empiricists? we will do well to 
analyze it further to see its significance in the whole noetic process. 
Sometimes Grote refers to "the mis-psychological supposition" as 
attaching itself to what he calls "•the Philosophy of the Human Mind' or 
Psychology." •Mis-psychology 1 is 'wrong psychology' which 
consists, substantially, in the attempt to analyze our consciousness 
while nevertheless we suppose ourselves, who have the consciousness, 
to be particular local beings in the midst of an universe of things 
or objects similar to what we ourselves are.8 
'Mis-psychology' may be traced as originating in the relation of the in-
dividual to the human race, and may be illustrated by our mode of speech 
as in the remark, •A stone lies before me: I see it.• 
The great mass of •the Philosophy of the Human Mind' .is in its de-
tails an attempt at a Real Logic of individual knowledge; an attempt 
vitiated in various ways. For this Real Logic of the individual is 
of more complicated and difficult consideration than the Real Logic 
of the knowledge of the race, unless we may say that this, to counter-
balance, has difficulties of a different kind. The greater difficulty 
is in this: that we are considering the growth of the knowledge of 
one mind in the midst of a quantity of others where the knowledge 
exists. This I believe, at bottom, is the origin of the mis-psycho-
logical error on which I comment so abundantly. •A stone lies before 
me: I see it.• We put .this down quite naturally in the account of 
the growth of individual ~~owledge, not apparently thinking that the 
first clause is other people's knowledge: the second is the step 
of mine: and, now, that the .step is taken, I say the stone lies 
before me.9 -
Let us look at Jmis-psychologyt and see if it can be defined more 
explicitly than it is defined or explained above. Mis-psychology is an 
approach to reality in which there is the supposition of the independence 
7. We will consider chiefly Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
8. Grote, EP, I, ix. 
9. Grote, 2£• cit., P• 153. 
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of the •things' perceived, and second, our perceiving of them. Leaving 
this definition, let us now look at a brief explanation or illustration. 
Take the sentence, 11We see things, touch them, and thus know that they 
exist." Mis-psychology (otherwise also called 1bad psychology,' or 
'wrong psychology') would analyze this sentence into three steps: 
(1) The •things' are there for us to see. (2) We see and touch them. 
(3) We infer from this se~ing and touching that the things exist. 
It is important to consider the generic distinction which is made 
between the idea and the fact involved in the case of seeing an object, 
for example, a stone. It is not fact, as fact, which requires an i dea 
t o complete it, but it is rather, the fact that is not accounted for: 
For the notion of the generic distinction of the idea from the fact, 
there needs to be substituted the not i on which I gave above , that 
it is not the fact, qua fact, which wants the ideas as something to 
complete it, but the fact as unaccounted f or. 11We see two trees of 
different kinds; but we cannot knov1 that they are so, except by 
applying to them our idea of t he resemblance and difference which 
makes kinds." The superinduction of the idea upon the fact as fact 
is just that same relativism and wrong psychology united which makes 
us suppose the existing universe first, and then speculate how we 
kno\'r it ••• When we first see the trees, how do they seem to us? 
of the same kind? then what leads us to apply to them the idea which 
makes us change our mind about them and think them of different kinds? 
Or , on the other hand, do we see them of different kinds? then we do 
know their difference already befor e the idea is applied. Or, again, 
do we see them of no kind? but then we do not see them as trees: 
they cannot be trees to us without the thought on our part of kind.lO 
~fuat Grote is concerned about pointing out here is that , i n the case, 
for example , of seeing , there is no actual seeing until there is the idea. 
ftnd after the seei ng takes place, the idea is not needed for that seeing, 
but may be needed very much for what that particular seeing suggests. We 
10. Grote, EP, I, 236, 237. 
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should notice the distinction, and also the relation, between the idea 
and the fact here, Grote would seem to say. And it is not the fact, 
as fact that requires the idea to complete it. For the fact, as fact, 
must somehow have an idea already or it could not be fact. But what 
does need an idea to complete it is the fact that is unaccounted for. 
By a statement like this last one Grote implies that there are many 
•things' yet that we do not know. These are the 'things' that are un-
accounted for. And before we can actually know these things there must 
be an idea (or ideas) to complete them. 
iii. The mind as a tabula rasa 
1Mis-psychology 1 comes in when we regard fact qua fact before we 
have an idea of the fact. It is all right to refer to fact qua fact if 
we already have an idea of the fact, that is, if the fact is a known 
fact, and has relation to us. Otherwise to refer to fact without idea, 
or thought of the fact, is meaningless. Grote is implying that rnis-
psychology is evident in much of Locke's Essay. Quite independently of 
Grote's statements we may fairly assert that Locke's affirmation con-
cerning the mind as a tabula rasa at birth, and that all knowledge comes 
to us from ~xperience is knowledge resulting from the 'experiencing ' of 
-the 'experienced.' 
An uncompromising and decisive dualism in which we have ideas on 
the one hand, and facts on the other, in abstraction from each other is 
simply fictional. Because all facts already have ideas connected with 
them, Grote seems to be saying that Locke sometimes expresses himself 
in this type of dualistic language, where the 'perceived' is abstracted 
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from that which perceives it. That is, if the mind is a tabula rasa 
at birth then there are no ideas but simply those facts in isolation 
(from ideas) . This is what is meant above when we said that, "all know-
ledge comes to us from experience is knowledge resulting from the •ex-
periencing' of the •experienced.'" That is, quite evidently, we can-
not have the 'experienced' except in necessary relation to that which 
is ' experiencing' (the •experienced•). It would be presumptuous to 
state that Locke engages in fictional demarcations. Yet there is a 
close resemblance between Locke's introspective method and such abstrac-
tions as the two above, namely, of mind from objects, and objects from 
mind. 
iv. All experience requires ideas 
Locke obliterates the view which he presents for consideration, to 
the effect that the mind has ideas at birth. Without some sort of a 
semblance of ideas nothing even of the vaguest sort could ever be ex-
perienced. For the •experienced' must be to someone. Even to speak of 
the empirical world for a tabula rasa mind is to give that mind an em-
pirical world that has no meaning at all l We are therefore forced to 
the conclusion that with a postulate of a tabula rasa mind must go 
necessarily, a tabula rasa empirical world as far as that mind is con-
cerned. This is equivalent to saying that if there are no ideas at all, 
not even very poorly or partially developed ones, then neither is there 
for that mind an empirical world. 
The preceding paragraph is an attempt to give a free rendering of 
. Grote 1 s criticism of Locke. Grote seems to have an important point in 
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mind here. In language fundamental for the whole of his Exploratio 
Philosophica, it can be said that Locke sometimes makes the mistake of 
considering what Grote calls phenomenal reality, as simply phenomena 
qua phenomena ~dthout any regard for phenomena qua 'philosophy.' Phe-
nomena are ~wholly abstracted from us, according to Grote. If they 
were, then there would be nothing to give them any meaning either noeti-
cally or as effects upon us in some other way. 
Now, it seems to Grote, in terms of his fundamental epistemological 
thesis regarding the essential connection between phenomena and 'philos-
ophy' that Locke has sometimes written as though phenomena could be 
wholly abstracted from 'philosophy.' And one of the places where Locke 
seems to do this is where he speaks of that which is absolutely essential 
for 'philosophy' (namely, a mind that is not tabula rasa) , as non-
existent. 
v. Ideas give the •external world' meaning 
These propositions, although not specific statements of Grote, seem 
to be supported by him. Now, let us come a bit closer to the specific 
critical analysis which Grote contributes to the introspective method 
in knowledge, and also see at the same time how he supports the argument 
presented above. In his explanation of what takes place in the human 
mind when we think, Locke denied what he needed for the explanation in 
his rejection of •innate ideas.• Only through experience and contact with 
external objects can ideas come, according to Locke. The external world 
waits, he says, for mind to come into contact with it. But he might just 
as well have said that mind waits for the external world to come into 
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contact with it. To speak of an external world (and therefore a world 
abstracted from mind) at all, is superfluous, one must conclude. There 
isn't in the tabula rasa mind anything that would give the •external 
world' meaning and hence the perceived would have no meaning. To speak 
of an external world is already taking for granted what already has been 
denied, namely, an external world for the tabula rasa 1mind.• In his 
introspection, then, Locke was not justified in stating that mind has no 
ideas even partially formed; he might as well have said that for that 
mind there is no external world either . And if there is no external 
world for that mind there can be no growth of knowledge, for such growth 
depends upon the existence of the empirical world in relation to it. 
vi . Phenomenal reality cannot produce thought 
Now, there does appear to be a better solution for this difficulty 
than the one which Locke offers. The prerequisites in this solution 
seem to be offered by Grote if we consider his distinction between 
'philosophy' and phenomenalism. Briefly, it may be paraphrased as fol-
lows: Phenomenal reality, as Grote uses this term, which is essentially 
communication between the •world' and the sense organs, nerves , and other 
essentially non-sensible parts of the body, affects us even though we 
-may be wholly unaware of this action. (We must always keep in mind that 
phenomena qua phenomena do not involve consciousness, for Grote. This 
fact is embraced in the peculiar and unusual sense in which he uses the 
term. ) No amount of such stimulation, affectation, or action can ever 
produce any ideas whatsoever unless the mind makes some sort of contri-
bution, through consciousness, awareness, activity, or however we may 
195 
describe this essentially conscious part of life. Now if the mind is a 
tabula rasa, how does knowing ever begin in the first place, to say 
nothing of a knowing process going on which increases so that we have 
a right to refer to the mind as having ideas? 
In his method of introspection, which is essentially a considera-
tion of what it is that the mind knows, Locke virtually says that first 
the mind knows nothing. This is the view he professes, but the view he 
does not profess has already boldly entered the scene through his as-
sertion that there is an external world for the mind that has no ideas l 
For the external world is already--since Locke speaks of it as existing--
a sort of partially formed, more than potential (in Aristotle's sense of 
potency), idea.11 Locke supports this last statement himself when he 
refers to the concurrence of the idea and the thing: 
\Vhen Locke says, an idea is right if it agrees with the thing , what 
purpose is served by the language? For what is the thing to us ex-
cept the idea which we have of it • • • ? If we can know the facts 
in any independent way, so as to be able to test the notions which 
we form of them by the facts themselves, what is the good of forming 
the notions, if the facts are already known? 1112 
vii. Primary and secondary qualities 
The concurrence of the idea with the thing (which strangely enough 
is regarded by Locke as a •thing' before we even have an idea of it) is 
a situation presented by Locke as legitimate which nevertheless is 
classed by Grote as •mis-psychology.' This criticism of Grote's, which 
seems to be well made, applies also to Locke's classification of qualities 
11. Substance is, for Locke, "something I know not what." 
12. Grote , EP, II, 90. 
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into primary and secondary. Let us, then, look at this classification. 
'Mis-psychology' repeatedly has appeared in Locke's writings sometimes in 
a subtle and intricate form. The primary qualities as Locke enunciated 
them were figure, number, situation, bulk, etc., and rest or motion, which 
are in the object as well as in ~ur perception of it. The secondary qual-
ities, as color, taste, and sound , are really modes of perception brought 
about by the characteristics of the objects which do not, however, co-
incide with the perception. 
In general, then, when the senses come into contact with the external 
world we receive, passively, general or elementary ideas. Here, Locke is 
assuming the external world as such even before we have ideas of it. But 
the external world is such .only because we already have an idea (however 
vague or undeveloped) of it. That is, it is no more true that the mind 
is passively awaiting the 'external world' to affect it--thus giving it 
ideas, than that the external world is awaiting the mind to come al ong 
with ideas of it--thus giving to is, its nature as the 'external world.• 
This is partly what Grote's division in epistemology into 'philosophical• 
and phenomenal aspects, amounts to. Grote is virtually saying tbat you 
cannot separate knowledge into ideas and what the ideas are of, and say 
·- that the latter affects us so that we have ideas. That is, conscious 
states exemplified in the nature of ideas simply cannot be brought about 
by the phenomenal reality of the 'external world.' The most that phe-
nomenal reality can do is to communicate with our bodily organs and 
senses. The awareness must be left up to the non-phenomenal factors 
which are the only ones that can give meaning to anything. 
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So, to say that the primary qualities of objects affect us so that 
ideas are produced implies that the phenomenal world (qua phenomenal) 
is creative of ideas. The point is that phenomenal reality does not 
create anything at all on the thought side of any epistemological issue. 
If this is so, as there seems excellent reason to believe, (on the basis 
of what has already been presented many times throughout this disserta-
tion, in distinguishing 'philosophy' from phenomena) then the mind is not 
a tabula rasa at all, but is activated by ideas in a sort of medium of 
consciousness, or awareness, which assumes a necessary 'philosophical' 
approach in questions concerning introspection and reality. Then to 
speak of powers in objects capable of bringing about the secondary qual-
ities in us is erroneous. In fact to speak at all, of primar.y qualities 
as in the object is to assume that we already have ideas of these qual-
ities and hence to say that they produce ideas in us is superfluous . 
viii. Interrelations among ideas 
Now, let us look at the introspective method as it deals with inter-
relations of ideas. According to Locke we are aware, however it happens, 
of external things (such as objects, qualities in them, etc.) to begin 
with, and these give rise to ideas. The ideas in some virtually mysteri-
·ous manner become interwoven and related so that the objects are then 
created for the mind just as though they did not exist before this. 
It is to be observed that all those ideas which either sensation or 
reflection imprints upon the understanding are all pure and unblended, 
and therefore I call Simple Ideas; as are those of whiteness, black-
ness, heat, cold, softness, length, or extension, unity, and all t he 
particular tastes and smells, and other sensible qualities for which 
we have no names, and also thinking in all the several modes of it; 
which the understanding, when it is stored with, has the power and 
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faculty to join together, enlarge, compare one with another, and 
consider them with reference to others, which is all a sort of 
comparing, and unite even to an almost infinite variety and so 
make at pleasure new complex ideas.l3 
The mysterJ involved in the interrelating of ideas is no mystery for 
Locke for he plainly states that when the mind is stored with simple 
ideas it has the power of joining together, enlarging, and comparing 
them ~dth each other in an infinite variety so that complex ideas are 
possible. One might state that this is a capacity that one would scarce-
ly expect to find in a mind that, previous to the possession of simple 
ideas, had to wait for impressions to be made by 'objects' so that ideas 
were formed. That the mystery is not so easily explained may be illus-
trated in the following: 
Locke betrays considerable perplexity in his attempt to give an 
account of ideas of relation and the manner of their formation 
in accordance with his preconceived theory of complex ideas . l4 
Now it seems that Locke, in stating how complex ideas are formed, is em-
phasizing the 'philosophical' approach to epistemology, and that he is 
doing this as though there were, for the time being at least, no phe-
nomenal reality to which this 'philosophical' approach applies. 
ix. Locke emphasizes the 'philosophical' and the phenomenal 
approaches to epistemology, interchangeably 
That Locke emphasizes now one point of view, that of consciousness, 
and again the other point of view, that of phenomena, is recognized by 
another English philosopher. 
13 . 
- 14. 
Rand, .EHU, 66. 
Gibson, JL, __ 21. 
The confusion of the two points of view usually appears (as in 
Locke's philosophy, and again in Hamilton's) in the twin assump-
tions of a material world existing independently of being known 
and a mind or consciousness which knows this independently exist-
ing world.l5 
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Hence one may conclude that the Lockian introspective method in knowledge 
is confused by a mixing of two fundamental approaches that may be taken 
in epistemology. The basis of this criticism of the introspective method 
is the same as that employed in dealing with Sir William Hamilton who 
took a double point of view, namely, that of consciousness of mental 
states on the one hand, and--what was a much different kind of conscious-
ness--consciousness of matter on the other. 
x. Grote's suggest ed improvement for Locke's 
introspective method 
a. Locke should have recognized the 'purely mental experience' 
in our mental history 
Grote holds that Locke, true to his professed empirical starting-
point, should have asserted that there is •purely mental experience• in 
our mental history, and that would have removed the view that the mind 
was originally a blank tablet--and it would have been in conformity with 
Locke's empiricism. This 1purely mental experience• would cause us to 
_infer that there is fact outside of us, so that we could say there is 
experience analyzable into 'experiencing' and •experienced.' Thus we 
might conclude that the fact of the external world would gradually become 
known to us. This is, at least, the general procedure that Locke's 
_ 15. Forsyth, EP, 140. 
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epistemology could have followed. And this procedure would be an advance 
from consciousness where 'purely mental experience' resides, to phenomenal 
reality which is none the less real even when we are not conscious of it 
though it does not become real until it is real for us (through aware-
ness). lhis procedure seems to be advocated by Gr ote as more consistent 
in the sense that there would not be an assumption of •the external 
world' even before we have any idea of it where the mind is a tabula 
rasa. 
b. Appraisal of Grote's suggestion · 
~~ether Grote's suggested procedure would have been as fruitful for 
Locke as the one Locke himself followed is open to speculation. There 
might have been much less likelihood of 1mis-psychology' (nco-psychology, 
or 'bad psychology') but it might have so restricted Locke that he would 
eventually decide to sacrifice the contribution that he made in order to 
be consistent and so, probably, would never have given us An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding at all . 
3. Hume 1 s rationalism 
i . 1Mis-psychologyt 
Like Locke, Hume seems guilty of a 1mis-psychological 1 approach to 
knowledge. Grote is going to try to explode the skeptical basis from 
which Hume views rationalistic theories since Hume affirmed that reality 
nas primarily an empirical basis. It will be noted throughout this dis-
cussion of Hume that there is a strong strain of rationalism in Hume and 
that Grote , generally, tends to overlook this rationalism. In overlook-
ing Hume ' s rationalism Grote tends to look upon Hume as more of a 
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phenomenalist than he is justified in doing. 
Yet, Grote maintains that Hume, in referring to the creative power 
of mind and the activity of the senses when we have 'impressions,' is 
correct. Let us look at the following statement by Hume: 
This creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the 
faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing 
the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When 
we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, 
gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A 
virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we 
can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape 
of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the 
materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or in-
ward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs 
alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical 
language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our 
impressions or more lively ones .l6 
But there is much evidence of elements of 1bad psychology ' in this pas-
sage. This error is especially evident where the 
creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of 
compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diroinishing the materials 
afforded us by the senses and experience.l7 
Here, Hume assumes that there are •materials afforded us by the 
senses.' These materials are not materials at all for tpe mind if the 
mind is not allowed as being present in order that 'materials' would 
have meaning. Now, 'materials' are in the same position inHume's wri-
ting here, as phenomena are in Grote's Exploratio Philosophica. But, for 
Grote, phenomena for us always require awareness. One might comment on 
Grote's position here to the effect that Hume cannot regard •materials' 
as such apart from mind, as though they have no relationship with mind 
16. Hume, EHU , 16. 
17. Loc. cit . 
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and yet are related to mind so that we can know them 1 Grote observes 
too that Hume shifts emphasis back and forth between the 'philosophical' 
and the phenomenal as though there were at times a definite distinction 
between--to put it generally--the 'subjective' or the thought side in 
epistemology, and the 1objective 1 or the 'external world' side. Hume 
speaks at times as though reality is reality without us, that is, with-
out any relation to self, and again he refers to it as a reality for self. 
Hume inclined to confuse perceiving with the object perceived. 
That Hume is inclined to be confused here, is supported by the 
following observation: 
What Hume really did in his work on the external perception, was 
to shift his attention from the objects generally perceived, on 
to the conscious experience of perception itself. This is not to 
say that he always realized what was involved in this change of 
attitude . He was often inclined to confuse the 'perception' with 
the object perceived, and to argue,--that because space, time and 
matter, and all that they involved, were not themselves to be 
found in the 'perception,' although they were undoubtedly 'per-
ceived,' that space, time, and matter, did not really exist.l8 
To say that space, time, matter, and all that they involved are not to 
be found in the 'perception' "although they are undoubtedly 'perceived'" 
is to make the error of •bad psychology' to which Grote calls attention. 
For Grote contends that we cannot say that anything is 'perceived' ~dth-
out also being "found in the 'perception.'" What Grote is actually say-
ing here is that there is one reality, and two aspects or ways of look-
ing at this reality, that is, from the point of view of consciousness and 
the point of view of phenomena. 
18. Salmon, CPH, 14. 
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ii. Strong tendency toward rationalism 
It is interesting to note that Mill, contending for what Grote calls, 
a Real or Phenomenalist Logic, implies that Hume should have regarded 
matter as an original fact of consciousness. But that Hume had this in 
mind is evident from what he says about 'unknown causes,' or as it is 
otherwise expressed: "Substance is the unknown, indescribabl e support 
of the known contents of ideas.rrl9 That is, Mill implies that matter 
can be postulated as real even apart from consciousness, and that we can 
then be conscious of what we have postulated without any consciousness 
being present at all. Mill doesn't quite say that the presence of con-
sciousness is not required. This position would be too glaringly de-
fective. But, the point is that Mill tends to develop a Real Logic, as 
the last chapter indicated. Differing with Grote and agreeing with 
Salmon, I contend that Hume is much more rationalistic than Grote makes 
him out to be. Moreover, Hume's rationalism does not allow him to be 
identified with the generally phenomenal position presented in a con-
siderable portion of Mill's logic. The justification for mentioning the 
subjectivistic and objectivistic strains in Hume at all is to show that 
at one time he follows the phenomenal approach and at another time the 
'philosophical.' Ideas, Hume holds, are pale copies of impressions; and 
impressions are received from experience. Ideas should be regarded as 
pale copies of what is received from experience. But Hume is assuming 
experience corresponding to which there are no ideas, and having made 
this step he is ready to say that there are ideas of what he has already 
19. Windelband , HOP, 473. 
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accepted without ideas. This is the •bad psychology' to which Grote 
refers. 
Let us subject the following passage to sufficient analysis to pre-
sent the point that Grote is trying to make here: 
Suppose ••• a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years , 
and to have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds 
except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never 
has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades 
of that colour , except that single one, be placed before him, de-
scending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain 
that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and 
will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place 
between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whe-
ther it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply 
this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particu-
lar shade, though it bad never been conveyed to him by his senses? 
I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: and 
this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in 
every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though 
this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our ob-
serving, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our 
general maxim.20 
Hume clearly means to imply that ideas are "derived from the correspon-
dent impressions," when he says that 11the simple ideas are not always, 
in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions." 
Now thi s means, in the language of Grote, that Hume is using •bad 
psychology' in asserting that there are impressions from which ideas 
are derived. For, Grote would say here that if an impression ~ 
something then we must have an idea of it already. In that case, Grote 
would remark that, we have ideas of impressions even before ideas are 
derived from •the correspondent impressions 1 1 
Again, it is evident , according to Hume, that impressions do mean 
20. Hume, EHU, 18, 19. 
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something, for: "By the term impression • • • I mean all our more 
lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or 
desire, or will."21 Already, then, Grote would assert, there are ideas 
of the impressions, even before the ideas are "derived from" them. That 
is, wherever we have Grote's phenomena there is an 1inside 1 to them which 
may be designated variously as 'philosophy,' •consciousness,' or even 
'ideas.' 
iii. •The creative po\ver of the mind 1 
Grote appears to criticize Hume somewhat too seve~, for Hume re-
garded •the creative po1-1er of the mind' as an important factor in know-
ledge. Now, if Hume were completely empirical his strictly objective 
approach in epistemology would be as glaringly evident as Grote makes it 
out to be. The vi~v that he was not an outright empiricist is supported 
in the following: 
It is seriously misleading to say that Hume was an empiricist 'pure 
and simple'; such a view arises by neglecting the more or less tacit 
assumptions that lie in the background of Hume's philosophy but none 
the less effectively determine the nature of his conclusions. So 
far as his ideal of what ought to constitute true knowledge is con-
cerned, Hume is almost if not quite as much a rationalist as Locke; 
his extension of empirical principles consists largely in irrefutable 
proofs that the rationalist ideal is unattainable, a suspicion which 
Locke shared, though with only the most confused perception of its 
consequences.22 
Yet Grote's view of the very great significance to be attached to Hume's 
empiricism is not an isolated one. A sharing of this view by others is 
21. Hume, EHU, 15 . 
22. Sabine, PE, 43, 44. 
evidenced i n the f ollowing statement: 
It is i n vir t ue of the r lentless faithfulness with which he fol-
lows out t he logical consequences of the empirical point of view 
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that we are compelled to admit that in the 'Treatise of Human Nature,' 
the l ogic of empiricism works itself out to its inevitable conclu-
s i ons • • • We cannot describe the sceptical philosophy of Hume as 
the complete logical development of the Lockian and Berkeleian phi-
losophy, but only as the logical completion of the empirical element 
in the philosophy of his predecessors. That which had for them been 
a part becomes for Hum.e the v1hole; he is . an empiricist pure and simple, 
and he shows us wit h singular insight the ultimate meaning and con-
sequences of pure empiricism.23 
iv. Place of mind in 'impression' 
Hume, however, does not disregard the important place that mind has 
in what he calls 'impression, ' particularly when he holds that ideas (as 
mental entities) are pal e copies of impressions. It is scarcely possi ble 
to give mind as subordinate a place as Grote does in considering Hume as 
an empiricist. That there are rationalistic elements evident in Hume 
is manifest from the following: 
No1o1 I ask , whether it be possible for him, (that is , a person who 
enjoyed his sight for thirty years) from his 01~ imagination, to 
supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that 
particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his 
senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he 
can: and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not 
always , in every instance, derived from the correspondent im-
pressions . 24 
Here Hume makes provision for the mind to form an idea without a 
"correspondent impression." 
However , Grote seems somewhat unjustified in taking a particular 
passage from Hume, and in dwelling at length on this extract in order to 
23. Seth, EPS, 150. 
24. Hume, EHU , 18, 19. 
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exhibit the possible imperfection in Hume 1s argument. It is quite pos-
sible that this ~fairness is due to the fact that Grote , after a study 
of Kant's Critigue of Pure Reason (especially in regard to the categories), 
became fully convinced of the weakness of Hume in giving less place than 
he should have to the mind in considering a problem like that of causality. 
v. Relations 
Actually, Hume in the sections dealing with the association of 
ideas25 and skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the under-
standing26 deals with various types of relations. Relations amongst 
ideas include resemblance, contrariety, and cause and effect. Relations 
depending upon matters of fact include identity, time and place relations, 
and again cause and effect. At first sight it would seem presumptuous to 
criticize this distinction of Hume 1s. But a second look enables us to 
see that the distinction seems somewhat arbitrarily made. For example, 
Hume doesn't seem quite sure where to place cause and effect relations 
and settles the question for himself fairly satisfactorily by holding 
that these relations have to do with •Matters of Fact.• "All reasonings 
concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause 
and Effect.n27 
Matters of fact, then, depend upon relations of cause and effect. 
If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which 
is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the countr,y, or in 
France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some 
25. Hume, EHU, sec. III. 
26. Hume, 2£• cit. , sec. IV. 
27. Hume , ~· cit., p. 24 . 
other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of 
his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or 
any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there 
once been men in that island.28 
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But that there is a clear affirmation of 1thought' or •thing' re-
l ations is a tantalizing hope that t urns out to be illusion. It seems 
that Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by observing Hume 
wrestling with this problem in an arena of relations. Grote, too, sur-
mised that all was not well and began searching for a defect. He found 
one which assured him still more that his hypothesis of a basic dis-
tinction in epistemology, between the phenomenal and 'philosophical' 
approaches, was correct. 
vi. Are cause and effect relations concerned with 
ideas or with matters or fact? 
Grote could well ask, Are cause and eff ect relations concerned with 
ideas or with matters of fact? Grote seems to conclude that Hume, true 
to his professed empiricism, holds that these relations deal with mat-
ters of fact. Then Grote is ready to show that cause and effect re-
lat ions are already accepted as matters of fact, even previous to any 
corresponding relations amongst cause and effect as ideas. And he is 
ready to point out that this is the defect of the phenomenal approach 
where •things' are accepted as existing even before they are connected 
with mind, and t~at •things' can only be considered as such to a mind 
which regards them as things. Grote could have gone further and said 
that the same thing holds true of the other matters of fact, namel y, 
28. Hume, EHU, 24, 25. 
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identity, and time and place relations, as held true (as we just pointed 
out) in the case of relations of cause and effect.29 
vii. Idea, impression, and 1impressioning' 
Now, what is said about matters of fact being considered apart from 
ideas can also be said about Hume 1s whole discussion of 'impression' and 
1idea. 1 11 By the term 'impression,' then, I mean all our more lively per-
ceptions, when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will.u30 
Here the term 'perception' is vague. It may mean something perceived, or 
the act of perceiving, and we are left uncertain 1.vhat Hume meant. It 
seems quite possible that the reason for this uncertainty is founded on 
the possibility that Hume himself was not too clear whether he should be 
29 . It will clarify remarks made on relations to note specifically how 
Hume classifies these relations. 
There are seven different kinds of philosophical relation, viz. 
resemblance, identity, relations of time and place 2 proportiOn in 
quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causa-
tion . These relations may be divided into two classes; into such 
as depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such 
as may be chang 1d without any change in the ideas. Hume, THN, 185. 
It appears ••• that of these seven philosophical relations, there 
remain only four, which depending solely upon ideas, can be the ob-
jects of knowledge and certainty. These four are resemblance, con-
trariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. 
Hume, THN, 186. 
This is all I think necessary to observe concerning those four re-
lations, which are the foundation of science; but as to the other 
three, which depend not upon the idea , and may be absent or present 
even while that remains the same, •twill be proper to explain them 
more particularly. These three relations are identity, the situations 
in time and place, and causation. Hume , THN, 190. 
30. Hume, EHU, 15. 
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emphasizing the subjective or the ob j ective phases of the question. If 
he meant to imply that ideas are involved, in emphasizing the subjective 
side of 'impression' he could have used some such term as 1impressioning.' 
If he meant to imply that things are involved, in stressing the objective 
side of 'impression' then 1things 1 are considered apart from any mind to 
which they are ~hinge' 1 Also, such a t erm as 'impressioning' is hardly 
a good substitute for 1idea. 1 And yet this term 'impressioning' seems 
to express what Hume meant when he used the term 'impression,' for 'im-
pressionings1 are clearly more lively and vivid 'ideas.' 11 The less 
forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.n3l 
4. Berkeley's subjectivism 
i. Berkeley's approach wholly 'philosophical' 
Berkeley may be contrasted with Hume. Instead of assuming the 
external world previous to 'impressions' (or 'impressionings') Berkeley 
did not regard the universe of 1things 1 as existing at all. Ideas are 
the only reality. Berkeley's approach in epistemology is wholly 'philo~ 
sophical.• Berkeley, a subjective idealist, possesses the virtue of 
consistency. 
ii. Importance of judgment 
In his Theory of Vision, Berkeley holds that people are generally 
biased since they regard the •things' that they see as real external ob-
jects, whereas the true account, according to Berkeley, is that the 
judgment intercedes on behalf of sight in order that the seen may be 
31. Hume, EHU, 15. 
real to the mind. Taking the case of a blind man who recovered hi s 
si ght, Berkeley indicates the importance of judgment: 
For , we have shown that to the immediate objects of si ght, con-
sidered in themselves, he would not attribute the terms high and 
low ••• \-Tithout this motion of the eye, this turning it up and 
down in order to discern different objects, doubtless 'erect,' 
'inverse,' and other the like terms relating to the position of 
tangible objects, would never have been transferred, or in any 
degree apprehended to belong to the ideas of sight--the mere act 
of seeing including nothing in it to that purpose; whereas the 
different situations of the eye naturally direct the mind to 
make a suit able judgment32 of the s i tuation of objects intro-
mit ted .by it.33 
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Berkeley states that we see 'perspectively' when what we see is sometimes 
regarded as in association with things. In order that the real may be 
~' judgment must be present. The basis for this judgment may be seen 
in the following remark by Philonous: 
Whatever opinion we father on Him, it must be either because He 
has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because 
it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and 
g1 ven us by God. 34 
Berkeley 's use of judgment in reference to distance is significant. 
Distance may be 'seen' but cannot be calculated without judgment acting 
on behalf of what is seen. In other words it is simply nervous affec-
t ion that is responsible for what is 'seen, ' and then through experience 
(t he important part of which for Berkeley is judgment) the distance is 
calculated. 
32. Italics mine. 
33. Berkeley, WOR, I, 81. 
34. Berkeley, 2£• cit., p. 339. 
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iii. Vision at the eye 
Berkeley believed that one's vision of the 'external' world is all 
at one's eye. 
An account of some observations made by a young gentleman, who was 
born blind, ••• When he first saw, he was so far from making any 
judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever 
touched his eyes (as he express 1d it) as what he felt did his 
skin.35 
Grote attempts to refute this view by showing that a person just re-
covering from blindness would really not see things ~the eye. 
We have only to affect the eye: there might be imagined medica-
ments for the optic nerve which might enable us to live in a 
visible world of our ovm, perpetually varying and of whatever 
beauty we pleased and coul d pre-imagine. But all this . gives us 
no reason to consider that a person beginning to see will see 
things as at the eye. What is in the eye is nervous agitation, 
and corresponding to this in the world of consciousness is true 
sensation or thought, and according to the nervous agitation this 
thought creates the visual object and projects it into space which 
it has created likewise, and this is its locality as a part of the 
visual scene. It is at the eye in quite a different sense from 
the sense in which it has this locality, and no experiences can 
make a bridge between one and the other.36 
Neither would one be inclined to think, Grote continues, that, if cured 
of deafness in the midst of an instrumental concert, one were a victim 
of head noises 1 Grote holds that the eye, in the case of the blind re-
ceiving sight, is an organ of nervous agitation corresponding to which, 
in the mind, is thought. But to say that it is 'an organ of nervous 
agitation' is to become phenomenalistic in one's approach. Berkeley 
illustrates his view in the following, concerning a "most i ntelligent 
35. Berkeley, WOR, I , 444, 445. 
36. Grote, EP, II, 123, 124. 
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judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever 
touched his eyes (as he express 1d it) as what he felt did his 
skin.35 
Grote attempts to refute this view by showing that a person just re-
covering from blindness would really not see things ~the eye. 
We have only to affect the eye: there might be imagined medica-
ments for the optic nerve which might enable us to live in a 
visible world of our ovm, perpetually varying and of whatever 
beauty we pleased and coul d pre-imagine. But all this . gives us 
no reason to consider that a person beginning to see will see 
things as at the eye. What is in the eye is nervous agitation, 
and corresponding to this in the world of consciousness is true 
sensation or thought, and according to the nervous agitation this 
thought creates the visual object and projects it into space which 
it has created likewise, and this is its locality as a part of the 
visual scene. It is at the eye in quite a different sense from 
the sense in which it has this locality, and no experiences can 
make a bridge between one and the other.36 
Neither would one be inclined to think, Grote continues, that, if cured 
of deafness in the midst of an instrumental concert, one were a victim 
of head noises 1 Grote holds that the eye, in the case of the blind re-
ceiving sight, is an organ of nervous agitation corresponding to which, 
in the mind, is thought. But to say that it is 'an organ of nervous 
agitation' is to become phenomenalistic in one's approach. Berkeley 
illustrates his view in the following, concerning a "most i ntelligent 
35. Berkeley, WOR, I , 444, 445. 
36. Grote, EP, II, 123, 124. 
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boy, nine years of age, who had congenital cataracts of both eyes. 1137 
He gradually became more correct in his perception, but i t was 
only aft er several days that he could or would tel l by t he eyes 
alone, which \"las the sphere and which the cube; when asked, he 
always, before answering, wished to take both into his hands; even 
when this was allowed , when immediately afterwards the objects 
were placed before the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. 
Of distance he had not the least conception. He said everything 
touched his eyes, and walked most carefully about, with his hands 
held out before him, to prevent things hurting his eyes by touch-
ing them.38 
iv. Phenomenalism evident in Berkeley 
Grote disagrees with Berkeley, for he does not believe that 'every-
thing touched his eyes.' Grote contends that Berkeley's view commits him 
to the 'philosophical• approach in kno\-rledge, and that the phenomenal 
approach is simply avoided, or professedly non-existent. Grote is ob-
viously attempting to enrich his hypothesis of the possibility of a 
division into two possible approaches to the problem of knowledge, namely, 
the 'philosophical' or 'logical,' and the phenomenal. Grote holds that 
with equal justification Berkeley could have affirmed that there are 
phenomena which affect us even when we are not aware of them, and that 
these phenomena are ~ even though we are not always aware of them. 
Yet it may be maintained in Berkeley's defence that spiri ts affect us, 
especial l y the divine spirit. Nature (regarded by Grote as phenomenal 
reality ) , for Berkeley , is divine language. 
Phenomena, in the sense in which Grote uses this term, have no 
meaning apart from some consciousness. It seems, then, that Grote does 
37. Berkeley, lrfOR, II, 413n. 
38. Berkeley, ££• ~. , pp. 414, 415 . 
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not differ so greatly from Berkeley as he professes. For Grote virtually 
holds that in order to have meaning (or 1sense 1 ) in anything we must be 
'philosophical' in our attitude. It seems that Berkeley would not dis-
pute this and is simply carrying the 'philosophical' lead to knowledge, 
to its (logical) conclusion, namely, that nothing can mean anything 
·~~thout the mind.• Grote seems to be saying somewhat the same thing 
in another way and by use of different terms, namely, by saying that 
there are two ways of approaching reality, that is, from the point of 
view of consciousness, and again from the aspect of phenomena. Whereas , 
Berkeley approaches reality from one side only, from the ~· 
But there is an important point in Grote's criticism of Berkeley 
that should not be overlooked. It is a point that partly concerns the 
unfortunate way in which it is sometimes necessary to express ourselves. 
This point is where Grote criticizes Berkeley for stating that in the 
case of the person recovering his sight all things would be seen at the 
eyes. Now, Berkeley seems to have meant to illustrate that things are 
real on the basis of mind alone. His illustration regarding objects 
seen at the eyes seems rather unfortunate. For the eyes are ~ mental 
and are safely classed as •external' (in the sense of external to the 
mind). So Berkeley still is not showing that •objects' are mental any 
more than if he held that 'objects' are somewhere •out there.' Grote 
does not seem to have mentioned this point anywhere, nor is there any 
intimation that he had it in mind. But he could have mentioned it, and 
shown that Berkeley sometimes mixed phenomena with 'philosophy .' 
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v. Fundamental agreement between Grote and Berkeley 
However, Berkeley's meaning of reality as mental {or spiritual) is 
prominent. If any illustration is not altogether acceptable it seems 
to be due to the refractory nature of the problem with which he is deal-
ing. Thus, there is revealed the difficulty of always expressing oneself 
in 'philosophical' language when to do so seems to overlook the facts of 
phenomena which affect us even when we are not aware of their so doing. 
To account for those phenomena by an affirmation of the existence of 
deity is to admit the existence of such phenomena--though never giving 
them meaning apart from some mind, either human or divine. In short, 
that anything can have meaning wholly apart from any mind {considered 
as consciousness) is a view held neither by Berkeley nor Grote. The 
introspective analysis which each makes of the human mind seems to make 
such a conclusion legitimate, despite the fact that their main conten-
tion is reached by different roads where the respective emphases do not 
always coincide. I t seems to have been the denial of 1a material world' 
that inspired Mansel to write: 
Like Malebranche, Berkeley maintains that the ideas which we per-
ceive are imprinted on our minds by the Author of Nature, to whom 
they are ever present; and in denying the existence of a material 
world corresponding to these ideas he merely discarded an assumption 
which, as far as philosophy was concerned, his predecessor had al-
ready dispensed with.39 
But in the case of Mansel as well as Malebranche there seems no readiness 
to make the legitimate contention that Grote makes for phenomena which 
are always for some mind (either God's or our's). These phenomena are 
39 . Mansel, LLR, 390. 
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an excellent substitute for 1objects 1 or an 1external world.' 
vi. Berkeley's illustration valuable to 
Grote's interpretation 
Grote's contention that phenomena must be somehow accounted for 
appears in the following: 
We should have no notion of the wide prospects of earth or the 
vast spaces of the heavens without sight; but there would be no 
meaning in the notion of them as wide or vast, without the humble 
experiences of our own individual handling and walking.40 
Grote would say to Berkeley that in stating that the blind person sees 
things at the eyes is an affirmation that bears out his hypothesis re-
garding the existence of phenomenal reality. T. K. Abbott very strongly 
emphasizes sight rather than touch for the truth of the tangible. The 
basis for this emphasis is 1 common sense' or 1the evidence of conscious-
ness.' He seems to have overlooked the fact that the sense of sight is 
also a sort of sense of touch or contact, inasmuch as the eye , physically, 
adjusts itself as it makes contact with the atmosphere and ~dth so-called 
physical objects. One of Abbott 1s .purposes in writing his book is 
to assail the theory in its foundation--the assumption that Touch 
is the sense pre-eminently perceptive of extension and distance. 
And here, again , we have no really philosophical theo~J to combat; 
nothing is opposed to us but vague and popular impressions. Touch 
proper gives us nothing but a series of sensations which have of 
themselves no more connection with extension than with colour.41 
Now, sight contrary to Abbott's view, is only apparently free from 
phenomenal interpretation. Abbott seems to have been wholly unaware that 
the eye through the special organ of sight is also a sort of organ of 
40. Grote, EP, II, 128. 
41. Abbott, SAT , 60. 
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touch or physical contact, as is evident in the fact that the mind through 
sight judges distances. Abbott is mentioned here as a glaring example of 
the necessary recognitipn of the fact that phenomenal reality affect us 
even in the case of sight-- sight which is so aEEarently, to Abbott and even 
to Berkeley, free from non-phenomenal entities. 
5. Spencer's and Morell ' s evolutionism 
i. Spencer repeats the error of the Lockian psychology 
Grote asserts that t he error, or 1mis- psychology 1 of which Locke is 
guilty is one into which Spencer also falls. Yet the Principles of 
Psychologr "contains • • • a more correct account of the process of per-
ception and understanding than any other I know.u42 Grote appears to 
have seen the error in Spencer's First Principles not by the reading of 
Spencer first, but by coming upon the idea of there being a mis-psychology 
and then turning to Spencer to find out if he is guilty of this error. 
For this error is frequently mentioned as the error of the Lockian psy-
chology . Apparently, then, when Grote discovered mis-psychology in Locke 
he turned his attention to various philosophers, including Spencer and 
Morell , to see if they like Locke st~~bled into the same pitfall. 
ii. Identity of consciousness of facts with the facts themselves 
Spencer believed that the clearer our consciousness of facts are the 
nearer we are to the truth. He would identify clear consciousness of 
facts with the facts themselves 1 Spencer asserted that experience ex-
plained the origin of our powers of thinking, or (the origin of) the 
42 . Grote, EP, II, 91. 
21$ 
features of our knowledge. Grote asserts that experience is sufficient 
to shmv to us phenomena but not the features of our knowledge. 
iii. Perfect success of the attempt to harmonize thought 
with things reveals truth 
Grote borrows the term 'pre-established harmony' in clarifying 
Spencer's position. This harmony may be conceived as existing between 
intelligence and things and it is from this standpoint that Spencer 
discusses the growth characteristic of his system. Truth is nothing 
more than the goal of the effort to make thought and things harmonize. 
As consciousness grows the truth becomes clearer and clearer. Spencer 
virtually asserts that "things correspond with consciousness and con-
sciousness with things.n43 If this is so, Grote asks, then is there 
any difference between thought and things, or are they identical? 
Spencer's answer is that the truth is that which cannot be conceived 
otherwise. Truth for Spencer is innate and therefore logically nee-
essary . 
As against the associational psychology he admits that th~re are 
for the individual immediately evident principles, and truths 
which are innate in the sense that they cannot be explained by 
the experience of the individual.44 
Moreover, he states that the truth as proper conception is identical 
l.d th 11 the independent existence of sensible thi ngs. 1145 
43 . Grote, EP, II , 92 . 
44. Windelband, HOP, 658, 659. 
45. Grote , EP, II, 92 . 
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iv. Spencer compared with Spinoza 
It is Grote's contention that it is impossible to establish this 
identity if a confusion between the two views, 'philosophy' and phenomena, 
is to be avoided. What Spencer's position really is, seems to be more 
correctly stated by Frederick Pollock than by Grote, though Grote centers 
attention upon the way in which Spencer expresses himself. Pollock com-
pares Spencer with Spinoza, in showing what he regards as Spencer's cor-
rect view: 
Spinoza does not say, be it observed, that every apparent certainty 
is true knowledge, but that there is no true knowledge without cer-
tainty, and the certainty is given in the knowledge itself. In 
other words, there is ultimately no external test of truth; we must 
be content in the last resort with the clear and persistent witness 
of consciousness. This doctrirte is not necessarily transcendental 
or dogmatic. I t is compatible with a purely empirical account of 
the origin of all our knowledge, and indeed is adopted in that con-
nection by one of the leading philosophical authors of our o~m time 
and country. Mr. Herbert Spencer's view of the final test of truth, 
though he puts it in the negative form as the inconceivableness of 
the contrary, is substantially not distinguishable from Spinoza's. 
Rightly understood, the doctrine is not an assumption of infalli-
bility, but a warning against any such assumption.46 
Truth for Spencer is inconceivableness of the contrary; Pollock remarks 
that this means the same as the basis accepted for truth by Spinoza, 
namely, 11 the clear and persistent witness of consciousness." This seems 
to harmonize with the comment, above, that, for Spinoza truth is innate, 
or what is logically necessary. This extract is based upon a study of 
Spinoza's Ethics and is especially dependent upon the following passage: 
No man who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves 
the utmost degree of certitude. For to have a true idea signifies 
nothing else than to know the thing perfectly or as well as possible; 
46. Pollock, SLP, 129, 130. 
nor can any one possibly doubt of this unless he thinks an idea 
to be a lifeless thing like a picture on a panel, and not a 
mode of thought, to wit the very act of understanding.47 
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The congruence between Spencer and Spinoza on this point is rather 
remarkable in view of Spencer's statement: 
I obtained • • • books which bore in one way or other on ~ set 
purpose--books, however, which did not bear upon it in the most 
obvious way. For I paid little attention to what had. been written 
upon either ethics or politics ••• The books I did read were those 
which promised to furnish illustrative materials.48 
That Spencer was less interested in the psychological aspects of epis-
temology is supported in the following: 
As regards his philosophical equipment, it is to be remarked that 
there continues the same singular absence of the metaphysical, and 
even of the psychological i nt erest.49 
v. Not necessary to trace the growth of knowledge 
to reveal truth 
The question which Grote raises in the light of the foregoing is, 
How far is such a fundamental view a proper account of the beginning of 
knowledge? If it is merely an intuition or innate idea it is not neces-
sarily knm1ledge, and because it exists in the realm of consciousness it 
will have nothing to do with what one might call 'independent realityH 
But if this view of Spencer's, that it is necessary to trace the 
growth of knowledge to exhibit truth, is left out entirely--that is, if 
the hypothesis-- that knowledge is partly made up of potentially innate 
ideas--is cast aside, then it is useless to trace the development of 
47. Spinoza, ETH, prop. 43. 
48. Spencer , AUT, I, 304. 
49. Pringle-Patti son, PR, 119. 
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knowledge. This is one of the reasons why much of Spencer's writings 
have become obsolete. Yet this critical analysis, by reason of its lim-
itations , does not entirely discount the significance of his philosophy. 
A well-deserved tribute to Spencer has been expressed thus: 
We must admire the grandeur of the outline he has sketched, acknow-
ledge the greater breadth of view he has given to human speculation, 
and appreciate the abounding wealth of suggestion displayed through-
out the work, which not only enriches human knowledge, but it is sure 
to give rise to further earnest, bold, and penetrating research into 
the mysteries of nature.50 · 
Nevertheless, this appreciation is expressed in conjunction with the view 
that 11with regard to Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy taken as a whole, 
we come to the conclusion that, ••• he fails in his vast attempt.n51 
The failure is based upon Spencer's own admission that 11the conception 
of mental evolution as a part of Evolution in general, remains incom-
plete.n52 
vi. Spencer compared with Locke 
Grote sees a close similarity between Spencer and Locke: 
Mr. Spencer's opening chapters may be considered an expansion of 
Locke's 'when our senses are conversant with external objects,' 
and then .he traces, as Locke does, but in a wider field, how in-
telligence becomes possessed of (or by) its ideas or consciousness • 
• • • I think then, that in spite of the care with which he lays 
down the position which he wishes to take, Mr. Spencer is still 
not able to escape the kind of 'circularity• which belongs to all 
that I have called the wrong psychology. His proceeding is a very 
bold application of the positivist or historical method, in this 
way: truth to us is, with him, what I have ventured to call 'in-
counterconceivableness': this incounterconceivableness of certain 
things to us is a fact of our present nature, a fact which has had 
a historical origin.53 
50. Guthrie, SUK, 476. 
51. Guthrie, ~· cit., p. 475. 
52. Guthrie, ££• cit., p. 157. 
53. Grote, EP, II , 94, 95. 
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Spencer's method is to trace out how intelligence came by consciousness 
or idea. His method is one of process, while that of Locke is more con-
cerned with mental activity. ~fuile Locke deals with thought (or ideas) 
and things, Spencer regards things as an hypothesis to which mind or the 
criterion of that which cannot be conceived otherwise is the truth. It 
should be noted, however, that 
Spencer's ultimate interest in the systematic treatment of all 
problems from the point of view of Evolution was, according to 
his own account, practical rather than theoretical. ' The whole 
system,' he says in the •Autobiography, •54 •was at the outset, 
and has ever contL"lued to be, a basis for a right rule of life, 
individual and social.•55 
vii. Explanation by considering the 
genesis of thought is inadequate 
Spencer makes a vast underlying assumption that Grote considers ih 
the following way: The race believes, Spencer states, that the earth 
moves round the sun and not vice versa. The physicist could come to this 
conclusion very readily in comparison to the speed with which the philos-
opher would arrive at i t. And the reason is this. The philosopher can-
not make the assumption to begin with that he exists and that there is 
an external world about him while the physicist can. Spencer has taken 
t he physicist's approach on this point and waived the approach of 'phi-
losophy.' Or, to vary the statement, if we know that an experience is 
things then we know that knowledge is of things in the first place--
apart from experience. 
54. Spencer, AUT, II, 314. 
55. Seth, EPS, 292, 293. 
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Hence , thought is independent of experience .and does not need ex-
perience to test its truth for the exper ience is assumed to exist (in the 
f orm of •things' above) apart from the thought. That is, Spencer's method 
of dealing with the genesis of thought as related to experience is invalid. 
For at one time he takes the approach of physics , and at another of 'phi-
losophy.' Then he assumes the correspondence theory of truth, in his 
view that truth is that which cannot be conceived otherwise. And to 
affirm, as Spencer does, that the thought of the most advanced thinker 
of the race is ~' is a different standard from the coherence theory 
of truth which is implicit in this view and explicit in the view of truth 
as inconceivability of t he contrary. Through consciousness we are on the 
side of thought, but cannot be on the side of phenomena unless we speak 
of •consciousness of matter' and then we make the error already indicated 
in the philosophy of Willi~ Hamilton.56 
viii. 1 The experience-hypothesis' 
Grote illustrates the 1bad psychology' in Spencer's writings by 
centering attention upon what Spencer calls •the experience-hypothesis.• 
Here, the assumption is made that experience of things, or notions of 
them, i s ~ssurance that there is an outside world and this is the ground-
work and root of all knowledge. 1 The experience-hypothesis' simply means 
that experience is fundamental for the beginning of all knowledge and 
growth of knowledge is attained by the adding of new knowledge to the 
former. Grote could have criticized Spencer here by pointing out that 
56. P. 125, above. 
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there is a curious mixture of 1 thought 1 and 'things' involved. For, 
taking the physicist's point of view, as Spencer is inclined to do, ex-
perience is the 'experienced' or the 'things' side of the epistemological 
issue. He holds the view that such 'knowledge' can be increased by 
adding new knowledge to this 'experience.' 
1here is no ob j ection to the view that there is an adding of new 
knowledge to the experience one has already attained. Grote's point is 
that if Spencer takes the physicist's attitude toward experience, then 
the adding of knowledge, which can be analyzed into 'knowing' and the 
1known 1 is hardly a good way of expressing what is meant. It seems that 
the reason Grote objects to Spencer's view of how 'knowledge' is in-
creased is that, for example, one can hardly say that to the 'experienced' 
as the physicist would regard it, a number of thoughts are added--which 
is a contribution from a 'universe of discourse' quite different than the 
one in which Spencer, considered as a 'physicist,' operates. 
ix. Criticism of the use of the term 'experience' 
Grote criticizes the word 'experience' as used in this connection; 
he ill ustrates from the experience that nettles sting. Suppose the sen-
tence, 1I know by experience that nettles sting. 1 57 This might be con-
sidered in the light of the following sentence employed by Grote:5S "A 
stone lies before me: I see it." In the case of the stone we have seen 
that it is useless to say that we see it after asserting that it lies 
before us, for the only reason why one can say that it lies before is 
57. Grote, EP, II , 99. 
58. Grote, EP, I, 153. 
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that one sees it. 
11 A stone lies before me , 11 and "I see it, 11 are taken as meaning the 
same thing for Grote. He holds that "I see a stone" does not add anything 
to what is given in the sentence, "a stone lies before me." Now, it may 
be questioned whether these two statements mean exactly the same thing . 
But this question does not vitiate Grote's point, namely, that when we 
see an 'object' it is an 'object which we already see.' Hence there is 
no purpose served by saying, 11 I see what I already see." 
Likewise in the sentence, 1 I know by experience that nettles sting,' 
one would have to know the nature of nettles before a statement could be 
made concerning experience of nettles stinging. 'That nettles sting' 
must be contemporaneous or anterior to the experience and not posterior 
to it, hence 'experience' is unnecessary or useless as well as misleading 
when employed in this connection. For to say, virtually, as Spencer does, 
th~t we know by experience with 'things' assumes that there are things 
which we know even before we actually have experience of them. 
x . Much evidence of 1bad psychology' in Spencer 
Grote examines a number of passages from The Principles of Psychology 
one of which may be cited here in order to indicate the confusion between 
logic and phenomenalism. 
The multiplied phenomena of heat are resolvable into dynamical 
ones, on holding a thermometer near the fire; the same agent which 
causes in the hand a sensation of warmth causes motion in the 
mercury.59 
The fault which Grote finds with this passage is that in the case of the 
59. Spencer, POP, 192. 
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agent and warmth there is an inanimate object producing warmth. Producing 
is also caused in the case of 'motion in the mercury.' The question is 
as to the meaning of 2roducing in both cases. Spencer does not distin-
guish between the meaning of the word in each. To say that the agent 
2roduces the sensation of war mth in the hand is to give to the agent what 
does not rightfully belong to it. 
Activity of consciousness is as important a factor as is the agent in 
the production. Here both phenomena and consciousness are involved. Yet 
Spencer does .not appear to be at all aware of this for if he were he would 
not make a comparison where the agent 'causes motion in the mercury.' 
In the one case, where fire heats the hand to give a sensation of 
warmth, the sensation has a 'philosophical' side which gives meaning to 
the sensation. What is produced in this action is quite different from 
what is produced in the motion of the mercury when heat is applied. In 
the latter case, there is no 'sensation' and hence no meaning involved in 
the reaction. That is, what is produced in the former case involves mean-
ing, in the latter case there is no meaning involved in the reaction. 
That is,_ in the former case the 'philosophical 1 aspect of reality is 
prominent, in the latter it is absent. Yet Spencer makes a comparison 
between these two cases that are , for the reasons given, not parallel . 
There are many cases of this confusion throughout The Principles of 
Psycholo&V• Grote calls attention to a few of them and indicates where 
the confusion has arisen. This we have pointed out. 
xi. Explanation of the origin of 'consciousness' 
is unsatisfactory 
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In his comparative psychology Spencer has left himself open to 
criticism. His method of approach here is to study forms of life from 
the very lowest up to the highest, man. He believes that man is self-
conscious but denies self-consciousness to the lower animals. But self-
consciousness cannot be denied to the lower animals because one does not 
know directly about the self-consciousness of other people, let alone 
animals . All we can say about other people we can say also of animals, 
namely, that they act as though they were self-conscious. Spencer has 
erred in saying that what animals ~ we know. Contrary to this, what 
animals actually feel we do not know. 
Grote seems to contend, here, that only knowledge that is immediate 
can be relied upon entirely, for when we speak of consciousness of an 
•object• for example, we are speaking of a consciousness of 'something' 
which already has a relationship with consciousness. Now, to say that 
we are aware of what animals know is to make a statement that cannot be 
supported. For what animals feel {or know) is not related to our con-
sciousness already, and there is no way for us to know {or be conscious of) 
-what they feel {or know). The best we can do is to be reasonably sure 
from the actions of animals {as also of human beings) as to what is going 
on in their minds. Just what is taking place, exactly, we can never know. 
That is, we cannot deny self-consciousness to the lower animals be-
cause of our incapacity for knovdng whether they actually have self-
_consciousness or not. And since this is the case the explanation of the 
228 
origin of 'consciousness ' is unsatisfactory. For Spencer says, unjusti-
fiably, that the lower animals do not have it and that we do. 
And since this is so, how can we proceed from a •materiality• or an 
unconsciousness , post ulated about non-human forms of life, to postulate 
consci ousness in a human being? The main point to notice is that there 
is a confusion between phenomena on the one hand, and consciousness on 
the other. Spencer proceeds from a synthetic study of the lower living 
forms, which he regards in the same way as Grote regards phenomenal re-
ality, except that, in the case of the phenomenal reality Grote holds that 
we can be conscious of it. He, also, does not deny consciousness of phe-
nomenal reality to non-rational animals, whereas Spencer does deny self-
consciousness to the lower animals. Spencer, then , in dealing with lower 
animals regards them in the same way as he would regard inorganic objects. 
Coming further along in the evolutionary process he has to admit con-
sciousness or leave it out altogether. If Spencer leaves consciousness 
out completely then there are no things for us. If he admits it he ad-
mit s the •bad psychology' referred to by Grote where •objects• are ad-
mitted as objects for us which then act on us, when, in actuality they 
acted on us already in being objects for us. Spencer proceeds from a 
~ynthetic study of the lower living forms, and then rises for no adequate 
reason to belief in consciousness in the individual which cannot be spoken 
of as phenomenal. And, besides , it does not seem certain that there is 
no consciousness in the lower forms even though we may be unaware of it. 
If the lower forms of life are entirely void of consciousness then 
there must be some stage in the o~ganic development toward higher forms 
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at which consciousness begins. If this were not so it would seem entirely 
justifiable to speak of the lower forms under the term, positivism--that 
is, if consciousness were not even represented in any form either as 
'potential' or sub-conscious. If the lowest forms of life, as Spencer 
represents them, are devoid of any consciousness whatsoever then one may 
refer to them as phenomenal. If they are therefore, purely phenomenal, 
there appears to be no justification for supposing consciousness in the 
higher forms. And, again, if in the lower forms there is something more 
than •materiality' then this cannot rightly be referred to as phenomenal. 
xii. Morell's 1bad psychology' 
a. Morell resembles Spencer in repeating 
the error of the Lockian psychology 
John Daniel Morell is in some respects alike Herbert Spencer and may 
be conside~ed here.60 Morell uses the term •zoocosm' frequently.61 This 
term may refer to a graduation of forms of life which are co-existent, 
and hence form the present zoocosm, or to a succession of zoocosms in the 
past. Morell's starting-point in comparative psychology is with a view 
of the zoocosm which is necessarily man 1s (or Morell's) view. From this 
he creates a scale of sensation at the bottom of which is the animal 
world and at the top is man. However, in this scale Morell appears to 
have made an illegitimate jump from what is phenomenal to what is con-
sciousness. 
60. Let us consider, briefly, the following works by Morell: 1. His-
torical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in-rhe 
Nineteenth Century; 2. The Elements of Psychology. 
61. Morell, EOP. 
230 
For the jump that he makes is from a consideration of the 'inferior 
animals' as having 1knowledges' which •we appreciate by observation' to 
the position that we have knowledge (in t he sense of consciousness, or 
' philosophy•) . But the question that Morell does not answer adequately 
is whether we can say that the lower animals have knowledge that we can 
be sure of, by our simple observation of them. Grote states that this 
question cannot be answered in the affirmative. All that we can be sure 
of is that animals have phenomenal reality only, and not consciousness. 
Or, that they do have consciousness cannot be ascertained by observation. 
We can say only, that they act as though they are conscious. There is 
no immediate knowledge of animal consciousness. 
If we cannot be sure that animals have consciousness then it can-
not be said that there are gradations in consciousness from the animal 
to the human consciousness . Hence the illigitimate jump Morell makes 
from phenomena to consciousness. 
b. Concerning the origin of consciousness 
Where did consciousness commence and how?, Grote asks. The diffi-
culty in Morell's philosophy, with which this question is concerned, is 
the same as that in Herbert Spencer's. 
The great point as to comparative psychology is, whether we can 
really hang on human knowledge,62 as we appreciate it by conscious-
ness , to the various, and, we will suppose, graduated, knowledges 
of the inferior animals, as we appreciate them by observation.63 
Grote's criticism is that this hanging on appears unjustifi ed. It is 
62 . Grote seems to mean, "hang human knowledge (as we appreciate it 
by consciousness) on to." 
63. Grote , EP, II, 107. 
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unjustified in Morell as it was unjustified in Descartes. In fact, 
Descartes held that animals were unconscious machines and the only argu-
ment which can be put up against this conviction is one which may be 
employed in dealing with Morell, namely, that animals act as though they 
had consciousness. Moreover, this is the only 1proof 1 that each person 
has concerning belief that his fellowman possesses consciousness. Just 
how the step can be made from proof of the existence of our own conscious-
ness to proof of the existence of consciousness in others is the problem, 
for Grote, exactly as the problem for Morell is, How can we be certain 
that there is any consciousness in the race anywhere outside of ourselves? 
Since we cannot be certain that there is, then we cannot be sure that 
there is a growth of consciousness in the race which corresponds to 
growth of the same in the individual in the succession from what Morell 
describes as, sensation to intuition, etc. 
c. Morell compared with Spencer 
In other words Morell ends at the same place as he starts. His 
starting-point, from man, is essentially philosophical and from here he 
proceeds to phenomena. He may be contrasted with Spencer, therefore, 
who started from phenomena and proceeded toward consciousness. 
Mr. Herbert Spencer begins with an analysis of the action of the 
human mind, from its most complicated processes to its most simple: 
and having arrived at these latter, he recommences with an exceed-
ingly elaborate and valuable synthesis, as he calls it, or exami-
nation of the zoocosm from the bottom (i.e. from the simplest 
organizations) in conjunction with the circumstances of the universe 
belonging to it at each stage, or in other words, an examination of 
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the relations of life, in its successive steps, to its environ-
ment , till we come to the relation of human life to its environ-
ment , a part of which relation is human knowledge.64---
6. Retrospect and prospect 
i. Retrospect 
a. Purpose 
Let us now return to survey the present chapter and consider brief-
ly its content. A chapter, such as this one, which purports to act as 
a fitting prelude to one on Grote's professed idealism, or personalism, 
should be introspective in nature, namely, dealing with what goes on in 
the human mind when we think.65 The purpose of this introspective chap-
ter is to examine the bases upon which several of the best known British 
Empiricists take their stand . This purpose involves showing that it is 
extremely difficult , yes , impossible, to consider reality as 'out there' 
and separate from us entirely. For, to so consider 'reality' is to con-
sider it in relation to us, as though it were in no relation to us at all 1 
b. Locke 
It seems best, then, to start with the foremost introspectionist 
among the British Empiricists , namely, John Locke, and see if he is al-
ways consistent in holding the view that all knowledge comes from exper-
ience considered as 1objects 1 making their effect upon the mind. Locke 
found himself considering 'things' with their primary qualities as 
'things' apart from the mind altogether, which at birth is a tabula rasa. 
64. Grote , EP, II, 106. 
65 . Introspection, according to Ledger Wood, has to do with "observa-
t ion directed upon the self or its mental states and operations." 
Runes , DOP, 149. 
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This is clearly what Grote would call a phenomenal approach to reality. 
That Locke also gives much place to the mind in recollecting , combining, 
etc., must not be denied. When he does so he is emphasizing the 'phil-
osophical' or 'logical' approach to reality. Advance made from either 
viewpoint is quite all right so long as it is implied that such advance 
is made with an awareness that abstractions of one from the other are 
for the sake of clarity. That Locke is not always aware of the change 
in emphasis is evident, for example, in his distinction of primar,y qual-
ities as located in 1things,' or that there are 1things' for a tabula rasa 
mind. 
c. Hume 
Let us next consider the introspectionist, Hume, leaving Berkeley 
to be considered later because of his specifically subjectivist position.66 
In Hume we see a tendency toward rationalism, especially in his treat-
ment of ideas, and impressions. We can see this tendency toward ration-
alism in his assumption that, for example, the mind ~ have ideas that 
are not "derived from correspondent impressions." Also there are 'phil-
osophical relations' that depend solely: upon ideas, namely, "resemblance , 
contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. 11 67 
Now , if these relations are dependent solely upon ideas, it would seem 
66. The reasons for implying that Hume is less subjectivist than 
Berkeley are at least two: (1) Hume accepts 'impressions' as a funda-
mentaL postulate for his epistemology. (2) In dealing with relations 
he assumes that there are relations of 'matters of fact.' Berkeley, on 
the other hand, seems to be specifically subjectivist in postulating 
that there is no reality 'without the mind.' 
67. -Hume, THN, 186. 
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that this emphasis upon mind (pre-eminently as rational) as the origin 
of these ideas would justify referring to Hume as having a tendency to 
rationalism. 
Let us now look, further, at ideas and impressions. Ideas are pale 
copies of impressions , and are clearly mental in character. It is not 
so clear that impressions are mental. In fact 'impressions' is a term 
which lends itself to analysis into active and passive elements. 'Things' 
are treated as active in relation to mind as passive. But the mind is 
also active in generating ideas. And the ideas generated correspond t o 
impressions. The question naturally arises whether impressions are men-
tal or physical. If they are mental then what is it that corresponds to 
them as physical? Clearly they must have some sort of mental nature to 
be impressions of which we are conscious. 
Again, if impressions are physical, then one may ask if this physi-
cal nature (of impressions) is somehow known independently of its 
(physical nature) being known 1 Grote is aiming at a point on which Hume 
does not seem to be altogether clear. For Hume does say that ideas are 
nderi ved from the correspondent impressions. 11 · Now, one may ask, Vfuat 
are these impressions before ideas are derived from them? If they ~ 
anything then there must be ideas of them already. But Hume says that 
the ideas are derived from them. That is, first there are the impres-
sions, ~the i deas are derived from them. If the ideas are mental 
entities it would seem that 'impressions' are non-mental entities from 
which these ideas are derived. 
At least, then, impressions must be partly physical. This view of 
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the essential physical nature of impressions is supported also by Hume's 
definition of impression: By impression 11I mean all our more lively per-
ceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or 
will. 11 Nov1, these 1 more lively impressions' take place Nhen we, for 
example, 1 see, 1 or 1feel. 1 Seeing and feeling must be of physical things 
as Hume seems to imply. This appears to be what Grote would have in mind 
if he were called upon to support the view that 'impressions' are physi-
cal. He would contend, on the basis of his meaning of phenomenal reality , 
that they are at least partly physical . Also, Hume's division of rela-
tions, into relations of ideas and relations of matters of fact, falls 
into the same error. For example, Are the matters of fact such, apart 
from a mind that regards them as matters of fact? If this is so, we 
know them before they are related to the mind in any way ! Hence, Grote 
points out the mistake in professing an empiricism devoid of any ideal-
istic or personalistic elements. 
d. Berkeley 
Of the three British Empiricists so far studied, Berkeley is the one 
least open to criticism. There are some points on which Grote seems 
justified in passing critical reflections. For example, i n speaking of 
vision as at the eyes, a view that Berkeley variously illustrates , the 
error of 'mis-psychology' seems to be evident. The eye is physical. 
Even though things touch the eyes, this touching is not vision, and the 
touching is external to the consciousness that is aware of the touching . 
To say, then, that there is a touching that somehow affects us is to say 
that there is something already in relation to us. Then Berkeley goes 
236 
on to show that that which is granted in relation to us, then affects 
us 1 This is a sort of double consideration of what affects us , which 
Berkeley has accepted as already mental--namely, a touching at our eyes. 
Grote criticizes Berkeley on this issue of vision, but there seems 
to be more agreement between Grote and Berkeley than between Grote and 
either of the other two introspectionists, Locke and Hume. Both are 
obsessed with the view that there is no reality but reality in relation 
to us . There is then a basic epistemological idealism evident in both 
Berkeley and Grote. 
The reason for maintaining that Grote is an epistemological idealist 
is that, in a certain sense his idealism derives the metaphysical ideal-
ism with which it is inseparably involved from the identification of 
'objects' with ideas. Now rationalism argues that there cannot be an 
object without a subject. Hence, one may refer to Grote as both an 
epistemological and metaphysical idealist, and a rationalist. 
Grote's epistemological idealism derived from metaphysical idealism 
is based on the fact that 'objects' are identified with the ideas we have 
of those 'objects.' However, Grote seems to depart from this tradition-
ally accepted definition of metaphysical idealism sufficiently to reveal 
his own peculiar position. We have said that, for him, 1objects 1 are 
identified with ideas. It seems even better to say that , for Grote, 
reality is one. This oneness has two aspects, the 1philosophical, 1 or 
'idea, ' aspect, and the 'object' or phenomena aspect. He asserts that 
we can never have phenomena apart from ideas though we can have ideas 
apart from phenomena. 
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Again, phenomena gua phenomena are only one way of looking at reality. 
But in order to look at it from this aspect we must have ideas which cor-
respond with these phenomena as the opposite side of reality from phe-
nomena. In other words, phenomenal reality is identified, partly at least, 
with thought, or the 'philosophical• side of reality. 
With regard to Grote's rationalism, it is very evident throughout 
all his writing. For Grote there cannot be an 1object 1 without a subject. 
All phenomena have their 'philosophical' side. In fact, without the sub-
ject, as representing 'philosophy,' there could be no reality at all. 
Phenomenal reality is essentially dependent upon 'philosophy,' and it is 
inseparably bound up with it. 
e. Spencer (and Morell) 
We turn away from the several outstanding introspectionists to con-
sider the evolutionist, Herbert Spencer. Spencer traces the growth of 
knowledge from early beginnings. But if the hypothesis that the growth 
of knowledge can take place without a consideration of what are actually 
or potentially innate ideas, and on the basis of experience alone, then 
it seems useless to trace the growth of knowledge at all. And it should 
be noted that, by •experience• Spencer implies an •out- thereness' con-
sidered as external before it is considered as affecting us 1 Grote seems 
to have a suspicion that he may be over-critical of Spencer in concluding 
that Spencer lacks an idealistic approach to reality. Hence he illus-
trates his critical view of Spencer by showing more evident discrepancy 
in Morell and then showing how Spencer and Morell are considerably sim-
ilar . Morell in tracing evolutionary development makes an illegitimate 
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jump from phenomenal reality in early animal life to phenomenal reality 
in conjunction with consciousness. The error in 1IDrell is his regarding 
phenomenal reality in early organic life as something 'existing' even 
apart from consciousness of it, that is, apart from any mind. 
Phenomenal reality gua phenomenal is not knowledge at all and can-
not be spoken of as such. It only becomes knowledge when the 'knowing' 
element is present. To speak of any ~owledge at all before conscious-
ness or awareness, is to characterize one's reflections as 'mis-psycho-
logical .1 We cannot speak, then, of a growth of knowledge by the addi-
tion of knowledge to what is not knowledge without implying that what 
is not knowledge is somehow knowledge 1 This error is very evident in 
Morell; it appears less overtly in Spencer but is present for the same 
reason in him as it is in Morell. 
ii. Prospect 
The chief introspectionists in British empirical philosophy have 
now been considered, along with Spencer and Morell. Grote's purpose in 
considering these is to show that reality must always be considered as 
related to mind, either human or divine. The term 'phenomena' or 
'phenomenal reality' is reality for us inasmuch as the reality signified 
by these terms, to be spoken of or thought of at all, implies conscious-
ness. But there is reality which affects us even t hough we are not aware 
of it. We refer to this reality as 'phenomena' or 'phenomenal reality,' 
but we can never ~ to it without having it in relation to us as con-
scious beings; hence Grote asserts that phenomenal reality is an ab-
straction from 'philosophy,' or, as we might say, abstraction from 'mind.' 
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Phenomenal reality implies immediacy or reflection, if it has any 
meaning. It is this characteristic of phenomenal reality that prompted 
Grote to refer to his fundamental belief in idealism, or personalism. 
It is important , then, to consider more fully the personalistic nature 
of Grote's philosophy. This consideration will comprise a complete 
chapter.68 But before dealing with the personalism of Grote, we will 
turn to the important and kindred topic of "Immediateness and Reflection." 
Having dealt, in the present chapter, with the most outstanding 
introspectionists to show the fundamentally , though frequently non-
professed , 'subjective' character of their approach, it seems well to 
deal with immediateness and reflection69 previous to the chapter immedi-
ately follo\'Ting it, on the significance of personalism in Grote's 
writings. 
68. Chapter IX. 
69. In Chapter VIII. 
CHAPTER VIII 
I MMEDIATENESS AND REFLECTION 
l. Introduction 
Intro pectionist s cannot overlook the significance of what Grote 
refers to as phenomenal reality. Toward the latter part of the last 
chapter it was stated that phenomenal reality implies immediateness and 
reflection. It may be said, also, that introspection implies immediate-
ness and reflection ivith equal reason. Introspection implies immediate-
ness first and reflection afterwards. Introspection, as pointed out in 
the previous chapter must take into accolint both the 'philosophical' and 
the phenomenal approaches to epistemology. Both of these approaches and 
introspection--as we use this last term in referring to the British 
Empiricists--involve both immediateness and reflection to be considered 
in the present chapter. Let us now look more closely at these two terms, 
immediateness and reflection, and the purpose of the chapter in intro-
ducing them. Let us also consider their meanings and significance in 
Grote's philosophy. Last of all critical comments applicable to these 
terms ~dll be made.1 
2. Purpose of the chapter in introducing these terms 
The purpose of the chapter in introducing these terro~ is to analyze 
more fully the nature of the 'philosophical' approach in the epistemology 
of Grote. Both terms, having to do with thinking, deal ~dth the nature of 
1. It should be noted that mention is made of Grote's use of terms that 
do not mean what they seem to say. df. below, p. 274. 
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consciousness in its very beginnings, as becoming aware (for example, 
upon awaking from sleep), at any stage in the life of the individual. 
Immediateness also is concerned with consciousness, in the early life of 
the child. But Grote is concerned with consciousness as immediateness, 
I 
in adult life. Consciousness as reflection is also analyzed and a com-
mitment made regarding the earliest beginnings of reflection, that is, 
regarding the point at which reflection takes leave of immediateness 
sufficiently in order to be referred to, distinctly, as reflection at all. 
The purpose, then, of considering immediateness and reflection is to ana-
lyze the nature of consciousness and to indicate just how much, if at all, 
phenomenal reality is involved. 
3. Meaning of immediateness and reflection 
i. No reality without mind 
Now if immediat eness and reflection are concerned in any way with 
phenomenal reality, this fact woUld seem to make Grote a metaphysical 
idealist for whom no reality can exist •without the mind.•2 Already, in 
various places throughout the foregoing part of this dissertation this 
conclusion (that all reality is personal) was reached, and further con-
sideration of the content of this conclusion will be dealt with in the 
next chapter on personalism. If immediateness and reflection are so 
'mental' as we shall see them to be, and yet involve phenomenal reality, 
then it seems necessarily clearer than ever that no reality exists except 
in relation to the mind, consciousness, or thought. But let us turn more 
2. Berkeley, TDH1 in Fraser , WOR. 
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specifically to the meaning of these terms. 
Immediateness, or "immediate thought may be described as the feeling 
of being, in contradistinction to the realizing (or presenting to our-
selves) ourselves or anything else, as being or existing. 113 What Grote 
means here, is that Urunediate thought has no object to which this thought 
stands a.s subject. Immediate thought is simply 11 the feeling of being" 
in distinction from a thinking upon ourselves as in reflectiveness or a 
thinking upon anything else whatsoever (on which we may reflect). 
ii. •Immediate• and •mediate• thought 
•Immediateness' has to do with thought which is not reflective but 
immediate. Consciousness consists of immediateness, but self- onscious-
ness does not. •Imme · teness' refer t what Grote calls the •self-self' 
in contradistinction from the •thought-self .• 
By the •self-self• I mean that which cannot really be thought of,4 
i. e. which cannot be made an object of thought, but which is with-
thought (mitgedacht), thought along with, or included in, our----
immediate thought and feeling, or which, in other words, is one of 
the essential elements of such thought or feeling. There is a sort 
of contradiction here, for by attempting to make t he reader under-
stand what it is, I am making it an object of thought: it is there-
fore to be remembered, that when we talk of it we are making a 
supposition only, which requires accompanying correction in our 
mind, or the accompanying thought that, for the purpose of talking 
about it, we are obliged to make a supposition about it, which is 
for the occasion only.5 
In the •self-self, • thought is immediate or unreflective, while with 
the•thought-self' thought is •mediate• or reflective . 
3. Grote, EP, II, 14e, 149. 
4. Grote realizes that, strictly, the •self-self' cannot even be men-
tioned or even thought of, else it becomes an object of thought which 
means in that case that it no longer can be the •self-self.• 
5. Grote, £E• cit., p . 145. 
The •thought-self' is that, more or less distinctly conceived, 
which I have been obliged inevitably to foreshadow and suppose 
in trying to describe or set in view the 1self-self. 1 As soon 
as we in any degree distinctly conceive of ourselves thinking, 
it is evident that thought is no longer simple or immediate. We 
are ourselves then double. And we are this as soon as ever we 
set the object of thought out before us as a separate object to 
contemplate. Concurrently with this, we necessarily separate 
(bisect or double) ourselves.6 
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The ambiguity of •I think, therefore I am• is somewhat evident in 
the light of the above distinction. According to Grote, Descartes's 
state of mind was 'I am thinking that I think, therefore I ·am.• That is 
Descartes's thought is reflective rather than immediate. But Descartes's 
words, •I think,• carry both the meaning of 'I think,' that is immediate 
thought, and '1 think,' that is, reflective thought ('I am thinking that 
I think.•). 
Grote simply means, in analyzing 'I think,' that when one says 
•I think,' that the self, thinking, is an object for thought. That is, 
I am reflecting when I say, •I think.• But, there is a larger question 
with which one should deal, _ namely, 1 Do I always reflect?• Grote's answer 
to this question is that in strict immediateness we do not reflect. Our 
concern is only with the feeling of being as wholly unreflective. 
If one were to ask Grote, •Do we ever experience strict immediate-
ness?• his answer would be: Immediateness is a sort of impractical and 
theoretical extreme such as we designate by the term •self-self.• And, 
he would say, the further we go away from the •self-self' the more we 
become the reflective self. The question, then, regarding whether we 
always reflect, is answered. In the extreme of immediateness there ie 
b. Grote, EP, II , 146. 
no reflection. In all variations of thinking where there is no strict 
immediateness, there is always reflection. 
If we apply what I have just been saying to the Cartesian 'Cogito, 
ergo sum,' it will appear more strongly than before that such 
truths as it has must have reference to that primary indistinction 
of knowing and being which exists in immediateness. If we explain 
it, Cogito, ergo sum conscius, we have not advanced a step: if we 
interpret it, Cogito, ergo vivo , we have advanced too far. And I 
cannot understand what the absolute notion of being, here apparently 
involved in •sum' is. Being is being something: being something is 
looking in some way, or, in grander language, possessing some char-
acter presentable to intelligence. It may be more than this , for it 
may be intelligence itself as well: but this is what is contained 
i n the 'cogitp , ' or what the 1cogito' means. In order to get a step 
beyond the 'cogito , ' we want the addition of some property, some 
character, something for us to be: and it is quite impossible for 
us to proceed from the bare 'cogito 1 to this. I do not understand 
the seeming predication of this absolute •being' to carry any mean-
ing ••• The Erimary fact is not 'cogito,' but is what I have called 
immediateness.? 
Grote regards immediate thought as resultl ess in that we can conclude 
nothing at all f r om i t until t he elements in it are distinguished and the 
object developed, and when this is done it is no longer immediate thought. 
Immediate thought may be said to be being rather than to ~ it. Med-
iate thought is something more than this. Descartes did not appear to 
dist inguish between immediate and mediate thought in his 'cogito.' 
Let us now, briefly, consider a question involved in the whole of 
thi s discussion on immediateness. Grote's view regarding the necessity 
for immediateness and reflection to be considered as inseparable finds 
kinship in Hegel's Der Geist. Hegel is pointing out that people are fre-
quently too concerned with experience, for example , when the getting of 
t echnical education is considered as of supreme importance. Over-emphasis 
7. Grote, EP, II, 178, 179. 
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on empirical requirements may well lead to the disregard of metaphysics 
and theology. 
Reasoning (and rationalizing!) may go on in the immediate; there 
may be grave doubt of the objective truth of results of these 
processes, but in so far as they are actual processes there can 
be no doubt that they are going on. This infallibility of the 
immediate causes it to exercise a fascination over the mind. Not 
only is the immediate the necessary starting point of all thought 
and the point at which all eventual empirical verification occurs ; 
it seems also to be the point at which objective reality is re-
vealed, free from all distortions.8 
Grote would agree that •objective• reality is revealed in immediate-
ness. Revelation is only possible in the 'self-self. 1 This "immediacy 
is the truth about the real. 11 9 Here we see a coherence theory of truth; 
all is coherent and true as iromediateness. 
For Grote, there is no immediate •knowledge.• •Immediateness' is a 
term employed to show the extreme where all reflection would be absent--
granting that such abstraction could be carried out. Let us note the 
following: 
There is no immediate knowledge. "Immediate knowledge" is that in 
which we do not have the consciousness of mediation, but it is 
mediated. 111Je have feeling, and it seems immediate. We have in-
tuition, and it appears under the form of immediacy.lO 
V.Te may note that "here Hegel concedes that feeling and intuition may be 
immediate, although thought is not.nll This is very reminiscent of 
Grote in speaking of immediate •thought• as the feeling of being. This 
feeling for Grote is intuition in the sense of immediateness. But it 
8. Brightman, "Immediacy?" in Idealismus, I(l934), 88, 89. 
9. Loc. cit. 
10. Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, XII, 92. 
11. Brightman, 2£• cit., p. 90. 
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is never wholly abstracted from thought. Thought is regarded, by Grote, 
as reflective and is therefore mediate. Grote would seem to reject the 
relationless immediate as Hegel did. There is no possible escape, both 
would agree, from relational thought which seeks after a reality that 
is both true and whole. 
W. R. Sorley makes the following statement in which he acknowledges 
Grote's contribution to a doctrine of knowledge: 
From the first self-consciousness is implied in every conscious 
state, because it can be brought to light by reflexion~ But it 
is not explicit there, because reflective examination may show 
that it did not appear in that past state. Its appearance means 
the raising of mental life to a higher leve1.12 
This higher level is the level of immediateness. "Grote suggests that in 
such a state there is acquaintance with self as knowing but not knowledge 
that one knows. nl3 
The point here is that in immediateness, according to Grote, and as 
Sorley acknowledges , there is knowledge of the self. This knowledge is 
knowledge of acquaintance, where the self knows itself, giving us the 
term which Grote uses in connection with immediateness, namely, the •self-
self.• This is what Sorley is referring to in his remark that "in such 
a state there is acquaintance with self. 11 
The "knowledge that one knows" is "knowledge about," or reflective 
knowledge. Grote distinguishes between these two types of knowledge, 
namely, of immediateness and reflection, and Sorley here is recognizing 
this distinction. It should be noted that the two kinds of •knowledge' 
12. Grote, EP, I, 60, 61. 
13 . Sorley, MVI, 206. 
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distinguished as 'knowledge of acquaintance' and 1knmqledge about' have 
had their origin in Grote's distinction between immediateness and refl ec-
tion.l4 But the former has long since come to mean immediate knowledge 
of a thing or person, and the latter to mean only mediate knowledge as 
conveyed, for example , by statements of others who had first-hand or 
immediate knowledge. 
iii. The •self-self' and the •thought-self• 
The •self-self' or the self with which immediate thought is con-
cerned has little to do with the •thought-self'; and when it has then the 
•self-self• is no longer the •self-self' but the 'thought-self.' That is, 
when the self-self passes over into the thought-self, thought is reflec-
tive. This distinction between the self-self and the thought-self are 
not so separate from each other as an attempt to distinguish them here 
would seem to indicate. The self-self cannot be thought of, though it 
may be regarded as •with-thought.• It is not an object of thought, though 
for purposes of explanation it may appear at first to be so; at most it 
may be supposed to exist. 
In general, the very close relationship existing between the self-
self and the thought-self cannot be completely broken down. Reflection 
has at its basis immediateness. All thought that is concerned not solely 
with consciousness has this basis. Grote asserts that as soon as we con-
ceive ourselves as thinking we are ourselves 'double.' There is an anal-
ogy to this co-existence in contemporary philosophy: 
14. Grote, EP, II, bk. II. 
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An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the super-
ject of its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half 
of this description can for a moment be lost sight of. The term 
•subject' will be mostly employed when the actual entity is considered 
in respect to its own real internal constitution. But •subject• is 
always, to be construed as an abbreviation of •subject-superject .• l5 
To say that an actual entity is a subject-superject is to clothe the self 
in terms similar to that of the 'self-self' hyphenated with the 1tho ght-
self,' giving "'self-self 1- 1thought-self 1 • 11 There is one general differ-
ence, however, namely that this latter term does not include objects 
beyond the thought-self. 
But the •thought -self' is an 'object• and hence a •superject. 1 Yet 
as the term 'superject' cannot be by itself, without the 'subject,• neither 
can the •thought-self ' be regarded as an 1object 1 or 1superject 1 unless 
the 'philosophical' side of it is also kept in sight. And the •thought-
self' is, again, a sort of 1object 1 for the 'self-self' which Grote seems 
to regard after the nature of the self to itself. 
What, then, is this t erm that we may call the '11 self-self 1- 1thought -
self' 11 which Grote does not actually use but which seems to be implicit 
in his writing on immediateness and reflection? The answer is that the 
'self-self' is the self thinking, or the subject. The 1thought-self 1 is 
the self thought .of. One is the 'subject• and the other is the 'super-
ject, ' in Whitehead's terms. Now the 'self-self' is pure immediateness. 
There is no distinction into 'philosophy' and phenomenon here. All is 
'philosophy' or consciousness. On Grote's own basis, then, namely, that 
consciousness and phenomenon are each necessary to the other, Grote 
15. Whitehead, PR, 39. 
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would have to admit that the 1self-self 1 is fictional. 
Probably Grote recognized the fictional nature of the 'self-self.' 
There is no evidence that he thought the •self-self' could actually be. 
But, there seems to be implicit, in Grote, the recognition that the •self-
self' is the extreme toward which we would advance (but never reach), the 
more we became non-reflective. 
Now we must look briefly also at the •thought-self.• There is not 
so much difficulty involved in this term. Here there are the two parts 
which Whitehead would admonish us should never be lost sight of , namely, 
the •subject • and the •superject,• or •thought• and the •self thought of 1 
(or 'philosophy• and phenomenon). Again, the •self-self• and the •thought-
self' stand in the relation of •subject• and •superject,• also . For the 
•thought-self' requires the •self-self' as pure immediateness (or as close 
to this immediateness as it is possible to go). And the •thought-self' is 
phenomenon, and the •self-self' is •thinking' or 1philosophy. 1 On Grote's 
terms, then, each of these, the 1self-self 1 and the 1thought-self 1 are 
as necessary to each other as are consciousness and phenomena. Conscious-
ness and phenomena are of crucial importance to the whole of Grote's 
epistemology. 
iv. Where reflective thought departs from immediateness 
As soon as we are aware or think of objects, thought is reflective · 
thought, for we cannot conceive of objects existing without conceiving 
ourselves in some way as co-existing with them. That is, we have, Grote 
states, a •co-conception• of ourselves in counter-distinction from other 
objects. This reflectiveness is evident even as we think of such entities 
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as 4004 B.C., or the twenty-first century. We think of them in conjunc-
tion with ourselves who do the thinking. 
Reflectional intelligence appears to be somewhere about half-way 
between, on the one hand, an infinite universe or creature, conscious, 
but not active ani with no desire to be, and on the other hand, an uni-
verse of activity. Grote believes that in order to explain reflectional 
intelligence we must begin either with the supposed universe of activity 
or the infinite universe of consciousness. If we begin with the former 
we could imagine, for example, the sun warming a leaf and causing move-
ment; if we begin with the latter, we might imagine a person seeing an 
apple, putting out his hand and taking it. 
The wide region of reflectional intelligence is a region intermediate 
between,--if we can conceive such--an infinite creature or universe 
on the one side, conscious, but actionless and without change or de-
sire for it, and neither self-conscious nor distinguishingly percep-
tive, and, on the other side, a universe full of movement of regular 
actions, interactions, and reactions. In order to present to our-
selves the reflectional or the developed human intelligence, we must 
begin with immediateness, either of thought or of action. If of 
action: let us iro~gine the interaction between the light or air and 
the leaf of a plant causing the movement of the latter or the opening 
of its pores, and let us follow upward interaction of this kind, if 
we may still call it so, to the long and complicated process which 
takes place when an apple strikes the eye of a man, leading him to 
put out his hand and take it and eat it. We have no means of knowing 
within the plant, further than we can trace the movements: perhaps 
there is nothing but the movements; and then the action is reflex 
or immediate. What passes within the man is the complicated process 
of reflectional intelligence: but there-is not much more that we 
can say about i t except so to name it, when we proceed in this way 
of investigation from immediate action.l6 
16. Grote, EP, II, 149, 150. 
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v. Reflectional intelligence 
Even though we may know that reflectional intelligence is a posses-
tion of the human we have no reason to conjecture that there is anything 
more than immediate action in the plant. In the former case, that of the 
universe of activity, there may be suppos ed an immediate action with the 
reflectional factor abstracted, in the latter, that of the universe of 
consciousness, there may be supposed immediate thought with the reflec-
tional factor abstracted. Now, whether we are dealing with the universe 
of activity or the universe of consciousness t here is actually at least 
a small amount of reflection involved. 
vi. Immediate knowledge possesses a minimum of reflection 
Grote speaks of immediate knowledge as immediate thought with a 
small portion of reflection attaching to it. However, according to the 
way in which he distinguishes between immediateness and reflection, im-
mediate •knowledge' does not seem possible. Reflection would imply know-
ledge but immediateness would not. To join both terms and say that there 
is immediate knowledge does not appear admissible. Just how small a por-
tion of r eflection is necessary to make immediate thought immediate know-
ledge appears very indefinite.. Grote states that it should be only large 
enough so that a distinct judgment is not formed. What appears so in-
definite is that this small portion apparently may range from nothing to 
something just less than enough for a distinct judgment. Grote has re-
ferred to such immediate knowledge as •knowledge of acquaintance . •l7 
17. Grote, EP, I, 60, and II , 201-20$. 
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vii. ~mediate thought develops into knowledge 
In stating that there is immediate 'knowledge,' which is derivable 
from immediateness with a minimum of reflection, Grote is simply stating 
that knowledge develops from immediateness as a basis. To immediateness 
much reflection may be added; the more reflection we have , the more know-
ledge. Knowledge is a combination of •distinction' and 'indistinction' 
of thought. The former, 'distinction,' corresponds somewhat to reflec-
tion so characteristic of self-consciousness or of the •thought-self, ' 
and the latter to immediateness of the •self-self' which cannot be thought 
but which is, rather , i mmediately felt. 
Perhaps the best way in which we can describe knowledge is that it 
is an union of indistinction and distinction of thought, the in-
distinction giving the reality or trueness of knowledge, the dis-
t inction its point or particularity. Knowledge is thought, with a 
particular kind of value, which we call trueness, understood to 
attach to the thought. This value , it seems to me, is the carrying 
on of immediateness into reflection, while reflection on its side 
supplies another kind of value, that namely of distinction-among 
objects, enabling us to know their relations one to another.l8 
There are two kinds of value furnished. First, from immediateness , the 
value has nothing to do with the 'thought-self,' while, second, from re-
flection, it has everything to do with the •thought-self' and also the 
•self-self' which forms the intuitive basis for the former . 
viii. •Pre-distinctional' immediateness 
In the case of immediate knowledge Grote states there is a sort of 
'pre-distinctional' immediateness. J. Loewenberg uses the term'pre-
analytic' instead of 'pre-distinctional.' But by preanalytic Loewenberg 
18. Grote, EP, II, 153. 
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refers to what "consists of a tentative intuition of the general field 
of facts to be studied.nl9 •Pre-distinctional• refers to inunediateness 
where •facts• are not yet recognized. The facts arise when reflection 
takes place. It is.true that this grasp of reality is most inadequate 
and conveys little meaning. Loewenberg 1 s 1preanalytic stage' is more 
informative . Both terms, 1pre-distinctional• and 'preanalytic,' are 
synoptic in character. 
What Grote means by pre-distinctional immediateness may be observed 
in the following . In immediateness there is a oneness of the thinker and 
the thought which makes the thought or inunediate knowledge true; this is 
not the case with reflection as in the •thought-self' for in the latter 
there is a distinction between subject and object, and since there is, 
the trueness vanishes. Grote, very evidently does not believe in a 
correspondence theory of truth. The closer, he says , that knowledge can 
remain to immediateness the more likelihood is there that truth obt ains. 
'Distinction' has to do with reflection rather than with immediateness 
but not wholly so because of the element of reflection which enters into 
immediate knowledge. If, then, •distinction• is in any way a charact er-
i stic of inunediate knowledge one may be justified in saying that there 
is 'pre-distinctional• (that is, before reflection makes •distinction') 
immediateness . 
immediateness . 
This involves trueness which is a characteristic of 
19. Brightman, POR, 117. 
I 
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Yet it is not the distinction which gives the character of trueness 
to the thought, and in that way marks it as knowledge, but it is the 
£re-distinctional immediateness which involved the trueness, and on 
which, for foundation, the trueness rests and must always rest. The 
oneness of subject and object, thinker and thought, in immediate 
thought, is the germ of all after knowledge: it is this which con-
stitutes the life, essence, special character of knowledge, the 
trueness in one word, though it cannot be called knowledge till it 
is developed.2° 
ix. Intuition 
a. Meaning of •intuition• 
The word •intuition• in all this discussion should not be passed 
over without examination. It is concerned with immediateness but not 
with reflection primarily. For reflection implies •distinction• which 
is no direct concern of intuition in its character as immediateness, as 
contrasted with its character of distinction bound up as it is with 'in-
distinction' and merged with the thinker and thought (when no distinction 
is made between the two), or with subject and object. Intuitive •know-
ledge,' as Grote speaks of it, is concerned with only a minimum of re-
flection (not enough for a judgment). We may have an intuitive knowledge 
of an object, say a tree . Then we, the tree and the world of which we 
form a part cannot be analy zed , according to Grote. In the indistinction 
resulting is the basis of the truth of the tree. Of course, if reflec-
tion is added then there is perception, and consequently the problem of 
the two points of view, namely, the 'philosophical• and the phenomenal, 
is evident. It seems that Grote follows the line cf thought taken by 
Bergson much later as the latter distinguishes between intuition and 
, 20. Grote, EP, II, 153, 154. 
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intelligence, for example, in referring to time: 11We do not think real 
time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect.n21 
Immediateness and intuition are not concerned with the problem, but 
reflection and perception are. No distinct object, or thing (whether of 
sense or reason), can intuitivelz be kno\iO, in the sense in which Grote 
speaks of intuition in its character as immediateness. 
Intuition is true, or real knowledge, in its character of immediate-
ness, so far as immediateness can give knowledge, but not necessarily 
true, or real knowledge, in its character of distinction. We have 
no proper right to say, we know this or that intuitively, because 
•this,' and •that,• imply a distinction of objects which does not 
belong to intuition as immediate. We have an intuitional knowledge 
of the external world:22 but our distinction of objects from our-
selves and among ourselves, and our consequent view of their relations 
to us and among each other, which makes up our notion of the external 
world in its characters and variety--all this is not at all intuition, 
though it need not be inconsistent with it. Intuitive knowledge, as 
immediate , is a state of undistinguished and common being uniting us 
with what we know:23 as soon as we separate it off from us, intuition 
passes into reflection.24 
b. Trueness of •intuition' 
Concerning the trueness of intuition Grote has the following to say. 
Truth is a property of intuition in its character of immediateness (but 
not in its character of distinction). In its purest form truth is in 
intuition, not in reflection. This intuition is immediate •knowledge, ' 
except the extreme of immediateness seems to be, for Grote , a limit 
rather than an actuality. The closest that it is possible to get to 
21. Bergson, CE, 53. 
22. Obviously Grote means intuition 'in its character of distinction' 
here. 
23. When we are united with what we know, there is then no 'subject• 
and 'object,• but only •subject' (in the sense of the subject being 
characterized by immediateness), giving an idealistic metaphysics. 
24 . Grote, EP, II , 154. 
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truth is through intuition. vVhen reflection enters so also does error, 
for when the inactive immediateness is put into activity by reflection 
not hing new in the way of truth can be added. Activity as mere activity 
is the fountain of error. Grote seems to take a position regarding in-
tui tion and reflection akin to that of Bergson regarding intuition and 
intelligence.25 
x. Antithesis between immediateness and reflection 
Grote calls attention to the antithesis , indicated by •immediateness' 
and •reflection• or •intuition• and •refl ection,• as asserted by different 
terms in English usage, such as •intuition• and •experience , • or 'ideas' 
and •sense.• Int uition in its cfiaracter of immediateness is truth. For 
when r efl ection enters no more of truth can be added, and there is the 
possibility of error. Now intuition in its character of immediateness, 
plus reflectional activity, gives intuition in its character of distinc-
tion. This plus portion is what Grote considers responsible for a great 
deal of confusion. 
By rea on of this meaning •intuition• (in its character of distinc-
tion) as used by almost all English philosophers is practically equivalent 
to Grote•s •reflection.• Therefore the place which Grote reserved for 
•intuition, • in its character of immediateness, is left vacant ~hough in-
tuition does occupy a place within reflection). It is 'pre-distinctional • 
immediateness. Confusion becomes somewhat worse confounded when the term 
•experience• is regarded sometimes as e~ivalent to •intuition' when, 
25. Bergson, CE. 
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according to Grote, it should be the antithesis of it. Hence, the term 
'experience' may r efer to any one, or all, of the following, experience 
of the physical, of the mental, or simply to consecutive states of mind. 
The word 'intuition' ••• in its English form, is used more or less 
to express a combination of two things, which are looked upon as one, 
viz. what I have called the higher intuitions, and the reflectional 
activity of the mind. It appears to me that this analysis or antith-
esis ot knowledge is virtually admitted by almost all English philos-
ophers . That is to say, those who most strongly urge that the former 
element, the English 'intuition,' is not real or important, nevert he-
less make their supposition of the other element, 'experience' (from 
which they derive all know~edge) much as their opponents would, leav-
ing in this way, if we may so speak, the place for the former element 
vacant, though they will not allow it to be occupied. Or, to put the 
thing in another way, they keep it (I do not mean with any intentional 
bad faith) as a convenient ground to which their term 'experience' 
retires now and then, and we never can precisely be sure whether . 
'experience' means mental experience, succession of states of mind, 
or physical experience.26 
What Grote is saying here is that we must recognize two meanings of 
intuition, one of which is 'immediateness' or "immediate 'knowledge,' " 
and the other 'reflection.' English intuitionists use the word 'intuition' 
for •reflection' and hence leave intuition as immediateness, vacant. And 
Grote is arguing that if you follow the method of these intuitionists you 
do not really have intuition at all but reflection, distinction, and ex-
perience. 
xi. Crit icism of Kant's 'experience' 
In his criticism of the use of 'experience' Grote attacks a rock of 
Gibralter in his condemnation of Kant's use of the word. Kant's meaning 
is different from the above yet there is a certain lack of clarity about 
26 . Grote, EP, II , 157. 
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26 . Grote, EP, II , 157. 
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it. Kant speaks or •the manifold of experience and intuition.•27 There 
is too much distinctness involved in the manifold to suit Grote who would 
rather speak of •the undistinguished• or •the conrused• which, he thinks, 
would better indicate the •immediateness' characteristic of •the undis-
tinguished• or •the confused' before attention or notice (or, reflection, 
one might say) is applied to it. This criticism of Kant is in conformity 
with the antithesis, which Grote advocates, between intuition and reflec-
tion. It is the same error, Grote asserts, that underlies both Kant and 
the English philosophers, namely, the lack of observing the •indistinc-
tion• characteristic of immediateness in the case of Kant • manifold, and 
by the English philosophers who make an antithesis between experience on 
the one hand, and reflectional activity and the (pure or higher) intui-
tions on the other. In such an antithesis the •indistinction• which 
should be characteristic of all that lies in contrast to experience, 
namely, immediateness, is violated. 
xii. English philosophy unjustified in making antithesis 
between •ideas• and •experience• 
Grote claims that in English philosophy ideas modify experience and 
experience modifies the ideas and both are placed in an antithesis, as in 
Locke28 and Hume.29 He sees no reason why the antithesis should be made. 
For if ideas fit experience (or vice versa), both ideas and experience 
are characteristic of immediateness. Unless reflection or activity 
27. Kant, CPR. 
28. Locke, EHU. 
29. Hume, THU. 
became involved in the ideas or experience both these latter may as well 
be regarded as 'immediateness' and hence the artificial antithesis set 
up falls apart. Again if reflectional activity takes place in order to 
make the 'ideas' or 'experience' mean something, what happens is that 
there is no 'immediateness' but all is 'reflection.' 
Grote seems to think that English philosophy tries to support a vir-
tual antithesis between 1ideas 1 and 'experience' in the following way: 
One may see30 a tree as oneness or as greenness, the oneness is the idea 
and greenness the sensation. Grote believes this is erroneous. For the 
explanation usually given is that there is a correspondence between the 
greenness and certain nerves of our body while there is no such corres-
pondence in the case of oneness. What is of importance here in Grote's 
criticism is that the greenness no more than the oneness is distinguished 
without attention. Attention at once brings both sides of the antithesis 
out of the realm of 'immediateness.' 
xiii. Immediateness, and 'subject' and 'object' 
Grote's exposition of 'immediateness' in its pure or complete form 
is that it is as subjective as it is objective. 'Subject' and 'object' 
are merged into one. The individual has no self-consciousness for all 
is conscious, and intuitive; there is no reflection in immediateness. 
As reflection combines with intuition the result is that the relation 
between thought and things becomes more subjective because things are 
looked at from the side of thought . One is concerned more with thought 
30. 1See 1 with the meaning of 'sense' or 'perceive,' that i~as 
phenomenal and 'philosophical.' 
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than with that which is thought about, or the •object.• 
Grote believes that William Hamilton and George Berkeley funda-
mentally would be of one mind if they really had been aware and im-
pressed by the distinction which he makes between intuition and reflec-
tion. Yet Grote claims that neither saw consciousness in the sense of 
immediateness as he himself saw it, namely, as subject and object merged 
into one. Hamilton' s philosophy deals with consciousness at one time as 
conscious~ess, and at another as self-consciousness (as Grote distin-
guishes these two terms). Grote believes that Hamilton's interchange 
of meanings makes for a great deal of confusion in philosophy. That is, 
Grote believes that Hamilton never saw such a fundamental distinction as 
he himself makes between ~nediateness and reflection. Berkeley was 
more concerned with one side only of the antithesis, and, hence, Grote 
thinks he too is a victim of error. Thus, thinking and what is thought 
about should be kept strictly distinct. The distinction was not main-
tained in Hamilton nor recognition given to it by Berkeley, Grote holds. 
When Reid and Hamilton broke out into controversy as to whether or not 
consciousness is a faculty, they were each wrestling with the problem 
f or which Grote claims that he has found the solution. 
One may state that Grote's comments are rather evidently appropriate 
when applied to Hamilton but it does not seem that they suit too well in 
Berkeley's case. For Berkeley held that there are no objects •without 
the mind.• It is clear, then, that Berkeley could not be in error since 
he did not refer to •subject• and •object• in the ordinary sense. How-
ever, there is objectivity evident throughout all Berkeley's writings. 
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This would violate the truth found only in immediateness, Grote would 
hol d. However, one must say here what one cannot help thinking through-
out all Grote's writing on immediateness, namely that, it seems impos-
sible to make immediateness intelligible without bringing in 'subject,• 
•object , • •things,' etc . , such as •reflection• makes possible. 
What Grote is distinguishing here, is aptly shown in the distinc-
tion between "Situations Experienced and Situations Believed-in.n31 
11 The only Situation Experienced by anyone is his own consciousness. 1132 
Immediateness is similar to a 'Situation Experienced.' As soon as we 
bring in such terms as, •subject,• 1things,' etc., we are no longer deal-
ing with immediateness but ~uth reflection. Or, in terms of 'Situations 
Experienced and Situat ions Believed-in,• as soon as we are involved with 
other t han consciousness we are dealing with Situations Believed-in. 
It is necessary to distinguish between Situations Experienced and 
Situations Believed-in. A •situation• means any state of affairs . 
No situation is a Situation .Experienced tmless it is actually 
present in consciousness. Experience is given only as a conscious 
state of affairs. To experience is to be aware. A man cannot 
properly say that he is experiencing a fire in his house merely 
because the fire is going on; he experiences the fire only when 
it makes a perceptible difference to his conscious experience. 
More exactly, the man can never say that he is experiencing the 
fire, even when perceptions of its odor or heat occur; yes, even 
when the fire burns his body, the Situation Experienced is ex-
cruciating pain, not actual fire. The fire is always a Situation 
Believed-in, no matter how painfully well-grounded the belief may 
be.33 
31 . 
32. 
33. 
Brightman, POR, 347. 
Loc. cit. 
Loc. err. 
-- --
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xiv. Self-consciousness not dependent upon the 1objective 1 
Grote criticizes those who would place self-consciousness within the 
universe or dependent upon the universe, and would advocate rather the 
importance of observing an initial self-consciousness to which external 
objects are ob,jects for me, the self-conscious subject. He believes that 
no possible physical discovery can change the primary importance of self-
consciousness, especially of the •self-self' as distinguished from the 
•thought-self.• It is for this reason that Grote does not agree with 
Mill's language concerning sensation or consciousness being a function 
of matter or that matter is only 'possibilities of sensation.' 
The truth is to be found rather in immediateness. Grote regards 
truth as existing only in immediateness where •things' and •thought' are 
indistinguishable. As soon as reflection enters so that there is self-
consciousness this immediateness vanishes and gives place to distinction 
where there is no longer reason and meaning to hold things together in 
combination. 
I said that the thing was the combination of its looks , not the sum 
or aggregate, and in respect of this we have to notice that the looks 
of a thing are in degrees, and of very different values: and that 
the difference between a combination and an aggregate is that, as to 
the former, we understand there is reason for it, meaning in it , not 
as to the latter. The looks are of greater or less value according 
as they tell us more or less of this reason or meaning. In fact, 
this reason or meaning might be described, if we like to use the 
language, as the look of the thing itself--it is what I have formerly 
called its •t hinghood.•34 
The •impressions' and •ideas' of Hume and the ideas of Berkeley are not 
34. Grote , EP , II, 177, 178. 
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open to criticism when they are regarded as a part of consciousness 
(where immediateness is i nvolved) but only become so when they are re-
lated to self-consciousness where ' distinction 1 enters, or r1hen they 
are regarded in their atomistic nature as discrete. 
xv. Sensibility and activity 
a. Want 
Besides •self-consciousness' and 'perception• dealt with in the 
above, as related to our intellectual nature, there is also sensibility 
and activity in connection with the active side of our nature. The 
parent of both sensibility and activity is •want• or •immediateness.' 
\Vhen the •state of things' passes into reflection, •want• is felt as 
want. Further qualification of the above two factors of sensibility 
and activity should be made. Let us look at some of the terms Grote 
uses. •sensibility• is regarded as t he capacity which an animate ob-
ject may have for pleasure or pain. The fact of the presence of pleas-
ure or pain is called •sentience.• 'Sensiveness' is the instrumental 
operation that conveys information from the outside world t o our bodies. 
It is the corporeal or nervous porti on of •perceptiveness. ' Grote uses 
the word 'perceptiveness• in a wider sense than•sensiveness.• 
By sensibility I mean capacity of pleasure and pain, and I care-
fully distinguish it throughout from sensiveness, by which latter 
I mean the general operation or instrumentality of the nerves of 
our body in giving us information of what we then call external 
things. Sensiveness, as I use the term, is a portion , the nervous 
or corporeal portion, of the more general operation or faculty 
'perceptiveness.• We are perceptive as intelligences: we are 
sensive as corporealized or incorporated intelligences.35 
35. Grote , EP, II , 185. 
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b. 'Reflectiveness' 
Grote refers to •reflectiveness' as halfway between immediate 
thought on the one hand and immediate or •reflex• action on the other. 
Some time since I said, that what I called •reflectiveness' was 
intermediate between immediate thought and what I called •immediate• 
or •reflex' action. Immediate or reflex action, speaking roughly, 
is where there is action of one thing upon another, and continuous 
or spontaneous ~-action from this other. 
I only allude t o this for the purpose of pointing out the difference--
a difference, however, entirely gradational--between this and an 
action from without upon what we call an intelligence , with will 
leading to an action on its or his part, no longer to be called a 
simply re- action, but a consequence through a complicated inter-
mediation. What I am saying now is from the physical point of view.36 
When •distinctiveness' enters through reflection there is more of thought 
than what is thought of in evidence. This is because we are always on 
the side of thought. Just as there is self-consciousness and percep-
tiveness when ref ection enters so there is sensibility and activity 
where action enters. The former twd, namely, self-consciousness and 
perceptiveness, deal with 1intellectiveness 1 ; the latter two, sensibility 
and activity , deal with action . One experience of sensibility and ac-
tivity leads on to another just as in the case of •intellectiveness' one 
experience of reflection leads on to another. 
c. Reflection as action 
It seems that Grote here is trying to separate thought and the 'ob-
ject• of thought, and in doing so he appears to be true to his professed 
basis of attempting to see the epistemological problem involved at one 
time from the 'philosophical• approach and at another time from the 
36 . Grote, EP, II, 188. 
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phenomenal point of view. In speaking about action he appears to mean 
physical action of one thing upon another, and upon the mind. But true 
to his position that reflection can differentiate the 'self-self' from 
the •thought-self' he should regard reflection as action just as surely 
as corporeal activity. It is not likely that Grote did not see this 
point, yet in.what he writes he does not always make this issue clear. 
Reflection cannot, in Grote 1s view, be immediate. Corporeal ac-
tivity is involved in reflection, for reflection has to do with phenomena 
representing the physical (or 'object•) side, and also with 'philosophy' 
(in corporeal activity) which gives meaning to what is experienced 
through reflection. Also, it was said that reflection is action ('just 
as surely as corporeal activity•). By this is meant that there is a 
reflecting and that upon which the reflecting is carried out. There is, 
therefore, a differentiation here which produces mediation. 
d. Semi-consciousness 
Grote speaks of self-consciousness being extended to semi-conscious-
ness of corporeal activity. 
\tie pass onward from one experience to another, in respect of our 
activity, just as we do in respect of our self-consciousness and 
perceptiveness. As our self-consciousness is extended to that 
semi-consciousness, as I called it, which we have of our corporeal 
organization, so the experience of our power in directing our at-
tention is extended to the experience of our power in directing 
corporeal movement, or (what is the same thing) to the experience 
of our body not only as a sensive organization, but as an active 
organization or machine for producing mechanical effects. Our 
experience of it in this way is exactly analogous to our experience 
of it in the other: we can move it partly, but it can be moved 
without our moving it.37 
37. Grote , EP, II, 189, 190. 
I am not here concerned to consider the nature of this 'will' 
or what is called the 'freedom' of it. It is certainly not 
arbitrary, and our attention to one part of what is before us 
rather than to another is suggested by something independent 
of us: the nature of the suggestion is not matter for discus-
sion now.38 
This 'semi-consciousness' of corporeal activity, that is, this 
sensibility (at least the thought side of it) has the characteristic 
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of immediateness. I t corresponds to intuition which also is immediate. 
The same may be said for activity, in the primary sense of activity as 
the result of •want• as a fact. •want• as a fact, and not as a feel-
ing, underlies this activity. 
The common parent both of sensibility and of activity may be 
said to be •want•--•want• as a fact, which we must carefully 
distinguish from wanr-iS a feeling , or the feeling of want. 
Want, in what I have called immediateness , exists as a fact, 
and when this immediateness passes into reflection, this fact 
of want passes into felt want or uneasiness, and concurrentif 
with this (not as a result of it) the fact of want impels 
action.39 ~ -
When reflection enters in, the fact of want passes over into a feeling 
of want, and generates action. Reflection is the waking to a state of 
things which before the waking were included in immediateness. Reflec-
tion is half-way between immediateness and activity, or immediate 
thought and immediate action. That is, it is a state of semi-conscious-
ness (or semi-self-consciousness) where we are aware of our corporeality. 
By saying, some time since, that reflection was intermediate 
bet.-1een immediate thought and immediate action, what I meant 
was this : that reflection, as we have seen, brings us into a 
region of what I called 'semi-consciousness , ' which is the 
38. Grote, EP, II , 189. 
39. Grote, 2£• cit., p. 190. 
state of feeling in which \ve stand in regard of our body . From 
the other side, if we follow immediate action upwards or inwards, 
we come to a region of more refined physics , of vital physics, 
where there are phenomena of a very peculiar nature. This region 
corresponds, from the other side, with the semi-consciousness. 
In this region of the study of life we have consciousness and 
physical fact in very close proximit y and entanglement. But for 
all this, we never can get both into the same view, any more than 
the two sides of the carpet.40 
xvi. Immediateness and reflection illustrated by carpet 
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The epistemological problem involved in a discussion of immediate-
ness and reflection is carefully presented in an illustration of a 
carpet: 
If we now recall to mind • • • action viewed from the side of 
physics, and compare it with what I have now said about action 
viewed from the side of immediate tho t, we seem to see two 
portions, which put together, make up intelligent or volitional 
action as a whole. But this is not exactly so, and the supposi-
tion that it is so seems to me one of the errors which, in the 
present state of philosophy, we are most in danger of. We have 
to remember that they are seen from different sides. Looking 
from t he side of consciousness and from the side of physical fact 
is like looking at a carpet , hung up, from the one side and from 
the other. What we see is the same, and yet not the same: and 
those who add the facts of body and facts of mind together as two 
constituents of the universe seem to do very much as if it shoUld 
be said there are two carpets, which make up all of what we see: 
the one carpet rough and unfinished, the other smooth and pol-
ished: the one with a man in the pattern of it who has got a 
sword in his left hand, the other with a man who has a sword in 
his right. In a way, it may be said that it is two carpets that 
we see: but though we may combine them together if vie know how, 
we must not add them or put them side by side with each other, 
for they are viewed each in a different manner, and cannot in 
this way be brought into relation.4l 
Grote looks at reality (the carpet), from the point of view of 
physics, or phenomena. Here there is physical activity, as though we 
40. Grote, EP , II, 193. 
41 . Grote, 2£• cit., pp. 191, 192. 
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are on the phenomenal side of reality and, for example, directing t he 
eyes (as physical) on the carpet, from the physical side. But the eyes, 
as physical, tell us nothing about the carpet. Yet the eyes, as phy-
sical are absolutely necessarY if we are going to conatively 1 see 1 the 
carpet (from the other side). That is, there is physical action upon 
the carpet and a corresponding reaction, as when we stretch out the hand 
to touch the carpet, and find that there is a reaction to our touch as 
the carpet may yield to it, seem rough, etc • . But this action and re-
action do not yield meaning though they are necessary to the derivation 
of meaning. Where meaning is derived is from an approach to the carpet 
from the opposite side. This is the 'philosophical' approach. Here 
there is voliti on or will, as conation. 
xvii. A paradox 
Let us return now to consider briefly again the initial starting-
point of this chapter, namely, intuition and reflection. It is untrue 
to say, Grote holds, that of intuition and reflection , that intuiti on 
comes first in time. Total abstraction of either intuition or reflec-
tion from each other is not possible. For convenience in analysis it 
seems fair to Grote's position to say that intuition as immediateness 
could be abstracted from reflection (if abstraction were possible at all) 
more readily than reflection could be abstracted from intuition. What 
is meant by this is that, for all thinking at all the 'self-self' under-
lies ever,ything el se. The 'self~self' is itself an abstraction, but it 
must be present before any possible reflection can take place. Now 
since intuition (as immediateness) is an abstraction it can not be said 
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that intuition generates reflection. For, strictly, intuition is never 
present without reflection. And it would be impossible to say just 
what intuition by itself could do since we never find it by itself but 
always along with~ reflection. 
Reflection (specifically implied in the •thought-self') is possible 
on~ because there is thought. •Before• is emphasized here in order to 
call attention to a rather p~radoxical position in Grote. For if the 
•self-self' is itself an abstraction it cannot very well 1precede 1 the 
•thing-self' from which it is abstracted. Grote seems aware of this 
paradox though he never refers to it by this term. There is a sense in 
which Grote is incorrect, and a sense in which he is correct. The sense 
in which he is incorrect (and he doesn't seem unaware of this incorrect-
ness) is that if immediateness or the •self-self' is an abstraction from 
reflection or the •thought-self' then it is incorrect to say that it 
precedes or comes before reflection or the •thought-self.• The sense in 
which he is correct (and he seems very aware of this correctness) is that 
immediateness or the •self-self' is basic to all reflection, whereas all 
reflection is not strictly basic to immediateness or the 1self-self. 1 
That it is not basic to the self-self is evident in the fact that as 
soon as reflection is considered it is the •thought- self ' that is con-
sidered and not the •self-self.' 
xviii. •Knowledge of acquaintance' and 
'knowledge of judgmentt 
a. Intuition as •looking on' 
1Intuition 1 is a very inadequate term for what it represents. 
270 
What is meant by the word is that mind and its object are so closely 
connected that they are one. This is immediateness. There is so in-
t i mate a contact between the object and the subject that the one can-
not be distinguished from the other. The German word 1anschauung' has 
been used for intuition and implies 'looking 2!!.' the object, but there 
is a separation implied in this t erm that should not be entertained in 
the case of Grote's use of the word 'immediateness.' If the separation 
is to be made, it will be of the nature of an abstraction with tv10 kinds 
of knowledge, first, immediate or intuitive, and, second, mediate , con-
ceptual, or reflectional. The former Grote refers to as •knowledge of 
acquaintance' and the latter as 'knowledge of judgment.• Judgment strict-
ly could never enter into the former , for if it did the former kind of 
knowledge would be no longer immediate. Immediate knowledge may be re-
ferred to as knowledge of acquaintance because the element of reflection 
which enters into this knowledge is not sufficient for judgment. Of 
~ourse bot h kinds of knowledge are abstractions for they never really 
'lre other than in conjunction. Kno'TtTledge of acquaintance and knowledge 
of judgment shade off into each other so gradually that they cannot be 
found, in actuality, separate . 
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b. Basis for distinction arises in 
immediateness and reflection 
The basis for this distinction between knowledge of acquaintance 
and knowledge of judgment in Grote's writing arises in connection with 
the distinction he draws in dealing with immediateness and reflection. 
In the popular references to •knowledge of acquaintance• and 'knowledge 
about• indebtedness has been acknowledged to Grote as the originator of 
the distinction between these terms. This distinction will be discussed 
later in this dissertation. 
c. Analogy in Ferrier 
How closely both kinds· of knowledge are combined may be noted in 
Ferrier where he says that what we know is not the object of knO\'iledge 
but •our knowledge of the object of knowledge.• That is, the person 
who knows gets in the way of what is !mown. To speak of •knowledge of 
acquaintance' is correct if by this term immediateness is implied; but, 
strictly, to speak of intuitive •knowledge' is not correct. For •know-
l edge' implies reflection and hence knmvledge as r efiecti ve knowledge is 
not intuitive. 
4. Significance of immediateness and reflection 
in Grote's philosophy 
One of the most evident and significant points in Grote's analysis 
of immediateness and reflection is this distinction just made between 
•knowledge of acquaintance' and •knowledge of judgment• (or •knowledge 
about•). This distinction has now become familiar in philosophy.42 
42. Cf. •conclusion' of this dissertation. 
This significant issue out of an analysis of immediateness and reflec-
tion is explicitly presented by Grote. 
There are other significant points that are both implicit and ex-
plicit--mostly implicit. Throughout his discussion of these two terms 
Grote is concerned with showing just what happens when epistemology is 
approached wholly from the 'philosophical' aspect. The result is the 
'self-self.• One could make an extravagant statement by saying that 
this is pure unadulterated immediateness, a total abstraction--yes, an 
abstraction so extreme that Grote will not strictly allow it. This 
extreme and impossible position of immediateness at least shows that 
the •philosophical' approach in epistemology may be so far-reaching as 
to be absurd. 
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Now immediateness as a total abstraction would have no reflection 
in it. 'I'his would involve an abstraction from reflecting upon the past 
or a considering of anything regarding the future. In that case pure 
immediaceness would be wholly devoid of relations, for relations in 
immediateness would have to allow for thou~ht as well as what is thought 
of. Immediateness wholly abstracted from reflection would not have any 
relations with spatial objects, nor could it have any relations with 
thoughts (as •objects•) in a time sequence. Immediateness, then, would 
e a theoretical limit rather than an actual one. In fact, Grote would 
have to admit that pure immediateness devoid of all relations, and ab-
stracted from all reflection does not actualll exist. 
Sensibility and activity are represented in a view of knowledge 
rom the physical side. These terms are not too specifically defined 
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but they are reasonably adequate for Grote's purpose in showing the 
phenomenal approach possible in epistemology. Strictly , Grote should 
not use the term •sensibility• here, for the term has 'philosophical ' 
implications. It carries mean~~' implies consciousness, and is also 
otherwise a philosophical term. He seems to require just enough 
meaning to allow use of such a term as sensibility in the sense in 
which he is using it, namely, capacity which an animate object has for 
pleasure or pain. 
Now, an animate being cannot have any capacity for pleasure or 
pain unless there is at least ~ meaning present in the mind of that 
animate being, though not necessarily very much. This permits Grote 
to speak of sensibility and activity as representing the phenomenal 
approach to knowledge. Both sensibility and activity together are re-
ferred to as volition, as conation. For there to be any volition at 
all there must be ~meaning present. This necessary meaning implicit 
in volition is an additional testimony to the impossibility of wholly 
abstracting phenomenal reality from •thought.• 
There are, then, two sides to the carpet, the immediateness and 
reflectional side, and, the sensibility and activity side. But there 
is also a sense in which both sides of the carpet are involved even in 
immediateness and reflection. For reflection has a sort of •subject• 
and •object• nature. This is evident in the practical impossibility of 
ever being without the •thought-self' or of having only the •self-self• 
in thinking. 
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It should be noted that even though we begin with our own personal 
experience, such as Grot e refers to by the term 1self-self, 1 yet we are 
always going beyond ourselves. If the given is so 'innocent' as it has 
been declared to be43 then it can reveal little if anything. If this 
'innocence' were perfect we would never know it--not even as the given. 
The given must be richer than mere perfect innocence. It is this issue 
that causes Grote to assert that the 'self-self' is an abstraction from 
the 'thought-self.' The 'thought-self• reveals the fact that the given 
is not innocent. It is intimately bound up with the 'self-self' so that 
the 'self-self' (wholly by itself) must be regarded as fictional. That 
is, the given is a given for us. This givenness involves a reflection 
on the past, anticipation of the future, and a whole network of other 
relations also. 44 For Grote, the given is always a given for conscious-
ness or 'philosophy.' 
5. Critical comment 
Grote's remarks on immediateness and reflection make difficult 
reading--a trait not uncommon in Grote's writings, especially in t he 
~loratio Philosophica--because of the introduction of new terms with 
specialized meanings. Only a few terms are so used but these are suf-
ficient in number to require considerable qualification throughout this 
chapter, or in the chapter where they appear in Grote's writings. Grote 
may have been dependent upon others in his use of these terms but the 
43. vlilliams, 11 The Innocence of the Given," Jour. of Phil., XXX:(l933), 
617-620. 
44. Brightman, in Jour. of Phil., XXXI(l934), 263-268. 
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fact that he does not acl<nowledge any sources implies that he is not 
using these terms in any senses other than the ones that he specifies 
himself. This seems true in the case of such words as 1self-self 1 and 
•thought-self.• This practice of dealing in terms with precise and 
familiar meanings, as well as with precise and unfamiliar meanings, has 
its advantages. It enables the user to present his meaning more direct-
ly and with a minimum of words. This is the method most attractive to 
Grote, and the one which he frequently makes manifest to the reader. 
There is a second advantage, namely, that the word so introduced may 
present an argument that could not otherwise be presented by Grote. 
This point seems to be frequently brought out. Grote appears to be 
strongly of the belief that he must couch his argument in terms some of 
whicry are of his own coinage. 
There are several disadvantages in this use of new terms to bring 
out one • s meaning. It is the difficulty which the reader finds in some 
of Whitehead's writings.45 New terms are coined in order that the 
reader may not mistake the meaning which he would be almost certain to 
do if shop-worn t erms were employed. This use of new terms makes the 
reading slow and difficult. And if one does not carefully note the con-
t ext, as well as the words actually being read at the time, one does not 
get any sense out of the passage under consideration--at least not the 
full meaning that the author wishes to convey. 
45. For example, Whitehead, PR. 
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Another disadvantage in the use of new terms, or in the new meanings 
given to old ones, is that a work otherwise ver,y meritorious may fall in-
to oblivion in which case the characteristic terms along with their res-
pective meanings are lost. Probably this oblivion is somewhat justified--
certainly not on the grounds that would lead to the adoption of •basic 
English' on the view that all other English is unnecessary--for the slow 
adoption of terms gives more opportunity to weigh and consider, in order 
to find out the ones that are most valuable and most essential. 
A third disadvantage arises, especially in the case of words already 
used with other meanings, from weighing down our language with new inter-
pretations that could be expressed in some other way. This seems true in 
the case of the terms, 'philosophy' and 'phenomenon• as used by Grote. 
To the reader who comes upon Grote's use of these terms for the first 
time, the old meanings (sometiw~s referred to by Grote as the ordinary 
accepted meanings) will recur again and again, making it difficult to 
see that the author is accurate when he seems inaccurate. 
These advantages and disadvantages are characteristic of Grote's use 
of •immediateness• and •reflection' as one can readily see both from what 
has been presented in this chapter on the terms 'immediateness' and 're-
flection' (neither of which is ever wholly abstracted from the other) , 
and to a lesser extent on such te rms as 'sensibilit~• 'intuition,' and 
•want.' 
Regarding the use of 'immediateness' and •reflection • comments have 
already been made under 'Significance of immediateness and reflection in 
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Grote's philosophy' (above)46 and passing mention may be made here to 
Grote' s use of terms that do not mean 1-vhat they seem to say. For ex-
ample, he uses 'immediateness' which is strictly not immediate, 're-
flection' which is strictly not reflection, and 'sensibility' which 
strictly does not pertain to the senses alone. For 'immediateness' is 
never wholly immediate but contains some reflection , 'reflection' always 
requires something immediate upon which it may reflect, and 'sensibility,' 
in the sense of possessing capacity for pleasure and pain, cannot termi-
nate in pleasure and pain unless there is an animate object to which 
pleasure and pain~ something (namely, pleasure and pain). However, 
it should be said to Grote' s credit that he is concerned with showing 
what some terms can i mply, if taken in their extreme form. And he wants 
to point out that a taking of terms in their extreme form, or meaning , 
is frequently characteristic of much of our thinking. Hence, for example , 
he wishes to show that this is quite all right provided that we be pre-
pared to Tecognize the extremity of our analysi and not affirm that such 
ext reme meanings are the sole ones. For example, he would hold that to 
regard 'immediateness' as wholll immediate is to be guilty of what has 
frequently been ment ioned in this dissertation by the term (which he ap-
plies to this mistake, namely) 1 w~s-psychology, 1 or 1bad psychology.• 
The sound advice, frequently true in dealing with propositions in logic, 
to understand what is written in the way in which it is meant rather 
that in all the possible and remote meanings that can be drawn from it, 
46 . Pp. 268-271. 
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is good advice to follow in dealing with Grote's somewhat unusual and 
partially hidden meanings throughout the various expositions of his 
views. Yet it must be said on the side of the reader of much of Grote's 
work, and, for examplej in connection with his exposition of immediate-
ness and reflection, that it is frequently difficult to understand •in 
the way in which it is meant' much of what Grote writes. Whatever Grote 
has contributed that may be judged of considerable importance will be 
forever vitiated by this weakness. That his thought is not completely 
vitiated but rather is of very considerable importance is a view to the 
testimony of which this dissertation is written--which project is it-
self an explicit recognition of Grote's contribution in philosophy. It 
is the aim of this work, also, to signify implicitly (that is, meaning-
fully) how much recognition and importance should accrue to Grote be-
cause of the heritage received by his written contributions. 
6. Relation to the following chapter 
The chief significance in giving an exposition of immediateness 
and reflection preceding a discussion of personalistic elements in Grote's 
philosophy, is to show once again the importance of distinguishing between 
two approaches that are taken in philosophy, the 'philosophical' and the 
phenomenal. A mixture of the two is frequently found in the use of the 
>vords, ' immediateness 1 and 'reflection.' The closer a philosophy can 
come to complete 'immediateness' the less likelihood there will be of 
error. Grote's emphasis on the 1self-self, 1 which he regards as basic 
for everything else in epistemology, is as personalistic an approach to 
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reality as any. 
This 1self-self 1 may be compared to what has been called the 'Pure 
Ego .' This 'self-self' may be "conceived as a non-empirical principle , 
ordinarily inaccessible to direct introspection, but inferred from intro-
spective evidence.n47 The •self-self' therefore, is a sort of soul sub-
stance, implied in 11the soul theory which regards the pure ego as a per-
manent spiritual substance underlying the fleeting succession of con-
scious experience.n48 The 'self-self,' Grote states, is that which 
contains thought which is immediate and unreflecti ve. It seems , then, 
that the •sel f-self' could be regarded as a spiritual substance--'spirit-
ual' in the sense of animated , and God-given--which is basic for all re-
flection, or for "the fleeting succession of conscious experience , " as 
described above . 
Grote's position regarding the basic importance of this 'self-self' 
appears to designate him clearly as a theistic personalist , who regards 
the relation of thought and •thing,' or 'philosophy' and phenomenon, as 
inseparable aspects of one fundamental reality. 
He has been referring to the way in which all •things' must confonm 
to this idealism. He contends, on quite safe ground, that we are always 
present in any realism, whether professedly or not. This point, so sim-
ple that critics of Grote might regard it as naive, is of extreme impor-
tance. It is Grote's way of acknowledging what later was called •the 
47. Wood , "Pure Ego," in Runes, DOP, 88. 
48. !££· ill· 
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ego-centric predicament.•49 So we cannot take the position that we must 
forsake the considering of things in relation to us, and look at them 
for what they are in themselves. 
Grote would say, they are nothing in themselves; •they' are always 
in relation to us. One might comment on Grote 1 s argument by remarking 
that to regard them as i n themselves is an unwarranted abstraction. It 
is an abstracting of what never is found alone, namely, phenomenal re-
ality; 'phenomenal reality• is always •found• in relation with conscious-
ness. It is that which can affect us even though we may not be conscious 
of it. And yet when we are conscious of it there is a mixture of con-
sciousness and phenomenal reality. 
vJhen Hamilton, for example, speaks of the •consciousness of matter' 
he unwittingly assumes matter in relation to us, and then deals with it 
as though it were not in relation to us already, by referring to it in 
the phrase •consciousness of matter.• In reflection, as Grote deals 
with it, in this chapter, there is the self reflecting and that upon 
which the self reflects . Now, this •thing' upon which the self reflects 
is in the very same position as Hamilton's •matter• which is already un-
wittingly assumed as in relation to consciousness before we are said to 
_have consciousness of it. If we may comment on Hamilton's position here, 
as it provides a convenient illustration of what Grote is dealing with 
49 . Ralph Barton Perr,y, defending his view that we are involved in •the 
ego-centric predicament,• attacks James Bissert Pratt who in criticism of 
Perry stated: Let us "forsake dialectics and observe what actually trans-
pires~' for "observation will do the realist very little good, " etc. 
Jour. of Phil., X(l913), 454. 
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in this chapter on immediateness and reflection, there is implicit truth 
in the self doing the reflecting--in the self that is self-conscious--
in Hamilton. 
Hamilton is not fully aware of this and mixes up a correspondence 
theory of truth with a coherence theory . But if there is a coherence 
theory of truth, then a correspondence theory of truth is both unnecessary, 
and superfluous (in the additional sense of being not only unnecessary but 
also erroneous). Grote seems to be sticking vdth a theory of truth as 
~oherent.5° And the greatest coherence that he can imagine is to be found 
in the 1self-self. 1 
This seems to be an extreme personalism that is wholly i mpracticable, 
for a 'self-self' that doesn't admit even of a 'thought-self' not to men-
tion 'things' (both mental and physical) as we have them in reflection, 
is impracticable. But the impracticability is only apparent, for Grote 
affirms that the 1 self-self' is a sort of imaginary extreme which does 
not exist by itself, but always has some reflection combined with it how-
ever small the reflective element may be. 
Throughout all his writing on 'immediateness' and •reflection,' Grote 
is especially concerned with analysis. He has been so interested in the 
analytic approach to his subject that he might give the impression that 
what he designates as the 1 self- self,' •thought-self,' 'reflection,' 
'immediateness,' etc., are entities which are valid when considered 
50. Grote's criterion of truth is coherence. The greatest coherence is 
found in immediateness. The more reflective, and •objective,' the 
elements are that comprise •knowledge' the more likelihood there is of 
error. 
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separately . This is one of the possible impressions that, his writing 
generally, and his views on the 'self' particularly, gives. 
However, regarding the 'self,' it should be noted that Grote has 
persons, or personality, in mind. The 1self-self 1 is personal, though 
Grot e does not wish to make it an object, for then it would become the 
•thought-self.• But the atomistic elements which Grote presents, are 
misconstrued if taken in abstraction. Probably Grote could have said 
that the •self-self' alone exists and that the •thought-self' exists in 
it. But he has already stated that the •self-self' is not an object of 
thought, and has implied that it exists only as a sort of theoretic ex-
treme from which, because of his analysis , all reflection is abstracted. 
Actually, the •self -self' does not exist as such. Reflection is 
always present in some degree. A consideration of this immediateness 
and reflection together makes Grote•s personalistic philosophy a prac-
ticable one which recognizes the basic and extreme (epistemological) 
personalism from which it stems. We i'Till now consider it. 
CHAPTER IX 
Pl!1tSONALISM IN GROT:E ' s vmiTINGs 
1. Introduction 
As indicated at the close of the last chapter, Grote may be classed 
as an epistemological personalist. It rna be added that he is also a meta~ 
physical personalist. Let us look at each of these terms, both to see what 
is meant by them and also how they apply to Grote's philosophy . First, as 
an epistemological personalist Grote reveals his position by pointing out 
that the common source of thought and ' thing ' is to be found in deity 
mediated through human personality . Man is a partaker of a nature above 
phenomenal nature. This higher nature is of 11 a Planner or Maker with his 
ideas and his purposes. "l 
There is also involved in this view of the deity, Grote's metaphysical 
personalism. By metaptysical personalism is meant the personal nature of 
reality . Now Grote 's view of reality as personal is revealed in his con-
ception of a Planner or Maker who possesses ideas and Eurposes. Ideas and 
purposes, considered on a level at least as high as human beings , are pro-
perly regarded as belonging to persons and are therefore, on that level, 
personal. Ideas and purposes consirtered as belonging also to "a nature above 
all this "2 are like1iise personal. That is to say, the nature of realit.y is 
personal and can have meaning and can be understood only through personality. 
This is what Grote seems to say and i s what he accepts as a basis for the 
l . Grote, EP, II, 293 . 
2 . !£.£.• cit ,. 
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metaphysical expression of his personalism. 
Grote's interest is taken up, in his chief writings, with episternal-
ogy rather than with metaphysics. Yet, metaphysics, dealing with the 
na~ure of being or reality, is basic for epistemology. There is no re-
ality, for Grote, that is not a sort of reality-for-us. This is not a 
reality that can ~be regarded as separated from us. There is always 
a personal nature to reality. Here is Grote's metaphysical personalism. 
The monistic nature of his epistemology is evident in his view of reality 
as essentially one, but a reality that can be viewed from two different 
aspects, namely, from the consciousness or philosophical side, and the 
phenomenal or 'reality' approach. 
These t wo aspects are of the same reality, Grote seems to say in 
various ways. Now this reality cannot overlook epist emological personalism 
where there is a blending of "ourselves and our being with the known." 
The epistemological monism evident in Grote's thought may be illustrated 
by referring to his corrunent on 'intuition.' 
The wor d 'intuition' is in many respects about as bad a word as could 
have been chosen to express irrunediate knowledge, and in fact, it is 
almost the most confusing word in all philosophy. The looking into 
a thing implies a very high degree of attention and distinguishing, 
and is thus the mental process almost at the furthest remove from what 
'int uition' is intended to mean. No doubt 'intuition' means also 
'looking on' a thing, the metaphor simply taken from sight, and hence 
t he German-s use 'Anschauung 1 to correspond with it, but even this meta-
phor expresses very poorly that which we want to express, viz. that 
blending, so to speak, of ourselves and our being with the known, that 
intimate contact of it with us and of us with it, which is the ground-
work of our confidence in 'intuition' as necessary trueness.3 
3. Grote, EP, II, 203. 
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The essential part of Grote's meaning is 11 That blending ••• of ourselves 
and our being with the known." It is this meaning given to intuition which 
enables him to speak of immediateness in distinction from reflection, and 
the 1self-self 1 from the •thought-self .' Thus, also , he contrasts intuition 
with experience . 4 
Grote makes this contrast because it seems to him that experience is 
concerned too much with a correspondence theory of truth which he rejects. 
It is only in intuition that reality is wholly grasped and where there is 
no analysis possible between knowing and the known. Here his essentially 
epistemological monism presents itself. If one were to say that intuition 
as used by Grote should be the most characteristic experience, Grote would 
raise no objection. Yet his use of 1experience 1 implies analysis into 
•subject• and •object •--an analysis which he rejects as unsound because 
dualistic. If we maintain that intuition is the most characteristic ex-
perience, Grote would agree. He is simply veryoautious about the use of 
the term •experience,• being careful to imply that it is characterized by 
dualism and therefore unacceptable. 
Intuition, as Grote defines it, may be put differently as, 11that in-
timate contact of it (i.e. •the known•) with us and of us with it, which is 
the groundwork of our confidence. 11 5 All knowledge, t hen, is essentially 
personalistic in the sense that personality is central. We may consider 
personality central, epistemologically, as a blending 11of ourselves and 
our being with the known" thus, metaphysically, mediating reality through 
4. Grote, EP, II, 152-159. 
5. Grote, 2£• cit., p. 203. 
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personality--so that the result is the personal nature of reality. 
Now complete truth is found only in intuition, or i n the 1self-self. 1 
For Grote considers "intuition the ground of all knmiledge. n6 Grote uses 
the term 'self-self' as an abstraction. If the 1self-self 1 is an abstrac-
tion and truth lies essentially in the 'self-self,' it looks as though 
truth is an abstraction and hence not complete truth. VJhat Grote is t ry-
ing to say is that it is only essentially through the 'self-self' that truth 
can be recognized. For once we admit any semblance of duality into episte-
mology we get the unacceptable correspondence theory of truth. Grote much 
prefers a coherence theory of truth, and coherence rests ultimately upon 
the self. All reality other than the personal nature of reality is a real-
ity borrowed from the self. 
2 . Epistemological monism 
This epistemology is fundamentally monistic . Hence it is akin to that 
presented by Royce, Calkins , and Hocki-ng rather than to personal dualists 
like Bowne. But the monism is of an unusual variety. If one is to distin-
guish between the terms 'idealism' and 'panobjectivisrn 1 in regard to this 
monism, the choice must certainly lie on the side of idealism. Being 
epistemological monism the idealism is 'idea-ism' rather than 'ideal-ism.' 
Yet the !deals' are metaphysical personal norms in the sense of standards 
by which to evaluate~ Ideals used in this sense characterize Grote as a 
Platonist. For Plato, as Professor Demos is careful to point out,? these 
ideals are reached by •a leap. ' These ideals are intuitively 'seen.' The 
6. Grote, EP, II, 218 . 
7. Demos , POP, Chapter III. 
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idea is essentially personalistic in the sense that the common source of 
thought and •thing' is mediated through human personality. 
Truth is found primarily in the person. This person, as a conscious 
self is the ' self-self' i n distinction from the self thought of, that is, 
the •thought- self.' Grote's Berkeleianism is humanistic as well as theistic . 
The theistic nature of his personalism appears in such passages as the fol-
lowing: 
To me human consciousness and freedom-- suggesting to us a personaL 
existence more real than that even of t he universe, suggesting moral 
responsibility, hope of f uture life, relation to God, or the mind 
which originated the universe--are t hings quit e unaffectable, a priori, 
by anything which physic-psychology can discover, and which any con-
sideration how the human race has come physically to be what it is, or 
how it is related to other organized races , has nothing to do with.S 
Here Grote definitely affirms his belief in, and relation to, God. 
God is declared to be the originator of the universe and therefore of con-
sciousness and phenomena. Grote conceives of God as a being possessed of 
mind and a personal existence more real than that of any human person. The 
greater reality which he attributes to God is that of one who made all other 
reality possible in the sense of originating (and sustaining) it . 
The metaphysical personalism characteristic of Grote can be observed 
in his conception of deity. Grote accepts Ferrier's position that 11in the 
judgment of reason there never can have been a time when the universe was 
wi t hout God."9 The reality of the universe is, therefore, characterized 
by divine personality. Hence, metaphysics is not excluded by Grote even 
though he seems to be more interested in epistemology than in metaphysics . 
8 . Grote, EP, II, 332. 
9. Grote, EP, I, 79. 
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And his interest in epistemology is also, necessarily, an interest in meta-
physics. He is both concerned, that is, with the nature of reality and the 
character of knov1ledge. All true knowledge pertains to the 1 self-self . ' 
Grote is thinking specifically of the human self, here. But there seems no 
reason t o believe that true knowledge does not pertain also to divine Self-
hood. 
That true knowledge pertains to divine Selfhood appears in such a state-
ment as 11 the mind which originated the universe 11 and 11a personal existence 
more real than that even of the universe. 11 It appears therefore that Grote 
resembles Berkeley, in view of the following r emark regarding Berkeley: 
Of all the British thinkers Berkeley was perhaps the greatest, the 
most misunderstood and neglected and with the strongest metaphysical 
interests . Too often he has been taken as a pure subjectivist where-
as he founded his objectivity in true personalistic fashion in t he 
act of the immanent Supreme Creative Person.lO 
3. Monistic, pluralistic, and theistic personalism 
i. Grote's uni~le personalism 
The 1self-self 1 of Grote 1 s epistemology has part of the characteri stics 
of the self of personalism. 11 By self personalism means a unitary, self-
identifying, conscious agent. nll However, Grote's •self-self' has the ad-
ditional characteristic of being non-reflective. For as soon as the self 
becomes reflective it is no longer the unreflective •self-self ' but the 
•thought-self.• This 1self-self 1 of Grote is a theoretical and impracti-
cable abstraction, which as an abstraction is therefore virtually and ad-
mittedly incomplete. He emphasizes it as the extreme limit of the •thought • 
10. Fl.e\'lelling, "Personalism, 11 in Runes, TCP, 333. 
11. Brightman, 11Personalism and the Influence of Bowne, 11 in PCP, 161. 
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or philosophizing side of reality in contrast with the •thing' or phenom-
enal side. The •thought-self ' is an aspect of the self it is true, but it 
is that phenomenal aspect with which there is a corresponding 'philosophi-
cal' aspect, the ' self-self.' Grote refers to his epistemology as 11 t he 
idealism, personalism, or whatever it may be called, which lies at the root 
of all that I have said. 1112 
Personalism has been defined as 11 the theo!"'J that to be is to be a self 
or a member of a self. Personalism may be singularistic or pluralistic, 
theistic or non-theistic. 1113 It has already been pointed out that Grote is 
a monistic, epistemological personalist. It may be stated also that he pre-
sents a theistic and pluralistic type of personalism. The theistic nature 
of personalism is not as frequently presented as metaphysical pluralism. 
It is, nevertheless, convincingly present as has been pointed out already 
in this chapter in referring to deity. Additional evidence in favor of the 
view that Grote is theistic is manifest , indirectly, in a later part of the 
present chapter in dealing with the topic of a 'Critique of materialism.' 
ii. Monism and pluralism 
a. Introductory 
Now, the first issue that must be dealt with at once is the senses in 
which Grote is an epistemological monist and a metaphysically pluralistic 
personalist. There appears to be two strains in his philosophy, namely, 
monism and pluralism. In what senses can these strains be present in any 
one, generally coherent, philosophy? Let us look at monism first. 
12. Grote, EP, I, 146. 
13. Brightman, 11Personalism and the Influence of Bowne, 11 in PCP, 161. 
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b. Monism 
'Monism,' a term that Grote does not seem specifically to use anywhere, 
has been defined as 11 in general, the theo~J that one principle or being will 
explain the plurality in the world. In epistemological monism that principle 
is the identity of idea and object . 1114 The sense in which Grote is an epis-
temological monist is due to his identifying idea and object. •Both' are 
one; 1they 1 are idea. Grote refers to himself as an idealist . It is only 
through mind which has the ideas that 1things 1 have any meaning at all. There 
are no ' objects ' out there, for Grote. The meaning of all reality is to be 
found in the self, the 'self- self, ' intuition, 'philosophy,' mind, etc . 
Meaning is not found, essentially, in ' objects,' the ' thought-self,' exper-
ience, phenomenal reality, matter, etc . The essential nature of things is 
revealed through idea, the self, the person. Hence Grote may be called an 
idealist, or a personalist. 
c. Pluralism 
Though Grote does not expressedly use the term 'pluralism' in his view 
of reality as pluralistic, let us now briefly analyze to see in what sense 
Grote is a pluralist despite the fact that in a certain sense (described 
immediately above) he is a monist. It should always be remembered that 
Grote is concerned with looking at both sides of the one 'carpet.•l5 One 
side reveals the 'philosophical' approach to reality, this is the view of 
reality revealed in idea, mind, self--monism. This monism is an abstraction 
from phenomenal reality. The other side of the carpet reveals a plurality, 
14. Brightman, ITP, 388 . 
15. Grote, EP, II, 192. 
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a plurality t hat is never found wholly dissociated from mind, or the 
self. In the reality of phenomena there is plurality, variety, a mani-
foldness. In reality, also, Grote admits that there is a plurality of 
selves and that reality is essentially viewed individualistically. These 
phenomena (which are real) affect us and affect each other, even when no 
human consciousness is present which might assimilate all the phenomena 
into a monism. One cam1ot deny the existence of these phenomena though 
we may not be conscious of them. Yet they are . not things-in-themselves 
when we are not aware of them. That there is variety amongst phenomena 
cannot be denied. 'They 1 are phenomena not phenomenon. 'They' are plu-
ralistic, because all reality is 1 seen 1 in parts, and individualistically. 
Hence the pluralism that we seek to draw out of the epistemology of Grote. 
This combination of monism and pluralism lies at the foundation of 
all Grote's writing on epistemology and metaphysics. Grote is an epis-
temological monist and a metaphysical pluralist. His epistemological 
monism has been pointed out frequently throughout the body of this present 
vmrk, in referring to his view that reality is one though approached from 
two different directions. That reality is one is a view evident in the 
"fundamental principle of psychology, that there is no awareness apart 
from a subject and an object .ul6 His metaphysical pluralism arises from 
his basic individualistic approach toward reality. There is no meta-
physical pluralism i ndependent of man. Pluralism has meaning only in 
relation to the knowing faculty. Nothing exists, to which meaning can be 
16. Bertocci, EAG, 198. 
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attached, that is independent of us. Reality is as pluralistic as the 
many selves that view it. It is also pluralistic for any particular 
self that vi~ it through analysis. Moreover, there is the reality of 
many selves or consciousness; the term 'selves' is plural, also implying 
metaphysical plurality. 
iii. Theism 
a. Grote, a Berkeleian? 
Let us now look at the theistic nature of Grote's epistemology. In 
many ways Grote resembles Berkeley. Like Berkeley he is a 
pluralistic idealist, reflecting upon the spatial attributes of dis-
tance, size, and situation, possessed, according to Locke, by external 
objects in themselves apart from our perception of them, concluded that 
the discrepancy between the visual and the tactual aspects of these 
attributes robbed them of all objective validity and reduced them to 
the status of secondary qualities existing only in and for conscious-
nes s • • • The physical aspects of the world are reducible to mental 
phenomena. Matter is non-existent.l7 
There is a mild intimation of Berkeley's theism in t his pass age . The 
physical aspects are reducible to mind. Berkeley is thinking of the mind 
of the deity that sustains all human minds. Grote at least may be r e-
garded as r esembling Berkeley in pluralistic idealism but for Grote's 
theism we cannot go f or direct aid to the fact that both are metaphysical 
pluralists and idealists. For both could be pluralistic idealists and 
yet not be theistic. However, it is the case that Grote believes that 
God creates or makes possible human knowledge. And Berkeley maintains 
17. }uller, on George Berkeley, in Runes, DOP, 38. 
that all human knowing is dependent on divine knowledge. 
b. Resemblances to Berkeley 
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Let us now examine this likeness. Both are subjectivistic, ideal-
istic, personalistic. They emphasize the supreme importance that mind 
has in all knO\dedge. T'na.t is, except in relation to the self there is 
no knovrl edge at all. Berkeley admits, of course , C-od 1 s knowledge (wher e 
no senses are necessary) which is not dependent upon finite selves. Grot e 
holds tha t God as the Creator of human beings is the origin of all human 
knowledge. He admits t he existence of phenomenal reality even when we 
are unaware of it. So also does Berkeley; the phenomenal reality is in 
the mind of God. For Grote there is no ·phenomenal reality f or us ( 1us' 
impl ying the presence of mind) unles s there is some consciousness present. 
Grote is thinking particularly of human consciousness. All reality of 
which we can speak, talk, or think, is in relation to the self. 
Grote will admit the existence of 'objects' as always related to us. 
Thes e 'objects• are phenomena and never appear without an admixture of 
consciousness. For Berkeley there are no objects without the presence of 
mind. Berkeley vmuld not admit the existence of 'phenomenal reality • in 
Grote's s ense. Grote seems to be attempting an explanation of a reality, 
by holding that such reality exists, in its inter-connections and inter-
ef f ects, and its influences upon us, even though we are not always a>vare 
of it. In Grote, deity is not emphasized so constantly as it is in 
Berkeley. Yet deity is necessary to Grote's epistemological scheme for 
he admits that there is 11in the Universe a Planner or Maker," and that 
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we are in "relation to God, or the mind which originated the universe. 111S 
For Berkeley, 
f inite spirits are created by God, and their several experiences 
represent his communication to them, so far as they are able to 
receive it, of his divine experience.l9 
Human experiences are the result of a communicat ion of divine experience, 
for Berkeley. 
There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by 
him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit 
who is the Author of Nature. For it is evident that in affecting 
other persons the will of man hath no other object than barely the 
motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be 
attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends 
wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is viho, "upholding 
all things by the word of His power, 11 maintains that intercourse 
between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of 
each other.20 
c. Grote is essentially theistic 
Grote's essentially theistic view is evident in the f ollowing: 
There seems to me to be a nature above all this: a nature of which 
man, in virtue of his consciousness and knowledge, is partaker, 
just as, in virtue of his body and its sensation, he is a portion 
of the phenomenal nature. And it is this nature which the one part 
of his thought points to vrith as much legitimacy as the other to 
phenomenal nature.21 
Though Grote does not urge the theistic nature of his metaphysics so con-
stantly, he, nevertheless , supports both his metaphysics and epistemology 
by a fundamental awareness of the importance of belief in God. He seems 
to feel the necessity for a theistic hypothesis in stating that 11man, in 
virtue of his consciousness and knovdedge, is partaker" of 11a nature 
l S. Grote , EP, II, 332. 
19. Fuller, on George Berkeley, in Runes, DOP, 3S. 
20. Berkeley, TPH, in Burtt, EPB, 575. 
21 . Grote, EP, II, 293 . 
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above," that of "a Planner or Maker with his ideas and his purposes. 1122 
Again, Grote's theism appears in his remark regarding 11 God, or the 
mind which originated the universe. rt23 He refers to God as Creator: 
~fuat security have we that our humanly natural thought is not a sort 
of gen~rically private or individual imagination (as in fact some 
relativists go far to think it), except our feeling that we with our 
thinking are a part of a constituted, harmonious, self-consistent, 
God-created universe?24 
There seems to be the implicit view in this statement that the awareness 
of all human beings is somehow related. Grote could not possibly mean 
that any human mind is immediately aware of what takes place in another 
human mind. But he does seem to hold ~hat we are at least partly aware 
of what takes place in the divine mind. In short, our minds are unified 
by and part of the self-consistent and harmonious nature of the mind of 
God. God through his nature as Creator has made this relationship 
possible. 
4. Critique of materialism 
i. The natural sciences 
a. Psychical anatomists 
Let us turn now from an examination of Grote's personalism to consider 
his attitude toward the natural sciences, or materialism, made possible be-
cause of his personalistic approach. The following is, therefore, a partial 
:2:2. Grote, EP, II, 293. 
23 . Grote, ££• cit., p. 332. 
24. Grote, ££• cit., p . 36. 
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critique of materialism a ed upon Grote ' s personalism. 
Grote criticizes t e natural sciences in general and psychical anat-
amy in particula~ for their failure t o find an adequate explanation of 
mental experience . After asserting his disagreement with such science, 
Grote supports his argument by citing certain moral and intellectual dif-
ficulties of materialism. Probably the reason why Grote chooses psychical 
anatomy rather t han another science is because this particular science was, 
in his day, coming to a position which up to that t ime it never had at-
tained . Certainly psychical anatomy (called by various terms, psycho-
physiology, physiopsychology, or psychologic 1 anatomy ) or anatomy applied 
t o psychology reached a place of importance not true of it two millenniums 
before. There were two reasons why psychical anatomy claimed to super-
sede philosophy: (l) philosophy no longer seemed to advance, and (2) 'hi-
losophy dealt \<ofith unrealities while psychical anatomy dealt with facts .. 
Psychical anatomy virtually seemed to explain away the view that all true 
bein is personal . Grote does not eA~ress himself in t his way exactly, but 
this comment seems justified beca e of Grote is professed personalism. I t 
is also interesting to note the approac of Fechner's psycho- physi cs to 
epistemological problems: 
According to Fechner, the connection of inner and outer experience in 
our consciousness makes it possible to investigate the laws of this 
correspondence. The science of this is ~cho-physics . It is the 
first problem of this science to find out methods for measuring 
psychical quantities, in order to obtain laws that may be formulated 
mathematically. Fecbner brings foMvard princip lly the method of just 
per~eptible differences, which defines as the unit of mass the smallest 
di fference that is still perceptible between intensities of sensation, 
and assumes this to be equal everywhere and in all cases . 25 
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To assert that psychical anatomy has not been superseded and to give 
no reason for this assertion, beyond aspirations which cannot be explained 
bypsychical anatomy, is to present a fear of philosophy. For psychical 
anatomy to claim that it possesses the last word for any philosophy is 
merely idle pretension~ 
~ aim in trying. to clear the ground from the wrong nco-psychology 
or mis~psychology, is in order that we may have instead of it a good 
physic- psychology, such as now seems possible. To me however it does 
not seem that we ever shall have such a thing, unless we can clear 
our minds from the thought that it will do anything, one way or the 
other, towards settling the higher questions and difficulties of 
morality and religion ••• But all physic-psychology seems to me 
to be vitiated by the want of clearness of view as to its relation 
to the higher philosophy and to morals.26 
Philosophy, according t o Grote, in contrast to materialism, must show that 
psychical anatomy does not accoturrt for the factor which gives to philosophy 
a right to predominance . If psychical anatomy claims to deal with fact, 
philosophy must deal with something higher than fact. It seems justifiable 
to regard this something that is higher than fact as personality. It is 
only through personality that any reality can exist for us. And in the 
controversy between psychical anatomy and philosophy, desire to follow 
either one of the contestants rather than the other must not be entertained 
without good reason. In other words, one does not acquiesce correctly un-
less adequate support can be given for one's position. 
b. Professed materialists 
Supposing the professed materialist explains everything even to what 
thought or action are, he will still be confronted with the problem as to 
26. Grote, EP, II, 331. 
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what we are. "Formerly it was supposed that the facts might be reduced 
to matter and energy, and the categories consequently to one type . This 
\'Tas the method of the older materialism. n27 Hence Grote refers to 'pro-
fessed materialists,' who deal with phenomena only and yet adhere to their 
materialism as an avowed philosophical doctrine. Viscount Haldane i s typi-
cal of modern critics of materialism who note, as Grote did, great defic-
iencies in materialism: "Morality cannot be reduced to mathematics , and 
no more can life be resolved into mechanism, or reason into mere instinct.n28 
Materialists, Grote continues, regard matter as a thing-in-itself and be-
lieve that this gives a complete philosophy. 
I have used the expression ' professed materialists• here to signify 
those who, from the point of view of psychical anatorow, consider 
themselves able to make out that the notions which men have at var-
ious times maintained as to another world and a future life cannot 
possibly have any foundation.29 
Further concerning 'professed materialism' Grote makes the following 
remark: 
All the corporeal explanation is really only a discussion of a por-
tion of the fact: what I have called above ' professed materialism' 
is a taking of this portion of the fact for .the whole . And the notion 
of the professed materialists, that they are right in doing this, seems 
to me a good deal confirmed by the deal ing of their adversaries tov1ards 
them. 30 
c. New Realists 
Nor do the recent New Realists, with their reduction of reality to 
'neutral entities,' offer any more satisfactory explanation of kncrv1ledge, 
27. Cunningham, IBA, 244. 
28. Haldane, ROR, 133 . 
29. Grote, EP, II, 235 . 
30. Grote, ££• cit., p. 237. 
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than Grote noted about the 'professed materialists• of his day. For, 
these materialists resemble those about whom it was said by a present-
day writer, that 
they undertake to put the universals and relations of thought into 
the non-mental world, which for them confronts the mind as something 
from which the latter is receptive. But herewith the mind becomes 
like a substance on which impressions are causally effected from with-
out. Among the causes are the very universals whose significance seems 
to be possible only as belonging to the nature of mind itself. And 
there is no justification for this, certainly not in scientific methods 
of treatment.31 
d. Imagination and memory 
It is true that Hobbes looked upon imagination as decaying sense. 
"Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense. 1132 And Hartley be-
lieved that mind and matter could be explained by the vibration of deli-
cate nerve fibres over all parts of the body. 
As a man of science, he sought a physiological basis for this mental 
transformation, and concluded that simple ideas are the result of 
vibrations in the brain, and that complex ideas arise from the co-
alescence of such vibrations.33 
However, imagination and memory are still left unexplained. For example, 
it is not the physical eye merely that sees; the twe 1 has an important 
place in sight. Imagination and memory are but two of the various attri-
butes included within the 1we. 1 One may comment on Grote's position here 
by saying that •we• is that upon which imagination, memory, etc. in per-
sonality, is founded. 
Grote mentions a possible argument which antagonists of the psychical 
31. Cunningham, IBA, 244. 
32. Hobbes, LEV, in Burtt, EPB, 133. 
33. Wright, HMP, 225. 
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anatomical explanation of mind could give. The argument is to the effect 
that if the professed materialists explain everything as ~ by body then 
the idea of soul is superfluous. Grote advocates the soul as the director 
of bodily activity. It is that which comprehends and without which there 
could be no reality. Grote sees no reason why the soul should not be re-
garded as directing the activity of the body. But he prefers not to use 
the term 'soul' here because of its historical and substantialistic signifi-
cance; he prefers to use the term •mind.' 
The contention of Grote is that consciousness and personality cannot 
be exp~ained away by any materialistic system. He would seem to hold that 
the view of thought as sufficiently explained by stating that it is a modi-
fication of the body is erroneous . For what is not known, he would seem to 
agree, is the very point in dispute, namely, where the body leaves off and 
consciousness enters. Psychical anatornw, he could continue to maintain, 
furnishes no adequate explanation for consciousness. 
It might be contended further, beyond the point where Grote leaves the 
subject, that psychical anatomy emphasizing materialism can not offer an 
explanation without violating the virtually exclusive materialistic basis 
it accepts. If psychical anatornw were to insist on a parallelism it would 
run into the difficulty which has been illustrated by 11 two railway trains 
running side by side on a double track. 1134 The trains are operating on 
different tracks, are moving together but have no causal relationship with 
each other. 
34. McDougall, BAM, 1. 
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But the psychical anatomists with whom Grote deals are virtual 
epiphenomenalists who hold that consciousness or mind is simply a second-
ary phenomenon \'lhich accompanies bodily processes. For these mater i al -
ists, matter is the primary or r eal substance. For the materialists the 
laws of the natural sciences are universal . Psychical anatomy, in sh rt~ 
furnishes no adequate explanation for consciousness or mind. 
Again, there is a moral difficulty in the professed materialists• 
philosophy . Grote regards knowledge, as well as other facts of phenomena, 
as greatly dependent upon imagination . If the developed thought of a human 
being is not regarded as having something to do beyond the 'facts • and 
processes of life, then the position of the human being may be given the 
status of the brutes . The point is that Grote believes th t t here is 
something beyond the material world (as interpreted, for example, by the 
psychical anatomists) \fl th vlhich man is concerned , and ima ination pro-
vides for this . If knowledge, which is not alone concerned with material-
ism, is to be re arded as a phenomenal fact it must be given a place ~ 
professed materialists. It has its foundation like other phenomenal f cts 
on imagination . And imagination cannot be divorced from personality . It 
aids in giving be~ si nificance. Imagination an reside only in a 
person . I t cannot be ex lained avray by any materialism. Imagination i s 
concerned with the realm of morals as well as with the universe of phe-
nomenalism and therefore morality deser ves consideration by materialists . 
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ii. 'Proverse' and 1retroverse 1 
a. Significance of these terms 
There are two words widely used by Grote that help us to see the re-
lation between mind and its •objects.' These are 'proverse 1 and •retro-
verse.' •Retroverse' has a close relationship '>lith consciousness and 
per~onality. 'Proverse 1 is closely connected with phenomenal reality. Let 
us look at these two terms and see their significance since they are close-
ly related to Grote•s personal idealism. 
By the use of the words 1proverse 1 and 1retroverse 1 Grote attempts to 
further elucidate the relationship (or lack or relationship) between mind 
and •matter.• By 1proverse 1 he means the phenomenal fact as in the case 
of the eye having brain and nerves closely connected with and essential to 
its function. By ' retroverse ' is meant the consciousness which accompanies 
the phenomenal fact mentioned. Both are, really, facts, yet very dissimi-
lar ones . 
These are two contemporaneous facts, entirely, as facts, dissimilar, 
or if we prefer so to speak, one fact composed of two entirely dis-
similar portions. I shall call the one of them the proverse, the 
other the retroverse, of the fact: and the latter of these terms is 
that , .. hich will come into use the most frequently, because by the 
'proverse' I shall mean in general the fact, whatever it is, which 
is being spoken about, and by the retroverse the corresponding fact 
on the side of mind, or feeling, or consciousness, or whatever we 
may call it.35 
It was said in the preceding paragraph that Grote attempts to clarify 
the relationship between mind and matter. Now, one may reflect on just what 
affinity there is bet\veen Grote and Berkeley regarding matter. For Grote, 
35. Grote, EP, II, 251. 
303 
we never see matter gua matter, for we can, at best, say only that we can 
look at matter from the material side. But there really is no 1matter 1 as 
such f or Grote. Yet there is r eality . We may deal with this reality 
through our consciousness or from the ' philosophical' approach, so long 
as we admit that there is a sort of phenomenal language in regard to it 
that may be used also. Hylas36 is using what Grote could well refer to 
as phenomenal language. Hylas 1s difficulty was that in using this language 
he did not recognize it as phenomenal but thought he was describing real 
•things.' 
Grote would not accept Hylas 1s metaphysical vi~~. For , Grote would 
maintain, such a view is an abstraction from reality and reveals reality 
from one side only--it does not reveal reality itself as Hylas professed 
it did. Grote, then, resembles Berkeley in this rejection of ~ylas's) 
matter. But whereas Berkeley affirms that there is only the 'philosophical' 
(to use Grote's term) way in which we view reality, Grote maintained that 
we, frequently, at least tend to and do speak of reality from the phenomenal 
point of view. Grote asserted that phenomena may affect us through inter-
action even when we are unaware of them. Berkeley maintains that the real-
~ of reality , despite the fact that we may not ha;ppen to be 'seeing' it, 
is supported by the deity and is real for divine consciousness . 
Let us now return to a further consideration of the proverse and the 
retroverse, having dealt in the last two paragraphs with a necessary sup-
porting comment on Berkeley's and Grote's views of matter '1\rith which the 
36. Cf. Berkeley, TDH. 
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proverse especially (as well as the retroverse) is concerned. In 'sensa-
tion' the proverse means the communication between the nerves of the body 
and the phenomenal universe , the retroverse is the consciousness or feel-
ing of this communic tion. The proverse is known only as communication 
as fact; it is distinguished from retroverse as consciousness (or imagina-
tion, or conception, or thought). Yet it is only by virtue of the retro-
verse that the proverse is understood. Further, as an epistemological 
monist the retroverse and the proverse are one. 
The r.etroverse has an object which may be the universe or something 
within it. This universe contains fact and the proverse of sensation which 
forms an essenti al part of it. Grote here is attempting to show that the 
retroverse may include the proverse in the sense of giving meaning to it. 
But we cannot have this relationship vice versa. That is, the proverse is 
not as comprehensive as the retroverse, since it is only through the retro-
verse that there is meaning. Consciousness is more inclusive and fundamen-
tal than communication between, for example, the human body and material 
objects . Since this is so, consciousness itself, or the retroverse , must 
be admitted as closely related to the facts of phenomena. But conscious-
ness, or the retroverse as a fact closely associated with phenomena, was 
completely overlooked by the materialists. 
The proverse of sensation is the communication of the phenomenal uni-
verse with the brain and nerves, as physical organs; the retroverse has a 
sort of double aspect because it is at once both sentience (feeling of 
pleasure or pain, or body) and perception (or conception). Sometimes in 
the retroverse there i s very little perception, for example, in a case of 
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the body pricked by a pin; sometimes perception and sentience are mixed, 
for example, as in the smell of a rose; and sometimes sentience is almost 
absent, as in the motion of parts of the body. This is the case (namely 
when the retroverse is not prominent), when the proverse is the fact of 
communication between the phenomenal universe and our physical organs. 
b. Bain's psychology 
For the sake of further illustrating the proverse and the retroverse 
Grote turns attention to a glimpse into Bain's exploration of nervous or-
ganization. For Bain sensation and volition are two sets of brain nerves. 
The sensory nerves may be referred to as •receptive' and the motor 'editive.' 
It seems to me quite possible that physiological research might make 
out our nervous organization to be of the following nature; brain, 
with two sets of nerves, viz., of sensation and of voluntary motion 
starting from it: the brain a source of force, but of force communi-
cable with, and therefore to a certain extent of the same nature as, 
the existing physical forces of the universe: this force supported by 
corporeal nutrition: and again a special adaptation of the nerves of 
sensation to particular physical agents. We should then have the 
brain with the two sets of nerves starting from it, both sets in a 
manner alive and in action: we might call for the moment the sensor 
nerves •receptive,' the motor 1editive.• Both sets of nerves are then 
at work in their way: the editive transmitting the force from the 
brain, and with it contracting the muscles, which is our immediate or 
proper motion: The receptive seeking out, as it were, for something to 
receive .37 
The receptive nerves may be regarded as seeking for something to receive 
while to the editive belongs motion. To both working in conjunction Grote 
gives the awkward name 'nervicity . • 
All this may be conceived to be one force in the nerves analogous in 
some measure to electricity, galvanism, &c., but still peculiar: I 
will call it 1nervicity 1 : it is generated by the brain, supported by 
37 . Grote, EP, II, 254. 
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corporeal nutrition, has the occasions of its energ1z~g supplied to 
it by the receptive nerves, and passes out through the editive nerves 
into contraction of the muscles, where it becomes (or produces) 
mechanical movement.38 
The whole physical process of the above is what Grote means by the 
proverse. To the proverse corresponds the retroverse. All the terms used 
in referring to 'mind' are covered by the term 1retroverse.' To mention 
an example of the complication involved in the retroverse the following 
will suffice. 'Perception' refers to the retroverse of the simple action 
of the receptive nerves; •imagination' deals with the retroverse which lasts 
even after the communication between one's body and natural objects is fin-
ished; and 'conception' of the retroverse refers to the complicated internal 
action of the nerves when the communication takes place. The reason why 
Grote deals with the terms 'proverse' and •retroverse 1 at all is to illus-
trate as well as possible what is meant by ambiguous language such as this: 
"Impression of light on the eye and optic nerve produces sight or percep-
tion . tt39 
5. Critical comment 
i. Intuition 
Intuition is true or real knowledge if it has the characteristic of 
immediateness, Grote states. 
Intui M.on is true, or real knov1ledge, in its character of immediate-
ness, so far as immediateness can give knowledge, but not necessarily 
true, or real knowledge, in its character of distinction.40 
Just what kind of knowledge is this, one may ask, that has no •character of 
38. Grote, EP, II, 254. 
39. Grote, £E• cit., p. 255. 
40. Grote, £E• cit., p. 154. 
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distinction'? Grote seems to be narrowing the meaning of intuition to 
such a degree that it becomes the 'self-self' where there are no distinc-
tions allowable, not even the distinctions involved in the •thought-self,' 
or in reflection. It doesn't seem to make much sense to call this almost 
infinitesimally narrow meaning of intuition •true, or real knowledge.' 
Or, to put it otherwise, this distinction between the •self-self' and the 
'thought-self' is unreal. Grote may be defended in presenting it, however, 
on the ground that he is trying to reveal in.an extreme (though very ex-
aggerated) form the two basic approaches in epistemology, sometimes referred 
to as idealism and realism. 
ii. The 'self-self' 
The 'self- self' also has a very narrow meaning. 11 I mean by it thought 
or feeling primary or by itself, as distinguished from refle~ thought 
or feeling.n41 Grote has said that this •self-self' is true knowledge, but 
that 11as soon as we in any degree distinctly conceive of ourselves think-
ing, it is evident that thought is no longer simple or immediate. 1142 He 
also acknovtledges that the essential purity of the 'self-self' (where there 
is no admixture of the •thought-self' in it) is non-existent. It always 
appears with some amount of reflection in it. 
By speaking then, of 'intuition• and the 'self-self' Grote deals with 
what does not actually exist. He seems to l1ish to point out that .if true 
or real knowledge were possible, then it would have to be wholly •intuitive• 
41 . Grote, EP, II, 145. 
42. Grote, 2£• cit., p. 146. 
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or of the nature of the 1self-self.' Now, it seems important to point out 
the extr eme to which we must necessarily ~ if we are to have true know-
l edge. But true knowledge does not seem possible, in Grote 1s view. More-
over, when we ask what true knowledge is, then we are left wi th something 
wrapped up in an enigma, such as the •self-self,• or 'intuition.• 
Let us here consider a possible question that may come to the mind of 
the reader regarding the 1self-self 1 and the •thought-self.' The problem 
could be presented as tow~ the 'self-self' and the •thought-self' are not 
equally immediate as experience in the sense of experiencing. Now, if by 
the •self-self' were meant what is frequently referred to as 1self 1 then 
it would seem that it could be regarded as that which experiences and 
therefore as possessing immediateness. And if by the •thought-self' were 
meant the self ~ thinking then it would also be just as immediate as the 
self experiencing. 
However, Grote means to set up a term that will be devoid of all re-
flection whatsoever--which is not the case with the 1self•--as a sort of 
extreme (and one must say, therefore fictional) limit from which all 'ob-
jective' elements are abstracted. The term he selects is the peculiar one, 
the •self-self.' Now, the •thought-self' as Grote uses this term, is not 
devoid of reflectional, and therefcre of •objective• elements because the 
•thought-self' is the other extreme of the self where the self is not a 
sort of self in itself (as Grote seems to make out the 1self-self' to be) 
but a self for thought. It is for this reason that the 1self-self' and the 
•thought-self' are not equally immediate as experience--in the sense of 
309 
experiencing. 
We have then noted why the 1self- self• and the •thought- self' are 
not equally immediate as experience. There is a kindred question, namely, 
why these terms are not also equally dualistic as objective reference. 
By the nature of the •self-se1~1 possessing in its extremely abstracted 
form no •objective' elements at all, dualism is necessarily ruled out 
simply on the grounds that Grote has accepted the •self-self• as a ter.m 
not possessing this character of dualism. Again, the •thought-self' is 
objectivistic and--if we assume a necessary postulate of the self to which 
the •thought-self' is an object--is also dualistic. 
iii. Attitude toward materialism 
In his comments upon the self-self, thought-self, intuition, immediate-
ness, reflection, etc., Grote reveals quite pointedly that he is an episte-
mological personalist. His strong adherence to the view that only in re-
lation to the self can any reality exist in the whole universe--however he 
may express himself regarding _this view--furnishes convincing evidence that 
Grote is what he claims to be , namely, a personalist, or idealist. This 
personalism is essentially epistemological since practically all of his 
writings--and this i s especially true of the whole of the Exploratio Philoso-
phica-are epistemological. The essential purport of this work, though fre-
quently embracing a cumbersome and tutnecessarily involved style, is to re-
veal the relationship between the mind and objects, consciousness and matter, 
or 'philosophy' and phenomenal reality. 
Materialism, Grote maintains, does not offer an adequate explanation 
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of mental e;cperience. This is a criticism characteristic of non-material-
istic theories . It is, of course, supported by Bowne: 
Materialism, so far as it claims to be scientific, must build on the 
notion of fixed elements with fixed forces and fixed laws; and hence, 
if matter should attain to thought, the laws of thought must be viewed 
as a part of the nature of things, as much so as the laws of physics 
and chemistry. The mental manifestation, when it comes, is as much 
rooted in the nature of matter as any physical manifestation.43 
Grote holds that the province of materialism is to deal with 1facts •; the 
field of 'philosophy' is to deal with something higher than facts which can 
be accounted for only through self, mind, consciousness, awareness, or per-
sonality. The fundamental error in materialism is the neglect of the per-
sonal factor. 
The question may well arise in dealing with Grote 1 s attitude toward 
materialism, namely, What is the metaphysical status of Grote's 'phenomena• 
in relation with 'matter.• The term 1matter 1 falls under the same criticism 
as does 'ob ject. • Matter is regarded, either in ordinary speech, or in the 
materialistic approach, as something already out there independent of the 
mind that thinks about it. This out-thereness of matter is what Grote 
strongly objects to on the ground that matter can be intelligible only be-
cause of mind that views it. 
In this intelligible or meaningful connection we have 'philosophy' as 
Grote uses the term in a specialized sensej where the approach to reality 
i s that of consciousness. Grote criticizes the view of all those, including 
the materialists , who hold t hat there can be matter without 'philosophy. • 
43. Bmme, TTK, 348. 
I 
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~~at Grote does gr ant is that there can be phenomena as well as philosophy , 
but neither can be found at any time vrholly abstracted from the other. 
~fuat is maintained by some, not including Grote, is that matter can be re-
garded wholly abstracted from mind. 
Grote would substitute, therefore, phenomenon for matter as always iro-
pl~~ng a necessary connection either with consciousness , or, if conscious-
ness is not present, with our organism in some meaningful coru1ection where 
vre are affected, or acted onJ by phenomenon and in turn affect or react on 
it. 
iv. Analysis of sensation into t wo elements 
This neglect of personality in epistemology becomes evident in the use 
Grote makes of the terms 1proverse' and 1retroverse' of sensation, where he 
points out that the retroverse element, which essentially is mental, gives 
meaning to sensation. The proverse element provides commtmication between 
the 1thing, 1 or phenomenal reality and the organs of sense. This proverse 
role is, indeed, frequently called sensation, but sensation ~nothing 
unless the retroverse of sensation is pre ent. This is certainly a qual i-
fied explanation of sensation, but it seems a very intelligible and sound 
one , and one that allies Grote vdth epistemological monism. A less quali-
fied explanation of sensation leaves the significance of the word vague, or 
restricts it to a purely physical plane characteristic of materialism. 
It seems that Grote is \.Jholly justified in relating sensation with 
mind so that s ensation may have meaning . It is a sort of internal end of 
t he sensation process, in contrast to the external end which is closely re-
lated to phenomenal reality . This internal, or retroverse, end of sensation 
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is, of course, personalistic. Also, the external, or proverse end, having 
no meaning whatsoever aside from its relation to a human organism in some 
-..'lay, is also personalistic. 
This reference to the proverse and retroverse factors of sensation 
simply provides another way for Grote to present his main thesis regard-
ing 'philosophy' and phenomena. As there are no phenomena (that is, phe-
nomenal r eality) that haven't some element of awarenes s in them, so the 
proverse element of sensation is never found wholly separated from the 
retroverse. 
6. SWmnary and transition to next chapter 
In short, Grote is pointing out by reason of his personalistic ten-
dencies that all true being is personal, metaphysical as well as epis-
temological. The "theory that only persons are real, 11 44 holds true of 
Grot e 's idealism. Even phenomenal reality is real only because of persons . 
For Grote there is no reality that is reality altogether by itself. 
Strictly, reality is real, due to persons who perceive it. The •retro-
verse' part of sensation is what gives any meaning to sensation. The 
'proverse' portion communicates between our sense organs and 'objects .' 
For Grote there is no matter as such at all. The whole of his analysis 
of materialism is to show the necessarily restricted view in epistemology 
that is common to all materialism. He could say the same about all 
naturalistic or positivistic sciences that overlook the place that think-
ing has in all epistemology. If one follows Grote's argument it seems 
44. Brightman, ITP, 389. 
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impossible to regard anything as real that is not also personal. His 
system is personal realism, or personalism. This system admits of plural-
ism in the sense that there are many substances. But, as pointed out 
earlier in this chapter, none of these substances are real except when 
considered in relation to a personality. If, then, there is no substance 
except that which is such for thinking, the conclusion is that there is 
a sense in vlhich substance is one, and 11 that the real object and the idea 
of it (perception or conception) are one in the knowledge relation."45 
This personalism of Grote's is, then, both metaphysicall y pluralistic and 
epistemologically monistic. ~f:hat these specific senses are has been brief-
ly stated immediately above, but the whole of the Exploratio Philosophica 
forms the basis upon which Grote develops this monistic (and pluralistic) 
personalism. 
It was stated, in the paragraph immediately above, that Grote's sys-
tem is personal realism. The question may well be asked, How is Grote 
both a personal realist and a Berkeleian idealist, for he has already been 
designated as both? ~is personal realism is metaphysical realism v<hich 
is significant because it would be utterly meaningless except in relation 
to persons to whom it is reality. His Berkeleian idealism also is evi-
dent when considering epistemology. It is Berkeleian inasmuch as both 
agree that nothing can have any meaning apart from consciousness. However, 
Grote's epistemology differs from Berkeley's because Grote affirms that 
45. Ferm, 11Monism, 11 in Runes, DOP, 201. 
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communication (and effects) can take place without any consciousness 
being present at all. In that case there would be effects made on us 
but they would carry no meaning for us. Berkeley would say that there 
is meaning, if not for human beings then, for God. Grote does not 
emphasize persistently that meaning could be entertained by the deity 
and consequently inclines to say that phenomenal effects may be produced 
vlithout the presence of a mind • . But they cannot be effects, for Grote, 
that are meaningful unless we are aware of them. 
The specific consideration of personalism in Grote's philosophy 
seems appropriate. But Grote also presents an idealism that can be 
classed as personal except that the emphasis appears to be on the ideals 
of idealism. Persons are necessarily present, and ideals are also. This 
idealism, of course, cannot be decisively separated from personalism. 
But there are some factors in it that would seem to justify treatment 
under a separate chapter though the kinship between the present chapter 
and the following one is necessarily very close. Let us nmv consider 
11 Grote 's Idealism." 
CHAPTEn X 
GROTE' S IDEALISM 
1 . I ntroduction 
i. Ideal-ism 
In dealin vfith Grote ' s personalism it was shol~ that his idealism 
as personalism was idea-ism rather than ideal-ism. Here we s w evidence 
of Grote's epistemological personalism in that thought and 'thin,' or 
idea and 1object 1 have a common source in deity mediated through human 
personality . Here we saw, also, that Grote presented a metaphysical 
personalism inasmuch as the personal nature of reality is revealed in 
conjunction with epi stemological personalism where the co~non source of 
thought e.nd 1 t hing ' manifests itself t hrough persons* 
ii Personal ideal i sm evident in ethics 
and epistemology 
11Je will consider, in this chapter his ideali m as ideal-ism rather 
than as ide a-ism; the l atter involved a consideration of his epistemolo -
ical personalism, whereas the former \·fill deal "Tith his Platonic ideal-
istic tendencies in ethics. However, it i s evident that Grote, especially 
in his treatment of happiness in the sense that Aristotle does (to be 
c nsid.ered l ter in the present chapter ), regards an aspiration tovmrd 
happiness as (personal ) activity in accordance with the highest virtue. 
Inasmuch as happine s involves personal striving toward an end , Grote 
manifests, in hi s ethics , personal idealism. Both in his epistemology 
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and his ethics personal idealism is evident. 
iii. Distinctions in idealis.ms 
Some of what has already been stated, and what will be presented 
in this present chapter, re arding Grote ' s personalism and idealism, 
may be set forth in the following : 
Personalism 
} {
Idea-ism 
-~ personal idealism-~ 
Ideal-i sm Idealism 
pistemological monistic personalism 
Metaphysical pluralistic personalism 
Idea-ism 
Theistic personalism 
(Platonic idealism) 
{
Ethical personalism 
I deal - ism (Platonic idealism) 
(Aristotelian idealism !) 
2. Grote's Pl atonism 
i. Ideals 
Tnere is an import ant sense i n which his idealism is Platonic , which 
~~11 concern us now, where the ideals are forms, as in Plato 's Republic, 
which never can be attained fully but nevertheless can be aimed at . The 
Platonic nature of Grote' s thinking appears in connection 1dth 11 A Dis-
cussion bebreen Professor Henry Sidgv1ick and the Late Professor John 
Grote, on the Utilitarian Basis of Plato ' s Republic." 
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ii. Examination of a dialogue 
Let us now examine this article and see what light it throws on the 
view t hat Grote is a Platonic idealist. I n this discussion there is an 
imaginary conversation going on between George Grote and Socrates, with 
several others taking part also, in the discussion. John Grote is put-
ting his own views in the mouth of Socrates. Let us look at various 
portions of the dialogue to see the particular portion that reveals his 
idealism. Thrasymachus speaks: 
Justice is consulting the advantage of others to our own dis-
advantage and therefore there is no reason why we should practice 
it if we can avoid doing so • • .r-
Then Adeimantus says to Socrates: 
Without going so far as Thrasymachus, do you not think there is 
some truth in what he says? •• and •• that it is the resulting 
good reputation which, except when we act from fear of punish-
ment, is the reason, and the only reason , why we should practice 
justice?2 
George Grote continues the dialogue: 
I know our friend Socrates agrees with me • • • if you want your 
rights, you must perform your duties •• • you will be done by 
as you do: and this is the r eason why you should practice 
justice ••• 3 
The answer whic •socrates ' (that is, John Grote ~ i n the dialo 1 
i ves , favors a Platonic--in the sense of intuitive and idealistic--
basis for ethics, vrhereas George Grote 1 s position is somewhat in agree-
ment wi th Thrasymachus 1 • George Grote believes to a large extent in 
1. Grote, 11 A Discussion ••• Republic," in CR (Mar. 1889)·, 97. 
2. Loc.cit. 
3. Loc.cit. 
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paying attention to the practical consequences of our actions. He 
therefore partly favors Thrasymachus, in opposition to Socrates in his 
(Socrates•) view that justice has a r egard for others and a disregard 
of ourselves . Yet George Grote does not agree with the extreme posi-
tion taken by Thrasym.achus that 11there is !!£_ reason why \ve should prac-
tice it if we can avoid doing so." 
John Grote , however, is strongl y in opposition to Thrasymachus, on 
the point that there is a reason why we should practice justice even 
when we can avoid doing so. John Grote holds that there is a r eason 
for practicing just ice in such a situation. This reason has the same 
basis as it has in Plato, namely, intuition in the sense of being able 
to see the good . For Plato, all things tend toward the summum bonum, 
the ideal, the Good . John Grote, therefore, accepts an i ntuitive basis 
in ethics. 
But a consideration of intuition does not exhaust t he bases on 
which John Grote establishes his ethics. He i mplies in Adeimantus •s 
question to Socrates (above) that there is some small place for a con-
sequential or experiential approach in ethics also, as Adeimantus states: 
'~itholt going so far as Thrasymachus, do you not think t here is some 
truth in what he says ?" John Grote, being very Platonic, is not too 
willing t o admit a consequential basis. And this is the very point that 
John Grote seeks to establish, namely, t hat there is both a Platonic 
basis and a consequential basis for ethics, but that the Platonic basis 
is by far the more important . John Grote•s ethical idealism, therefore , 
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is to a small extent tempered by an experiential (i.e. a consequential) 
approach in ethics; he is t herefore a slightly mitigated Platonic idealist. 
Let us look further at t he dialogue, and specially at Thrasymachus• 
pointed question and Socrates• reply, in support of the above critical 
reflections on John Grote's idealism in ethics. Thrasymachus asks: 
MY question to Socrates was in effect: supposing a man has reason 
to know this trust will be abused, and that he l1ill meet, for his 
justice, with treatment from men exactly opposite to what Mr. 
Grote calls the 'natural consequence' of justice, is there still 
reason why he should practice it? 
There is, and the main reason of all. I do not say, and never 
said, but that a good reason for practising justice may be the 
reputation and praise that it brings--one kind of natural conse-
quence: nor again but that another good reason may be that in 
practising it we are taking our part in the general commerce of 
mutual service among men, and may fairly expect to receive service 
from those whom we have served--another natural consequence: nor 
again but that another good reason may be that which Thrasymachus 
thinks a reason against it, that it is for the advantage of others.4 
Socrates continues: 
All education, as well as all moral philosophy, takes account of 
something more than fact, takes account, in some way, of an ideal: 
the father f orms in his mind his ideal of the best life for his 
son, and tries to produce it: I form my ideal ·of the best life for 
man, and 'preach• that. Mr. Grote's use of the term 'preaching ' 
seems to me to ~ply a notion on his part that all attempts to 
raise or improve human nature is5 humbug, and with this notion I 
think he need not have troubled himself to criticize me: it is but 
going a step lower to think with Thrasymachus that all human so-
ciety is a humbug, in which everybody is preaching to others and 
trying to shirk practising himself.6 
If Mr. Grote says, We will have no ideals, we will keep to the 
practical: I think what he will come to is not his morality, but 
4 . Grote, 11A Discussion ••• Republic," in CR (Mar. 1889), 98. 
5. Obviously an error; Grote meant tare.' 
6 . Grote, ££• cit., p. 99. 
Thrasymachus 1s. I t is Ideals and moral ' preaching' which have 
brought human society so far as it has been brought.? 
iii. Grote's idealism evident 
Now, the remarks of Thrasymachus and Adeimantus provoke replies 
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from both George Grote and 'Socrates.' Socrates clearly reveals ideal-
ism when he asserts that all education as well as moral philosophy is 
concerned with ideals and not merely facts. The father has his ideal 
for his son; Socrates forms his ideal of the best life. Yet, Socrates 
continues, George Grote seems to mock ideals by using the term 'preach-
ing,' implying that the ideals 'preached' are impracticable, and "that 
all attempts to raise or improve human nature are8 humbug." 
iv. Anti-relativistic, generally 
Moreover, John Grote does not agree that 11the reason why you should 
practice" justice is that you desire that "you will be done by as you 
do 11 - -as George Grote suggests. I t is only one step further down to 
Thrasymachus ' position where "all human society is a humbug, in which 
everybody is preaching to others and trying to shirk practising himself." 
If anyone, John Grote is maintaining, insists on forsaking ideals, 
such as justice, while insisting on being practical, then ethics becomes 
very relative, individualistic, and selfish, according to the type dis-
played by Thrasymachus. And, as for the 'preaching' which George Grote 
is deprecating, the truth is, rather, that it is by "ideals arid moral 
'preaching' " that human society has advanced. 
7. Grote, 11 A Discussion ••• Republic," in CR (Mar. 1889), 99. 
8. Correct verb form. 
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In order further to clarify the wider-view of •Socrates' in dis-
tinction from George Grote's narrow conception that we have already pre-
sented9 where ideals are not placed in the forefront, the dialogue con-
tinues: George Grote 
charges me with making too little of the natural consequence~ of 
justice in the way of worldly success and men's approbation. I 
may have made too little of them; but still I .think I was right 
in saying that the fathers of families should bring up their chil-
dren rather to love justice for itself than to love it on account 
of these. I may be open to Mr. Grote's criticism as suggesting a 
wrong notion of human society by leading people to forget about 
these natural consequences of justice as if there were no such 
things, and to think only about their own state and feeling as 
their motive and reason for doing justly: the truth, putting all 
things, idea and fact, together , may lie rather between him and 
me; but I think it lies nearest to ~ side. 
Glaucon:--Yes, and I think it does also in regard of the question 
of the improvement of society. Mr. Grote, in making credit and 
the approbation of men so important a natural consequence of 
justice as he does, is brought in face of the question that this 
consequence will not follow on doing justly except in a tolerably 
good state of society. Here appears a fundamental difference be-
tween his way of thinking and yours. You have given us what you 
conceive a perfect society, could we have it, but in the meantime 
you make a man's doing justly depend on himself, and not on the 
approbation of .other men in our actual societies.lO 
v. Of utmost importance to teach ideals 
John Grote reveals his attitude regarding a particular ideal, like 
justice, by maintaining that it is of utmost importance to teach ideals. 
His brother, George Grote, is maintaining that it is more important to 
consider practical consequences and moral approval than to be primarily 
concerned with ideals. Glaucon i ntercedes as a sort of mediator between 
9 . Under "iii. Grote's idealism evident 11 (above). 
10. Grote , 11A Discussion ••• Republic, 11 in CR (Mar. 1889), 102. 
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the two extremes of the argument in which George and John Grote are in-
volved. He maintains that George Grote's emphasis upon 'natural conse-
quences of justice' assumes a tolerably good society in which these con-
sequences are brought about, whereas John Grote sets forth the perfect, 
or ideal society. Glaucon states that John Grote makes man's doing of 
justice depend upon himself and his ideals, while George Grote makes the 
doing of justice depend upon the approval of others in actual society. 
vi. Ideal and approbative ethics 
John Grote agrees that he himself may have overemphasized ideal 
ethics and feels sure that his brot her has advocated approbative ethics 
too much at the expense of ideal ethics. He inclines to agree with 
Glaucon. But if it is a case of deciding whose extreme position should 
be accepted, John Grote feels that his owri position is safer. Since 
John Grote is, of course, the author of the dialogue we know that his 
decision is in favor of idealistic normative ethics rather than conse-
quential normative ethics, that is, if it were to be a case of bifurca-
tion where one or the other was to be chosen. However, to affirm that 
the choice must be one or the other would be erroneous, Grote seems to 
imply. The error arises from what is popularly known today as the 
'fallacy of bifurcation.' 
So John Grote allows Glaucon to present his position more fully, in 
order that it will include regard for ideals but may also be concerned 
with the importance of consequences . Thus John Grote in a rather unique 
fashion reveals his Platonic idealism by introducing his views through 
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the medium of an improvised Socratic dialogue. His position is revealed 
through the words of 'Socrates,' supplemented by Glaucon who also pre-
sents further details in John Grote's view. 
3. Critique of utilitarianism 
i. Relation of this critique to views on Plato 
Another way in which John Grote reveals his concern for absolute 
standards is through his critique of utilitarianism. This he does 
through the posthumously published work An Examination of the Utilitarian 
Philosophy. Now, it is evident when one examines the preceding dialogue 
that there is a main tenet in it which also appears in Grote's exarnina-
tion of utilitarianism. Let us look at another of the statements made 
by •Socrates' in that dialogue: 
The reason why we should practice justice, right-doing, virtue, 
is because, in so doing, we are acting with or from our better 
and higher selves • • • lihat is we? Not merely ourselves capable 
of happiness, but ourselves altogether.ll 
The whole foundation of Grote's criticism of utilitarianism rests 
upon his conviction that it is "not merely ourselves capable of happiness, 
but ourselves altogether" that furnishes 11the reason why we should prac-
tice justice, right-doing, virtue." The ~does not refer simply to 
"ourselves capable of happiness" but to ourselves altogether. Here Grote 
is thinking of each person individually in speaking of 'we.' 
lihat Grote means is that each person should practice " justice , right-
doing, virtue ," not on the basis of having simply one capacity, a capacity 
for happiness, but rather on the basis of wha~ we, each one, possess in 
11. Grote, 11 A Discussion ••• Republic, " in CR (Mar. 1889), 98. 
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our complete selves, namely, something that is much more inclusive than 
one capacity. That is , we are possessed of many more capacities than 
just simply one capacity--for happiness. These other capacities--such 
as, he seems to hold, the capacity for recognizing intuitively the 
nature of many goods such as justice, courage , etc.--should also be 
taken account of, in moral action. 
ii. Problems not settled in utilitarianism 
All utilitarian doctrines fall victim to the same criticism by 
Grote , namely, that they overlook our capacities for things besides 
happiness. Though J. S. Mill was the first to use the term •Utilitar-
ianism,' there were happiness theories previous to the time of Mill. 
~fuat may be described as the 1old utilitarianism' existed before Mill's 
time in various forms. A view closely related to ~ull's theory, is the 
hedonism of Jeremy Bentham, with its basic tenet of, •the greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number.' J. s. ball defended the utilitarianism 
of Bentham at the same time as he modified it by the introduction of 
qualities amongst pleasures. The changes he instit uted are an acknow-
ledgment of the difficulties in the old utilitarianism. Mill, however, 
did not surmount all the obstacles with which utilitarianism was impeded. 
He made additions in clarity, and presented an introduction of qualities 
among pleasures. But the main trouble with his utilitarianism, accord-
ing to Grote, is that it is a happiness theoryl 
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iii. Descriptive and normative ethics 
Grote's idealism appears also, in his criticism of Mill for his 
(Mill's) analysis of what is rather than what should be. 
By the side of this discussion I have placed another, with the 
view of showing that though man, if we look at his past history, 
has proceeded along a course which has been one of real improve-
ment, still it is not from t he fact that such and no other has 
been his course, that we are able t o judge that it is improve-
ment, but we must further be able to give reasons why we call it 
improvement rather than the opposite . That is to say, we must 
have the idea of improvement: an idea of what ought to be, or 
what it is desirable should be, as well as a power of observing, 
recording, and analyzing what is.l2 
That men actually do desire happiness is descriptive rather than norma-
tive. And even if the objective is 'the greatest happiness of the great-
est number' it is an objective that has to do with people in regard to 
their actual capaciti es f o happi~. Grote wishes to have i deals that 
may be aimed at by the whole of our being rather than simply by our ca-
pacity for happiness. 
Grote seems to think that 1our capacity for happiness' does not in-
volve our whole being. Now, it is true that for Aristotle eudaemonia 
signified complete happiness. Grote would seem to leave himself open for 
some valid criticism here, especially if he meant that we have capacities 
for other than the summum bonum (such as eudaemonia) resulting from a 
fulfilment of function as in Aristotle. But, apparently, Grote did not 
mean that we have other capacities (than the capacity for happiness) for 
attaining the good, in the Aristotelian s ense of eudaemonia (happiness) . 
12. Grote, EUP, l, 2 . 
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Grote seems to have been emphasizing happiness in utilitarianism which 
he tended to interpret in the sense of satisfactory or pleasant conse-
quences. An emphasis on happiness of this sort where consequential 
ethics are involved is narrower , Grote would seem to hold, than happi-
ness (in the sense of living in accordance with right reason , as) in 
Aristotle, which is dependent upon all the rational faculties, or in 
Plato where the internal daemon intuitively sees and knows the good . 
iv . Why adopt 1the greatest happiness' standard 
Moreover, Grote is more concerned wit h finding out the reason why 
Bentham and Mill accept 1the greatest happiness principle' rather than 
i n knowing how this principle is elaborately worked out in all its de-
tails. '~Y 'the greatest happiness' standard rather than some other ? 
To t his question , Grote feels that neither Bentham nor Mill provides an 
answer. 
v. Activity and virtue 
In A Treatise on the Moral Ideals Grote stresses the view t hat not 
only happiness but also activity is necessary in order to have the 
summum bonum. Moral philosophy dealing with the concept of 1ought ' must 
take account of acti,~ty as well as happiness . Grote is, therefore, 
Aristotelian in his approach to the subject of happiness. The term 
'eudaemonics' is derived from e. v J cv ,M ~ v /~ , a word of prime importance 
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in the ethics of Aristotle.l3 The 1 eudaemonism 1 of the ethics placed 
the summum bonum in a life of activity in accordance with t he highest 
virtue or excellence. Int o the Aristotelian or Peripatetic school there 
crept the view that the chief element of this highest good was the feel-
ing of pleasure. Epicurus was an exponent of this view. Hence the word 
'eudaemonism' in moder n philosophy represents the ·theory of morals which 
regards the chief end of life as happiness. 
vi. Eudaemonia 
a. Relation to 1aretaics 1 
The term t u ~ C( 'A ov-(c:( was used by the common people as well as 
the learned for the highest good that it was possible for man to obtain, 
and i t is in this sense that Aristotle uses the word. Grot e means by 
happiness the s ame thing as Aristotle, and the deficiencies evident in 
partial approaches to Aristotle 's viet•r, such as Mill's and Bentham's, are 
subject to the criticisms which affect all theories that emphasize only 
a part of Aristotle's meaning. Grote is idealistic in his view of happi-
ness. This idealism colors all his analysis of hedonism. 
13. Eo d<tt..uovl~ was used by Plato and Aristotle to signify complet e 
happiness . £Jr1r:rf .u c.l v pertained particularly to outward prosperity, as 
well off, wealthy . 8 ~,~at's yl:>.ofws 't:7fl ..ufv -r~v .rr,Jiunt_,PyiJv cr/rri}I(YoA€8~ .. 
~Iff df 7WV l(~DC)(rfQv Tf tlC() t-(;d<(tPOVc.JV dOKOQV(t.JV fo"J'Y~I otJif C(t(/"'#<fVO,.til-IJfl{ . 
Plato, Rep., 206c. B. Jowett trans.: "This we remark in the case of the 
ar tisan , but ludicruously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of 
the richer sort." The notion of happiness is associated with ~ood f ortune 
(to which well off, and rlealth relate), as in "&).)."c( ;U~V 0 Tf- i-U stJ., 
/ / ' ' r " c r' ' ,. 1 t 
,.(.lql(il.f''"s -r6: 1\<7(, Eouo<(t .t.Hov, o <~E A''J TOCV"C(v'T"to( . P a o, Rep., 354a. 
Jowett trans.: 11 And he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he whn 
• . r / <" r' "' / ' ' -? l1.ves 1ll the reverse of happy"? Also, ~uoo<oc!, ol: Tt¥ >..o7'f ~~ ro (.u 
1-r"' .... , ..-. " "' ' ... r,- ' "' ' -'.r" A . t tl E I 8 (lf\V l{"o<t IO i:'v ::, P\lf ko(J TO t-l.l 'X"ft:(7'T~Iv rPtf~1111i)(DIIq', rl.S 0 e, th. , ' 0 
Edward Moore trans.: "Others may say that happiness is living well and 
doing well. " 
328 
Though pleasure may accompany the realization of the highest good, 
the term cannot be analyzed into the sum or succession of pleasures but 
is an active condition. The virtue which accompanies such activity is 
~~~? .14 The highest conception that Aristotle held concerning this 
activity was a life of pure speculation even though, practically, such 
might never be reached. '~at Aristotle ascribes to God is knowledge 
v1hich has only itself for its object. rrl5 "The sole activity of God is 
self -knowledge. rrl6 The traditional renderings of the word, -'0( ~ t:- n1 
are considerably different from the Aristotelian meaning. 
b. Reason f or including •aretaics ' 
Grote's point in supplementing the word · ~udaemonics' by •aretaics' 
is therefore much to the point in his arguments against the utilitarian-
ism of Mill. If the theory of eudaemonism as it is generally known in 
excellence, esp~cially of 
c3teernv t(VCO\ cfOft vwv. 
t~ans.: "He full of youthful 
14. (1) Used in Homer for ~oodness, or 
manly qualities: d"l: ror~ V'IJ1ftenrrt 7foJ"~v 
Homer, Il. , 20, 411. John Stuart Blackie 
light conceit his limber legs displayed." 
(2) Used in Aristotle for goodness or excellence: /()17-r;ov 
o t ~ K11 ~o~./4. ~Aristotle, Eth . , II, 6, 2, and Met • , IV. Edward Moore 
trans .: "Now speaking generally excellence of whatever kind." 
(3) The Attic sense remained, more with the meaning of active 
excellence than of the moral virtues, for examnle in art of skill, in 
Plato. <tJ-rtN ,((b.- Ttji ~e~ rBs Tl-lfrov-uf~.s 1) ).tyos ~\~h.,$ -ro'cs d1lltolljJytl(:?s . 
Plato, Pro., 322d. Jowett trans.: "When the question related to car-
pent eri ng or any other mechanical art ." With this is closely combined 
the notion of distinction, hence Qy>c-r ti seems to imply fame, praise 
for excellence, for example , noble deeds. /o~.£ f't!-71) y/Y6a"!V !iot] 1f1>o ytfvuw 
" c(,.?EoTOfls • Plato , Rep., 618b. Jowett trans.: "For their birth and 
the qualities of their ancestors." 
(4) Moreover, ~c--1~ is the recognized vmrd for •virtue• in 
Plato and Aristotle . Plato , Rep., 500d; Aristotle, Eth., I, 13, and 
Pol. , II, 3. 
15. Ross, Aristotle, 183. 
16. Ross, £E• cit., p. 185. 
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modern thought had not acquired a special restriction to happiness but 
rather retained its meaning as a theory which fixed the chief good in an 
active l ife in accordance with virtue, as in Aristotle, it would not be 
necessary for Grote to introduce the word 1aretaics 1 into his work. In 
I 
general , then, one may say that Grote takes the side of Aristotle as 
against Mill in A Treatise on the Moral Ideals. Moreover, there appears 
to be no conflict between Grote's treatment, here, of happiness and his 
presentation of the ideal in the dialogue considered at the beginning of 
this chapter . l7 
vii. Bentham's influence in popularizing hedonism 
Jerernw Bentham usually writes as though he were the first propounder 
of 1 the greatest happiness' principle. However , it would be difficult if 
not impossible to know how much Bentham is indebted to his predecessors 
in moral theory . Certainly Rtchard Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Francis 
Hutcheson, George Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, David Hume, David 
Hartley, Abraham Tucker ('Edward Search'), and William Paley had dealt 
with pleasure or happiness in some manner.lB These in their turn have 
been greatl y indebted to Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. To these Bentham 
may have turned before he read the words •the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number' in Priestley's Treatise on Government. These famous 
words became the cornerstone of Bentham's ethics and the maxim which 
guided a life of study and reform. 
17. Grote , 11 A Dis cuss ion • • • Republic, 11 in CR (Mar. 1889) • 
18 . Albee , HEV. 
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Never does Bentham speak about non-hedonistic theories except in a 
tone of contempt. His contribution to ethics probably was not so great 
as to law, yet he likely did more than any other writer to bring the 
utilitarian theory into popular ethical controversy. He did this in 
spite of having stripped the happiness of Aristotle of much of its 
idealism. 
John Stuart Mill was greatly influenced by Bentham as well as by 
his father, James Mill. More attracted by ethical questions than legal 
problems, Mill will remain outstanding in the realm of morals for his 
Utilitarianism. In one of his works,19 Grote analyzes the basis upon 
which Mill establishes his argument. A brief exposition of the main 
points of this book at this point will be attempted, in addition to what 
already has been indicated in regard to Grote's compatibility with Plato 
and Aristotle . 
viii . Difficulties which Mill's utilitarianism 
does not avoid 
a. Whose happiness, not answered 
Certain difficulties arise in Mill's treatment of Utilitarianism. 
One of the first of these concerns whose happiness is to be produced de-
spite the fact that intelligent determination to do only what is most 
useful and productive of happiness may be exercised. 
The most important points of moral difficult~arise not in reference 
to the question about actions, whether they are useful or not, but 
19. Grote, EUP. 
in reference to the question, who it is, in the conflict of 
various interest s in life, that they are useful to.20 
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The word ' happiness' is vague until the question, as to whose happiness 
is meant, is solved. Mill passes rather abruptly from the agent's happi-
ness to the happiness of all people. There is nothing to authorize such 
a step for the charge of selfishness may still be made against utilitar-
ianism. The problem of the amount of action necessary for the end of 
happiness is a constant obstacle to Mill. Mill's hedonism, as well as 
Bentham's, lacks t he precision of the definition of individual activity 
in accordance with the highest virtue that we see in Aristotle's ethics 
and Grote's idealism. He appears unable to set a standard for judging 
how distribution of activity should be made. Apparently quite unconscious 
that he is referring to a standard apart from happiness, Mill appeals to 
sympathy . Human beings , he states, 
only differ from other animals in two particulars. First, in being 
capable of sympathizing, not solely with their offspring, or, like 
some of the more noble animal who is kind to them, but with all 
human, and even with all sentient, beings. Secondly, in having a 
more developed intelligence, which gives a wider range to the whole 
of their sentiments, whether self-regarding or sympathetic.2l 
b. Mill's utilitarianism uses extraneous elements 
Grote relates , concerning Mill, 
Sympathy, he tells us ••• makes another the object with us of the 
same feelings which we have in regard of ourselves, desire, for in-
stance, of happiness: and sympathy follows fac t or, if we prefer 
expressing it so, answers to relation; that is, those we sympathize 
with are those who are brought into contact with us, or about whom 
we come to have knowledge, and whose circumstances or relation to 
20 . Grote, EUP, 4. 
21. Mill, UTI, 47, 48. 
us call for feeling on our part: and so the desire of happiness 
which begins of necessity with ourselves, (for all desire must in 
the first instance be individual,) is propagated, as to its object, 
around us, until it at last embraces the whole human race, or as 
I most heartily agree with Mr. Mill, the whole sentient creation. 
All this is almost moral common-place ; but it is common-place most 
unworthily exchanged, in the utilitarian scheme, for the doctrine 
that the object of our desire and action for happiness, should be 
the whole creation divided into so many units , one of which is 
ourselves, and each of which is to be looked on by us as of equal 
irnportance.22 
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Better than happiness as a standard is 1duty,' Grote declares. Duty 
as intellectually perceived, and its accompanying feeling, refer first of 
all to the particular, and not to the general as Mill would have us be-
lieve. 
The utilitarian maxim, that •an action is right in proportion as 
it tends to promote h ppiness,' is incomplete 1~thout having a -
pended to it ch an addition as this, 'an not merely happiness 
in general, but such happiness in particular as the agent is 
specially bound and called upon to promote,' the terms 1bound' 
and •called upon' being explained by the ideas of duty and sym-
pathy in the manner which I have just described. It is so that 
the question, 'Whose happiness?' is to be answered.23 
Duty is not sufficient to attain the summum bonum. There should be 
a natural moral overflow beyond what duty requires, and sympathy supplies 
this necessary part . The idea of duty as well as that of sympathy is 
included within the required virtue. The weakness of utilitarianism at 
this point arises from its resolve to allow nothing to the summum bonum 
except happiness . Probably the only potent criticism here possible per-
tains to action which appears to be just as important as happiness. 
Action appears to have value as action apart from any pleasure. 
22. Grote, EUP, 90 . 
23. Grote, ££• cit., pp. 97, 98. 
Man is by nature active , as well as active to an end; his action 
has a character of its own, independent of its reference to.an 
end; and therefore, though it must have an end in order to be 
reasonable, and our object must be to find the proper end for it, 
it is not necessary that it should have no value other than what 
is given it by this end.24 
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That is, there is a general tendency in feeling to elevate, i ntellectu-
ally. "Reason and moral imagination or sympathy supply to the feeling 
thus elevated an object and a purpose, and confirm its elevation.u25 
The question is the one of oughtness rather than existence. ~fill builds 
upon the foundation of what is. 
The meaning that Grote gives to duty seems to have been strongly 
colored by Kant's m~dJn, of 1duty done for duty's sake.' It is very 
possible that 1the moral law' of Kantian ethics has been influential as 
the determining source of duty as the ideally right, for Grote. 
Duty is the ideally right, or that which should be done, in so 
far as we consider it determined for us, and the principle which 
we suppose to determine it we call 'the moral law.t25 
Yet Grote does not directly acknowledge that he was influenced by 
Kant, in his view of duty. Grote, rather, gives credit to others for 
his conception of the moral law as the determining source of duty. 
If we suppose 'law' to mean a rule for individual action, of which 
rule we know nothing more than that, if we do not obey it, we shall 
be punished, then duty is bare, perhaps unwilling, obedience to 
something which we have no interest or pleasure in, but which we 
are afraid to resist. The moral law is then a yoke imposed upon 
us by the Deity (Paley), or by society and public opinion (some 
Socratic interlocutors and several philosophers in later times), 
or by arbitrary power in general (Hobbes).26 
24. Grote, EUP, 107, 108. 
25 . Grote, TMI, 98. 
26. Grote, ££• cit., p. 99. 
·Just how much aclmovTledgement Grote gives to these others may be 
noted in the following: 
I have thought it would conduce to clearness, ••• in accordance 
with the four views which I gave of law, and will now say about 
them, that in my view they all belong to the notion of duty.27 
c. Null's positivism helpless by itself 
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In his remarks in connection with 'the old utilitarianismt28 Grote 
states that he sees in Mill a somewhat diminishing attachment to the 
Benthamite school and yet a feeling of loyalty to it, a greater appre-
ciation of a certain positivism the proof of which refuses anything of 
the ideal. Yet this positivism is helpless if unable to appeal to some-
thing beyond itself. Hence the references which Mill makes to what is 
beyond positivism in an attempt to show, paradoxically enough, that 
happiness is the summum bonum. That is , in Grote's estimation Mill im-
ports into utilitarianism much that is foreign to it. 
ix. Non-idealist origin of Bentham's utilitarianism 
In the 18th century through the influence of Bentham and others, 
Utilitarianism was a revolt against jural ethics and gradually eventuated 
in legislative reform. Benthamite Utilitarianism revolted against natural 
law as a basis for ethics. It gave emphasis to happiness as a standard 
rather than to duty, and through the former attempted a reconstruction of 
society without fear of consequences. 
The Utilitarianism of Bentham was one of reform. There was another 
utilitarianism of which Godwin may be regarded as a representative. This 
27. Grote, TMI , 100. 
28. Grote, EUP, 10. 
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utilitarianism was revolutionary. The element of revolution smouldered 
in the utilitarianism of Bentham but the essential element in this lat-
ter was reform. The utilitarianism for which Paley advocated was some-
what akin to the Benthamite, more conservative, and based upon common 
sense. Paley, however, is less consistent than Bentham because the re-
form which he suggested was more on the side of rutile' than 'dulce' the 
useful than the pleasant. Paley, says Grote, 
describes happiness as not consisting in (1) self-indulgence, (2) 
idleness, (3) greatness; and ~ consisting in (1) sociality, 
(2) occupation, (3) what we may call moderation, {4) health, If 
his account had been given in perfect good faith, I do not see why 
he should not have added competent livelihood or fortune, for that 
is not more a matter out of our own power than health is and in 
the importance of it for happiness Aristotle and an English trades-
man would alike agree.29 
Bentham had the mind of a legislative reformer. 
Bentham thought, and with reason, that if men could once be got 
distinctly to have the idea that happiness, well examined and 
systematized happiness, and that not the agent 's own only, was 
the one thing worthy of being acted for, great .results in the way 
of philanthropy would ensue.::50 
Generally, then, the element of suspicion was directed toward utilitar-
ianism. It is significant to notice that Mill professed to recognize 
the authority of existing custom and hence becomes involved in inconsis-
tency when happiness is taken as the standard. 
x. Grote's idealism akin to idealism in Christianity 
A word should be stated here regarding the relationship of Utilitar-
ianism to Christianity. Mill relates that the ethics of utility are 
29. Grote, EUP, 38n. 
30. Grote, ££• cit., p. 103. 
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those of Christianity in its purest form. 'Ihere are two main elements 
recognized by each, according to Grote, namely, importance of happiness 
and love of one's·neighbor. Utilitarianism begins with the former; 
Christianity starts with the latter. It is Grote 1s belief that philan-
thropy is due to Christianity. Yet Christianity is as important for 
other ethical systems as i t is for Utilitariani sm. Grote 1s point here 
is that Utilitarianism cannot claim for itself, alone , practical moral 
philanthropy; Christianity can. 'Ihis statement should be qualified . 
Grote apparently does not mean that practical philanthropy is not pos -
sible outside of Christianity but that Christianity in its ideal form 
provides for such philanthropy. Utilitarianism cannot do so because of 
its failure to give great importance to duty, and sympathy. To account 
for what Christianity has and Utilitarianism has not, Mill deals with 
worthiness which is inconsistent with his positive Utilitarianism. 
'Worthiness' introduces a factor other than 'happiness. ' 
xi. Idealism haunts Mill's utilitarianism 
Grote notes an important distinction here which, he claims, Mill 
fails to see very clearly. 
'tle have then a philosophy of happiness as tu ~ lA ovt~, or a lofty 
ideal of what man may rise to , entirely different from a philos-
• r " ophy of happiness as '7 a o v r, , or the fact of enjoyment as un-
affected by man 1 s will and his moral nature . 
Mr. Mill hovers between these two , between an asp1r1ng and truly 
ideal utilitarianism or lofty eudaemonism, and a utilitarianism 
on the merely Epicurean basis of measurement of pleasures.31 
31. Grote, EUP, 46, 47. 
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This observation. by Grote distinguishes him as characterized by a strong 
tendency to idealism. 
xii. ~~antity and quality amongst pleasures 
Ndll att empts to distinguish between 1quality 1 and 'quantity' in 
pleasures. 11It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.rr32 
But 'quality' here is merely a sort of 1quantity. 1 A standard that has 
to do with quantity and quality is an appeal to an element other than 
happiness, Grote states. Grote seems to be vulnerable in his criticism 
here, for surely Mill was justified in speaking about quality and quan-
tity amongst pleasures. But if it is granted that qualities may be re-
duced to quantities where quantities fall short of an ideal amount, then 
Grote reveals :rtdll as a non-idealist, while advocating for happiness 
(in Aristotle's sense) in its ideal form. 
'Quality' of pleasures is unjustified unless the criterion of human 
experience is brought into consideration, Grote insists. 
A consistent utilitarian can scarcely hold the difference of 
quali tx_ in pleasures in any sense: for if they differ otherwise 
than in what, speaking largely, may be called quantitl, they are 
not mutually comparable, and in determining as to the preferabil-
ity of one pleasure to another, we must then be guided by some 
considerations not contained in the idea or experience of the 
pleasure itself.33 
32. :Mill, UTI, 9. 
33. Grote, EUP, 52 . 
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xiii. Utilitarianism suffers from lack 
of sufficient.and consistent idealism 
Mill attempts to establish upon experience what cannot be proved 
from it , namely, that the sole standard of morality is happiness. He 
is constantly faced with the question of proving that happiness as the 
summum bonum is what should regulate moral life. Grote contends that 
Mill might have as validly taken 1duty' as the summum bonum (or the 
summum bonum faciendum) as happiness and defended it. In regarding 
'happiness' as the criterion Mill has assumed more than what he ultim-
ately proves . 
If we have to recognize vast distinctions among the different sorts 
of utility, and to take into the consideration of utility other 
considerations of quite a different kind, as of different kinds of 
sentiment with which the utilities are accompanied; I do not see 
why the philosophy should be call ed utilitarianism more than any-
thing else.34 
4 . A critique of moral ideals 
i. Idealism basic in Grote's two works 
in the field of ethics 
Turning now from a consideration of Grote's idealism revealed through 
his critique of utilitarianism we may look with considerable satisfactory 
result at his treatment of moral ideals. There is a definite anticipa-
tion of much of A Treatise on the Moral Ideals in An Examination of the 
Utilitarian Philosophy. The idea of progress, elevation or improvement, 
as what should be, constitutes the greater part of the last four chapters 
34. Grote, EUP, 149. 
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of the latter work, and is the basis upon ,,.Thich moral ideals rest. 
Utilitarianism made an attack upon positivism in ethics for positivism 
attempted to construct a moral code upon the sole basis of experience 
and observation without assuming that there is any ideal at all . But 
utilitarianism insofar as it describes what is (even though it may go 
beyond this to what is not possible to observation, namely, ideas), is 
prone to error similar to that of positivism. Its failure and that of 
Comte is fairly explicitly presented in the follo~nng : 
The logic of the moral sciences, or what Mr . Wall considers such, 
will not at all in the same degree stand alone without Teleology, 
and the attempt to make it do so is almost certain to be an abuse 
of it as logic--that is, there 1vill be a supposition more or less 
express and distinct, but always \<lithout reason given for it, that 
it, the logic, is to supply us with the end as well as the means. 
This is precisely what I understand as the proceeding of M. Comte, 
and it seems to me the proceeding, to some degree, of all those 
who, like lii!r. Mill, put moral phenomena in the universe simply by 
the side of physical .35 
Here Grote emphasizes teleology as necessary; it is not logic but rather 
ideals that furnish the end. 
It may well be asked, \ffiat is meant by ethical idealism, and what 
is Grote's relation to it? Ethical idealism may be defined as a system 
of moral theory 1vhich is teleological in principle and accepts either 
one or both of the follmving: (a) a scale of rules of action, or a 
scale of values, and (b) moral freedom rather than natural or psycho-
logical necessity. Grote is an ethical i dealist not only because (a) 
he adopts a Platonic scale of idealistic values, but also because 
35 . Grote , EP, I, 201 . 
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(b) he believes in moral freedom rather than psychological necessity. 
There is no necessity for personalism to be idealistic ethically. 
But Grote appears to present a personalism that is such. As already ob-
served, the nature of metaphysics and epistemology is personal for Grote . 
Any metaphysic directs attention to four types of object, physical, con-
scious states, universals, and values.35a Grote is attracted to Platonic 
ideas, or universals, as objects. These objects are metaphysical and 
idealistic. Some, at least, of the Platonic universals are ethical. 
And all objects for Grote have their distinctively conscious or personal 
side. The result leaves Grote with a personalistic metaphysics that is 
idealistic ethically, for example, entertaining high regard for virtues 
metaphysically idealistic and by nature ethical. Here also, then, .is 
shown the necessary relation between metaphysics and ethics for Grote . 
His position appears invulnerable. 
ii. •Aretaics' and 1 eudaemonics' kept separate 
Even though Grote's treatment of the moral ideals may appear induc-
tive rather than deductive by reason of the separate treatment of happi-
ness, virtue, duty, etc., yet there is an underlying consistency in his 
scheme for which this basic idea of progress is largely responsible. 
Grote keeps what he calls 1aretaics 1 and 1 eudaemonics 1 as separate as 
possible in order to show that there are moral ideals which are not fully 
35a . Brightman, ITP, 101. 
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accounted for by Mill's Utilitarianism. That is, besides happiness 
(eudaemonism) there is activity which is partly responsible for making 
moral ideals such as duty, virtue, etc., possible, and for which 
eudaemonics cannot fully account. Man is not only a sentient being 
(capable of feeling pleasure and pain) but is active as well, and this 
furnishes a basis for the distinction of the two sciences. 11His activity 
and his sentience are two independent portions or features of his nature, 
each as early, as native, and as important, as the other.u36 
Man's nature, in fact the universe in general, has two portions or 
characters counter-fitting (if I may use the word) the one to the 
other, want and power in the universe, or, as I have called them 
in man, sentience and activity. I take as my principle, that man 
as early and as naturally asks for an employment of his activity 
as for a relief from his pain.37 
iii. Criticism of Grote's sharp distinction between 
taretaics' and 'eudaemonics' 
S 1il en est ainsi, on n 1apergoit pas la necessite d 1etablir, comme 
le fait M. Grote, une separation profonde entre la science de la 
vertu et celle du bonheur, l 1 eudemonique et l'aretique. Cette dis-
tinction ne nous parait pas suffisamment justifiee; il n'y a, 
croyons-nous, qu 1une science de la morale: celle qui determine le 
principe fondamental et les regles secondaires qui doivent diriger 
l'activite, le but supreme auquel elle doit tendre. Ce but, c'est 
le bien, qui comprend, indissolublement unis, la perfection morale 
et le vrai bonheur.38 
Probably the decisiveness with which Grote diqtinguishes between the two 
36. "Movement precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of 
any stimulus from without: action is a more intimate and inseparable 
property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and in fact 
enters as a component into every one of the senses, giving them the 
character of compounds while itself is a simple and elementary property." 
Bain , SI, I, Chap. 1. 
37. Grote , TMI, 10, 11. 
38. Carrau, RP (1877), pt. 2, p. 537. 
is due to the influence of Bain. Grote states: 
The fundamental fact of eudaemonics is, not that men do avoid 
pain, supposing this a matter of experience or observation, or 
in other words, supposing it conceivable that they might do other-
wise , but that pain is something which has in it that which makes 
it avoided.39 
The basal axiom of eudaemonics is that pain is undesirable and to be 
avoided, and the axiom of aretaics that pain is a thing not to be in-
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flic t ed. The former, however, deals with man as an active being just as 
well as the latter. The distinction which Grote attempts to make between 
the two sciences is not quite so distinct as he claims that it is. If 
pain is undesirable as included vdthin the axiom of eudaemonics, nd to 
be avoided, it is ndesirable and to be avoided for all people. Ho.ever , 
this involves the fundamental axiom of aretaics. Yet Grote seems to 
separate retaics and eudaemonics for the sake of convenience in analysis. 
It does not appear that he means to separate them because they have little 
or no relation to each other. They are fundamentally inseparable in the 
ecstatic character of happiness that Aristotle presents as the summum 
bonum, an ideal (happiness) accepted by Grote. 
iv. want or 'egence' 
True to his idealismJ Grote states that what ought to be sought 
after, cannot be determined by what is, or by the physical sciences alone. 
The starting-point of action is want or egence,40 
What) in addition to intelligence and fact, has to be taken account 
of when we think of action, is want. And what in addition to this 
again, has to be taken account of when we think of moral action, is 
39. Grote, TMI, 3. 
40 . Grote, 2£• cit., p. 27 . 
the existence of a plurality of sentient, some or all also active, 
beings. 
lfvant or egence is the great fact conditioning, and stimulating 
real action (by which I mean action as different from conceivable 
chaotic movement). Satisfaction is the fact corresponding to it: 
good is the idea, i .e. this latter fact, extended, heightened and 
developed, by the intelligence.41 
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The feeling of want draws man out of himself. He wants the ideal. 
Man never goes beyond himself as ~erely acting and feeling. One might 
be quite satisfied with one's O\ifn feelings and one 1s own personal ac-
tivit.y, but the experience and the idea of want demands action in ac-
cordance with higher ideals which pertain to the good . These are the 
moral ideals which Grote discusses. One may subscribe to 'egence' or 
1want 1 which Grote describes as the starting-point of action without 
agreeing with his further treatment of it as in the follo~ing: 
~~en we speak of moral attributes in God, we ascribe to Him an 
egence of the highest, but of the most imperious kind: for what 
are such attributes without other sentient and moral beings on 
which they may be exercised? Love with nothing to fix on--can 
we imagine a state of greater defect, imperfection, unhappiness? 
Suppose sentient beings created, there is a transfer of part of . 
this original egence: they want Him, as He wants them.42 
Against such words of Grote one might interject that the Absolute, con-
. sidered as perfect, should not rwantr as He is presented here as doing. 
Such difficulty does not appear in the words: 11Egence is the life of 
the universe: the highest forms of egence are variously called 'love': 
the lowest are simply appetance, perhaps merely physical. 1143 This 
41. Grote, ~IT, 26, 27. 
42. Grote, ££• cit., p. 31. 
43. Loc. cit. 
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supplies t he reason for Grote's use of the word 1aretaics. 1 And this 
'egence' is a striving toward a goal. It seems to be an Eros, as recog-
nized by Plato , toward the Good. "In the Symposium the Eros is described 
as the aspiration of the mortal for the immortal, of the actual for the 
i deal.n44 "Eros is the character whereby things are not, but are striv-
ing to be.n45 "Eros is the love of the good. 1146 
5. Critical remarks 
i. Bases of Grote's idealism enumerated 
The bases of Grote's idealism may be enumerated as follows: 
(l) As shown in regard to the dialogue at the first of this chapter, he 
is a Platonic idealist in ethics, in the sense that , for example, 1the 
good' is intuitively conceived. 
(2) Materialism, and kindred views, fail to account for thought, con-
sciousness , awareness, ideas, etc. 
(3) 1be whole of the self, personality, the 'we' in the sense of the whole 
of us , possesses an Eros, •egence,' or 'want,' toward the good. 
(4 ) Realization that only activity in accordance with the highest virtue 
can give happiness , or 'eudaemonia. ' This is a conviction inspired by 
Aristotle's swrumun bonum. Now both the Platonic and the Aristotelian 
views of the good are quite possible within a single theory inasmuch as 
Grote reveals a Platonic concern for absolute standards and also stresses 
t he Aristotelian criterion of activity in accordance with the highest 
44 . Demos, POP, . l5. 
45. Demos, ££• cit., p. 38. 
46 . Demos, ££• cit. , p. 82. 
virtue. 345 
(5) There is also a fundamental dissatisfaction with all non-idealistic 
theories because, as an epistemological personalist--believing that idea 
and object have a common source in human personality- -none of these the-
ories are satisfactory. They do not explain ho1r1 we actually know, or 
what knowledge is. 
ii. General criticism covering the foregoing bases 
The dialogue dealt with in the first of this chapter presents Grote's 
tendency toward Platonic idealism in ethics. The dialogue is cleverly 
worked out in a way that presents Grote as not concerned too much with 
consequences, but primarily interested in ideals. Having regard for one's 
own interests chiefly, in a sort of free enterprise and competitive world, 
presupposes an orderly society to begin with, Grote points out. Now, the 
only safe basis on which an orderly society may be established is one in 
which ethical ideals exist. 
The materialism which Grote opposes by his idealism appears so in-
capable of accounting for consciousness that one seems forced, as in the 
case of Grote, to find a solution for epistemology by dealing with •ob-
jects• as meaningful only in relation to minds. Grote seems to be basic-
-ally correct in his view that there is no phenomenal reality Nhich has no 
connection in some way with the self as the possessor of ideas, if this 
reality is to be reality for us. Materialists would at least say that 
idealists, like Grote, have gone too far in approaching epistemological 
problems from the side of personality, but it may be said in Grote•s 
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favor that wholll from the side of matter epistemological problems can-
not be 1 seen 1 at all, and that Y~owledge of matter is as 'personal' as 
knowledge of ideals. 
In contending for the 1we, 1 in the sense of the whole of us, 47 
rather than simply for that portion of us possessed with the capacity 
for happiness, Grote reveals again a sort of Platonic idealism which 
holds that all things aspire toward the good. The e:rnphasis here is not 
entirely on Platonic idealism. Grote seems to have an original contri-
bution of his own to make, in emphasizing that it is not simply that 
portion of us possessed with the capacity for happiness but our whole 
being that must be considered. It is difficult to see how this position 
of Grote's can be readily disputed, for the whole of the self must be 
considered when dealing with the summum bonum. The stunmum bonum is not 
that which is concerned simply with our capacity for happiness but it is 
rather concerned with the whole of us, vdth our entire welfare. 
This seems to be the case in Aristotle's view of the summum bonum 
where the complete welfare ·of the person i s . considered. The summum bonum 
is here, in Aristotle, concerned with personal activity in accord vdth the 
greatest virtue in such a way that ecstatic happiness will result. 
Grote is strongly Hegelian, as well as Platonic and Aristotelian, in 
his emphasis upon the complete person being considered, in relation to 
the summum bonum. "The truth is the whole. The \vhole, however, is 
47. Cf. 13. Critique of utilitarianism' and 1iii. Descriptive and 
normative ethics' (above), pp. 318, 320, for an exposition of what is 
referred to here by the words: 'in the sense of the whole of us.' 
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merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the pro-
cess of its own development. n48 'l':'l.ere are tvvo chief senses in which 
Grote placed emphasis upbn 'the whole.' (l) In epistemology when ex-
pressing the truth as a sort of union of subject and object: Grote 
tries to show this essential tmity by referring to the I sel f-self, I 
'intuition, ' etc. Also, his basic position is that the 'philosophical' 
and the phenomenal approaches are different ways of looking at the 
one reality. {2) In ethics, by affirming that it is only as the en-
t ire person is considered that we can have the truth regarding the 
summum bonum: 
The reason why we should practice justice, right-doing, virtue, 
is because in so doing, we are acting vrith or from our better 
and higher selves ••• \mat is we? Not merely ourselves capable 
of happiness, but ourselves altogether.49 
6. Concluding note to this chapter 
Idealism is fundamental both to Grote's epistemology and his ethics. 
This dissertation began with emphasizing what appeared at first to be 
considerably removed from idealism, with 'philosophy' and as, especially, 
apparently remote, phenomenalism. It seems appropriate now to recapitu-
late and survey the territory covered and to offer some general criti-
cisms of the entire study. To this task we will now turn and complete 
the research undertaken by means of the conclusion and appendix on var-
ious miscellaneous writings . 
48. Hegel, POM, 16. 
49. Grote, 11A Discussion • •• Republic," in CR (Mar. 1889) , 98. 
CONCLUSION 
1 . Grote ' s position in the history of philosophy 
i. Scanty position given to Grote in modern philosophy 
First of all , let us look at the place given to Grote in contem-
porary philosophy . The position given is only scant. ; there are various 
1 reasons for this meagre reference . The following is an extract which 
indicates Grote ' s opinion regardin his own philosophy and his reason for 
criticism of vnrious eminent contemporar.f philosophers. This statement 
is supported in the foregoing chapters by critical remarks on various 
writers such as Ferrier, Hamilton, Mill, and others : 
J . Grote, au lieu de ces doctrines qui se nuis ent mutuellement, et 
dont les ri v_ali tes expliquent J dans une certaine measure, 1 1 indif-
ference publique pour les speculations serieuses, voudrait voir se 
fonder, d'une part une philosophie r~ele ~icJ , qui ne se perdrait 
pas dans les abstractions et restituerait leur veritable valeur a 
l'intelli enc et a la liberte humaines, si independantes, en elles-
memes, des conditions de leur exercice; et, d 1autre part, une science 
generale de la nature, qui comprendr it une physio-psychologie com-
paree, mais a laquelle ne seraient pas subordonnees les questions 
de philosophie proprement dite et de morale •• • I l etudie succes-
sivement les oeuvres ma1tresses de Ferrier, de 1f. Hamilton, de 
Stuart Mill, de \r.Thewell, et il projetait de continuer, s 1il l 1avait 
pu, avec celles de Spencer et d Bain; mais nous n 1 vons pas, dans 
le second volume, sur celles-ci les memes de~eloppements que sur 
les autres dans l e premier. Ce sont autant de livres qui l ' ont 
fait beaucoup penser, dont il a beaucoup appris, et dont il n 1a 
pas ete pleinement satisfait . En les critiquant, il nous decouvre 
sa propre doctrine, plus eloignee de telle sutre, ou plus rapprochee, 
toujours ori~inale, sincere et tres digne d tetre etudiee, meme 
aujourd 'hui."-
Cr ' ticism of well- known philosophers who appeared to be in the ascendancy 
at the time of Grote was not the type of work that would make one ' s 
1. Whitmore, SJG, in PR , 36(19 7), 307- 337 . 
2 . 1 A.P. , ' reviewing EP, I, II, in RP, 54(1902), 435- 436 . 
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scattered notes very popular. This is not alone what caused almost com-
plete oversight of Grote's writings. There are several rather obvious 
reasons for neglect which were rather accidental. Henry Sidgwick suc-
ceeded Grote in the Km.ghtbridge Chair of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge 
University. Sidgwick 1s philosophy was not especially epistemological 
and did not continue the discussion of any basic problems with which 
Grote dealt. A smaller reason for this neglect or oversight might be 
attributed to the prestige in which George Grote, the elder brother of 
John, was usually placed. Any reference to the name of 1Grote 1 recalled 
the name of the former whose work on Plato and Aristotle was much before 
the eyes of the public of his ovm time. 
ii. John Grote overshadowed by his brother, George 
At the age of fifty-three John Grote died, five years before his 
brother, and this may have accounted to a somewhat small extent for the 
lack of attention which John Grote received. Moreover, in the first 
part of the Exploratio Philosophica, John Grote criticized Wdll, Whewell, 
Hamilton, Ferrier, Bain, and Spencer. During these various critical 
analyses Grote laid down his ovm position. Mill, Bain, and Spencer sur-
vived Grote and since they refer very little, or not at all, to Grote, 
this factor alone might be enough to stamp him into oblivion for a cen-
tury. 
iii. Bain's slight reference to Grote 
Mill and Spencer do not refer to Grote. The references which Bain 
makes to Grote are only slight. However , he makes the following re-
vealing statement: 
John Grote was very hospitabl e and friendly, and was himself an 
interesting man to talk to . He had all the candour and meta-
physical tastes of his brother, without the thorough-goingness 
in his conclusions. The two brothers rarely met, but held one 
another in the greatest brotherly esteem, whil e freely commenting 
upon each other's positions.3 
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Yet the reference to Grote's theory of knowledge alone, in the following 
remarks by various writers, indicates the very considerable regard in 
which his writJng was held. But it is int eresting to observe regarding 
Bain's view that Grote lacked 11thorough- goingness in his conclusions," 
that Joseph B. Mayor in editing A Treatise on the Moral I deals makes the 
following statement: 
No doubt his mode of exposition is generally unsystematic. Writing, 
as he did, without any view of immediate publication, he thought 
more of putting his matter into the form which was most natural 
and expressive to himself than of putting it into the form which 
was most intelligible to his readers. Thus he suddenly diverges 
in the midst of an argument, returns again, repeats what has been 
said before, and not unfrequently passes over some point which had 
been previously left f or further consideration.4 
iv. Stephen's reference to Grote 
Leslie Stephen writes favorably on Grote's epistemology . References 
to Grote have not been very numerous. Any estimate made concerning his 
work is to the effect that his l'rritings are in a style difficult to read, 
though the thought is generally extolled. An example of such an estimate 
is made by Leslie Stephen, regarding the F~ploratio Philosophica.5 
3. Bain, AUT, 258. 
4 . Grote, TMI, ix. 
5. Part I. 
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This book is, I think, by f ar the most interesting contemporary 
discussion of Vdll, Hamilton , and vfuewell. It was, unfortunately, 
desultory and unfinished, but it is full of acute criticism, and 
charmingl y candid and modest. Mill's Logic is especially dis-
cussed in Chapters VIII and I X. Grote holds, and I think truly, 
that Mill's attempt to divide metaphysic s from logic leads to real 
confusion, and especially to an untenable mode of conceiving t he 
relation between 'things' and thoughts. I cannot discuss Grote's 
views; but the book is full of interesting suggestions, though 
the results are rather vague.6 
This note is appended after the remark is made to the effect that Mill 
handed over certain problems to metaphysici ans, because, as metaphysi -
cians, he considered they should be able to judge f acts to be facts . 
Mill asserted that logicians need not enter into such judgment. Leslie 
Stephen questions Mill's distinction because 11it is apparently relevant 
to inquire what are these 'ultimate facts.' 11 7 
v. Remarks in an obituary notice 
In an obituary notice of the death of Grote,8 the writer of the 
article makes the following remark about Grote's f irst published volume: 
Hi unfinished work called ~ploratio Phil sophica , hard to read, 
chiefly from the intense closeness of the reasoning, is a masterly 
review of modern theories of philosophy full of t he soundest wis-
dom and opposed to the fallacies of popular metaphysicians • • • 
Professor Grote has left valuable papers, and it is hoped they are 
in a state for publication .9 
These valuable papers proved to be more in the form of 'notes' than the 
first part of Exploratio Philosophica, and did not aid in advancing 
Grote's reputation beyond what it was when he finished the second part. 
6 . Stephen, EU, III , 80n. 
7. stephen, ££· cit., pp . 80, 81 . 
8 . (No author nor title given ) re Grote, in GM, 22l(o.s.)(l866), 550. 
9. Loc. cit. 
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Moreover, the style of Grote's writings is not particularly attractive 
and gives the impression of hurried writing not intended for publication. 
vi. •Knowledge of acquaintance' and 'knowledge about• 
a. James's debt to Grote 
It is with Grote's epistemology that most people interested in phi-
losophy have acquainted themselves, if they lmow anything of much ac-
co1mt of his philosophy . At the foundati on of Grote 1 s theory of knm-v-
ledge is the division of knowledge into two kinds. In the chapter en-
titled "Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic 11 Grote deals with how one 
11may speak in a double manner of the •object• of knowledge.ulO 
That is, we may either use language thus, we know a thing, a man , 
&c.: or we may use it thus: we knmv such and such things about 
the thing, t he man &c. Language in general, follow~ng its true 
logical instinct, distingui shes between these two applications of 
t he notion of knowledge, the one being ~~~c(V«t , noscere , kennen, 
conna1tre, the other being yv~v~, , scire, wissen, savoir. In 
the origin, the former may be considered more what I have called 
phenomenal--it is the notion of knowledge as acquaintance or f a-
miliarity with what is known: which notion is perhaps more akin 
to the phenomenal bodily communication, and is less purely intel-
lectual than the other: It is the kind of knowledge which we have 
of a thing by the presentationof it to the senses or the repre-
sentation of it in a picture or type, a 'vorstellung.' The other, 
which is what we express in judgments or propositions, what is 
embodied in 1begriffe' or concepts without any necessary imagina-
tive representation, is in its origin the more intellectual notion 
of knowledge .ll 
This distinction of knowledge into two kinds is the basis of a 
whole chapter in one of Bertrand Russell's works.l2 William James states, 
10. Grote, EP, I, 60. 
11. Loc. cit. 
12. Russell, POP, Chap. V. 
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also, t hat 
there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distin-
guishable: we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance 
and knowledge-about. Most languages express the distinction ; thus , 
r~'[;) V'~/ , it(!"~'Vql ; noscere , scire; kennen, wissen; connaitre, 
savoir.l3 
On the same page James adds the following note : 11 Cf. J9hn Grote, Ex.-
ploratio Philosophica , p. 60. 11 The indebtedness of James to Grote is 
left unacknowledged in another of James's works. l4 Also, James has re-
ceived credit for this disti nction between two kinds of knowledge.l5 
Grote in the first sixty pages of Exploratio Philosophica, Part I , 
prepared the way for his division of knowledge into two kinds: 
A sizable, and solid body of doctrine precedes the 'page 60' by 
which Grote has thus far been chiefly ~own, and ••• his position 
is to be rightly judged only in the light of that doctrine.l6 
b. Eaton's debt to Grote 
I t is rather moment ous to notice in a rather recent volumel7 that 
the influence of Grote predominates certain pages. However, the author, 
Dr. Eaton, appears to have been unaware as to how much his chapter on 
"Meaning" (Chapt er I) owes to Grote . To Bertrand Russell appears to go 
a great deal of credit for the distinction of knowledge into two kinds.l8 
This is especially evident from Mr . Russell's article mentioned below,l9 
the title of which indicates the division of knowledge made by Grote. 
13. James, POP, I , 221 . 
14 . James , PBC , 14 . 
15 . Whitmore, SJG, in PR, 36(1927), 310. 
16. \f.hitmore, ££• cit., p. 316. 
17 . Eaton, ST. 
18. (l) Costello, in PR, 35(1926), 574-580. 
(2) Prall, in JP, 24(1927), 71-80. 
19. Russell , in PAS, ll(n.s.)(l910-ll), 108-128. Cf. 353. 
W. R. Sorley makes the significant remark that 
the distinction between acquaintance and knowing about was 
formulated by John Grote, 1Exploratio Philosophica,' Part I 
(1865), ••• More recently its importance has been emphasized 
by 1tr. Russell, e.g., in •Problems of Phil.,' pp. 7lff, where 
universals as well as sense-data are regarded as objects of 
acquaintance.20 
An elaboration of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by de-
scription has Dr. Eaton for its author in various places throughout 
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Symbolism and Truth. The exposition itself is worthy but the source for 
the four chapters (to mention no more) on 'Meaning,' •Universals and 
Individuals: Order , ' •Description and Analysis ' and 'The Metaphysics 
of Knowledge ' is very Grotian. The beginning of the trouble appears to 
have been in James's Principles of Psychology where Grote appears to 
have been overlooked though James possessed a copy of Grote's major work . 
Consequently, James has received recognition for what properly belonged 
to another. Dr. Eaton quotes the following from James: 
Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of view, 
differs from perception only in the extreme simplicity of its 
object or content • • • A pure s ensation is an abstraction.2l 
Such a quotation breathes of Grotian language. Compare with the follow-
ing words of Grote: 
The description of knowledge as a course of experience and the de-
scription of it as a course of analytic and self-correcting judg-
ments--as what many would call sensation, or as reflection in this 
view of reflection--are both what I call abstractions.22 
Such similarities call for attention and especially so when "the scale 
20. Sorley, MVI, 193. 
21. Eaton, ST, 16. 
22. Grote, EP, I, 30. 
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of sensation or knowledge" is made the subject of at least one chapter 
in Exploratio Philosophica (Part I , Chap. VI) and is frequently referred 
to in some form in current philosophy. 
c . Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson 
If James is indebted to Grot e further than he indicates in The 
Principles of Psychol ogy there is no reference to the f act, though i t 
is clearly evident that James had the Exploratio Philosophica before him 
in writing his memorable work. However, it is quite possible that Grote 
himself may have been dependent upon Boswell 's Life of Samuel Johnson 
where Johnson observes: 
Knowledge is of t wo kinds . We know a subject ourselves, or we 
!mow \vhere we can find information upon it. vJhen we enquire into 
any subject, the first thing we have to do is to know what books 
have treated of it. This leads us to look at catalogues, and at 
the backs of books in libraries.23 
Here, indeed, Johnson writes of 1two kinds ' of knowledge. And he 
deals with who kno\<rs rather than what knowledge i s. It is possible, how-
ever, that the sentence, "we know a subject ourselves," might be r egarded 
by Grote as having to do ;vi th 'knowledge of acquaintance, ' and, "We know 
where we can find information upon it , " would be r egarded as only second-
hand information and therefore to call it 'knowledge about ' is a poor sub-
stitute of terms. 
23 . Under the date, April 18, 1775. 
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d. Robinson refers to 
'William James's famous distinction' 
Daniel Sommer Robinson refers to 11 the controversy initiated by 
William James 1 s famous distinction between lmowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge by description, 1124 to which he appends the note: 
The history of these terms is obscure. James evidently did not 
coin them, because they are found in the form, "knowledge of 
acquaintance," and 11 knowledge about," in J. Grote's Ex.ploratio 
Philosophica, Part IJ p. 60, from which they were .taken by 
Joseph:Z5Royce, in the article entitled "Mind," in Hastings' 
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, attributes the terms to 
James. But the distinction itself is at least as old as Hobbes' 
Leviathan. He there said: "There are of knowledge two kinds; 
whereof one is ~nowledge of fact, and the other knowledge of the 
consequence of one affirmation to another. TI1e former is nothing 
else but sense and memory, and is absolute lmowledge • • • The 
latter is called science and is conditional.n26 
It may be added that Professor Robinson's attributing of the distinc-
tion, made by Grote, to Hobbes is at least defensible in so far as he 
(Hobbes) refers to two kinds of knowledge; thus: "There are of knowledge 
two kinds." But that Professor Robinson is correct in labelling the lat-
ter kind as 'knowledge about,' is not clear. For the second type may be 
regarded as either causal or logical knowledge, and in either case it is 
not clear that such knowledge is 'knowledge about.• 
Under the sub-title of 11Perception and Conceptionas Fundamental 
Cognitive Processes 11 in the article 1Mindt27 Josiah Royce gives credit to 
William James for a distinction which is at least as old as the time of 
24. Robinson, POR, 109. 
25. Joseph, I1L, 68. 
26 . Robinson, ££• cit., p. l09n. 
27. Hastings, ERE. 
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John Grote. They are 
two \ofell-lr..nown types of cognitive process, perception and concep-
tion • • • These two have been recognized throughout the historJ 
of science and phj_losophy, and the:Lr familiar contrast has dom-
inated epistemology • • • \I.Jilliam ,James has use, for what is here 
called perception, the term •knowledge of acquaintance.' He dis-
tinguishes 'knowledge of acquaintance' from 'knowledge about.r28 
e. Joseph acknowledges Grote's distinction 
H. w. B. Joseph remarks: 
I t has been frequently pointed out that the English language 
uses only one verb, 1know,' to represent two different acts, 
1rrhich in some languages are distinguished by different verbs: 
the knowledge of acquaintance with a thing, and the knmvledge 
about it. 
To this he appends the footnote: 11 Cf., e. g . J. Grote, 'Ex. Ph.,' Ft. I, 
P. 60--a work and by an author less known than they deserve to be; the 
expressions 'knowledge of acquaintance• and •knowledge about• are bor-
rowed thence. 11 29 
f. lifuitehead 1 s relation to Grote 
One might observe, again, in modern philosophy, an influence at-
tributed to James vThich goes back to the time of Grote. Professor White-
head in elucidating his meaning of •the extensive continuum•30 quotes 
William James in support of the essential relation among all actual en-
tities in the continuum: 
Either your experience is of no content> of no change, or it is 
of a perceptible amount of content or change. Your acquaintance 
with reality grows literally by buds or drops of perception ... 
28. Hastings, ERE. 
29. Joseph, ITL, 55. 
30. Whitehead, PR, pt. II, Chap. 2. 
Int ellectually and on reflection you can divide these into com-
ponents , but as immediately given, they come totally or not at 
all.31 
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The language 'acquaintance with reality ,' and 'immediately given' sug-
gests John Grote on "Immediateness and Reflection . rr32 However, James 
supports his argument by reference to Zeno's 'Arrow in its Flight.' 
g . Ward's adequate reference to Grote 
The division of knowledge into knowledge as acquaintance and know-
ledge about is referred to by James Ward: 
There is an ambiguity in the words 1know 1 and 'knowledge,' which 
Bain seems not to have considered : t o know may mean to perceive 
or apprehend, it may also mean to understand or comprehend. 
To this he appends the footnote, 
Other languages ~ive more prominence to this distinction; compare, yy {.;j V<:ol / and 6-/ cTt! V'q' 1 , nos cere and scire, kennen and wissen, 
connaitre and savoir. On this subject there are some acute re-
marks in a l i ttle-known book, J. Grote , 1Exploratio Philosophica .t33 
h. Sellars' reference to Grote 
The dist inction between the two kinds of knowl edge is also recog-
nized by Roy Wood Sellars: 
For common-sense there are t wo ki nds, or types, of knowledge: 
these are knm'lledge-of-acquaintance and knowledge-about ••• 
lUlowledge-of-acquaintance is , pr·marily, knowledge due to ac-
quaintance, and knowledge-about is knowledge due to inference 
and communication. ~Vhile the English language possesses only 
the word 'know' to designate these two kinds of knowledge, many 
other languages employ two words~ Thus knowledge-of-acquaintance 
31 . Professor Whitehead states that his attention was drawn to this 
passage from reading Religion in the Philosophy of William James, where 
the extract appears. James's words, reproduced here , are from Some 
Problems of Philosophy , chapter X, p. 155. 
32. Grote, EP, II , bk. II, Chap's, I-VIII. 
33. Ward, PP, 86n. 
in Latin is 'cognoscere 1 and knowledge-about is 'scire.' In 
French, there are two corresponding words, 1connattre 1 and 
•savoir'; in German, 'kennen' and •·wissen.' This dist inction 
was emphasized by Grote, and, since his time, has become one 
of the recognized contrasts in knowledge • •• Mr. Russel 
regards the distinction of knowledge-by-acquaintance and know-
ledge-by-description as of fundamental importance for episte-
mology.34 
i. Mackenzie gives proper credit to Grote 
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Professor John Stuart Mackenzie, of Glasgow and Cambridge, gave 
credit to Grote for the phrase "knowledge as acquaintance or familiar-
ity with what is known" (along with a criticism of the phrase) in the 
following: 
A distinction is sometimes drawn between immediate and mediate 
knowledge,35 or, again, between what Mr. Russell calls knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description; but, if we are 
right in our general interpretation of the meaning of knowledge, 
it would seem that all knowledge involves some mediation and 
some element of description. 1~e have, indeed, some immediate 
experiences (e.g. of pain, colour, etc.), but these can hardly 
be called knovrledge. They become knmvledge only when we reflect 
upon them and form beliefs about them; and, in doing this, we 
are always. going beyond what is immediately before us.36 
.i• Brightman's informative reference to 
and aclmm l edgn ent of Grote 
Prof .ssor Edgar .s . Brightman acknowledges Grote's distinction be-
t ;·teen 'knowl edge of acquaintance 1 and 'lmowledge about,' and indicates 
indebt edness of James, Russell, Sorley, and others, to Grote: 
34. Sellars, CR, 257, 259. 
35. (1) Grote, EP, II, bk. II. 
(2) Russell, KAK, in PAS, ll(n.s.)(l910-ll), 108-128. 
(3) Russell , POP, 88 . 
(4) Russell, NSD, in MIN, 22(n.s . )(l913), 76- 81. 
(5) Russell, PM, I, 14. 
36. Mackenzie, ECP, 130n2. 
The distinction between 'knowledge of acquaintance' and 
'knowledge about' was made by John Grote in the Exploratio 
Philosophica, Part I(lS65), pp. 60ff., Part II(l900), pp. 
20lff. It was taken up by James in his Psychology, Vol. I, 
· pp. 22lf ., by B. Russell, who introduced the term 'knowledge 
by description 1 for 'knmdedge about' in 'I'he Problems of 
Philosophy, Chapter V; by W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the 
Idea of God, 2nd ed., pp. 194f., and by others.37 
vii. Two recent and peculiarly significant references 
to Grote's philosophy 
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The foregoing references to John Grote are probably enough to in-
dicate the high regard in which his theory of knowledge is held. Two 
recent philosophers, who have made use of some of Grote's thought, are 
~villiam James and Bertrand Russell. Both appear , inadequately, to have 
given credit due to a predecessor whose thought perennially had and has 
appeared in various f orms . Outside the slight r ef erence to the Explor-
atio Philosophica,JS no acknowledgment appears to have been given to 
Grote either in the work of James or Russell. 
It is probably unnecessary to carry on further investigation to indi-
cate the debt of modern philosophy to one whose name is frequently passed 
over but whose t hought is quite alive in modern moral science and epis-
temology. 
2 . Further critical comment 
To pass over Grote so almost completely as history has done, is 
scarcel y fair to one whose thinking is char acterized by frequent flashes 
of insight if not of genius. It was pointed out above (under "1. Grote's 
position in the history of philosophy") that Grote was largely respon-
37. Brightman, I TP , S3n . 
38. Grote, EP, I, 60 . 
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sible himself for this lack of recognition. He did not write with a 
view to publication but rather in order to clarify his own vi~~s. Much 
of what he vr.rote, therefore, is in the form of, what he himself called, 
'rough notes.' 
His posthumous publications were a complete and painstaking pro-
ject, undertaken by the husband, Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, of his 
adopted niece. Had Grote himself been able to prepare these papers for 
publication he would have had the freedom, which his literary executor 
felt that he did not have, to make extensive alterations, in deleting 
some repetitions, clarifying the style of writing, and possibly putting 
his thoughts in considerably better order. 
Much of Grote's criticism of Descartes, Berkeley, and, sometimes 
Hume and several others, does not seem appropriate. But there is some 
of it that is appropriate. And the appropriateness of it stems from 
his theory of reality as one, but reality as viewed from two possible 
approaches. Just which of these aspects is to be taken depends upon 
whether one wishes to speak in conceptual or phenomenal language. 
The primary difficulty that one will most certainly encounter in 
becoming familiar with Grote's thought, especially as expressed in 
Exploratio Philosophica, is his meaning of 'philosophy' and especially 
of phenomena. What he means by these terms is of prime importance for 
the understanding of Exploratio Philosophica. It is by no means an ex-
aggeration to say that this two-volume work can not be understood unless 
these meanings are grasped . This distinction is a basic requirement in 
the foundation of his epistemology. 
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For 'philosophy ' Grote sometimes uses such terms as, 'conscious-
ness, 1 'logic , t •thought,' 'reason, r 'knowing,' 'understanding, ' 'mental , ' 
and 1 conceptual. 1 For 'phenomena~' he substitutes 1ob ject, 1 •the known,' 
•thing, ' 'physical, ' and 'phenomenal reality.' The one, 'philosophy • is 
never wholly separated from the other phenomenon. Phenomenon is always 
phenomenon for consciousness, or for us, i n some -..vay. It is a term that 
represents the •thing' aspect of reality. The main trouble with refer-
ring to these phenomena for consciousness, as •things,' is that in so 
doing we separate , or abstract, those •things ' from consciousness (or 
ourselves in some other way) as though they were such •things' on their 
own merits. The fact is, as Grote is painstakingly careful to show, they 
are ~·things' in this way. 
This seems l ike a very simple way of expressing what he means, but 
it is amazing how much writing in the field of epistemology seems to 
almost completely overlook this basic and essential distinction. Realis-
tic philosophy, that attempts to analyze 'objects• as though they are 
•things' already there for us to look at , runs against this impregnable 
rock which successfully defies all attempts to remove it. Behaviorism 
falls victim also to this particular and perennial psychological thrust . 
We simply can never deal with •things as they are ' since there are no 
such entities (altogether divorced from ' philosophy'). 
But one of the major types of •offender' (who overlooks this funda-
mental distinction which Grote points out), is the one who will admit 
that we can not have 1objects 1 out of all connection with ourselves, and 
yet who -..vill analyze those 'objects' as though they were not related to 
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us primarily . This is a subtle danger lurking to catch the unsuspecting 
epistemologist unaware. 
In some ways Grote's criticism of several outstanding contemporaries 
was judicious . At least, he attacked some important and well known phi-
losophers whose strength was far more evident than their weakness. If 
he could successfully undermine the basis upon which they wrote, then 
this would be an accomplishment indeed. To the reader making a minute 
study of this approach to contemporaries, such criticisrrsof Grote are 
very convincing. 
These critical remarks are frequently rather difficult to read. The 
reason for this is that the style is laborious and frequently interspersed 
with parenthetical clauses that prolong the sense and often require first 
a reading excluding the parentheses and then a reading including them. 
This is also a reason why a hasty pen1sal of Grote's writing on epistem-
ology makes only a minimum amount of sense. One has to read on contin-
uously in some sections, particularly in the ExEloratio Philosophica , 
to get the meaning that othe~~ise one fancies one gets yet does not. This 
is surely an enigmatical way to write, and Grote could have improved on it 
greatly . 
In his various writings certain main influences are noticeable. The 
modern philosopher who influenced him most was Kant. He was i mpressed, 
apparently, by Kant's thoughts on space and time, on the 'ground thought 
of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' as the disengaging of •the action of 
intelligence from all application and actual use of it• in order •to see 
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what it is in itself,•39 and on the manifold and its relation to exper-
ience. He was also impressed by evidences of dualism in Kant. 
Also, as pointed out in the last chapter of this dissertation, 
Grote seems to have been much impressed by the idealism of Plato. vn1at 
constitutes a •thing' to be v1hat it is, is 11 that in it which Plato con-
ceived to correspond to the idea, that which I have variously called • 
• • the meaning, purpose, etc., the reason • • ,. of it. n40 His Platonic 
idealism becomes especially evident in his writings on ethics, where he 
insists that it is not simply our capacities for happiness that govern 
our conduct, but our total selves which seem to be motivated by some-
thing more that utilitarian pleasure . In short, Grote insists we are 
motivated by something that takes into account the whole of us p 
I 1.ean by 'ideal' anything which we mentally set before ourselves 
as the purpose or -rule of our action, and (as will have been seen 
from all that I have said) I do not regard anything as a proper 
ideal for our conduct, a true ideal, except as being fact or part 
of fact, representing or expressing fact. But then it is not the 
fact of our ordinary understanding (which can only furnish us 
~~for action, not purposes): it is the fact of our imagination, 
intuition, belief, inward vision, however we like to describe it.41 
It should be noted also that Grote's idealism is personalistic. It 
is personalistic in two main senses. First, this personalistic idealism 
engages the whole person in aspiring after an objective or ideal, the 
s1~~um bonum, which in Pl?to is the Good and in Aristotle eudaemonia or 
happiness akin to ecstasy. Second, this personalistic idealism is 
39. Grote, EP, I, 18 . 
40. Grote, 2£• cit., p. 112. 
41. Grote, EP, II , 324. 
evident in the emphasis that Grote lays upon the 'philosophical' con-
sciousness, or 'idea' side of his epistemology without which there is 
no being of any sort. All existence must be such for persons; there 
is no other existence. 
Regarding Grote's belief in deity, it should be noted that he is 
professedly and actually a theist. He believes that the universe is 
God-created, and that human beings are a part of this harmonious and 
self-consistent creation.42 Also, in addition to the natural world is 
11 a nature above all this. 11 
By reason of his knowledge and consciousness, man is a partaker of 
this 'higher' nature. Man's thoughts point to this higher realm while 
his phenomenal being refers to phenomenal nature. In the universe there 
is 11 a Pl anner or Maker with his ideas and his purposes. 11 In short, 
though Grote is neither frequent nor insistent in his references to the 
deity, yet there is sufficient evidence as noted above, that he is ftlil-
dam.entally theistic. 
42. Grote, EP , II, 36. 
APPENDIX 
AN EXPOSITION OF THE MISCELLANEOUS 
~vHITINGS OF JOHN GROTE 
I. 110n a Future state"l 
1. Glorification of body and mind 
In the first part of this article Grote speaks about the glorifi-
cation of the body and of the mind. The glorification of the former as 
well as of the latter, must be through an ideal, in a manner compatible 
with its nature. Whatever form this glorification will take remains 
very indefinite and comparatively unimportant, in comparison with the 
gl orifTcation of mind. Grote does not explicitly state what he means 
by ' glorification. ' 
2. Simplicit of style and thought in this article 
This article labors under the confusion necessitated by a Purit an-
ical conception of a future life. It is somewhat different than one 
might expect from the author of Exploratio Philosophica, where personal-
ist ic humanism is so prominent . One might readily conjecture that this 
fragment was written for people who had not adapted themselves to modern 
t heological analyses . I t is written from.a popular standpoint and is 
exceedingly simple--much after the fashion of a Sunday School quarterly 
lesson. For example, Grote states that if we have lived an evil l ife 
up t o t he present we should make the best of what lies before us. The 
1. These miscellaneous writings follow , generally, as close to a 
chronological order as it was possible to fi gure from some dates appended. 
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narrative tal<es the form of exlJ.Ortation rather than of philosophical ex-
ploration which is so characteristic of the Exploratio Philcsophica. 
3. Effect of present life on the future 
In the future state the body \...rill have gone through a process of 
remodelling which will bear the traces of the present life. Just what 
the remodelled body will be like Grote does not state. However, he at-
tributes as much perfection as possible to it . 'I'he mind will be modi-
fied also but the nature of our present l i fe will have an influence upon 
the future state of the mind. 
4. Manner of individual appearance 
in a future life is unimportant 
Grote does not consider the question important as to how each indi-
vidual will appear before men and angels. 'I'his problem evidently was 
prepared for the unsophisticated theological ~nd somewhat incapable of 
independent speculation. "Minds, 11 Grote states, 
must there see into each other, far more th~n they do here; but 
they will have no desire and no care to do so in such a manner 
as to give pain; each will have his own burden to bear, and will 
only be considered with t hose of others in so far as there may be 
a possibility of lightening them.2 
5. stress on the importance 
of both present and future life 
The future state implies another life as well as a continuance of 
the present one. If one were t o consider future life as too important 
one would run into the danger of deprecating the value of present life, 
and if one were to consider future life as wholly unimportant one would 
2. Grote, CR, 18(187l)j 134 . 
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give too much place to the present life. Grote does not wish to go 
deeply into any theological implications. 
Grote remarks that injury done to one's fellow-man is injury done 
against God. Unwise conduct is the outcome of too little stress upon 
present life. 
God showed how He took all sins upon Himself, made himself, so to 
call it, the great sufferer of all wrong that had been done, in 
order that he might have a right to forgive it in that character, 
as well as in His character • • • Christ in his death is at once 
the pledge of the completeness of God's pardon, and the universal 
Reconciler of all immortal men . 3 
We have no reason to think that our fello\llr- beings will be less 
interesting to us, or less cared for by us, there than here~ It 
is the nearer presence and the clearer view of Him (God) which 
will be the source of the truer understanding of, and better 
SJ'lllpath T with, them.4 
6 • Com1nent 
In short, this article appears to have been prepared for a religious 
audience which for the most part were not expected to be interested in 
traditional arguments in favor of immortality, except Christ's view of 
the future life. Probably the article was prepared for such audience 
as The Contemnora~r Review reached, though Grote could have delivered 
the content as part of a sermon. 
3. Grote, CR, 18(1871), 139. 
4 . Grote, ££• cit., p . 140. 
369 
II. "On Glossology" 
1. Concerning terminology 
i. Break in Grote's projected work on glossology 
In 1872 two articles of Grote's appeared in The Journal of Philolo~y, 
and in 1874 one article. The v10rk vras 'to be cont inued, 1 as pointed out 
at the end of the third article, in this periodical but was not, for 
some, apparently, unknovm reason. 
ii. ' Phone' and 'noem' 
The key i<Tords for all Grote's \;rorlc published in The Journal of 
Philology are ' phone' and 'noem.' The former of these is from tf wv~ , 
the latter from v0''1.uct. . 'Noem' refers to the 'thought-word.' 1'\rJhen I 
mean words as thought I shall use the term noem."5 This is true not only 
for single v10rds but even sentences (as well as nouns, verbs, particles, 
etc). 'Phone' refers to words as sounds. 'l'he adjectives 'phonal' and 
'noematic' are employed in conjunction with the nouns. Modifications of 
the noems and phones have the term of 1phonal 1 or 1noematic t ' schematisms' 
applied to them. Languages differ from each other in two respects, (1) 
'noematically,' in respect to what is expressed (i.e. , what the sound 
expresses), and (2) 'phonally,' in respect to the sounds expressed. 
'Noematism' refers to everything, generally, from the concrete to the 
abstract . 
5. Grote, JOP, 4(1872), 55. 
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iii. 'Phonism' and •noematism' 
The vihole 'noematism' of any language does not differ so greatly 
from the noematism of any other, though the syntactical difference may 
be considerable. The case is different with ' phonism.' vfuere radical 
'phones' are used, the distribution of these among the noerns are sub-
ject to various laws of schematism. 1rfuat Grote means by 1 schematism' 
is close to Kant's meaning, namely (and briefly) 1 according to a rule. ' 
All this is responsible for the various differences between one lan-
guage and another . 
iv . I deas of physical •things ' 
Phones are attempts to express the noems, and careful use must be 
made of these in order that the noems of one language may correspond 
with the respective noems of another language. ~ihat Grote wants to ex-
press by the term 1noem 1 is precisely what once must have been meant by 
the word. 1thing.• The noem, however, has more general application than 
•thing,' because it has reference not only to what is supposed to ~e 
substantial existence, but to relations, actions, etc., of every kind. 
The noem has reference, then, to whatever is conceivable in the universe, 
on the one hand, and to whatever is expressible as a whole or in part, 
on the other. It would seem, then, that Grote holds that for every noem 
a 'phone' is possible however inadequate the phone may be in expressing 
the noem. 
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v. Stomatism 
A synthetic approach may be taken tm'/ard the examination of the 
human vocal or ganism, exhibiting it \'lrith all of its phonic power, or the 
total of its vocal elements and the relation of these elements to each 
other. Conversely~ an analytic approach may be taken where each actual 
existing utterance is examined and its physical constitution and condi-
tions determined. For this latter process Grote uses the term ' stomatism.• 
Stomatistic investigations, Grote maintains ~ are of importance chief-
ly in regard to writing, where there is a presentation of phones to the 
eye. But greatly independent of the phonism of a language, the noematism 
might deal with vrhat is presented to the eye~ or it could be written. 
Thus the noem tism of a language could become far removed from the phon-
ism. In the Chinese written languagej for example, Grote points out , 
there is a close correlation between the noematism nd the phonism of a 
language. 
vi. 'Hypophonism' 
A phone may be partly represented by phonograms. \llhen these phone-
grams, considered individually, are put together, they cannot make up the 
complete phone needed. Much must remain to be understood which is unex-· 
pressed. Bypophonism is concerned with this great amount that is under-
stood. Hypophonism must go along with phonogrammatism, and must be con-
sidered of great significance when we speak of a language being ambiguous. 
This is probabl y what Reid had in mind when he stated that "when 
men att empt to define things which cannot be defined, their definitions 
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will alrmys be either obscure or false. rr 6 In order t hat a person may 
be able to master a language~ not oRly the noematic elements must be 
understood but the phonal also . Moreover~ the forming of' a phonal 
sound and the forming of an idea are entirely different though they may 
readily accompany each other . 
2 . The philosophy of language 
i. Four d "visions 
In the philosophy of language, accordin to Grote , there are cer-
tain main l i nes which should be noted; in regard to (1) 1noematism, ' 
(2 ) 'noematoschematism,' (3) construction of a 1 phonarium, 1 and 
(4) 1dianoematism.' 
ii. •Noematism ' 
In respect to the first of these, namely, noematism, the center of 
the noems are determined. \.1Jhat is meant by this is the maintenance of 
the r elati on of the primarJ meaning of the phone to the sub-meanings of 
it, or what Grote calls the ' protonoem' to the ' paranoem.' 
A very good example of a book which i llust rates the relation of the 
protonoems to the paranoems is Liddell and Scott, Greek Lexi con . Here 
the problem of subsUlJ.'Iing paranoems syt ematically as species under the gen-
eral noems as genus is very cl early presented. There are examples , Grote 
continues , of books that do not classify systematical ly paranoems under 
protonoems . One such example is Richardson, Arabic nd Persian Dictionary , 
from which, Grote cont ends, one inclines to come to the conclusion that 
6 . Hamilton, vTTR, I , 220 . 
373 
vrords have no definite meaning at all, since the catalogue of possible 
renderings is so arbitrary, unconnected, and multifarious. Lexicography 
has, generally, however, grouped lists of words in proper order and sub-
o~dination, so the possibility of great variety of meaning in words can 
be understood. This is particularly evident in the case of the compari-
son of one language with another. 
The no ems not only must be defined in respect to their cente r s and 
boundaries but also must be classified or enumerated. Though this 
classification is somewhat the same as the determination of the centers 
of the noems yet it cannot be made tr.e practical basis for language since 
the phones of language occupy such an important place. 
iii . 'Noematoschematism' 
'Noematosc.lematism' is that whic treats the noems through the ar-
itrary rnedi m of phones. The phones exist merely for the matter of ex-
pression, but are very necessary as such in order that the noerns may be 
expressed. 
iv. 'Phonarium' 
In an attempt to formulate a full 'phonarium,' whi ch is the comple-
tion of the schematization of the phones, one must appreciate the arbi-
trary nature of the phones. I t is this arbitrary nature which makes 
possible the communication by means of rhones and forms a foundation for 
the elements of language. It is the purpose of etJlnOlogy as commonly 
practiced to strip the phones of all the noematic quality with an attempt 
to find counterparts with words of other lan6Uages. This is done to the 
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neglect of much of the essentially arbi t rary characteristics of the 
phones . 
v. 1 Dianoematism 1 
Dianoematism is that which is concerned with the expression of one 
noem or idea by means of another or others. Thus by dwelling upon a 
word or its meaning, wide views as to the noems of the written vrords 
may be attained; this contemplation on the meaning of a vrord is 'dia-
noematism. 1 That is, to give a ~rord a stereotyped meaning kills its 
dianoematism. For there is much more in a word than can be brought out 
by the word written, or by phones . There is really no such a process 
as 1 tra~sdianoematism 1 practicable. By transdianoematism is meant the 
process by which one language, wanting one word from anotter, would in~ 
corporate the actual phone, the idea or noem of which it does not ossess. 
\tJhat, instead, is actual ly done is t o translate the phones of which the 
other language is compounded. That is, it forms words with their o~m 
respective phones and with similar composition or dianoematism. 
A word may be taken over by one language from another, to which a 
very different phone than that of the original may be attached, because 
the phone in the one language may possess a very different idea than the 
corresponding phone in the other. 
vi. In extreme cases the modification in 
noematism is very great 
'J:he noematism of words undergoes a very great change in extreme 
cases which Grote indicates in his use of the '\'lord 'perinoematism. t7 
7. This word is explained above . 
375 
The feature of perinoematism ~vbich most readily presents itself is 
'impejoration 1 or the change for the worse in the moral signification 
of words. This law (if one may call it such) is on y part of a still 
wider one where a vrord becomes more and more impotent. This latter law 
is entit led 'trivialization' or 'evaporation.' These laws are the most 
important ones in perinoematism. The former is the outcome of 'euphemism' 
and the latter of ' grandi loquence.' Both euphemism and grandiloquence 
are the result of 1levity 1 of speech. When levity is employed so that 
exaggeration takes place, and a thing is given a name worse than it de-
serves, the result is what Grote entitles 'im~elioration.' Again there 
are the laws of ' generalization' and 'particularization' which corres-
pond, respectivel, , to the earlier and the later growths of language. 
There is a sub-law called 1deflection 1 or 'side-change,' where the change 
of meaning takes place as in particularization or generalization. In 
particularization there is a tendency to extend the application of a 
word, \vhile the opposite is the case in generalization. 
3. Criticism of Tooke 
All the words immediately above concern the dianoematism of words . 
Grote presents them in order to clarify glossology from his point of view. 
In order to support his ovm arguments and manifest the futility of those 
of others Grote deals >-fi th Horne Tooke's treatment. Grote 's general 
criticism of Tooke s that he mistakes the form of words for their dia-
noematism. Too~s system of derivation of meaning from the form of words 
was admirable in consideration of the small amount of work that had been 
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done previo sly on the sub j ect. A sin le example of the general mistake 
that Tooke makes may be observed in the folloHing : 
His interlocutor is in doubt how the people of Melinda should be 
~escribed, with whom it is the custom to use their left hand exactly 
as we use our right,and vice versa. Was De Gama correct in de-
scribing them as all left-handed? 
H. T.: "With reference to Eur pean custom the author describes them 
truly . But the people of Melinda are as right-handed as the Portu-
guese; for they use that hand in preference which is ordered by 
their custom, and8leave out of employ the other which is therefore their left hand." 
What Tooke neglects is the dianoematism of the 'right' and 'left' 
hand . He derives the meaning of the words from what is decreed by cus-
tom; his mistake is the one of neglect to see that 'right' and 'left' 
are facts of nature. What Grote means by this is that the words 'right 1 
and 'left ' are called so not because of custom but by reason of something 
in thought which underlies the very words themselves. There is a mean-
ing independent of and antecedent to the words, though t o what extent 
different peopl e mean the same thing must remain a problem of conjecture. 
4 . Criticism of Trench 
J~ter an examination of Tooke's etymological conclusion Grote next 
considers the glossology of Richard Chenevix Trench. Grote believes t hat 
Trench generally correctly examines words and their meanings. Yet. he 
believes that he lays too much stress upon the dictionary meaning of 
wor ds, for example , "plague means properly, and according to its deriva-
t i on, blow or stroke."9 
8 . Grote, JOP, 5(1874), 161. 
9. Grote, ££• cit., p . 169. 
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vfuat Grote does not agree with is the etymology of the "!ord taken 
as indicating the whole, and final, meaning. The dianoematism of words, 
Grote contends, is just as important. Due to changes in the meaning of 
words through generalization and particularization, the meaning of words 
constantly changes. This is true of words such as 'wretch,' which came 
eventually to involve wickedness when the original meaning would have 
reference to misfortune. Grote asserts that the immoral bearing of the 
later word is due to the attempt to exaggerate what the original word 
•wretch' signified. This exaggeration is the result of a certain levity 
of all speech. In contrast to Trench, Grote states that generalization 
and particularization caused by a certain levity of language is respon-
sible for the differentiation of language, whereas if words continued 
in their etymological signification there would be a general tendency 
to less adaptation. In another manner of speaking, one might say in 
commenting on Grote's criticism of Trench, that this means that if Trench 
had things his mm way at the beginning of language there would be no 
language at all. 
5. Comment 
At least Grote has shown in this article that it is possible to 
philosophize on the meaning and derivation of words. One basic note is 
sounded throughout this article by Grote, namely, that to regard dog-
matically any estimate of the meaning, etc., of words as final, is an 
error. 
Grote has used many terms in this article that are foreign to phi-
losophy. Their nature is of little or no concern for philosophy generally. 
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But he has shorm to some small extent at least, what one may seem justi-
fied in calli ng a philosophy of etymology. 1bis philosophy of etymol gy 
(if we may call it such) has a successor which is called by a somewhat 
different namej semantics, or 11 the study of the relation of sign to the 
objects to which the signs are applicable .ulO This l ater study is by 
no means remotely related to philosophy and a few present- day writers 
have ve~J considerably enriched t~e field of semantics . 
10. Morris , in Runes, DOP, 288. 
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III. 11 Thought vs. Learning" 
l. A contrast 
'fhe sub-title of "Thought vs. Lea.rning 11 i s 11 An Address to Self-
educated Men. 11 The substance of the ·article may be conjectured to a 
certain extent. One might say that Grote here is attempting to indicate 
the clear distinction between 'intelligence' and 'education' even though 
he does not act ually use these words in contrast to each other . Or the 
difference betY.reen the two may be further i ndicated by the method of 
Socrates and that of the Sophists as well as suggested by the vwrds of 
the titl e , 1thought ' and 'learning.' 
2 . Use of one's own mind is of chief importance 
By •thought' Grote means individual judgment or the using of one's 
own mind rather than plagiarizing from the minds or writings of other • 
By 'learning' he means, roughly speaking, the opposite, or, that is, 
virtual plagiarizing . To make the discussion of the contrast somewhat 
modernistic Grote attempts to show that it is true of his day as well 
as of centuries before to consider the importance of finding out what 
should be learned, rather than what may be learned . That i s, it is of 
great importance to realize that those who have not had the advanta es 
of education, may know the way in which education may be sought . Intel-
ligence may remain unaffected whether books are read or not. I t is more 
important to think than to read. An evident example is Descartes who 
felt that after all his reading he must yet find a method of his own 
whereby truth might be f ound. Hobbes said that if he had read as much 
as others he would have been equally uneducated as they, or have talked 
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as much nonsense as t hey talked. The Socratic method was through thought 
r ather t han through learning . Socrates , Grote states, asserted that he 
had not been able to learn anything, at least after the manner of his 
own age. 
3. Thought and learning stagnation 
The worst form of mental disease is thought stagnation, not learn-
ing stagnation. Grote contends that the latter may e1ren lead to the 
paralyzing of thought, unless it is ,,fisely pursued. ~Vhat is of very 
great importance is the use of one's own mind and lack of direct reliance 
upon the thought of others. There is little danger of relying too much 
upon the thought of others since man constantly recognizes himself as 
a social organism. 
Of the two daughters of language, thought is far the more Lmportant , 
for this inward talk, where the sympathy is imaginative only, is 
very often the most real society .ll 
Books need not be relied upon too greatly for one's own thought may 
contain as much as they contain. This is not to discountenance the value 
of books but to recognize that it is of utmost importance to use the mind 
in thinking independently ~ concentrating, etc. To say that they possess 
what we cannot grasp without knowing something of history, for example, 
concerning the dialogues of Plato, is not the whole truth or even much 
more than a small part of it . The danger is that unless this fact is 
recognized one may come to the conclusion that -vmrks, even like Plato's, 
cannot be understood except by the educated man. "~at is wanted for 
11. Grote, TVL, in Gl.~, 12 ( 1871) , 820. 
381 
• entering into much of the best thought ••• is not more knowledge , 
but that their minds should move better under the knowledge which they 
have already. 1112 And again, 
If we want something to think about, let us think about words. Our 
stock of language is a great book in our minds always ready for us 
to read, suggesting to us all kinds of images which as Milton could 
do no more than put together, and full of home-made philosophy of 
the kind which Socrates brought to bear against the book philosophy 
of the Sophists. i'Je have all this in our mouths wit~out giving it 
a thought, WP~le we are mUrmuring that our minds are empty and 
stagnant, because what we want of other people's thought is per-
haps denied us.l3 
4. Comment 
The fact that this article ~'las published in the journal, Good Words, 
is sufficient to indicate its simplicity. The sub-title is very de-
scriptive, 11 An Address to Self-educated Men. 11 The brief work is de-
signed to be encouraging, adulatory and optimistic. It shows that it 
is of much gre.ater importance to do one's own thinking than to be greatly 
dependent upon the opinions and views of others to the neglect of reliance 
upon one's own mental capacities. 
12. Grote, TVL , in G~, 12(1871), 819. 
13 . Grote, ££• cit., p. 823. 
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IV. 11 Pascal and Montaignen 
1. A brief comparison 
Grote points out that Pascal was a great admirer of Montaigne and 
though he resembled him in certain respects he differed from him very 
greatly in others. He was alike Montaigne in his depreciation of human 
reason even to the extent of pessimism: 11 From the Port Royalists he may 
have learned to take a dark view of human nature, as he had learnt from 
Montaigne to take a depreciatory view of human intelligence.ul4 
2. Pascal's devotion to religion 
Pascal was not so wholly absorbed by the controversy of his time 
even though he entered into argumentation with the Jansenists and Jesuits. 
He was ardently devoted to any causes which opposed irreligion. Grote 
refers to 11 the old faith" before the rise of Protestantism. This faith 
embraced both outspoken opponents who were absorbed by Protestantism, and 
despisers who n,tTere led to attach themselves to the old faith, i n the way 
of obedience and profession, more than othe~dse would have been the 
case." Pascal was not so interested in this cleavage in the church as 
he 'vas concerned with opposing irreligion. 
3. Montaigne•s neopaganism 
Grote classified Montaigne (and also Erasmus to a somewhat lesser 
extent) as an adherent of neopaganism, a sort of 'mental Renaissance.•l5 
This Renaissance was the outcome of a bizarre mixture of ancient phi-
losophy used to the detriment of existing mediaeval religion and to the 
14. Grote, PAM, in CR, 30(1877), 288. 
15. Grote, ££• cit., p. 286. 
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disrepute of the Ancients upon which it claimed to be based. This de-
structive criticism threatened to overwhelm mediaeval Christianity in 
the cause of which Pascal became an ardent exponent. 
Montaigne probably \·Jas taken with levity by all of his readers 1:vi th 
the exception of Pascal. Grote claims that Pascal was inclined to take 
Montaigne 1 s utterances too literally and therefore missed much of the 
irresponsible inconclusiveness, which Montaigne intended. Not only was 
there a threatening influence hovering over philosophy and theology but 
over the conclusions of science also. Within science there were two 
elements one of which was hostile to religion, namely positivism, by 
reason of its refusal to accept anything as existing beyond physical 
fact. The other element was favorable to religion. This element was 
the scientific spirit which believed that there is truth and that it is 
obtainable, a fact which ultimately demolished a great deal of the in-
differentism and inconclusiveness inherent wi thin the work of Montaigne. 
Pascal's Pensees , especially in the firs t chapter, is directly op-
posed to Montaigne 1 s inconclusiveness. Pascal argues from the vreakness 
and want of man and the reality of religion, and not from despairing 
scepticism. Though it was a last request of his father to translate 
Raymond Sebond 1 s Natural Theolog,y, Montaigne concluded in defense of the 
volume that since man vras unable to judge properly of religion he must 
dogmatically accept it . To a certain extent, Pascal, too, depreciated 
human reason because of the weakness which he felt to be inherent in man. 
Pascal reasoned, therefore, to religion as supplying a great need for 
hQmanity, while Montaigne argued to irreligion vdth the assertion that 
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it didn 1 t make much difference whether the truth of anything might ever 
be found out. Grote believed that Pascal went somevlhat too far in 
starting vJith scepticism and ending with the importance of revealed re-
ligi.on: 
I have endeavored, in all that I have 1tJTitten about hUJnan nature, 
to ayoid both the cynic indifference of Montaigne, and what t"le 
must call the complaint and repining of Pascal • l·Je may have 
Pascal's earnestness without his bitterness or his determined look-
ing at things on the worst side .l 6 
At one moment he vlrites as one who is himself painfull;y- conscious 
of the weakness, the complications, and difficulties of human 
life; at another, as one who is simply satisfied to turn to ac-
count in proof of reli.gion~l7 
4. Pascal on happiness 
Grote quotes from Pascal's Pensees to support the Lmportance of 
happiness: "L'homme est visiblement egare, et sent en lui des restes 
dtun etat heureux, dont il est dechu, et qu 1il ne peut recou:vrer." This 
is a much healthier attitude toward human life that Pascal takes here. 
~mere he goes to an extreme incompatible with this statement may be ob-
served in the following: 1'V.Jhy," says Grote, 
should it be necessary for Pascal to say that the desire for truth 
and happiness, impossible in our present state to be gratified, is 
left to us from our former one, not only to show to us that there 
has been such a former one, but to punish us? Would it not have 
been a greater punishment to us if it had not been left to us? 
This is what I have called his needless severity, and making the 
worst of ever)~hing.l8 
16. Grote, PAM, in CR, 30(1877), 288. 
l?. Grote, 9.£• ~-, p. 289. 
18. Grote, ££• cit., p. 29le 
5. Comment 
This article, written for a current journal vfith a vlide circulation, 
was composed in a very simple style and presents rather obvious and con-
trasting traits in Pascal and Montaigne. It reveals Pascal's strong de-
votion to religion and Montaigne 1 s professed irreligion. This brief work 
is chiefly descriptive of main traits in each man's thought. 
V. "On the Dating of Ancient History" 
1. Dating of events by two methods--
epochal and eponymous 
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In his article bearing the above title, published in the Journal of 
Classical and Sacred Philology, in 1854, Grote examines the various 
methods in use for the dating of events which took place before the 
Chris tian era. He makes the general statement that time is not only 
measured but also marked, and it is vdth the marking thet Grote is es-
pecially concerned here. If chronology is to be trust-,rorthy it must 
be contemporary, or 'epochal,' so that comparisons may be made. The 
opposite of this is the manner of reckoning called 'epon;y-mous, ' or 
successional. Of course the epochal manner of marking may involve the 
epon~~ous but not vice versa. Grote's whole essay is based upon the 
manners of reckoning, epochal and eponymous. 
2. Dynastical reckoning 
Epochal reckoning was characteristic of the East rather than of the 
Ti'fest. Tne first recorded epochal marldng known in secular writing -.,ras 
the years of Nebonassar (called so, by the Greek astronomers cf Egypt). 
The Nebonassar reckoning was a dynastical form which 1.vas contemporaneous 
vdth the reckoning of years of kings. This dynastical marking of time 
'·ras modified later by the influence of Rome. 
3. Olympiadic dating 
In the Hest, in Greece, t he reckoning of time was carried on var-
iously by the many states. Probably the beginning of any other form of 
writing took place when the dynastical reckoning of the East first came 
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to the attention of the Greeks. Timaeus, who was the first to give a 
complete history of the v..rorld, found it expedient to use a contemporary 
form of marking. He employed the Olympiadic dating which became recog-
nized by all the states of Greece. Eratosthenes improved the method of 
Timaeus and chronologized records even before the first OlJ~piad, one 
of which was the Trojan War. This war became the startine- point of the 
traditional history of Rome, rather than of Greece. Timaeus may be re-
garded as the originator of epochal dating both in Greece and Rome. 
4. Dating by lunar months 
With the establishment of Roman dominion over the whole of the knovm 
world a more universal marking of time eventuated. The lunar months be-
came fairly definitely established as the recognized form of dating. 
However, the neglected quarter of a day in three hundred and sixty-five 
was responsible for much error. Grote believes that the imperial domin-
ion of Rome meritoriously supplemented the science of the East in the 
establishment of an accurate chronological dating . 
5. Dating originating in Christendom 
\l!ith the origin of Christianity J dating was improved. The Hebrew 
scriptures penetrated Greek thought and the establishing of events with-
in these scriptures became the object of much attention chiefly because 
of the advantages afforded by contemporary dating . Moreover, the lunar 
reckoning of the Jews in establishing a proper date for Easter, gave a 
further impetus to accurate contemporary dating. Also, the Christian 
era began to occupy the minds of men so markedly that the beginning of 
it took on a particular significance even though due to various adjust-
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ments the birth of Christ is approximately fixed at 4 B.C. This was only 
one influence in the dating of historical events. The importance of 
Dionysius in fixing the date of the Incarnation as the beginning of an 
epoch should not be overlooked. 
6. Other methods of dating 
The dating of history before the birth of Christ occasioned much 
dispute. Because chronology v-ras so uncertain no epoch could be agreed 
upon. Hence, the method of dating backward came into common use as early 
as the sixteenth century. The dating by epochs depending upon the par-
ticular country considered is the method favored by some, despite the 
backward dating. 
7. Present and future methods of dating 
Grote regards the present system of dating of events in ancient his-
tory as better than any other previous system. However, he believes that 
there is stil l a better method that might be used 1-fhere time might be 
measured in 'chiliads,' each chiliad referring to 1000 ·ears. 1be dis-
cussion of this system is the climax in all systems that have been used 
in dating of ancient history or of all possible ones, according to Grote. 
The system is rather elaborate and its study in detail appears unnecessary 
here . 
VI. 110rigin and Meaning of Roman Names 11 
1. Significance of •nomen,• 'praenoemen,' 
and 'cognomen' 
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Grote states that a complete Roman name consisted of at least a 
'nomen. ' Frequently associated with this was a 'praenomen 1 v1hich pre-
ceded the 1nomen 1 and a 1 cognomen 1 which followed. 1Nomen 1 refers to 
what the person was called, originally. Generically, it was the name 
which referred to large numbers. 'Praenomen' particularized the refer-
ence since i t applied to individual members • 'Cognomen, ' when it ap-
peared vdth 'nomen' standing as surname, signified a particular famil y. 
Hm,rever, 'cognomen' did not usually appear since it was a sort of nick-
name applied to the person because of some peculiar characteristic. On 
the other hand, 'praenomen' was always a part of the name. 
2. Criticism of Plutarch 
According to Grote, Plutarch was a great offender in his attempt 
to trace the coenomen of names to some particular defect or peculiar 
trait in the character of the person to whom the name was originally at -
tached. Although he is correct in so doing in some cases, yet in the 
later days of the Roman republic cognomination. was rife and was an 
Oriental naming rather than Roman. 
3. Change in a Roman name 
Gradually the full Roman name under-went change so that the simpli-
city which once attached to the name by reason of the explicit 'nomen' 
changed to complexity and when the praenomen partially or wholly dropped 
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away the cognomen or even a title might take its place. 1he general re-
lation of the words of the complete name may be noted in the following: 
The relation of the cognomen to the nomen is not difficult: 
that of the regular praenomen to the nomen is more difficult, and 
in some respects, so far as we can make it out, more interesting, 
as bringing us nearer the origin and principle of the 1·1hole system.l9 
vVhat Grote means is that the original name consisted always of the 
praenomen and the nomen and this relation is more interesting than the 
relation of cognomen to nomen, even though the changes of praenomen may 
be more complicated. The cognomen was originally merely an appendage 
which variously took on considerable significance . 
4. Criticism of Varro 1s view 
The origin of Roman names appears to have been in binominalism, ac-
cording to !}rote, rather than in one name as Varro contends. Varro ap-
parently would base his attestation upon the singleness of, for example, 
the name 'Romulus.' However, this particular name, like others, had a 
second name, namely, 1Quirinus.' 
5. Present-day names based on 
Roman rather than on Greek 
Grote makes the significant statement that the names of the present 
day owe more to Roman language than to Greek. That this is so may readily 
appear from the f act of the existence of the bi vocabulary naming , '·lhich 
the praenomen and the nomen reveal. The Greek names may have been re-
sponsible for a certain portion of the 'cognomen' of the complete Roman 
19 . Grote, OMR, in JCP, 11(1855) , 268 . 
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name. T'nat is, the cognomen vihen derived from the Greeks , as it often 
was, had no reference to a peculiar characteristic of the individual 
nor vras it a nickname. From the Roman naming there has been a divergence 
because of the prevalence amon European peoples of family naming. Hence 
what is now the Christian name is of least importance as compared with 
the surname, when in the Roman naming what stands for the Christian name 
today was then the most important name. Exactly how. the change actually 
took place appears some'.vhat indefinite , Grote concludes. Use has es-
tablished the present m nner of naming . An example appears in the 
follovring: 
Once John or William was the proper or generic name, and Johnson, 
Williamson, or the name of the place of residence, additions for 
the purpose of differentiating or distinguishing one John or 
Hillium from another: now use has altered this, and, if a man 
is asked his name , he mentions his surname, the Christian name 
serving simply as a specific differentiation, a distinction with-
in the family.20 
20. Grote, OMR, in JCP, 11(1855), 257-258. 
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Conclusion to Miscellaneous Vvri tings 
In the foregoin . miscellaneous wri tings, Grote reveals his versa-
tility of interests . The articles are summarized mainly in this work, 
with comments in var · ous places throughout. \ihere the particular sub-
ject that Grote writes on seemed to call for it , a separate and brief 
comment was made at the close of the summa:r-.;r of the article. 
The subjects on which Grote writes are somewhat generally technical 
and not designed to decl with what is ordinarily classified under phi-
losophy . The audience that Grote reached was likely to appreciate the 
most of what he ~~ote in these miscellaneous articles. The type of 
journal publishing the writing is fairly indicative of the popular vein 
in which Grote expresses himself. Of course, a subject like 110n 
Glossology" is specialized, not written from the popular viewpoint, and 
is of interest mainly in the field of philology . In his miscellaneous 
writings Grote reveal s a considerable breadth of interest, though he 
can scarcely be classed as a prolific writer considering the importance 
of the Kni ghtbridge Chair he held in Cambridge University . 
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This dissertation is the result of an investi gation of the writings of 
John Grote with attention being directed chiefly upon his principal works, 
Exploratio Philosophica (in two Parts), A Treatise on the Moral Ideals, and 
An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy. All additional writings that 
are available anywhere have been critically examined and treated in an Ap-
pendix. Grote's most important work in philosophy is t he EJ~loratio Philo-
sophica, in t wo volumes. 
Grote made a si gnificant contribution in having coined many new words, 
and introduced them in England. Some of these words have not been adopted 
and others have begun to find their way into common use. Examples are 
'personalism' as a philosophic term, 'relativism,' 'nervicity,' 'hedonics,' 
'cosmocentric,' 'intuitivism,' 'adstance,' 'biobjectal,' and many others . 
Grote's chief contribution is found in his epistemology . He has offered, 
as basic terms in dealing with the theory of knowledge, 'philosophy' and 
phenomenon. Each of these terms, considered by itself, is an abstraction 
f rom the other. Each presents an as pect from which reality may be approached. 
lieality is one, and may be viewed from either of t wo sides. This view is 
t hat of an epistemological monist. But the parts of reality, meaningful 
\v-hen viewed by a mind, are many, and there is a plurality of selves who view 
reali ty . Reality , t hen, for Grote is pluralistic. Thus Grote is both a 
personalistic metaphysical pluralist and a personalistic epistemological 
monist. Let us now consider more specially basic tenets, or conclusions, 
pr es ented in his writings. 
1. Phenomenon. The term 'phenomenon' is used to present that aspect 
of reality opposite to thought, consciousness, or personality . Phenomena 
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affect us either consciously or unconsciously. 'Ihey a re the physic al 
aspects of real thing s . .J:.< 'requently they are contrasted with 1 philosophy, ' 
' mind, ' 'spirit,' or 'consciousness.' Never must they be equated 1·vholly 
with the senses . For the senses tell us nothing; the senses, qua 
physical, have no meaning. Phenomena have meani ng . Their meaning 
necessitates their inseparable relation to 'consciousness,' 'spirit, 1 
r awc"reness, 1 or ' philosophy.' It is this insepa r able connection with 
the mind or with l~ersonal entities that makes phenomena r eal . 
Phenomena are not real by themselves. 'I'he character of the thing 
in itself is fictional. The thing in itself can be spoken of, but it 
cannot be asserted as existing . Pnenomenon can be as serted c:ts existing . 
It is on the other side of r eality from thought, consciousness, or spirit. 
It, frequently and erroneously, has been decla red to be, as though it has 
a peculiar existence that is, in s pite of p ersons . Such existence, how-
ever is dependent upon persons. To assert otherv.rise is to declare tha t 
'things' exist v-;ithout any relation to us and yet the only justification 
f or referring to t hem a s things is because they r ela t e to us already· . lmd 
those things that are, thus, in relation to us ar e asserted to be unrelated 
to us, and then sometimes contra s ted with things related to usl 
This absurdity in t heories of knowledge is not intentionally em-
braced . It is subtly entertained and sometimes ardently sponsored . 
Grote intimates in a variety of ways that there is a solution to this 
epis t emological i mpasse . It is not enough to say the;£ 1.-ve are necessarily 
involved in t he 1 ego-centric predi cament. 1 That the 1 ego-centrj_c pre-
dicament' exists as a 'pr edicament, 1 or at least as a ' situation,' Grote 
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would have been willing to admit had he heard it mentioned in such terms. 
vfuat Grote presents in his use of the term phenomenon is a recognition 
that personality is always involved. 
2. 'Philosophy.' Hence, for personality, the ego, or the self, 
some term should be adopted that will prove suitable. Grote adopts and 
very frequently uses the word 'philosophy.' This term is only provision-
ally suitable. The case is not otherwise with various other terms such 
as have been mentioned already as contrasting with phenomena. In deal-
ing with reality these contrasting terms are·as adequate as the epis-
temological situation vlill allovl. It is the philosophical aspect of 
reality that imparts meaning, or significance. The self when affected 
by other than itself feels the impress of phenomena or •things.' These 
•things' are already things for us however remote they may happen to be 
and however infinitesimal their effects are on us. 
There are, therefore, two aspects of reality~ the phenomenal and the 
'philosophical.' What is sometimes referred to as 1realism 1 is contrasted 
with idealism. Real things are declared to be almost wholly, if not al-
together, separate from ideas. The result would be, for Grote, a violent 
and unjustifiable bifurcation where one of the sides of an epistemologi-
cal dualism is accepted as a sufficient basis for metaphysics while the 
side not accepted is regarded as non-existent. Realism, therefore, is 
not without its merits, but the merit that it possesses does not rest on 
a non-recognition of the 'philosophical' aspect that Grote believes so 
firroly to exist • 
3. Idealism. No reality can be considered by itself, or apart from 
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mind or the self. 'Ihe other side of a dual view of reality i s l~epresented 
b;y idealism. Neither of these aspects, the phenomenal (with its close 
relative, l~ealism), or t he philosophical (sometimes r epresent ed by i dea.l-
ism) present reality adequate l y . Each reveals reality f rom a necessarily 
restricted approach. Each has its merits. lvior e merit is earned by thJ.t 
approach which presents a coherent theory of lmowled!-:;e. Each of the two 
pos sible approaches may be emphatic in pr esenting real i t y , and yet may 
recognize, at the same time, the validity of a contrasting emphasis . 
I dealism is the contrasting sys ~em on the other side of r eality 
from phenomena. i;·Jhat gives idealism great credence 1rri th its sponsors 
is the accepted · f a ct t hat one is alv~-ays aware in any metaphysical view of 
the activity of one 's mm mind with its i deas and i deals, and that c>.ll 
reality is concerned with mind or spirit. It is f or this reason that Grote 
affirms his belief in i dealism and personalism. 
4. Personalism. Just what sort of personalism di d Grote pr esent? 
Briefly , it may be stated that he pr esent ed a personalist ic epistemolog-
ical monism and a personalistic metaphysical pluralism. 
a . Epis t emological monism. ~pistemologi c al monism is taken in this 
dissert a tion to mean that vievv in whi ch thought and 'thing, ' . or i dea and 
'obj ect , ' ar e inseparabl y relat ed and are r egarded as opposite sides of one 
ftlildamental reality . Grote reveals hi s position by pointing out that the 
common source of thought and 1thing 1 is to be found in deity medi at ed 
t hrough hwnan personality . Human personality is partaker of a nature a,:Jove 
phenomenal nature . The thought and the ' thing ' ar e two sides of one funda-
mental r eality . This one reality is exempl ified i n a higher nature who is 
at one time Lot h 11 a Planner and Maker with his ideas and his purposes" in 
regard to the creCLted object, the w1iverse. 
4ll 
In asserting that the common sourc e of thought and 'thing ' is founci 
in deity medi ated through persons, Grote is maintaining that a manifesta-
tion of reality takes place in persons . These persons are created by a 
higher nature by virtue of which they have their powers of comprehension. 
In asserting that the common sou rce of thought and 1thing 1 is found 
in deity mediated through ;>ersons, Grote presents his basic theistic view 
that all reality is made possible to us by reason of this higher natur e . 
The manner of this mediation is through c.. reality that may, by abstl~action, 
be said to exist a s phenomenal. It is also medic.ted t h rough a reality 
that, likewise by abstraction, ma y be said. to be such that we have 
consciousness of it, or at least that it is i'or a self. 
b . Metaphysical pluralism. There is a plurality of selves. Ther.;; 
is also a plurality of 1things 1 of which these selves are aware. By 
metaphysical personalism is meant the personal nature of re ality . 'I'his 
view of r eality a s personal is manifest in Grote 1 s conception of a Plan-
ner or Maker who possesses ideas and pur poses. Considered on a level a t 
least as high as human being s, i l e a s and pur J:.lO ses are properly regarded 
as belonging to persons and are therefo re , on t hat level, personal . 
I ,;_ea s and purposes considered a s belonging also to "a nature above 
all t his" are likewise personal. That is, the n ature of reality is 
personal and can b e unders t ood and possesses meaning only t hrough per-
sonality . Thus Grote virtually expresses himself , and i n so doing he 
manifests his a ccept ance of a metaphysics which is at the same time both 
personalistic and pluralist ic. 
5. I mmediateness and r eflection . All knowl edge is fundamen t:.ally 
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rel ative to the i ndividual. For Grote, the l.;rima.r y and basic char acter-
istic of knowledge is i mmedia tene s s. For him, i rrunediateness is an i m-
practic able and t heoretic al extreme such a s he desi gn ates by the t erm 
1 self-self 1 in distinction from the 1 thout;ht -self ,' or t he self thought 
of . The more we go a, J"ay f rom the ' self-self 1 the more .re be co me t he 
r efl ective self . The question , then, r e garding \·lhether we a l >'<aJ s re-
f lect, is ans wered. I n the extr eme of i mmediateness the re is no re-
f lection . I n all. variations of thinking wh ere t here is no strict i m-
m,;;diateness, there is ahmys l'eflection . 
Grote r egards i llmediate thought a s unpro ductive i n t ha.t we can con-
clude nothing &.t all from it until the element s in i t are di stinguished 
and the obj e ct developed, and when t his is done i t is n o l onger i rrunediate 
t hought. I.rmnedi &. te thought may be s ai d ther efore, i n Grote 1 s vie;•, to 
b e being rather than t o i mpl y it. He thus a ccepts a coherence theory of 
truth and re j:cts the correspondence theory. The extreme of the fo rmer · 
t heory rej ects all of the l a tter t heory . :·re oTe not s o fortuno.te, how-
ever , a s to d vi ell in a vmr l d of i mmedi a t eness ; we are constantly r efl e c t ive 
in our thinking . The mor e i mme di ateness thc..t is character i stic of our 
t >inking , the more ¥ie possess ' knO\Jl edge of acquaintance; 1 the 1.11ore r e -
f lec "c. ive vie a re about •thing s 1 the more v1e t end to possess ' knowledge 
about' t hem. 
'l'.lle se basic ten ets in Gr ote 1 s philosophy a r e united to f or m an har-
roonious s t ructure . The re ar e s ome pi e ce s of h i s epi stemological and 
metaphysical theory t hat do not fit i nto the i'ramevmrk of his fundamental 
views , e . g . his isolc.. ted admission that the t hing in i tself is somet hing 
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in which he a h1-ays believed. I ncoherence is c::.t least partly due to the 
unf inished fo r m in vfhj_ch many of his writing s wer e left, and also to 
his desir e to present his thoughts in some manner before their content 
vias l ost while t aldng little _ains t o make his fundamental consistency 
apparent. 
6. Conclusions of the dissertation. 
i. Heality is one but may be r egarded as possessing t wo epis t,emolog-
ica.l a spect s, the ' philoso 2:::hic a l' and the phenomenal. Both a spects are of 
crucial significance in c onsidering r eality and commit Grote to epis temo-
logi ca l monism. Neither aspect can be viholly s epar a ted from the other . 
ii. Considered metaphysically , real ity is pl ur a listic. .tteal objects 
are infintely numerous and there u_r e j,;ul ti tudinou s selves vlho vievr these 
ob jects. 
iii. Grote is at the same time both a personali stic epistemological 
mo:g.ist and a personalistic metaphysical plur tlist . 
iv. . ~at erialism, and kindred vie>v-s , fail to account for thought, 
c onsci ousness, a ;.- ::: r :mess, i de as, etc. 
v. :!-;leaning can be a product of mind or av;ar cnes s, never of the 
physical, mater i alistic, sens ationali stic, behavioristic side of life. 
vi. Though Grot e cioes not urge the theistic n c.ture of his meta-
physics constantly , yet he supports both his metaphysics and hi s e pi ste-
mology by a fundamenta l a\va.r enes s of the i mportance of b elief in God . 
vii. Grote is a Pl atonic i dealist i n ethics in the sense tha t, for 
exampl e, •the good' is intuitively conceived . 
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